


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
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THE RISE OF SOUTH AFRICA



A HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN OF SOUTH AFRICAN
COLONISATION AND OF ITS DEVELOPMENT
TOWARDS THE EAST FROM THE
EARLIEST TIMES TO 1857

BY
G. E. CORY, M.A.

KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

PROFESSOR IN RHODES UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, GRAHAMSTOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

IN FOUR VOLUMES

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CHAPTER I.

SLAVERY AT THE CAPE.

DURING the latter part of the eighteenth, and the earlier part of the nineteenth century, there had been growing in England an ever-increasing revulsion against the African slave trade with all its horrors and atrocities. The indefatigable and untiring labours of such men as Clarkson, Wilberforce, and, latterly, of Thomas Fowell Buxton, opened the eyes of the Christian world to the enormous amount of cruelty and the wanton sacrifice of human life which this disgraceful trade entailed. The first decisive triumph of this agitation was the passing, in 1807, of Fox's Act for the prohibition of the slave trade. This leading, in the first place, to profitable smuggling and a consequent increase of cruelty to the wretched creatures, resulted in a movement which once started could not come to rest until slavery was abolished altogether. As the Cape was a slave owning, and, if not to as great an extent as America, a slave trading country, the great measure of 1834 was destined to have a momentous influence on its history.

In view therefore of the stigma which rightly attached to those countries which were in any way concerned with the nefarious traffic, it may be of interest to consider the history of slavery in connection with Cape Colony—or South Africa of those times. It does not appear that Van Riebeeck brought any slaves with him when he arrived at the Cape in 1652, though we find there were eleven—eight men and three women—in the infant settlement in 1657. In the following year, the want of labourers for agricultural purposes as well as for the loading and unloading of ships, together with the apparent impossibility of enlisting the services of the natives who were to be found in the Peninsula, necessitated recourse to the only expedient remaining, and one which was sanctioned by the

CHAP. I. custom of those times, namely, the importation of slaves from other countries. Hence, in 1658 the first slavery enterprise of any magnitude in connection with the Cape of Good Hope was undertaken. In that year two small ships, the *Maria* and *Hasselt*, sailed away to the north with the object, either of obtaining slaves by purchase along the West Coast of Africa, or, what was simpler and more expeditious, of seizing a Portuguese vessel and claiming the slaves as "prize"—the Dutch being then at war with Portugal. As no Portuguese prize rewarded the search of these two vessels, the *Maria* returned to the Cape while the *Hasselt* voyaged to Popo on the coast of Guinea. There, 271 slaves were purchased. Of these 43 died at sea, and 228 were landed in the settlement. But shortly before the arrival of these, 170 others had already reached the Cape, and were thus the first shipment imported. The Dutch East Indianman, *Amersfoort*, on her voyage from Holland, had been so fortunate as to overtake a Portuguese vessel bound from Angola to Brazil with 500 slaves on board; 250 of the most valuable of these were transferred to the *Amersfoort* and thence to the Cape, where 170 arrived more dead than alive, the remaining 80 having perished on the voyage. From this time onward, slaves continued to arrive at such a rate that, before the settlement had been in existence a century, they outnumbered the European population. Besides those who were brought by way of trade from Madagascar and the eastern coasts of the mainland, the numbers were gradually increased by the arrival of criminals and political offenders who had been deported from Batavia and other Dutch possessions, the Cape being then regarded by the Dutch East India Company as a kind of penal settlement. These, during their terms of punishment, were Government or public slaves, but might afterwards become free. After the taking of the Cape in 1795, General Craig, in reporting upon the condition of the country to the Secretary of State,¹ said: "Among the slaves are still a number of what are called banished Indians. These are criminals of various descriptions, including, however, several for political reasons, without any criminality, who have been sent here from Batavia. Some have been here twenty and

¹ *Vide Records of Cape Colony*, vol. i., p. 272.

twenty-five years, and as no account was ever sent with them, even the Government was ignorant of the cause of their detention." CHAP. I.

Unlike most of the other slave holding colonies, where ill-treatment and cruelty destroyed so many, the slave population of the Cape was further increased by the number of births. It is worthy of mention, however, that three-fourths of this number were half-castes, the progeny of slaves and white inhabitants.

From 1793 to 1797 there was a complete lull in the Cape slave trade; the circumstances of the times putting a stop to all importation of human chattels. Thus the Cape labour market received a severe check, and clamour for servants became loud on all sides. In 1797, however, in consequence of the most urgent representations which had been made to him, General Craig sanctioned the landing of 350 slaves from a Portuguese vessel from Mozambique, which was then at anchor in Table Bay. These were eagerly seized at public auction and at high prices.

Very shortly after this, General Craig was succeeded in the Governorship of the Colony by Earl Macartney (May 4th, 1797). From him also the Burgher Senate sought permission to introduce further slaves from Mozambique, but, in the manner characteristic of him, he refused,¹ as the Burghers themselves put it, "in a manner which was so grievous not only especially for us in our relation to the Burgher Senate, but also for the natives in this Colony, that we were deterred from ever expressly making again any representation".²

But all the same, Earl Macartney seems to have been so impressed with the necessity of further slave labour, that he became willing to try the experiment of importing slaves from the West Coast, and therefore gave permission to a Mr. Hogan, who had already fitted out a slave ship, to obtain 400 slaves from those parts. Earl Macartney selected the West Coast of Africa, as he was anxious as far as possible to prevent all communication or intercourse with Mozambique. Mr. Hogan succeeded in obtaining only forty slaves. When he returned

¹ Letters of November 29th, 1797, and January 30th, 1798.

² Letter of Burgher Senate to General Dundas, February 25th, 1799. *Records*, vol. ii., p. 375.

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to Cape Town with these, Earl Macartney had left, and the government of the Colony was then in the hands of Major-General Dundas. The new Governor was more sympathetic towards the representations of the Burgher Senate. He renewed Earl Macartney's permission to Mr. Hogan, and, in view of the failure of the west coast expedition, sanctioned the importation of 400 slaves from Mozambique. This, however, was rendered unnecessary, for just at this time (January, 1799) a Portuguese vessel, the *Joaquim*, bound ostensibly for Rio de Janeiro, put into Table Bay with 450 slaves on board. These, Mr. Hogan, in conjunction with a Mr. Tennant, was permitted to purchase and to land on payment of the customary duty of two rix-dollars each—and to sell at public auction. Influenced undoubtedly by the movements against slavery which were then in progress in England, General Dundas intimated to the Burgher Senate that no more slaves would be permitted to be landed in the Colony until the intentions and pleasure of H.M. Ministers in England were known.¹ Mr. Hogan, a prominent figure in the Cape commercial world of this date, was a gentleman of great business enterprise; with a singleness of purpose and a whole-hearted devotion to the ideal he had set before himself, he allowed no scruples of conscience, morality, or any other such encumbrance to stand in the way of the great object he had in view, namely, to make money. Hogans, however, have probably not been scarce at any period of the world's history.

Just after General Dundas had made clear to the Burgher Senate his position with reference to the importation of slaves, Mr. Hogan, not to be balked in his slave speculations, determined to pursue the trade by taking advantage of the state of war which then existed between England and France. According to the law at that time, a French ship with slaves could be seized, and when the vessel had been brought to Cape Town and adjudged as lawful prize by the Vice-Admiralty Court, the slaves, after two rix-dollars per head, as duty, had been paid, might be sold for the benefit of the captors. Mr. Hogan, therefore, equipped and armed a vessel called the *Collector*, which, under the command of a Captain D. Smart,

¹ *Records of Cape Colony*, vol. ii., p. 417.

sailed from Cape Town on a privateering expedition on March 13th, 1799. Before long the expedition seemed to have met with success and to have given trouble to the French slavers, for on the following November 10th, a French brig, *La Rose*, with forty-eight slaves was taken into Table Bay by some of the *Collector's* men. It was stated that she had been captured off the Malne Islands. About a month after, on December 25th, a French lugger, *Le Africano*, with twenty-six slaves on board, was also sent in by the *Collector*. It was stated by those on board that she had been captured while at anchor off the Seychelles. Then on the following February 11th, the *Collector* herself, with 164 slaves, returned to Cape Town, having, so it was stated, captured the French brig *L'Auguste* off the coast of Madagascar. Further, it is worth noting, the Portuguese vessel *Joaquim*, about the same time, again appeared in Table Bay with a large number of slaves on board. After the usual trials of the first three, the Vice-Admiralty Court adjudged them as lawful prize, and the slaves were sold accordingly for the benefit of Mr. Hogan and Captain Smart. Through the influence which Mr. Hogan had with those in authority, he acquired also the slaves brought by the *Joaquim*. The naval captains then stationed at the Cape protested against this to the Collector of Customs, as such trade was prohibited by the 7 Geo. I., stat. 1, cap. 21, sect. 9, and by His Majesty's Order in Council of December 28th, 1796.

Unfortunately for Mr. Hogan's reputation, a Danish ship, the *Holger Dansche*, arrived at the Cape shortly before the Vice-Admiralty Court considered the case of the *Collector*. There then spread rumours to the effect that no French vessels had been captured by the *Collector*, but that all the slaves had been brought from the mainland of Mozambique, in short, that Captain Smart and, indirectly, Mr. Hogan were carrying on an illicit traffic—in fact, were smuggling. Captain Smidt of the Danish vessel, on being examined, deposed that he saw the two smaller vessels arrive at Mozambique without slaves or cargo and then leave with slaves on board, that the *Collector*, renamed the *Mountain* for the occasion, under Captain Smart, also arrived without slaves, and that the slaves with which she returned to Cape Town were purchased in the usual manner, and further, that the *Joaquim* was also there, and being too

CHAP. large to enter the river, the *Collector* assisted in putting the
 1. slaves on board that vessel. Captain D. Campbell, the port captain of Table Bay, brought the matter before the Fiscal with a view to the prosecution of those concerned. But the corrupt Sir George Yonge, who had then become Governor of the Colony, was very reluctant to take any steps. He argued that it would be a most extraordinary proceeding for the Court of Justice to try a case which had already been decided by the Vice-Admiralty Court, and said that if he were Mr. Hogan he would refuse, under the circumstances, to give any evidence.¹

However, after it was borne in upon him that it was not a case of prize but illicit traffic, he complied with the Fiscal's demands. The trial before the Court of Justice left little doubt as to the nature of the transaction. Nine of the witnesses, including Captain Smart, who had given evidence before the Vice-Admiralty Court, had absconded from the Colony, and the ship's log, which had been produced on oath before that Court, was shown to have been a fabrication, the real one being found subsequently on the *Collector*. And, further, it was proved that all the absconded witnesses at the former trial had been guilty of perjury. Mr. Hogan denied all knowledge of Smart's proceedings or any complicity in the plot. However, it came out in evidence, that after the true record of the expedition had been discovered, and while investigation was proceeding, that there was a stormy interview between Hogan and Smart, during which the latter accused the former of having planned the whole affair, and of being the prime mover in all the villainy. Smart stated that his loss in consequence of the turn matters had taken was over £1,500. Hogan appears to have compromised with him by paying him £2,000 on condition that he left the Colony forthwith. The judgment of the Court was that all the slaves were to be confiscated, but that as there was a doubt as to Hogan's guilt, he was not condemned to pay the usual fine of triple the value of the slaves.

¹ For the "Fifth Charge," against Sir George Yonge, viz.: "By receiving from Mr. Hogan and appropriating to his own use a sum reported to be £5,000 sterling for permission to import into the Cape 8,000 slaves," *vide Records*, vol. iv., p. 256.

A great contrast to all this was the attitude of the Batavian Government towards slavery at the Cape during the short period (1803-1806) when it was in power. It must have been something of a shock to the inhabitants, especially to those of the Hogan type, when on April 11th, 1803, the following proclamation was issued from the Castle of the Cape of Good Hope: "The Governor and Council of Policy do, by these presents, give notice to all and every one whom it may concern, that, provisionally and until further notice no permission will be granted by the Government to embark or import cargoes of male or female slaves". Further, at this early date, the Batavian Government had evidently given the most serious attention to the abolition of slavery altogether—a fact which was probably quite unknown to those in England, who were commencing then to make such public stir—for when the Dutch Colonial Secretary, D'Orzy, arrived at the Cape and was seized as a prisoner of war—the Cape having been retaken by the English—among his papers was a despatch containing instruction to the effect that all children born of slave parents were henceforth to be declared free. Had this, together with the former measure, been allowed to take effect, slavery would have been abolished in an imperceptible manner and without the loss and suffering which the drastic proceedings of a later date produced.

The total number of slaves in the Colony in 1806, when the Cape was retaken by the English, was 29,861, the total white population being 26,268, that is an excess of 3,593 slaves over free people.

Sir David Baird, like his predecessors under British rule, seems to have considered slavery as inseparable from the development and utilisation of the resources of the country. He therefore sanctioned the further importation of human cargoes. "Anxious to give every encouragement to the inhabitants and to contribute by every means in my power to their welfare," he says in his Proclamation of October 30th, 1806, he allowed the slaves in a Portuguese ship, the *Dido*, then in Table Bay, to be landed and sold at public auction.¹ And later on in the year, he gave permission to Mr. D. Tennant, who had been associated in business with Mr. Hogan, to import 500 more.

¹ Proceedings, October 30th, 1806, vol. ix.; Proclamation, 106, 1825, p. 42.

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About this time a difficult state of affairs in connection with the Cape slave trade arose, and one which caused great perplexity to subsequent Governors in their attitude towards slavers calling at Table Bay.

In March 1807, the British Parliament passed the Act forbidding the importation of slaves into any British port; but nothing was said in reference to the calling of slavers at British ports which were on the slave trading routes from one foreign port to another. As vessels often arrived at the Cape on their way from Mozambique to Brazil in the last stages of distress due to want of water, provisions, and repairs, the question arose as to whether these should be refused and the hundreds of wretched creatures be allowed to perish, or whether the necessary assistance should be given and thus facilitate the horrible trade it was desired to exterminate. As will be seen, this dilemma was not unobserved by the slave trader, and, for a time at all events, he turned it to his advantage.

An interesting difficulty arose in connection with Mr. Tennant's venture. With General Baird's permission, he entered into a contract with V. de Souza, the captain of a Portuguese vessel, the *Neptune African*, then in Table Bay, to import 500 slaves from Mozambique. While that ship was on this errand, another Portuguese vessel, the *General Isedro*, arrived with 383 slaves. These Mr. Tennant was allowed to have as part of the promised 500. In due course de Souza's vessel returned with 220 slaves. But then Earl Caledon had succeeded General Baird as Governor of the Colony, and the Act of 1807 had come into force. Mr. Tennant, therefore, was reluctantly permitted to have only 117 in order to complete the promised number, while the remaining 103 were forbidden to enter the Colony. With these the *Neptune African* commenced the voyage to Brazil, but had not gone far before she was met by a British man-of-war, captured as a prize and taken back to Cape Town. As the slaves, from long confinement and starvation, were in a most deplorable condition, they were landed on Robben Island pending the decision of the Vice-Admiralty Court. A violent storm arose during which the ship was wrecked and thus they were stranded. What now was to be done with them? The law forbade their importation into the Colony, they could not be exported or

sent away, as that also would be forbidden slave trade, and to let them loose on the mainland meant starvation or forced servitude. Mr. Tennant, therefore, was permitted to have them indentured to himself for seven years, when they were to be free. But as honour, humanity, and all such nobler feelings had long been smothered in Mr. Tennant's slave trading breast, these poor creatures were found eventually to be ordinary slaves, Mr. Tennant having abused his trust.¹

British legislation in connection with the suppression of the slave trade could not affect a Portuguese slave trader acting under the laws of his own Sovereign and in a Portuguese ship bound to a Portuguese port, and, therefore, slaves in such vessels calling at the Cape could not legally be seized and become droits of Admiralty, unless there was any attempt to land them. The procedure with respect to such vessels on their arrival was, in the first place, to put them into strict quarantine, as infectious diseases, such as smallpox, too often existed among the entombed slaves, then to place them in the outer anchorage of Table Bay, and having seen to the supplies of the barest necessities, to order them to sea with the least possible delay.² But the fearful state in which the slaves arrived in these vessels compelled the strict letter of the law to give way to humanity, and the Cape to become, for a time at least, a kind of half-way house on the Mozambique-Brazil slave trade route. The horrors of this "middle passage," as it was called, cannot well be exaggerated. The vessels for the most part were small—that is from 200 to 300 tons, but many were very much less. By a law passed by the British Parliament in 1788, it was decreed that vessels should not carry more than five slaves to every three tons, but on these Portuguese ships the number was often over five to one ton—to cover the loss by deaths on the voyage. It was not unusual for the slaves to be huddled—it might be said packed—together in spaces below the deck not sufficiently high to admit of sitting upright, and, perfectly naked, to be chained or shackled together in threes or fives. The food was the scantiest and worst possible, consisting probably of bad yams and

¹ *Vide Records of Cape Colony*, vol. vi., p. 328; vol. xi., p. 242; and *Rise of South Africa*, vol. ii., p. 255.

² *Records*, vol. xi., p. 478.

CHAP. I. drinking water only sufficient to make their thirst worse ; and the supply of fresh air was as limited as the food and drink. No wonder that disease soon broke out among them, and that about a third, and sometimes a half, of the number originally embarked died before the end of the voyage. The only hope and ambition those poor creatures seem to have had was that of getting an opportunity to jump overboard.¹ It is, therefore, not surprising that the Governors of the Cape found it almost impossible to refuse assistance to slavers calling at Table Bay, though it was clear that by doing so facilities to the odious traffic were thus offered. The Controller of Customs gave the following as his opinion when consulted on the question:—

“ The various Acts allow of no modification. They give no power to the Governors and others to dispense in any possible case with the written Law of England, which now declares it to be felony to aid or assist in any shape in the *transport* of slaves, natives of Africa. By no very forced construction, the supplying them with provisions, however humane, is aiding in their transport and assistance and encouragement to the foreigner in this forbidden commerce. . . . The case may be hard and so is the trade, but, in my opinion, the slaves must go to sea or become forfeitures, and I can find no middle way.”²

No less than twenty-two slave ships called at the Cape between November 21st, 1808, and January 21st, 1813, but, in all probability, very few slaves were landed, except in those cases where the ship was wrecked or abandoned by its master in consequence of pecuniary difficulties. In these cases the slaves became prize negroes. Suspecting that slaves were being smuggled into the Colony, Earl Caledon, in 1808, instituted a Board of Inquiry before which every slave holder was compelled to appear and to explain how he became possessed of each slave, a penalty of Rds. 500 being incurred by failing to comply with this.³

The Board sat every day for six weeks. This prompt action was certainly a deterrent to the further introduction of

¹ For vivid description of the horrors of the slave trade, see *The African Slave Trade and its Remedy*, by Thomas Fowell Buxton, London, 1840.

² *Records of Cape Colony*, vol. xi., p. 475.

³ Proclamation, April 29th, 1808.

slaves, and in 1810 we find the European population at length outnumbering the slaves; the numbers were 31,194 and 29,394 respectively.

A case of abandonment, with an attempt at recapture, occurred in 1818, when the Portuguese brig, *Paquet Real*, bound from Mozambique to San Salvador with 171 slaves on board, arrived in Table Bay after a long and stormy passage of seventy-one days. The vessel was in a very dilapidated condition, and all the water and provisions were exhausted. The master, Joze M. Gomes, failed in his endeavours to procure necessaries in the usual manner as he had no money, and though he offered bills on the owners in San Salvador, they were not accepted as his credit was bad. Some assistance, however, must have been given, as the vessel was in port from April 14th until May 18th, when, perhaps fortunately for the slaves, a violent storm arose and she was driven on to the shore and wrecked. Detachments of the 60th and 72nd Regiments succeeded in saving 140 of the slaves, which were then cared for in the general hospital. Then again the difficult question arose as to what was to be done with them. The captain formally claimed them, but the Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, refused to give them up. The matter being eventually referred to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, it was decided that they could not be restored on the grounds "that the coming into port with prohibited goods is cause of seizure and confiscation". They became, therefore, the species of Cape Colony slaves known as "Prize Negroes".¹

There can be no doubt that in many of the cases of slave ships calling at the Cape in distress, the shortness of provisions was foreseen, and assistance at the Cape was actually calculated upon at the outset of the voyage. This is well instanced by the three Spanish ships of which Sir Rufane Donkin complained in 1820. It appears that early in January of that year the *Isabella*, a schooner of 208 tons with 236 slaves on board, put into Table Bay in great distress; assistance was afforded, and on the 31st of that month she left for Havannah. Only four days later the *Caridad*, of 210 tons and 216 slaves, arrived in a similar plight, and again assistance

¹ *Vide Records*, vol. xii., p. 29; also vol. xi., pp. 477, 486.

CHAP. I. was given. But when, in the following week, the slaver *St. Jose*, of 262 tons with 370 slaves on board, appeared and appealed for similar consideration, Sir Rufane began to suspect that there was something more than coincidence in all this. He examined the master of the *St. Jose* closely, and succeeded in getting from him a confession that he had sailed from Zanzibar with the *intention* of refreshing at the Cape. Anxious to put every obstacle in the way of this dreadful traffic, and yet to save the lives of the slaves, Sir Rufane gave the *St. Jose* water and provisions sufficient for fourteen days. He hoped this would carry the vessel as far as Tristan da Cunha—or back to Zanzibar.¹ It is not clear what the fate of this vessel was, for neither of these places could have been reached in that time.

The humanity and integrity with which the successive Governors of the Colony enforced the Act of 1807, and the vigilance with which the slave ships were watched during their stay at the Cape by the proper officials, make it extremely improbable that any slaves were imported after that date, except as prize negroes.²

The increase in numbers must have been due entirely to the increase of the birth over the death rate. At the time of the abolition of slavery in 1834 the number of slaves in the Colony was nearly 40,000.³

¹ *Records of Cape Colony*, vol. xiii., p. 26.

² For return of slaves captured as contraband, *vide Records*, vol. xv., p. 212.

³ *Slave Statistics*.—According to the returns of the Commissioners of Compensation in 1834, the total number of slaves in the Colony was 38,427. These were valued at £2,824,224 7s. 9d. Dr. Theal says the total number of slaves on November 30th, 1834, was 39,021, and their value £3,041,290 6s. The following numbers will suffice to show the rate of annual increase of slaves from the British occupation in 1806 and also the comparative rate of increase of the European population:—

1806	Slaves	.	.	29,861	Europeans	.	.	26,268
1809	„	.	.	29,016	„	.	.	28,782
1810	„	.	.	29,394	„	.	.	31,194
1812	„	.	.	29,907	„	.	.	32,707
1814	„	.	.	31,074	„	.	.	34,843
1815	„	.	.	29,607	„	.	.	37,264
1816	„	.	.	30,195	„	.	.	37,994
1818	„	.	.	32,034	„	.	.	41,392
1820	„	.	.	31,779	„	.	.	43,117 (1820
1824	„	.	.	35,509	„	.	.	settlers
1829	„	.	.	35,934	„	.	.	included in this)

Note the drop in numbers in 1815, probably the Government returns are

With regard to the pecuniary value of a slave. This depended upon the sex, age, capability, and the demand there was for labour at the particular period. In the earliest days, the Company sold slaves to the burghers at prices varying from £4 3s. 4d. to £8 6s. 8d. But at the time of the first taking of the Cape (1795), the average value of a male slave was Rds. 250 and a female Rds. 200. Taking the value of the rix-dollar then at 3s. 6d., these prices would be £42 and £34 respectively. By 1798 the average price of a male slave was about £75 and a female £64 (*vide Records*, vol. ii., p. 237). As the country became more populous and better developed the value of this species of property greatly increased; a clever male slave in the prime of life often having a market value of at least three times the above figures.

defective. To give an idea of the distribution of slaves in the Colony, the numbers for the year 1829 may be taken as typical. It will be seen that by far the largest number was in Cape Town and the district, while the smallest number was in Albany. The British settlers of 1820 were not allowed to work their lands with slaves, but there was nothing to prevent them owning non-predial slaves.

Slaves on the Colonial Register on October 31st, 1829 :—

	Males.	Females.	Total.
Cape and District	6,921	5,008	11,929
Clan William	425	366	791
Simon's Town	137	60	197
Stellenbosch	5,629	2,990	8,619
Swellendam	1,594	1,330	2,924
Worcester	2,188	1,749	3,937
Albany	62	54	116
Somerset	797	708	1,505
Uitenhage	633	548	1,181
Graaff Reinet	1,172	943	2,115
Beaufort	276	239	515
George	1,083	1,022	2,105
Totals	<u>20,917</u>	<u>15,017</u>	<u>35,934</u>

The following figures will give some idea of the numbers of slaves possessed by individuals. These are for the year 1826. Chief Justice, J. A. Truter 49 (25 males, 12 females and 12 children), J. A. Myburgh of Stellenbosch 68, P. G. Van der Byl 56, D. G. Van Reenan (Cape) 50, Dirk Cloete 40, A. Stockenstrom (Graaff Reinet) 15, J. G. Cuyler (Uitenhage) 16, Rev. F. McClelland (Port Elizabeth), British Settler, 2 (mother and child). *Prices of Slaves*.—In 1824, Olivier, a butcher in Graaff Reinet, paid £262 10s. for a mechanic slave. In the same year P. M. Brink paid Rds. 3000 (£210) for a woman with 4 children. The Executors of I. L. Rautenbach sold 7 slaves for Rds. 12,250 (£857 5s.). The slave Pamela was sold for £122 5s., Rachel and her three children for £266, Julian and her two children for £196.

CHAP. I. Slaves, therefore, often formed a very large proportion of the wealth of an individual. The average value of a slave which was adopted by the Commissioners of Compensation in 1834 was £73 9s. 11d.

Although Cape Colony, as has been shown, was involved in the slave trade, the attitude of both Dutch and British Governments from the earliest time was such as, by treating the wretched captives as human beings, to deprive the evil of its worst features. It might be said, in fact, that the most fortunate fate which could overtake the unhappy negroes who were so ruthlessly forced from their own country, was to be landed and settled in this one. Coercion was more in the direction of bodily and moral improvement than in that of labour under conditions of starvation and cruelty. Measures for enabling them to regain their freedom, for inducing them to embrace Christianity, and generally for raising them in the scale of civilisation stand out as the chief concerns of the many successive Governors in their regard. Sir John Cradock in writing to Earl Bathurst in 1814 said: "I have great pleasure in submitting to your Lordship my strong opinion, that, notwithstanding some painful instances I might adduce, and which would, as far as they go, militate against such a judgment, the state of slavery in this settlement is of a mild nature, and this unhappy class of people are better treated than in any other part of the world where I have been".¹

As early as 1658, when there were only about a dozen slaves in the Colony, a school was started for their benefit, and this solicitude for their moral welfare seems to have continued throughout the Dutch regime. They were encouraged to attend divine service and when sufficiently advanced in religious instruction, were baptised and denominated Christians. A profession of Christianity and an ability to speak Dutch gave them a right to their freedom, though it is not clear what arrangements had to be made with their owners who had purchased them. Emancipation, however, was soon found to have its disadvantages, for the liberated slaves showed a tendency to vagrancy with its concomitants of disorder and robbery. By 1708 it became necessary to forbid the emanci-

¹ *Records*, vol. ix., p. 451.

pation of slaves unless the owners guaranteed that they would not become a public burden. In some cases abuse of freedom had to be remedied by re-enslaving the individuals. CHAP.
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The conversion of the slaves to Christianity, and especially the prevention of their lapsing into Mohammedanism or that modified form then existing in Cape Town, known as the Slanische faith, was an object of great concern to the Dutch Government. On April 10th, 1770, the Council of Batavia decreed that Christians were to have their slaves instructed in their own religion, and that having been baptised, they were not to be sold. On the death of a master, the Christian slaves might be emancipated or bequeathed to some other Christian, but they could not be regarded as merchandise. Moors or heathens were forbidden to hinder their slaves from becoming Christians, and in the event of their conversion, they were to be ceded to Christians at reasonable prices. In short, the status of a slave was raised by embracing the Christian faith. Up to 1812, no testamentary document was valid unless the Notary had introduced into the body of the will a clause to the effect that he had informed the testator of the existence of this law. Take, for instance, the following statement in the will of Johan Albertus Dell and his wife Julia Johanna Barendse, May 11th, 1796, before the Notary, Johannes Daniel Karuspek: "And I, Notary, have acquainted the Testator with the Order of the Supreme Government of India, namely, that slaves who have been confirmed in the Christian Religion may not be sold".

This tended to lower the value of slave property and thus in a measure to defeat the object in view—for an owner knowing that he would not be able to turn his slave property into cash, if need be, was tempted to prevent his slaves from becoming Christians. This law, therefore, as will be seen, was rescinded by the British Government.

Of the treatment of slaves in Cape Colony generally, it may be said that their lot compared very favourably with that of the working classes in European countries of these times. As might be expected, in the districts more remote from the west and in the more sparsely populated parts of the country, the slaves too often endured hard and cruel lives, though there

CHAP. I. seems always to have been a disposition on the part of the different Governments to protect them.¹

The predial slaves of the west were employed chiefly in connection with the wine-growing industry, and were, on the whole, well treated. Their food consisted of bread, meat, soup, vegetables, and a liberal supply of wine of an inferior kind, and they were usually well housed in "slave quarters".² In the cases of those in the more eastern and northern districts, it is not so easy to generalise or even to classify them into predial and non-predial, as agriculture was so limited. But there can be no doubt that ill-treatment of slaves was more pronounced in these parts than in the west. But far the most fortunate class of slaves was that which consisted of artisan tradesmen, such as masons, carpenters, bootmakers, and tailors. These could, and did, make some arrangement with their masters whereby by paying some monthly sum, they practically obtained their freedom, and were at liberty to carry on their trade or dispose of their labour for their own benefit. With these, slavery was little more than a name. They often lived in houses or kept shops hired by themselves, and in some cases actually had Europeans to work for them.³ In 1824 there were about 2,000 slaves thus circumstanced. They were as skilled in their various trades as Europeans, and with them entered into successful competition.

¹ *Vide* Ordinance for the Administration of the Country districts by Janssens, October 23rd, 1805 (*Records*, vol. xxix., p. 367), par. 68: "As long as the use of slaves in the Colony shall not be abandoned, the Landdrosts shall consider it among their most sacred duties to watch the protection of these unfortunate beings. The Government can never tolerate that the title of property in human beings should ever have a tendency towards maltreating them."

Also Lord Caledon's Proceedings of May 16th, 1811, pars. 64 and 65, where the judges on circuit were enjoined scrupulously to examine the records of punishments inflicted on slaves, in order to ascertain that no unnecessary severity had been used. Also to ascertain whether any improper domestic correction had been administered by the master or mistress.

² *Records*, vol. xxix., p. 457.

³ Of this, the following instance may be quoted. Carel, a slave of a Mr. de Klerk of Cape Town, was a skilful saddler and upholsterer. For Rds. 40 per month, de Klerk allowed Carel to enter into business for himself. To assist him in this, he (Carel) paid Rds. 150 to Mr. Ingram who had imported a number of labourers from Ireland, for the services of an Irish lad named Paddy Farel. Carel was to have Farel's service for seven years. In return he undertook to teach the boy his own trade and to feed and clothe him. Further, although Carel was a Mohammedan, he looked to the boy's spiritual welfare to the extent of making him attend the Roman Catholic Church on Sundays. Thus the slave stood *in loco parentis* to the free-born European, *vide Records*, vol. xxi., p. 448.

It was a common occurrence for people who perhaps had had slaves bequeathed to them or, in other ways, had become possessed of more slaves than they could employ, to hire them out to others in order to provide for their maintenance. In some cases the master took all the slave's earnings and provided him with food and lodgings, in others the slave paid a certain sum to his master and maintained himself on the remainder. A good workman could earn Rds. 3 per diem, a labourer from Rd. 1 to Rds. 1½ per diem.¹ All this, however, is the brighter side of the picture. Although it is true that, taken as a whole, slavery in Cape Colony was of a mild character, yet in cases of misconduct the punishments were often barbarous in the extreme, and, as might be expected, there were, in spite of the law, many instances of gross and wanton cruelty. Slaves were considered to be destitute of all those principles which are commonly supposed to restrain more civilised people from the commission of atrocious crimes; further, as it was felt that in those places where large numbers of slaves were employed, the safety of the families depended upon the slaves being kept in awe of offending, the punishment for any particular crime had to be more severe than it would have been in the case of a free man. As, with the few exceptions, slaves possessed neither money nor goods, corporal punishment was the only means of visiting their transgressions. *Qui non habet in aere luat in pelle.* In the earlier days, not only was capital punishment the penalty inflicted for less heinous offences, but it was often carried out in such a manner as deliberately to cause much suffering. Breaking on the wheel, impalement, and slow strangulation were some of the methods of increasing the punishment for those who seemed callous to the death sentence. In 1754 a slave code was drawn up in which it was enacted that a slave, either male or female, who raised a hand, even without weapons against master or mistress, should be sentenced to death. But as time wore on,

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¹ Some specimen advertisements :—

TO LET.—Six Carpenters and a shoemaker's boy, and for sale six carpenters' benches. *Cape Gazette*, No. 68.

FOR SALE OR HIRE.—A slave girl, native of Mozambique. The purchase money may remain at interest. Apply office of his paper (*Grahamstown Journal*). TO LET.—A clever house boy, speaks English, and is of good character (*Grahamstown Journal*).

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¹ Although a number of cases of the most abhorrent cruelty might be given, the following will suffice to show the kind of thing which took place when the fear of the law did not restrain the masters—and in many instances, the mistress also—in the punishment of slaves. Extract from a letter of Deputy Landdrost Fraser (of Grahamstown) to Colonel Cuyler, July 17th, 1819: "I have not a moment to spare, but I cannot help recommending to your clemency the bearer of this, a slave woman of Hans van der Merwe, who came here about five minutes ago. Her story has made my hair almost stand on end. She has many marks of violence, though it appears not from her present master, but some from her present mistress are still fresh. The poor being has so much affected me that I would instantly pay her price to have her out of the hands of these brutes."

The slave, Rachael, was sent by the Field Cornet, Van der Nest, to the Landdrost of Cradock to report her master. She stated that about eighteen months previously, her master flogged her husband so severely with a rope, that he died three days afterwards. She buried him at a place near the river. She herself was so frightened of her master, that she fled into Kaffirland (Letter in *Grahamstown Archives*, November 19th, 1824). The slave, Joris, a Mozambique, was flogged to death by J. W. L. Gebhard on a wine farm at Groot Drakenstein in September, 1822. The slave did not work as quickly as it was thought he should, so Gebhard gave Joris two beatings with a quince rod. Young Gebhard then took the matter in hand and thrashed the slave with a thick piece of harness until he could not stand. Not satisfied with this brutality he had the poor creature pulled in a bleeding condition into the wine store where further chastisement was administered. A few hours afterwards the slave died. Gebhard, aged twenty-one and born in London, was tried for murder before the Court of

The offences, generally, for which the slaves brought upon themselves the violence of their masters or the result of the operation of the law were theft—most usually of food—refusal to work or not doing their work satisfactorily, and desertions from service. This last was a serious matter as the runaways were very often successful in joining the dangerous outlaws roving along the Orange River regions, or crossing the eastern frontier and associating themselves with the Kaffirs. In 1809 there were so many runaways that on June 2nd of that year, Earl Caledon issued a Proclamation¹ offering a pardon to all who would return to their duty—excepting those guilty of capital offences—and assuring them of good treatment from their owners. It is not clear what effect this had, probably not much. In 1816 there seems to have been some kind of combination among the slaves to desert in still larger numbers. In addition to the above, murder, rape, setting fire to buildings,² and such more serious crimes were well represented in the lists of their delinquencies.

It is only natural that individuals in a state of slavery should, in many cases, harbour sentiments of enmity against their masters. Not only might slaves be expected to rejoice in the misfortunes of their owners, but should opportunity offer, perhaps to conspire for their injury. A slave, therefore, gifted with more than ordinary ability and courage might have been a source of considerable danger to a community circumstanced with regard to slavery as that of Cape Colony was in those days. There were two conspicuous occasions when attempts at a general rising of slaves for the purpose of gaining their freedom took place. The first was in 1808. In that year there arrived in Cape Town two mischievous Irishmen, Hooper, of no particular calling, and Michael Kelly,

Justice and condemned to death. (For a full account of the trial, *vide Records*, vol. xxxii., pp. 281-325.) About the same time and also in Drakenstein was the case of the death of the slave Cornelius at the hands of J. J. de Villiers. The slave during a series of severe beatings was wounded in the head. He did not recover from the brutal treatment. As it was proved, or said to have been proved, that the slave had some disease which contributed to the fatal result, de Villiers was let off with twelve months' imprisonment (for details of case, *vide Records*, vol. xxxiii., pp. 131-220). In all probability there were very few extreme cases such as these where the offenders escaped punishment. But there were undoubtedly many cases of great brutality which never became known.

¹ *Vide Records*, vol. vii., p. 7.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xi., p. 224.

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a sailor. Hooper soon became acquainted with a slave named Louis, who was permitted by his master to work for himself. He was partly of European parentage and so light in colour as to be able to pass for a European. The seed of rebellion was sown by Hooper, by explaining to Louis as well as to two others, Abraham and Adonis, that there were no slaves in his country and that there ought to be none in this. A plot was then devised for disseminating this among the slaves generally and thus getting them to combine for common action. Those at a distance from Cape Town were to be approached first and then, having collected what was thought to be a sufficient number, to march on to that place where they would be largely reinforced. A general emancipation was then to be demanded. If this were refused, then the prison and magazine were to be seized and their freedom to be obtained by fighting. In the event of success, of which they entertained but little doubt, Louis was to become Governor and "Chief of the Blacks," while Hooper was to have a position, high and dignified, under him. In pursuance of this mad scheme, the slaves on the farm of P. G. Louw of Zwartland, in the present district of Malmesbury, were first visited by Hooper and Abraham with a view to obtaining their co-operation. The mission was successful. On the return of the two emissaries to Cape Town they obtained possession of some military clothing and accoutrements, and then on October 24th, Hooper hired from one Hendrick Matfield, a waggon and eight horses, saying that they were required for a military officer who had to go to Riet Vlei. Thus equipped, the five ringleaders, Hooper, Kelly, and the slaves Louis, Abraham, and Adonis, set out for Louw's farm. When they were within a short distance from the house, Louis decked himself in a blue coat with red collar and cuffs, gold epaulets, a large sword with gold knob, and a cocked hat with ostrich feathers. Hooper and Kelly also put on uniforms, but less gaudy than that of Louis, who was now to assume the leadership of the party, or what was more likely, to be the cat's paw of the two Irish scoundrels. Adorned in this manner, the party went to Louw's house. Mr. Louw was not at home, but to Mrs. Louw Louis was introduced as the captain of a Spanish man-of-war, Hooper and Kelly as his aides-de-camp,

and Abraham and Adonis as their black attendants. Mrs. Louw received them with due deference and showed them all the hospitality her establishment could afford. The two attendants waited upon their masters in correct form at the evening meal, and in other ways kept up the fraud. The good lady was completely deceived. Louis and Abraham found an opportunity to interview the slaves, and, in view of subsequent development, undoubtedly saw that all was to their satisfaction. Sometime after all had retired to bed, Hooper and Kelly quietly stole to the bedside of the sleeping Louis, and having taken away all his finery, escaped from the house by one of the windows and commenced a journey to Saldanha Bay, where they hoped to get on board some ship. Thus Louis was left to get on with the scheme as best he could. One would have thought that on discovering the trick which had been played upon him, he would have desisted in his rash course; but he did not. The next morning he called Louw's slaves together and told them to take Louw's horses and waggon and follow him.

In spite of Mrs. Louw's protests this was done, and the party, thirteen in number, moved on to the neighbouring farm of W. Basson. There they were reinforced by Basson's slaves. The house was looted and everything which could be of any use to them, such as guns, ammunition, and provisions, was taken away. The waggon and horses were likewise taken. Louis represented himself as having been sent by the Fiscal to take all Christians as prisoners to Cape Town and to liberate all slaves. In pursuance of this, they bound Basson's son and put him in the waggon, but the attempt to bind the farmer's wife failed, she managed to escape. The farmer himself was away during all this. The marauders then moved off from farm to farm with considerable rapidity, taking each place by surprise and committing every outrage short of actual murder. In this way thirty-four farms were visited in three days, and the number of insurgents increased until they amounted to 326.

On the evening of October 27th, a farmer arrived in Cape Town with the news of what was happening. The Governor, on hearing of it, instantly called out the troops and sent them in pursuit of the rebels. Within a few hours the whole were

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captured without a single shot being fired. A preliminary investigation showed that the greater number were innocent and had acted *bona fide* under the impression that they were obeying the orders of the Fiscal. These were sent back to their respective masters. Fifty-one were detained for further trial. Hooper and Kelly were also pursued and soon were in the hands of the authorities.

The prisoners were brought before the High Court of Justice, and on December 7th, 1808, sentences were pronounced against them. Hooper, Louis, and Abraham were hanged, and their bodies afterwards exposed in chains. Kelly seems to have got off altogether; he was sent to England. Adonis was sent to Robben Island. The less guilty received punishments varying from imprisonment with hard labour in chains for life, down to a flogging, while others again were condemned to witness the punishment of the more guilty and then liberated.

The second scare on account of the slaves took place in 1824. The actual rising was not so extensive as that of 1808, probably because it was dealt with at an earlier stage of its progress, but in view of this former one there was considerable alarm among the European population. The abolition of slavery was at that time occupying the public mind both in England and the Colony. This gave rise to vague rumours of partial and erroneous accounts of what was intended; these reaching the slaves led them to think that the Government was willing to give them their freedom while the masters were endeavouring to withhold it. This impression was probably confirmed by a Proclamation which Lord Charles Somerset had promulgated on March 18th, 1823, whereby certain privileges were given to the slaves, apparently at the expense of the masters. So again a plot to secure their liberty and to avenge themselves on their supposed oppressors was commenced, but this time of a more bloodthirsty character; and again it was contemplated to storm Cape Town or to desert in a body and join the Bastards on the Orange River. The leader was a restless slave of more than doubtful character, named Galant, belonging to a farmer W. N. Van der Merwe of the Worcester district. Although he had the disposition to resort to any violence, fortunately, he did not

possess the foresight and generalship necessary to ensure even partial success in his murderous scheme. The procedure he proposed to the slaves who showed any willingness to support him was to complain of their food, and when they met with the punishment which was likely to follow, to attack their masters and murder them. He himself commenced on these lines with Van der Merwe; but, to his disappointment, instead of ill-treating him, the farmer sympathised with him and showed him that he was receiving as good food as it was possible to give him. Shortly afterwards Van der Merwe had to ride round the district and visit some of the neighbouring farms. With him he took Galant and two other slaves, Isaac Thys and Rooy. Galant took the opportunity of pushing on his scheme and found ready accomplices in Abel, a slave of Barend Van der Merwe, and Adonis, belonging to J. A. du Plessis. On the evening of February 1st, 1824, action commenced. Abel rode over to Galant's hut, where he found Rooy, Thys, a Hottentot named Hendrik, and of course, Galant. Galant's wife was tightly bound with riems, so that she could not give any alarm to the intended victims. The party then left and made for the place of Barend Van der Merwe (Abel's master) and were joined by the slaves there. The time for striking a blow having arrived, some of the slaves went to the sheep kraal and drove out the animals, deliberately making a noise in doing so. This had the desired effect of drawing Barend from his house to see what was taking place. Galant and Abel then rushed in and seized two guns and a quantity of ammunition. They fired at the farmer on his approaching the door and hit him in the heel. Wounded as he was he managed to escape. The wife and children seeing what was happening, fled from the house and, under cover of darkness, found safety among some adjacent bushes. The party of slaves then returned to W. N. Van der Merwe's (Galant's master), where they arrived about midnight. At daybreak Galant, Abel, Thys, and another, Klaas, hid themselves among the peach trees in front of the house, while others, as before, went to the kraals and drove out the animals, thus waking Van der Merwe and those who were staying with him, namely, another farmer, Janse van Rensburg, and a schoolmaster, Verlee and his wife. Van der Merwe

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and Van Rensburg went out to the kraal when the four men then rushed into the house. Galant and Abel ran into Mrs. Van der Merwe's bedroom and seized the two guns which they knew to be there. Mrs. Van der Merwe immediately jumped out of bed and attacked them, endeavouring to take the guns from them. She was forced into the kitchen and a violent struggle took place, the slaves in the end gaining possession of the guns. Galant then fired at her and severely wounded her in the thigh. On hearing the screaming and the firing of the gun, the two men hurried back from the kraal. The slaves went out to meet them and as soon as they saw them they fired at them, Abel hitting Van der Merwe near the right eye; the wound, however, was not serious; worse was yet to come. Van der Merwe and Rensburg managed to get into the house and to fasten the doors against the insurgents. A general assault was then commenced upon the place. Van der Merwe incautiously opened a door a little in order to beg Galant to spare his life, but the only answer he received was a bullet which killed him upon the spot. The house was then again entered and completely ransacked, when pistols and further ammunition were found. While Verlee was attending to the wounded woman, he was shot, but not killed. A little later, the slave Klaas, discovering him to be still living, ended his misery with one of the pistols he had stolen. Mrs. Verlee and the children, together with two female slaves, had succeeded in getting into a loft over the kitchen, where also they had managed to put the wounded Mrs. Van der Merwe. Galant discovered them there, but though his manner was threatening, he left them without further molestation. Having revenged themselves upon this family, the murderers moved off intending to visit a farmer named Dalree and others. "I must now have Isaac Van der Merwe and Abraham du Plessis—my gun is good and I also am good," said Galant. Fortunately Barend Van der Merwe, in spite of his wounded heel, had reached Isaac Van der Merwe's place. He arrived on horseback—but without saddle and very slenderly clad. On receipt of his news a messenger was sent off instantly to the Field Cornet, du Toit, who immediately called together a commando of thirteen farmers, and by half-past ten they were in pursuit of the rascals. Very

shortly the commando came in sight of them when a few shots were exchanged but no one was hit. Only two were then captured, but in the course of a few days all of them were in the hands of the authorities and were sent to Cape Town for trial. Galant and Abel were sentenced to be hanged and then to have their heads struck off and affixed to poles erected in conspicuous places in the Bokkeveld. The others received lesser punishments commensurate with their degree of guilt, such as flogging or enduring periods of hard labour varying from fifteen years to life.

Long before the period when Galant and his associates adopted their own peculiar methods for establishing their freedom, the movements which were to end in the total abolition of slavery had commenced. As far back as 1750 the Quakers in America took the first step towards the institution of this humane measure by liberating their own slaves—even when their Government imposed upon them a guarantee of £30 for each slave not becoming a burden upon the public—and refusing membership of their church to anyone who should take possession of a human being.

In England, the movement may be considered to have commenced in 1786 when a Cambridge undergraduate, T. Clarkson, won a University prize for an essay on "Slavery and Commerce of Human Species". The result of his researches led him to do something more than merely write an essay, though that alone seems to have had the good effect of drawing general attention to the horrors of the slave trade. He succeeded in enlisting the sympathy of a number of prominent and upright men, and forming, on May 22nd, 1787, a Committee, under the presidency of Granville Sharp, for the purpose of initiating such steps as should lead eventually to the total abolition of slavery. Conspicuous among the members were William Wilberforce and Henry Brougham, both of whom became eloquent and untiring champions of the cause in the House of Commons. The ceaseless activities of the abolitionists, as they were called, and the widespread sympathy and co-operation with which they were met led to numerous petitions being presented to Parliament. The question of the abolition of the slave trade thus became a distinguishing feature of the debates of the Lords and

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 I. may be considered to have been reached in 1807 when a Bill for the abolition of the slave trade passed both Houses and received the Royal assent on March 25th of that year. In virtue of this, ships were prohibited from clearing out from any British port for the purpose of obtaining slaves after May 1st, 1807, and no slave could be landed in any British Colony after March 1st, 1808.¹

This, however, was scarcely half the battle, for the penalties for contravention of the new law were pecuniary only, and so profitable was the trade that under these circumstances it was still worth while endeavouring to pursue it. If one ship out of three, so it was said, was successful in landing its cargo of slaves, there was still an ample profit. This legislation greatly increased the sufferings of the captives during the "middle passage," for in order to cover the risk of loss by seizure the vessels were still more overcrowded, and further there was the most callous destruction of human life by throwing the wretched creatures overboard in case of pursuit. To obviate all this Mr. Brougham, in 1811, succeeded in carrying through Parliament a Bill making slave trading in any part of the British Colonies a crime punishable by transportation for fourteen years with or without hard labour. Thus an end was put to the slave trade in all British Colonies. There now remained the problem of dealing with slavery itself. Action in this direction was soon in progress. In 1821, after thirty-three years of strife in this good work, Wilberforce's failing health prevented him from continuing his active part and made it necessary for him to find a successor and Parliamentary leader in the anti-slavery crusade. His choice fell upon Thomas Fowell Buxton, a deeply religious man, who had been elected Member for Weymouth in 1819, and who had already warmly espoused the cause which was appealing so powerfully

¹ It is worthy of note here that the Batavian Government had moved in this direction at an earlier date than the British, as is shown by the following notice issued in 1803: "The Governor and Council of Policy do by these presents give notice to all and everyone whom it may concern that provisionally and until further notice, no permission will be granted by Government to embark and import cargoes of male or female slaves. J. H. Neethling. Castle of Cape of Good Hope, April 11th, 1803."

to the humane.¹ He brought the matter before the House on May 13th, 1823, when he moved that, "a state of slavery is repugnant to the principles of the British Constitution and of the Christian religion, and that it ought to be gradually abolished throughout the British Dominions with as much expedition as may be consistent with due regard to the well-being of the parties concerned".

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Mr. Canning moved and carried certain amendments² which led to an animated debate and fear on the part of the more ardent abolitionists that their position would be weakened and that trouble would arise with the West Indian planters. He was of opinion that the proposed amelioration should be merely suggested to the Colonial legislatures and should only be enforced in case of resistance. Lord Liverpool in 1826 said: "That for the amelioration of slavery the British Parliament should plainly and distinctly state to the Colonies what was the object of the British Government, and then let the Colonies apply themselves to carry these objects into effect, as they may think fit, because they might do it to the best advantage. We should say to the Colonies, we desire this to be done, do it yourselves, and in the manner you think best." The Lord Chancellor said: "We are going far enough to say to the Colonies, these objects are recommended to you by both Houses of Parliament of Great Britain, and see that you act upon that recommendation, but do it in the manner most convenient for yourselves, but it is expected that you should do it". But the Island of Trinidad, having no legislature of its own, direct action should be taken by the Home Government. The final result of much discussion was the famous 19th Ordinance or "Order in Council for Trinidad," which

¹ For Wilberforce's letter to Buxton *vide Memoirs of Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton*, p. 117.

² "1. That it is expedient to adopt effectual and decisive measures for ameliorating the condition of the slave population in His Majesty's Colonies.

"2. That, through a determined and persevering, but at the same time judicious and temperate enforcement of such measures, this House looks forward to a progressive improvement in the character of the slave population, such as may prepare them for a participation in those civil rights and privileges which are enjoyed by other classes of His Majesty's subjects.

"3. That this House is anxious for the accomplishment of this purpose at the earliest period that shall be compatible with the well-being of the slaves themselves, with the safety of the Colonies, and with a fair and equitable consideration of the interests of private property."

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It was always assumed in England that there was not the least probability of any action towards the liberation of slaves being taken by the Colonies themselves. "Trust not the masters of slaves in what concerns legislation for slaves," said Mr. Canning. And under the impression that England had waited sixteen years in vain for the Colonies to do something towards the extinction of slavery, the Anti-Slavery Committee came into existence in 1823. Whatever may have been the attitude in other parts of the British Dominions, this was certainly not true in the case of Cape Colony. For even under the Dutch rule there was always some disposition to give a slave his freedom—provided, of course, that the owner was reimbursed in the purchase money.

Long before pressure came from England, suggestions had been made by slave owning colonists that all female children should be declared free at birth. By this means it was hoped that slavery would be gradually stamped out, as the children of free women were also free. Many were equally willing that the same boon should be extended to the boys. To the honour of Graaff Reinet be it said that this measure, if not originated, was most warmly advocated in that district. In 1826, Andries Stockenstrom, then Landdrost of Graaff Reinet, went to Cape Town on behalf of the slave owners of that place to present a petition to the Governor and to give the view of those who were in favour of slave emancipation. It was signed by twenty-seven Dutch colonists all of whom were owners of slaves. "It must have given great satisfaction to our fellow-citizens," said they, "and our descendants will one day pride themselves that sentiments and principles which have been expressed this day did exist among us. We have, as it were, refuted with a single argument the libels which have been spread all over the world, and particularly in that country under whose dominions we live, respecting our sentiments towards and treatment of the coloured races." Stockenstrom for himself said: "I am myself the proprietor of many slaves, they form the greater part of my property; but rather than allow the evil to go on, rather than saddle an offspring

with an inheritance of the dangers and troubles under which we groan, and rather than expose our country for the future to similar commotions to those, which, as it were, paralyse us at present—I wish my countrymen would unanimously come to the proposition that no distinction should be made with respect to the sexes, and that the precious boon which all seem inclined to grant to the girls, should not be withheld from the boys. This is the wish of all the principal slave owners with whom I have conversed on the subject. We are moved with the conviction which experience has taught us, that the legislators at home have not the slightest idea of slavery in this Colony, and that they look upon us as having little, if not less feeling for our slaves than for the brute animals which we now possess.”

Emancipation of slavery in Cape Colony had been very common long before the 19th Ordinance came into force. In some cases owners liberated their slaves from sheer kindness, in many others, the slaves were allowed to accumulate property by their industry and good behaviour and then to purchase their freedom.¹ Emancipation, however, was not always a boon, as at times it was convenient to get rid of an old slave who was no longer useful. Hence regulations came into force compelling the master to guarantee that a slave on being liberated should not become destitute or a burden to the public. Lord Charles Somerset did much towards ameliorating the conditions under which the slaves lived. His spontaneous and continued concern for their welfare, and his measure for removing many of their disabilities stand out as features of his administrations which, notwithstanding his many errors, do honour to his memory. He could not have been in office long before he turned his attention to the state of slavery as he found it at the Cape and determined to act as the protector of the unfortunate class. It was not possible for him to abolish slavery, but he did the next best thing. He framed a number of regulations in their interest whereby it became impossible for the number to be increased except by births, for those who had been manumitted to be

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¹ *Manumissions*.—In 1816, 35; 1817, 87; 1818, 52; 1819, 58; 1820, 24; 1821, 26; 1822, 34; 1823, 44; 1824, 56; 1825, 29; 1826, 90; 1827, 245; 1828, 117; 1829, 153; 1830, 102. Total, 707.

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re-enslaved, or prize negroes to lapse into a state of slavery, and in order that there should be no doubt as to who were slaves and who not, a complete system of registration of all slaves was enforced. This Proclamation is dated April 26th, 1816.¹ It is worthy of note that all this was being done "while England was waiting in vain for the Colonies to do something". Every proprietor of slaves was bound to give accurate information as to their names, sexes, ages, occupations, births and deaths, and all details respecting sales, transfers, and inheritances. No person unless thus registered could be regarded as a slave, and any failure to comply with this was regarded as manumission of the slave. A registry office, with an officer called the Protector of Slaves, was opened in each district with a Head Office in Cape Town. In the following year, Lord Charles Somerset established a school² for all the Government slave children above six years of age; "at twelve they will be apprenticed, and my purpose is that at the expiration of their apprenticeship all shall be emancipated. Thus the Government will set an example which I trust may be followed by others."³

It may have been that during the years 1820 and 1821, while on leave in England, Lord Charles was influenced by the prevailing abolitionist enthusiasm; the improvement of the slaves was certainly in his mind when he took into consideration the educational development of the Colony and selected the teachers who were eventually sent out. For on his return to the Cape he took steps towards the further amelioration of their condition, so restricting the power and authority of the master and so increasing the privileges of the slaves that he made them all but a free people. His measures were embodied in his Proclamation of March 18th, 1823.⁴ It was declared illegal to compel a slave to perform field labour on the Sabbath Day, though certain duties of necessity might be performed. A reasonable number of hours of work per diem was fixed, and extra pay to be given for anything beyond.

¹ For the Proclamation, *vide Records*, vol. xi., p. 102.

² Eventually there were fifteen slave schools in different parts of the Colony, erected and equipped at a cost of Rds. 105,000, and maintained at an annual expense of Rds. 18,900, *vide Records*, vol. xvii., p. 41, also vol. xxx., pp. 43-96.

³ Letter to Earl Bathurst, Dec. 19th, 1817, *Records*, vol. xi., p. 433.

⁴ For this see *Records*, vol. xv., p. 336.

Proper food and clothing were to be provided. Slaves were to be permitted to be properly married instead of the system of indiscriminate cohabitation which had prevailed, and then husband could not be sold separately from wife, nor the young children from their parents. Children of Christian slaves born in wedlock had to be baptised within twelve months of their birth, and all children between the ages of three and ten had, where possible, to be sent to one of the free schools for at least three days in each week. Slaves were to be allowed to acquire and accumulate property and to have the same right as free men in the disposal of it. Their grievances might be brought before the proper justiciary authorities, and the evidence of a baptised slave was to be considered as good as that of a European. This Proclamation may be looked upon as the Magna Charta of the slaves. It was formulated and promulgated without reference to the Home Government. Of this Earl Bathurst complained, as it did not fit in well with the more comprehensive measures which were then under the consideration of His Majesty's Government for all the Colonies. "It is impossible not to give Your Lordship every degree of credit for the benevolent motives which have induced you to take this step," said Earl Bathurst, "but I am compelled to observe that upon a subject of such peculiar delicacy it would have been desirable that Your Lordship should have transmitted Home the Proclamation you have issued previously to its being carried into effect." Until he received this intimation, Lord Charles Somerset appears to have been unaware of the fact that the Home Government was moving in the same direction. The measures proposed, however, were so much upon the same lines that but little modification of the Home proposals was necessary in order to make them suitable to this Colony. A copy of the Draft of "An Order in Council for the amelioration of the slaves in the Island of Trinidad" was sent from London on February 8th, 1825, and on the following July 12th it came before the Governor in Council at the Cape. The Chief Justice was authorised to re-draft it in view of some of its provisions being inapplicable to this Colony, such as leaving out all reference to the whip and cat, "Because it is not customary here to carry whips, cats, or other instruments of punishment into the field as an emblem

CHAP. 1. of authority," and other matters which probably were suitable to the conditions prevailing in Trinidad but not to the Cape of Good Hope. On September 5th, these alterations and the reasons for making them were transmitted to Earl Bathurst, and meeting with his approval, the modified Act came into force in August, 1826. When these intentions of the Home Government became known in the Colony, namely, in June, the greatest alarm and consternation seized the slave owning inhabitants. They foresaw the most direful results. Not only did they fear great loss on account of the depreciation of slave property, but they anticipated the greatest personal danger to themselves, their wives, and families. The Bokkerveld murders of 1824 were attributed to the Proclamation of 1823, and as this new Act was still more in the interest of the slaves, it was considered that greater bloodshed and destruction of property could not but be the inevitable result. A petition signed by 370 people of Cape Town was sent to the Burgher Senate praying that that august body would approach the Government with a view to delaying the promulgation of the new law until they had had an opportunity of bringing their grievances before both the Government of this and the Mother Country. This was done. On July 3rd, 1826, the Memorial of the Burgher Senate came before the Governor in Council. The Memorialists looked with concern upon the proposed measure of allowing a slave to compel his master to liberate him upon payment of his assessed value with money which the slave himself had accumulated. This would place temptation in the way of the slave to steal the money, most probably from the master himself, and there would be plenty of half-coloured slaves who would be willing to assist a comrade by false swearing. They took particular exception to the 39th and 43rd Articles. The former permitted slaves to appear as witnesses in criminal cases against their masters. Although it was certainly true, as was stated, that there were numerous accusations brought by slaves against their masters which, on proper investigation were found to be false, yet on the other hand there were some shocking cases of cruelty, as for instance the murder of Joris by Gebhard and also that of Cornelius by de Villiers, where the evidence was almost entirely that of slaves, and where without this the guilty would

have escaped punishment. The latter section enacted that ill-treatment of a slave by an owner should lead to forfeiture of the slave. It cannot be said that the general tone of the objections raised against the 19th Ordinance was characterised by an inordinate concern for the slaves themselves. "A forfeiture of property in a slave by His Majesty's Government on account of ill-treatment is something very new and very strange," the Memorialists said. It was argued that this was almost tantamount to immediate emancipation, as bodily pain of short duration would certainly be considered as an easy way of obtaining their freedom; it would, therefore, be to the interest of the slave to misbehave in order to incite his master to violence.

After a careful consideration of this petition the Council was of opinion that the apprehensions of the people would prove groundless, and that there was no sufficient reason for repealing or altering any of its enactments. Stellenbosch and Worcester followed the lead of Cape Town and received answers of the same tenor. Under the mistaken idea that no new law could be effective until it had been read out publicly by the Burgher Senate in Cape Town and by the Landdrosts and Heemraden of the country districts, the former and the Landdrost of Stellenbosch refused at first to act in this customary manner when instructed to do so.

However, on the Lieut.-Governor informing them that they would be responsible to Government for any mischief which might arise from such unwise procedure, the Ordinance was duly proclaimed. The President and two members of the Burgher Senate then resigned as a protest. Thus foiled in the attempt either to prevent the promulgation of the Act or to effect its repeal, the inhabitants of Cape Town sought permission to hold a public meeting for the purpose of selecting a Committee of twenty-five persons to draw up a petition to the King in Council. The request was granted, and the meeting was held in the Town House on July 22nd. But though a petition was sent to the King, nothing came of it. A similar meeting was held in Graaff Reinet, but "the Committee have done just nothing at all" said the Lieut.-Governor. By allowing this unusual freedom of speech and apparently conceding to the desires of interested parties, as well as by his tactful

CHAP. and conciliatory manner, General Bourke, who at this time
I. had succeeded Lord Charles Somerset, did much towards allaying the irritation produced by the 19th Ordinance. The clamour gradually subsided, and within a few months all was working smoothly.¹

The registration of slaves and all matters connected with them as instituted by Lord Charles Somerset, together with the orderly arrangements and control exercised by the Protector of Slaves and his subordinates, was productive of as much good to the free as the bond. The rigid investigation of all complaints on both sides showed that the masters were no less in need of protection than the slaves, and that the balance of misdemeanours and crimes was greatly in favour of the latter.²

The quiet following the commotion caused by the 19th Ordinance was not permitted by His Majesty's Government to be of long duration. A desire for greater uniformity in slavery legislature induced the British Parliament to revise and consolidate the various Colonial enactments and thus to amend and bring in to one law the procedure which obtained in all the slave owning Colonies. The "Order of the King in Council for consolidating the several laws recently made for improving the condition of the slaves of his Majesty's Colonies,"³ was issued in February 1830, and came into force in Cape Colony in the following August. To the slave owners in this Colony, in view of what had so recently happened, this appeared to be a deliberate attempt to irritate them by rendering the possession of slaves an impossibility. Even the Governor himself described it as a "law to many of the provisions of which obedience was impossible, and which, though apparently recognising the right of property in slaves, virtually denied it by placing in the way of the slave holders such obstacles in the management of their slaves as to render that species of

¹ For the various petitions, despatches, and letters, *vide Records of Cape Colony*, vol. xxvii., pp. 89-117, 184-188, 303, 389; vol. xxxi., p. 409.

² Return of complaints, etc., from Aug. 1st, 1825, to Dec. 26th, 1826. Cases of ill-treatment brought by slaves against masters: proved 16, disproved 55, undecided 6. Cases of crimes against slaves: proved 78, disproved 6, undecided 8. For an excellent report of the Guardian of Slaves dealing with offences, punishment, and manumission, *vide* vol. xxxii., pp. 60-151.

³ *Vide* Manuscript, vol. 1318, Archives, Cape Town,

property worse than useless". At this time the 19th Ordinance was found to be working satisfactorily in the interests of all, and therefore to have let well alone seemed to be more conducive to peace and order than the promulgation of the new and additional elaborations of that Ordinance. The greatest excitement and anger again prevailed. Very great objection was taken to a necessary and common-sense regulation, namely, that each slave owner should keep a book in which were to be recorded the details of every case of punishment he had inflicted upon any of his slaves, and further that this book should be taken to the Protector of Slaves twice in each year for the perusal of that officer. Many of the slave owners were determined to suffer the penalties prescribed rather than comply with this. The appearance in Stellenbosch of some persons with their punishment books in compliance with this, led to a riot and defiance of the authorities. And though in no other place were these extreme measures resorted to, yet everywhere there was the bitterest feeling against the Home Government. Sir Lowry Cole, the Governor, himself seemed to sympathise with the irritated colonists, for to the Secretary of State he made the strange statement that, even if he possessed the means he should not feel it right to compel the observance of this order, and that if he must do so, a larger military force than was then in South Africa would be necessary. His position was a most difficult one. As if the existing law of 1824 with reference to public meetings were not sufficient, he found it necessary, in 1832, to issue more explicit injunctions on this head in order to prevent united action of the slave owners—and further, to reserve to himself the full and entire power to remove from that settlement any person whose continuance therein should be prejudicial to the peace, good order, and security thereof. But when in September, 1832, the tumult in the public mind had somewhat subsided, he permitted the inhabitants of Cape Town to hold a meeting for the discussion of their grievances. About 2,000 people met in the old Commercial Exchange, and in the most temperate manner considered the matters which dissatisfied them. The essence of the discussion was that they desired an elective Legislative Assembly which should have power to enact laws more likely to be suited to the Colony than those

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which were formulated by persons who, however good their intentions, were ignorant of the conditions of life prevailing at the Cape. They further expressed their willingness and desire, not only to ameliorate the condition of the slaves but to co-operate in the total abolition of slavery. The whole assembly then marched in an orderly manner to Government House, and then sent delegates to confer with the Governor. They asked for a suspension of the clauses of the Ordinance which had given offence, and stated that they were prepared to suffer the penalties prescribed rather than obey them. The Governor, however, could do no more than tell them that what they asked was not in his power to grant to them. Unfortunately the Cape colonists were as ignorant of what was taking place in England as the enthusiastic abolitionists in England were of the actual conditions of slavery at the Cape. That the Cape slave owners were utterly and entirely wrong in their impression that there was a deliberate intention on the part of the Home Government to exasperate them unnecessarily can admit of no doubt whatever. The awful state of affairs in the West Indies and especially in Jamaica was probably as bad as the reports represented it to be, and, carried away by their enthusiasm in behalf of the injured negroes, the anti-slavery zealots did not pause to consider whether the same, or any, blame attached to the Cape colonists. It is well worthy of note that among the names of the slave owning colonists which were so often pilloried and held up to public execration, that of Cape Colony is hardly, if ever, mentioned. Yet upon the slave owners of this Colony, the suffering and ruin inflicted was probably far worse than in any other.

The movement for the total abolition of slavery in all British Colonies, which began with the formation of the Anti-Slavery Society in 1832, soon assumed a magnitude which augured well for the success of the object in view. From every part of the country the outcry against slavery became louder and louder, and men—and women—of all ranks and religious denominations threw in their lots and worked for the common end. The Government of the time, however, was not so easily moved. There appears to have been in the Upper House an influential West Indian party, which was

not swayed by the enthusiasm of the Anti-Slavery Society, though there is no reason to believe that any of them were cognisant of, or had any part in the atrocities which were perpetrated on their distant estates. Not until the general election of 1832, when pledges to vote against slavery were demanded from candidates for Parliament could the House of Commons be induced to take more than a passing interest in the question. This increase in the number of anti-slavery members, and the general impatience of the mass of the nation compelled the tardy Government to rise to action. Mr. (afterwards Sir) T. F. Buxton, who had given himself up entirely to the cause, was enabled to bring forward a motion which resulted in the appointment of a Parliamentary Committee to collect evidence and investigate the whole subject. This Committee worked from June 1st until August 11th, 1832, and then had not dealt with anything like all the matters which were brought before it. They came to the conclusion, however, that "slavery was an evil for which there was no remedy but extirpation," and that "extirpation would be safe". Mr. Buxton, unlike so many of his followers, did not permit his sympathy for the blacks and his horror of the system to run counter to his common-sense, and thus he gave great offence to the over-enthusiastic abolitionists by his advocating that the extirpation should be compatible with the safety of all classes. Nothing further was done during 1832.

Great was the disappointment in 1833 when the King's speech was read, and no reference was made to any proposed measure for the abolition of slavery. Mr. Buxton, therefore, gave notice of his intention to bring the matter before Parliament on the ensuing March 19th, but he withdrew on the Government itself promising that a safe and satisfactory measure would be introduced. As, however, there were indications of the question being shelved again, and fearing the influence of the West Indian party, Mr. Buxton appealed for support to the now enormously powerful Anti-Slavery Society, and expressed his intention of bringing the matter before the House on April 23rd. At this juncture a great and unexpected impetus was given to the movement. A Mr. Whitely, a plantation bookkeeper, had just arrived from the West Indies. Introduced by Mr. Pringle (late of South Africa) he called on

CHAP. I. Mr. Buxton one morning and gave him a blood-curdling account of some of the cruelties he himself had witnessed shortly before his departure from Jamaica. Although Mr. Buxton was in possession of a large number of cases of a similar character, yet he felt that the publication of these, fresh from the spot, as it were, would stir up the most lethargic. Having assured himself of the *bona fides* of Whitely, his stories were taken down and published in pamphlet form. The effect was prodigious. Within about a fortnight, 200,000 copies were scattered over the country. Public meetings denouncing slavery in no uncertain terms were held everywhere, and petitions with over 1,500,000 signatures from all quarters poured into the House of Commons. One from "the females of Great Britain" contained over 187,000 signatures, and was so bulky that it took Mr. Buxton, with three assistants, to carry it into, and leave it on the table of the House. The great pressure of the prevailing public opinion and determination rendering it impossible for there to be any half measures, the total abolition of slavery became the chief consideration of that session of Parliament. Through the indefatigable and supremely unselfish devotion of Mr. Buxton, the Bill, "An Act for the Abolition of Slavery throughout the British Colonies; for promoting the industry of the manumitted slaves and for the compensating the persons hitherto entitled to the services of such slaves," passed the House of Commons on August 7th, 1833, and received the Royal assent on the 28th of the same month. The chief points gained were that slavery was to be abolished, that there was to be a term of years of apprenticeship intermediate between the state of slavery and that of freedom, and that a sum of £20,000,000 was to be set aside for compensating the owners.

These great ends attained, it was to have been expected that the most ardent abolitionist would have been satisfied. Such, however, was not the case. There were some who would have been contented with a gradual extinction of slavery as advocated by the Cape colonists, but by far the greater number argued that neither law nor custom could give one man the right to possess another, and refused to allow that the slave owners had any right to compensation. They deemed all compromise and concession as a dereliction of

principle, and revolted at the idea of striking a bargain with the oppressor. Mr. Buxton was in favour of the compensation and voted for it. He thus again drew upon himself the wrath of many of his followers. Some accused him, and certainly rightly, of sympathising with the masters, and demanded a "more enlightened advocate". Following, however, the dictates of his conscience and callous alike to popular approval and displeasure, he carried out to a successful issue the great work he had set before himself.

The next step, which was taken without delay, was, in accordance with the 45th section of the Act, the appointment of a Committee in London for the purpose of apportioning the £20,000,000 to the nineteen slave owning British Colonies.¹ On September 20th, 1833, Mr. Stanley could tell Sir Benjamin Durban that this had been done, and that a similar Committee was to be formed in Cape Town, which should collect and investigate the respective claims of the Cape slave owners. Returns were to be called for, showing the numbers of slaves in the various classes, such as tradesmen, domestic servants, and labourers. The value of a slave in each class was to be determined by the average price which had been paid for each for the eight years immediately preceding December 31st, 1830.

The first meeting of the Cape Committee was held on May 13th, 1834,² but some months elapsed before the necessary organisation of appraisers, who had to visit the various farms and come to an agreement with the owners of slaves, and other methods of collecting information were established. Towards the end of the year, however, all was in working order and good progress was being made.

Monday, December 1st, 1834, was the memorable day when slavery ceased in Cape Colony.³ Contrary to the fears and expectations of many there was no disorder of any kind, and with the exception of the festivities in connection with

¹ They were Antigua, Barbadoes, Bahamas, Bermuda, Berbice, the Cape, Dominica, British Guiana, Grenada, Honduras, Jamaica, Mauritius, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Christopher, St. Vincent, Trinidad, and the Virgin Islands.

² They were Sir Benjamin Durban (chairman), the Attorney-General, and Messrs. P. M. Brink, E. Christian, W. Gadney, D. I. Kuys, H. A. Sandeberg, and J. J. Smuts.

³ In the West Indies, the day for the final cessation of slavery was the previous August 1st, and in Mauritius, February 1st, 1835.

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During this December, the Cape Trade Society entertained serious misgivings in connection with the promised compensation. It was a disappointment to discover that no steps had been taken for making a final settlement at the time of the emancipation, and still more so, when it was found that the sums would be payable only in London. Distrust and excitement arose, as so many of the slaves were heavily mortgaged and the mortgagees became alarmed at the probable loss of their securities. Correspondence with the Colonial Commissioners for compensation showed the movers what they should have known before, namely, that, according to the Act, the period from April 1st to June 30th, 1835, was the time for receiving claims, and further, that the final adjudication of these was to be made by the Commissioners in London. All this, however, was suddenly lost sight of and the work of appraisal and slave compensation set aside by the unprovoked and blood-thirsty invasion of the Kaffir tribes which took place during this same eventful December of 1834. As the farmers

were called away from their homes in such haste to join the ranks in Kaffirland, and all, from Governor to Field Cornet, were engrossed with matters connected with the protection of life and property, slavery compensation could command but little attention. Hence we find the Colonial Commissioners writing on June 18th, 1835, that is within a fortnight of the time when all uncontested claims should be in, saying, "that in consequence of the few returns collected, it was necessary to modify the London regulation with reference to the closing of the lists on June 30th". And then as if the plight of the irritated colonists was not already sufficiently wretched, Lord Glenelg wrote to Sir B. Durban (June 15th) stating that Mr. Buxton had given notice of motion in the House of Commons for the introduction of a Bill suspending the payment of the £20,000,000 for one year, and warned the colonists that no distinct pledge would be given that the Bill would be opposed. Mr. Buxton seems to have acted in this manner in consequence of reports of ill-treatment of the apprentices in the West Indies which had reached him. This threat, however, does not seem to have been carried into effect.

Towards the end of 1835, when the cessation of war enabled the unhappy colonists to realise the extent of their ruin—and when, for want of proper protection against the tribes of thieves and murderers which were ever watchful along the left bank of the Fish River, the right to far greater compensation had been created—attention could again be turned to slavery matters. The assessment of claims then continued. A largely signed petition, with which Sir B. Durban sympathised, was sent to London, asking that the payment of the sums to be awarded might be made in the Colony and not in London; a most reasonable request. This action was supported by several merchants in London who had business with the Cape. Lord Glenelg, however, April 13th, 1836, could say to the Governor nothing more than: "I can only express to you my regret to have to acquaint you that the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury have recently, after the most mature deliberation, decided that the mode of payment proposed by the Petitioners, although extremely desirable if it could be effected, was liable to difficulties which are deemed insuperable". It was not until June 2nd, 1836, that the boxes

CHAP. I. containing all the papers relative to the valuation of the slaves were closed down and placed in charge of a Mr. Nicholls for transmission to England. Mr. Nicholls arrived in London on August 25th. The labours of the London Committee in apportioning the £20,000,000 could then begin. According to the Colonial Commissioners the number of returns was 6,335.

Total number of slaves—35,745.

Their estimated value—£3,041,290 os. 6d.

These numbers differed from those eventually found on the London list, which were:—

Total number of slaves—38,427.

Their estimated value—£2,824,224 7s. 9d.

Showing an increase of 2,682 in the number of slaves, and yet a decrease of £217,035 18s. 3d. in the estimated value.

It is not clear on what basis the London Commissioners made their calculations. They were certainly aware of the discrepancies, for in communicating with the Governor they said, "it may be expedient to apprise you that as the calculations for ascertaining the amount of compensation payable for each slave made by the Colonial valutors must be made in this office, it is possible that there may be a slight variation between the sums reported by you and the amount of compensation actually awarded to the claimants". In November, 1836, the compensations were completed, and the announcement was made that instead of the £3,041,290, the assessed value in the Colony, the sum awarded was £1,247,401 os. 7¾d.¹ "This sudden and extraordinary reduction in the amount to be received from what had previously been anticipated proved ruinous to many families, as the capitalists to

¹ The following from the Returns of Apportionment may be of interest. There were nineteen Colonies to receive compensation. The average value of a slave was highest in Honduras, least in Bermuda, and the greatest number of slaves was in Jamaica.

Colony.	Average Value of Slaves.	No. of Slaves.	Total Value.	Proportion of the £20,000,000 Awarded.
	£ s. d.		£ s. d.	£ s. d.
Honduras	120 4 7¼	1,920	230,844 0 0	101,958 19 7¼
Bermuda	27 4 11¼	4,203	114,527 7 5½	50,584 7 0½
The Cape	73 9 11	38,427	2,824,224 7 9	1,247,401 0 7¾
Jamaica	44 15 2½	3,111,692	13,951,139 2 3	6,161,927 5 10¾

whom many of these slaves were mortgaged, foreseeing that they would not be paid out of the compensation fund, immediately commenced proceedings against the principal debtors and sureties, sold off their goods and chattels, and thus reduced many respectable families to distress if not actual want.¹

As has been shown, the collection of the claims had been a very slow process. The distribution of the amounts awarded, however, was of far longer duration, in fact it never was completed, and a large sum of money eventually reverted to the Public Treasury. A variety of difficulties attended the adjustment of the claims. In the first place there were the counter claims preferred by those to whom slave property was mortgaged, also there were to be considered the cases where the slaves themselves had already partly paid for their emancipation. Then there appears to have been the necessity to guard against a claimant executing more than one power of Attorney and thus obtaining more than one payment for the same compensation, and even forgery was not unknown in connection with the proceeding.² Then again, some to whom amounts were due had left the Colony and joined in the Great Trek northward. As the money was to be paid in London and only to the claimants themselves or their London agents—a procedure incomprehensible to the greater number of the Dutch Afrikanders—it became necessary for them to get people to act for them, that is, employ further agents, in the Colony. These difficulties, together with the small proportion of the assessed value which would be obtained when they were overcome, determined many to have nothing to do with the compensation and to refuse any sum whatever.³

Thus years rolled on while compensation money lay

¹ Cloete's *Lectures on the Great Boer Trek*, p. 54.

² *Vide* Minute book of the Colonial Commissioners in the Cape Town Archives.

³ "Some of them (the slave owners) became so incensed against the Government that they rejected the paltry sum awarded to them, although repeatedly pressed upon them, . . . as its receipt would only deprive them of what they conceive to be a legitimate cause of grievance" (Cloete's *Lectures*, p. 56). "I cannot give a more striking instance of the loss so sustained by the proprietors of valuable slaves than by stating my own case, that for a slave whom I had frequently refused £500 and might have commanded £600 I found, according to the highest average for that class of slaves, a sum of £60 nominally awarded to me, but by the mode of payment ultimately received, even that pittance was reduced to £47 or £48" (*ibid.*, p. 54).

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waiting for the rightful owners. In June, 1839, the Secretary of State wrote to the Governor of the Colony: "The Assistant Commissioners in every other Colony, including the distant Isle of Mauritius, have completed their duties and closed their Commissions, yet your Committee, now in its fifth year, not only remains still open, but so little expedition appears to have been used in its progress, that in the six months which have elapsed of the present year, little more than 100 claims have been reported on, and there remain above 300 yet to be forwarded". The sum then still available was £24,913 6s. 4½d. A few months after this the Colonial Commissioners closed their office. More than a year afterwards, namely, on May 31st, 1841, the following was published in the Colony: "Notice is hereby given to all persons interested in the claims to compensation remaining unawarded or unjudicated upon by the late Commissioners of Compensation, that they do forthwith by themselves or their agents make application at this office (12 Manchester Buildings, Westminster) . . . and all money which remains unpaid on December 31st, 1842, upon uncontested claims will revert to the Public—and all contested claims unclaimed by December 31st, 1845, except such as may be the subject of suits in the Colonial Courts or of proceedings before any Court of Judicature of Appeal in the United Kingdom, will also revert to Public".¹

"It is not easy to bring home to the mind the widespread misery that was occasioned by the loss of £2,000,000 worth of property in a small and poor community like that of the Cape in 1835. There were to be seen families reduced from affluence to want, widows and orphans made destitute, poverty and anxiety brought into hundreds of homes. Men and women were recently living who had a keen remembrance of privations endured during childhood, of parents descending to the grave in penury, of relatives and friends once wealthy suddenly reduced to toil for their bread, all through the mode of emancipation of their slaves. Still harder to bear than the poverty brought upon the unfortunate people who had been

¹In 1842 some of the abandoned sums were of some magnitude. In one list of fifty-seven names there are sums ranging from £5 13s. 3d. to £438 5s. 10d., while on another of ninety names, there are such sums as £693 16s. 6d., £616 12s. 11d., and £766 8s. 5d.

slave holders was the exuberant rejoicing of the philanthropists and the tone of the abolitionist press. There was not one word, one thought of sympathy for them. Instead of that they were taunted as if they had been oppressors, and the statement was made that they were opposed to the emancipation of the negroes. The Act, as it was carried out, was extolled as among the noblest and most glorious ever performed, and the fact was suppressed that they, too, were ready and willing to extinguish slavery, and that without the cost of a penny to the British Treasury, provided it was done in such a way as not to bring ruin upon themselves and their children."¹

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¹Theal, *History of South Africa since 1795*, vol. ii., p. 77. Materials for study in connection with this subject: Dr. Theal's thirty-four volumes of the *Records of Cape Colony*. The Minute Book, etc., of the Assistant Commissioners in the Cape Town Archives. *History of the Rise, Progress, and Accomplishment of the Abolition of the African Slave Trade*, Clarkson, 1808. *African Slave Trade, the Remedy and Sequel*, T. F. Buxton, 1838. *Memoirs of Sir T. F. Buxton*, 1843. *Anti-Slavery Reporter*. *Mirror of Parliament* for 1833-1840, and of course, *Hansard*, and the various Parliamentary Papers.

CHAPTER II.

THE FIRST WEEK OF THE KAFFIR WAR OF 1835.

CHAP. II. WHILE, in 1834, the minds of the European population of Cape Colony were occupied with the benefits and blessings of freedom which were soon to be conferred upon the slaves, but few seem to have observed the gradually darkening cloud which was gathering in Kaffirland, and which, at the time of the emancipation, burst with such sudden and awful fury. On December 1st, the slaves were liberated. On December 21st, the Kaffirs, in thousands, rushed into the Colony, and with firebrand and assegai destroyed, in ten days, the fruits of fifteen years' struggle and toil. So well had the invading Kaffirs matured their plans that for two days the career of murder and robbery continued before the inhabitants of Grahamstown realised that there was war in the land. True it is that for some months previously there had been indications of impending disaster, and that these had not been entirely unobserved by the frontier military authorities. An inordinate number of Kaffirs, both men and women, in "school clothes" visited their "friends" in the Colony, especially at the Kat River Settlement; the conduct of the influential chiefs, Tyali and Maqomo, was almost more than suspicious, and there was a general restlessness among their followers which boded anything but good for the Colony. It was, however, a time of drought and great scarcity of grass, hence movements of the natives might have been nothing more than the innocent search for food for their cattle. But this did not account for the increasing molestation of the traders in Kaffirland, for the stealing of horses rather than of cattle, and the abandonment by Hintza of his "great place" at Butterworth for a more inaccessible situation on a small river, the Ameva, to the north-east. Little as all this seems to have impressed the people

generally, it caused the gravest anxiety to Colonel Somerset as well as to Captain Armstrong of Fort Adelaide, but even these able officers, ubiquitous and omniscient as they were, seem to have been ignorant of the real extent of what was taking place in nearer Kaffirland. During August and September of 1834 there was a noticeable lull in the depredations upon the farmers' stock, probably because matters of greater moment were then occupying the attention of the restless tribes on the east of the Fish River.

On August 3rd, there was an immense gathering of the Gaika and Ndhlabi Kaffirs at Gaika's old place near Burns Hill. It was one of those meetings which were never held except when matters of the greatest national importance were dealt with. The ostensible object of the meeting—so Colonel Somerset learnt two days later when he met Tyali with 500 armed warriors at the Kat River Post—was to discuss the murder of a Ndhlabi headman, and the suicide of the daughter of another. When, however, all this could become matter of investigation, and prisoners, after the war, could talk with impunity, it transpired that the real object of this meeting was the preparation of plans for the invasion of the Colony. There was an incident in connection with the meeting which should have been something of a warning to the Colonial authorities, though it is not clear that it was so. The three Amagqunukwebi chiefs, Pato, Kama, and Congo, refused to attend, and feeling that they were suspected of being in league with those whom they evidently knew to be actuated by hostile motives, they persuaded their missionary, the Rev. W. Shepstone of Wesleyville, to write, on September 3rd, to the Civil Commissioner of Albany repudiating any such imputation, and giving every assurance of their loyalty to the Government.

An important factor determining the precipitation of the war was the attitude and actions of some of the Hottentot Cape Corps and their friends, namely, a certain section of the Hottentots at the Kat River Settlement. The former seem to have chafed under the military discipline, and, having become discontented, to have been anxious to free themselves from the service and to have been willing to adopt rebellious measures to attain that end. The latter, for no very clear

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reason, were disaffected and disposed to wound though afraid to strike. Knowing well the resentment still harboured by Maqomo in consequence of his having been expelled from the neutral territory in 1829, they incited him to retaliation and led him to believe that, in the event of his making war upon the Colony, he might look to them for assistance. One Klaas Dirk, the official interpreter at Fort Willshire, actually entered into a conspiracy with him to capture that fort and murder all the European soldiers. It was arranged that Maqomo and his warriors should be in hiding in the vast bush which surrounds the fort, and that Dirk, during the night, should set fire to a small shop which was situated just outside the walls, and kept by a trader named Beale, and then, while the soldiers were extinguishing the fire, fall upon them and assegai them. Maqomo, in accordance with this arrangement, was in readiness and waited two nights for the expected signal, but it did not appear. Dirk afterwards explained that he could not get the key of the fort, and thus he was unable to perform his part of the agreement. This took place at the end of October, 1834. At the Gualana and Kaffir Drift Posts also, the Hottentot soldiers were reported to be willing to join the Kaffirs. There can be no doubt that, during the few months preceding the outbreak of hostilities, much was happening in the Kat River Settlement, which, taken in conjunction with the proximity of that place to Kaffirland and the disposition of the Kaffirs, could have led to scarcely any other result than the calamity which eventually overwhelmed the Eastern Province. Many people in the Settlement, including even the missionary, the Rev. J. Read, were regarded with the greatest suspicion by the authorities, but there was then no tangible proof of anything against them. Subsequent evidence, however, showed that these suspicions were not entirely groundless.

The Kat River people, in number between three and four thousand, though spread over a considerable area of undulating country, belonged to one or other of two congregations, namely, that of the Rev. W. R. Thomson, of the Glasgow Missionary Society, at Balfour, or that of the Rev. J. Read, of the London Missionary Society, at Philipton. The former, known as Bastards, were partly of European descent and were among the most respectable and industrious people in the

Settlement. They constituted about one-fourth of the total number. Although there were Bastards among Mr. Read's congregation, by far the greater number were Gonah Hottentots or Hottentots proper, as they called themselves. They were the offspring of Kaffirs and Hottentots and were more in sympathy with the Kaffirs than the Bastards.¹

The cordial relations between these two peoples were not very pronounced, in fact the want of unanimity extended even to the missionaries themselves. Mr. Thomson disapproved of the political activities and attitude towards the Government on the parts of Mr. Read and Dr. Philip, while Mr. Read was not best pleased at the want of co-operation on the part of Mr. Thomson.² Many of Mr. Read's people were very unsettled characters, squatting for a time among the more industrious and then, when perhaps food had become scarce, visiting their Kaffir friends, and this in spite of the vigilance of the military in endeavouring to prevent all communication with Kaffirland. They needed but little encouragement to do the worst mischief, and were, therefore, a class of people with whom it was necessary to deal with the greatest caution and circumspection. Unless the object was to drive them into open rebellion, the delivery of firebrand speeches by the guiding missionaries was the last course which should have been adopted towards them. Yet, unfortunately, this is what took place, though it is fair to believe that it was done unwittingly, and that those who were thus instrumental in stirring up the Hottentots directly, and Kaffirs indirectly, were, in common with the civil and military authorities, ignorant of what was going on among the natives themselves. Subsequent investigation into the causes of the war showed that the Kat River public meetings, as well as the general nature of the speeches and communications of Mr. Read and Dr. Philip with both the Hottentots and Kaffirs, had done as much as anything to bring about the bloodshed and misery of 1835.³ Dr. Philip

¹ *Vide* Blue Book, *Return of Caffre War*, ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, July 12th, 1837, p. 151.

² It was Mr. Thomson who, having visited Philipton to be present at the Missionary anniversary, left the church in disgust, in consequence of Mr. Read's illegal action in connection with the visit of Maqomo. *Vide* vol. ii., p. 452.

³ After the war was at an end and nothing was to be gained—or lost—by speaking the truth unreservedly, some interesting evidence as to the causes of

CHAP. II. was in these parts during the three months immediately preceding the war, impressing the Kaffir chiefs with the "injustice" of the white man, and in August, Mr. Read convened a large public meeting at Philipton, when inflammatory speeches were

the irruption was obtained from the natives themselves. The chief, Tyali, was interviewed at King William's Town on May 5th, 1836 (*vide Return of Caffre War*, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, July 12th, 1837, p. 75). After speaking on some of the causes of discontent among the Kaffirs, he said: "The Hottentots induced us to go to war; they assured us we could beat the English, so we sent to Hintza, who approved of it". Speaking of Dr. Philip, he said: "Philip said, 'it is your land; I shall speak in the Governor's ear'". Philip made great inquiry, then said: "The land is yours on this side the Fish River; I shall write to the King of England, and speak to the Governor; this and the Hottentots set us on fire".

Deposition of Ganya, an old counsellor of the late Gaika, at King William's Town, January 23rd, 1836. He said: "Not long before the war, Dr. Philip came up with another man from Cape Town to Mr. Kayser, to the missionary's house near Maqomo's kraal. Maqomo, Botman, Jan Tzatzoe, Mr. Read, Mr. Kayser, and some other missionaries were there. He (Ganya) was sent for as the great councillor of the late Gaika." Dr. Philip said: "You were Gaika's councillor?" "Yes," we all then spoke about the land. Dr. Philip said: "You are injured, that country between the Fish and the Keiskamma Rivers is yours, I shall speak to the Governor". Ganya, however, does not seem to have approved of all this—and was opposed to the war. "A respectable old Caffre baronet, named Ganya, in strong terms, in the presence of Maqomo, near Fort Willshire, did oppose going to war with the English at the instigation of these drunken Hottentots, as he called the soldiers. During the conference, in which Ganya used his utmost efforts to avert war, certain Hottentots arrived, whom the old man compelled to be silent by force of his eloquence. Either at that time or on another occasion, when certain Hottentots came to Maqomo, he said to them: 'Go to Ganya; if you can persuade him, you will find no difficulty in persuading me'" (evidence of the Rev. John Bennie, Glasgow missionary at Lovedale, *Return of Caffre War*, p. 81).

Deposition of Dr. W. Guybon Atherstone before the Civil Commissioner of Albany, January 1st, 1836. Stated that on the previous April 14th, when with the army invading Kaffirland, he was detailed as one of a small party to wrest a herd of cattle from some of the Kaffirs. This having been accomplished, a conversation took place between one of the enemy and Majecco, one of Pato's Kaffirs, who was acting as interpreter to the escort. "Yes, children," said the hostile Kaffir, "you must take these few cows and calves, they belong to Rarabe, but you will have no rest until we are avenged, we are enemies for ever." The interpreter asked him, "Who began the war? Was it not yourselves?" The Kaffir men said, "No, it was one of your white men". The interpreter asked, "Who was that?" The Kaffir said, "It was Tsongolo (literally a reed and meaning the Rev. Mr. Read of the Kat River). Tsongolo held a great meeting, and told us that the English were gradually taking away all our land, and if we did not stand up and make resistance, they would not leave us any ground to sit upon. We saw that Tsongolo talked well, and we followed his advice, and you will repent it" (*vide Return of Caffre War*, p. 91). The deposition of Majecco was taken nine months after, viz. on September 27th, at Fort Peddie before the Justice of Peace, and agreed substantially with the above (*vide Return of Caffre War*, p. 265).

made by himself, his son, and some of the Hottentots. This meeting was in connection with the protest against a proposed Vagrant Act which was to prevent stealing and other concomitants of Hottentot idleness and vagrancy. It all tended to the same end, however—a general rising of the natives. Significantly enough, Mr. Thomson's people were quite agreed as to the necessity of such an Act becoming law—and sent a petition to the Governor to that effect. If any one circumstance more than another can be regarded as the chief cause of the war, it was the expulsion and exclusion of Maqomo and his thieving hordes from the neutral territory in 1829. This was the "injustice" so loudly complained of by Dr. Philip and the pseudo-philanthropic party.

Briefly recapitulated, it was this: in 1819, after every other expedient had failed, Lord Charles Somerset was forced to the conviction that the only means of preventing the extensive and continual plunder of the frontier colonists by the Kaffirs was to constitute the country between the Fish and the Keiskamma Rivers a neutral territory—ceded territory as it was then called—in which neither whites nor blacks should live. Unfortunately the treaty to this end with Gaika was verbal, and, subsequently, the right which Gaika had to enter into any such agreement was questioned and resented by other chiefs. However, it was effected. Maqomo, one of the expelled chiefs and son of Gaika, with his numerous followers, crept back into the forbidden land and re-established himself there. Though he had no permission to do so and his action was well known to the Government, it was decided to take no notice of it, but to allow him to remain so long as he conducted himself peaceably and honestly. On that condition he might have occupied the country as long as he pleased for any action to disturb him which would have been taken by the Colonial authorities. The effect of his presence so near to the frontier was, however, too manifest upon the farmer's stock, and when his continual misbehaviour was crowned by his murderous attack on the inoffensive Tambookies and his defiance of all law and order, there was absolutely no course open but to drive him forth again. The land thus vacated became the Hottentot Kat River Settlement. Again, without the sanction of the Government he gradually established himself

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in that district, and was permitted to remain on sufferance. But again, in 1833, it was necessary to expel him with Tyali and others. The "injustice" of this consisted in the Colonial authorities refusing to allow the lives and property of the frontier colonists to be sacrificed at the whim and cupidity of a "nation of thieves". Maqomo from the first seems to have entertained confident hopes of regaining the territory. In his exile, if it may be so termed, he was never at any great distance from the coveted land, and the frequent intercourse between his people and some of the Kat River settlers must have kept the matter warm in his mind. Further, the overtures which were made to him by the Hottentots, and more especially the unwarrantable interference and honeyed words of Dr. Philip and his friends, did much towards inducing him to attempt to regain it by violence. "Maqomo's heart was always sore about the land, the subject always set him on fire," said the chief Botman, in his evidence subsequently collected.¹ Apart, however, from these matters more immediately connected with Maqomo there were others, or perhaps more correctly a combination of others, which had their due influence in bringing about the war. As has happened at other periods in the history of our Kaffir warfare, the young men of that time, who had become capable of bearing arms, were either forgetful or ignorant of the punishment which their fathers and grandfathers had received in contest with the white man, and not profiting by their experience, but reckless in disposition and thirsting for plunder they were eager to try their strength with the same power. Although they miscalculated this, the probability of success in 1834 seemed to be greater than it had been in 1819, as at the later date the Kaffirs were vastly more numerous and had horses and some guns.²

¹ *Return of Caffre War*, p. 77. "I do not think it would be possible to adopt any more injudicious course towards the Caffres than that which Dr. Philip adopted, or is said to have adopted in 1830, and Mr. Read in 1834" (Colonel Wade's evidence, *Aborigines Committee Report*).

² The means by which the guns and gunpowder got into the hands of the Kaffirs was something of a mystery to the military authorities, who had taken every precaution to prevent it. Captain Beresford (*vide* his evidence, *Aborigines Committee Report*, questions 2491-2498) states that the guns were evidently made in Birmingham but had not belonged to any regiment, and therefore though an article of prohibited traffic, must have been supplied by British traders. He, however, had no proof of this; Captain Beresford's surmise was not far from the

To these causes of the war must be added the attitude and conduct of the paramount chief, Hintza. Early in 1834, he must have known what was in the minds of the border chiefs, and given them every encouragement in their hostile intentions. "You are my children, you are right in letting me know, fight away. I shall not come to fight, but the news is good," said he to a messenger from Tyali at a later date. And to Maqomo: "Let the cattle (i.e. the Colonial cattle) run to their father, I cannot come to fight, but it is good". In July he abandoned his great place, which was then situated a little beyond the present town of Butterworth, and took a position on the Ameva.¹ He could thus be out of the observation of his missionary, the Rev. J. Ayliff, whom he robbed, and be in a position to secrete the large numbers of cattle which, with good reason, he expected would be obtained from the Colony. Hoping to enlist the sympathy of the Pondo chief, Faku, and endeavouring to undermine the good feeling which existed between that chief and the Government, Hintza sent some oxen to him as a present and asked him to join in the proposed invasion of the Eastern Province. Faku, however, still mindful of his debt of gratitude to the British for saving him from the savage Fetcani, in 1828, refused to have anything to do with him.

The traders in his (Hintza's) country about this time were robbed and brutally treated by his people, one of them, the trader Purcell, being murdered in cold blood. Yet all this time Hintza was pretending to be amicably disposed

truth. The chief channel for guns and gunpowder to the Kaffirs was through the Kat River Settlement. Several Gonahs of that place carried on an illicit traffic, exchanging guns for oxen. But the greatest offender in this respect was Andries Stoffles, the field cornet, churchwarden, valet, and general factotum of Mr. Read. "It was generally said you can buy guns of Andries Stoffles at Mr. Read's," said the Hottentot Plaatje (*vide* his evidence, *Return of Caffre War*, p. 89). Stoffles' house almost adjoined Mr. Read's at Philipton, hence it is scarcely credible that Mr. Read himself was ignorant of what was going on.

But how did *these* people get the guns? *They* certainly were not direct importers from Birmingham. There *can* be but little doubt that the guilty parties—and perhaps those most to blame—were certain British traders in Grahamstown. Shortly before this time, a Missionary brought before the Magistrate some natives who had guns and gunpowder in their possession and compelled them to state from whom they were purchased. By this means one "loyal" trader in Grahamstown was identified.

¹ At a place now called Lubisi, on a small tributary of the White Kei River.

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The wily rascal, however, was regarded with the greatest suspicion, but not until his tragic death, yet to be recorded, did the depth of his cunning and treachery appear.

With this state of things in Kaffirland, it needed but little to start that career of bloodshed, robbery, and incendiarism which, during the last ten days of the year 1834, resulted in the burning of 450 farm-houses, the driving off of 4,000 horses, 100,000 head of cattle, and above 150,000 sheep, and the turning into a desert the districts of Albany and Somerset.

As has abundantly appeared from what has already been stated, the continued stealing of cattle and horses by the Kaffirs had long, too long, been a feature of the life of a frontier farmer, and in this respect there was nothing particularly exceptional in the fateful month of December, 1834. Eager as the Kaffirs were for war, a *casus belli* could, with the utmost ease, arise out of this state of affairs. This, in fact, took place, and the tribe of Eno drew first blood. The following affair may be considered as the commencement of the war of 1835. On November 20th, a farmer named Joubert, living in the bushy country near the Koonap River, was robbed of three horses and a foal. As was usual under such circumstances, he sent round to the neighbouring farmers and asked their assistance in recovering the stolen animals. A few collected, and having made provision for an absence of some days from their homes, they set out on horseback and followed the spoor of the stolen horses as far as a kraal situated near the right bank of the Keiskamma River, and belonging to one of Eno's Kaffirs. Arriving there, the farmers called for the captain or head man. They were told that no such person existed. They therefore demanded to see the chief Eno himself. From one of the more distant huts he (the chief), with some of his men, came and listened to the complaints of the robbed farmers. In the end he was satisfied with the evidence of the criminalty of his people, and expressed himself willing either to return the horses or make compensation. Pending

¹ For full details of the evidence on all these matters, *vide* the letters on pp. 212-244 in the *Blue Book: Return of Caffre War*, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, July 12th, 1837.

the fulfilment of his promise, the farmers bivouaced in the bush in the vicinity. CHAP.
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Finding, however, that after waiting five days and nights, there was no intention on the part of the Kaffirs to do anything, the farmers rode to Fort Willshire and reported the matter to the military authorities. On receipt of this intelligence, the officer in command immediately sent off a messenger to Eno telling him that unless the horses or their equivalent in cattle were sent to the farmers within eight days, a party of soldiers would visit the kraal and take the animals by force. This threat producing no effect, eleven men of the Mounted Rifles and four farmers under the command of Ensign Sparks, an inexperienced youth of barely twenty years of age, set out from Fort Willshire on December 2nd.¹

Arriving at the kraal to which the animals had been traced, and getting to their statements no replies from the sullen Kaffir who lived there, they dismounted and seized forty head of cattle.² When they were about to leave, the Kaffir told Sparks that Eno had already taken sixty from him for his offence, which he considered, certainly with reason, sufficient punishment. Ensign Sparks advised him to get them back from Eno. Having collected the captured cattle, the men were ordered to commence the return journey. Had there been any doubt in the minds of these men as to the preparedness of the Kaffirs for war, the events which happened during this return journey must have completely dispelled it. When they had proceeded about a mile, a very large body of Kaffirs armed with assegais and shields was seen to be approaching and disposing themselves so as to surround and attack them. Five of the soldiers rode forward towards the advancing host and fired a volley over their heads, while the remainder of the patrol rounded up the cattle and prepared generally for defence. The small party was in a very dangerous situation. While their fate thus hung in the balance, a solitary Kaffir on horseback was seen to ride forward with the evident desire of speaking to them. He was allowed to

¹ *Vide* despatch from Sir B. Durban to Lord Glenelg, June 8th, 1836.

² It is stated that the market price of horses at that date was £7 10s. and of Kaffir cattle 12s., hence allowing some consideration for the foal, no injustice was done to the Kaffirs in this reprisal.

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II. Stock. He brought a message from his father to the effect that he (Eno) was unwilling to give any offence to the Colonial Government. Stock stated, further, that he had just prevented a large body of Kaffirs from following the patrol, and that, in accordance with his father's instructions, he was about to return in order to fetch twenty head of cattle as compensation for the stolen horses.

It should be stated that, as subsequent evidence showed, Eno all along was against the war; but like most other Kaffir chiefs he had very little influence in restraining his people from cattle stealing; and when Maqomo and Tyali had succeeded in precipitating matters, he was compelled to join in the general rising. This intervention of Stock undoubtedly saved the fifteen men from the extermination which seemed so imminent. They were thus enabled to continue their journey towards Fort Willshire. But their troubles were not yet at an end. Having proceeded about seven miles further, their path then lay near one of those bushy ravines which, in time of war, give such advantage to the Kaffir in his attacks on mounted men, more especially when encumbered with cattle. From such a cover a body of Kaffirs rushed forth. Some endeavoured to disperse the cattle, while others held the bridles of some of the horses and brandished their assegais in face of the men.

Ensign Sparks was afraid to give orders to fire upon them, though his men besought him to do so, and told him that otherwise their lives would be sacrificed. It is said that, through an interpreter, he threatened the Kaffirs with this extreme measure and that they shouted back he dare not do so. In spite of this, however, and without firing a shot the soldiers recollected the cattle and continued their march, keeping the enemy at a distance until they ceased to follow. When almost within sight of the fort, the cattle and men rushed forward and Ensign Sparks followed at his leisure. As he was passing close to a large clump of bush, a Kaffir sprang out, hurled an assegai at him, and fled. The blade passed through his arm. He quickly withdrew it and rode as hard as he could to the fort, bleeding profusely the whole way. Arriving there he was immediately attended to, but he had lost so much

blood, and it was found so difficult to arrest the hæmorrhage that for a time his life was in danger. In the end, however, he survived. Thus the Kaffirs drew first blood.¹

Colonel Somerset, the commandant of the frontier, happened to be at Fort Willshire when these men returned. The sight of the wounded officer and the account of these hostile indications determined him to lose no time in patrolling those same parts and visiting Eno with a much larger force. Accordingly, on the evening of that same day, he set out with a considerable number of the Mounted Rifles and scoured the bush along the whole route to Eno's place. But not a Kaffir was to be found. All, with their cattle, had fled over the Keiskamma. A messenger was sent to Eno asking him to interview the Colonel at the camp which had been formed. On the evening of the next day the chief arrived with a large retinue of followers. He was in a very conciliatory mood. He assured the Colonel of his innocence in any part of what had just taken place, and instanced his sending his son Stock to restrain the people. The Colonel told him that his people had, by their recent misconduct and general misdemeanour, forfeited the indulgence of residing on the west of the Keiskamma which had been allowed them on tenure of good behaviour, and that he was now prepared to scour every part of that country until the last man was driven over that river. Further, he demanded from Eno the restoration of 150 head of cattle and the horses already stolen. The chief made no demur, but placed his son and a body of Kaffirs under the Colonel's orders. For two days Colonel Somerset continued on this work, and then handed it over to Captain Armstrong. In the end, 137 cattle and 13 horses were captured and sent to the Civil Commissioner at Grahamstown for distribution to the rightful owners.²

From about this time, each day brought to light unmistakable indications of the plot which was maturing throughout Kaffirland. Depredations, especially of horses, increased both in number and the audacity and recklessness with which they were committed.

¹ *Vide* correspondence relative to the *Caffre War*, July 12th, 1837, p. 158.

² But within about a week afterwards the total number of animals sent in by Eno was 237 head of cattle and 18 horses.

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The most defiant determination to reoccupy the wooded kloofs in the neutral territory became more and more evident. Scarcely was a military patrol, which had been sent to clear those parts, out of sight before the Kaffirs returned to them. In this respect Tyali was the greatest offender. The extent to which the forests of the Mancazana valleys were believed to have become invaded and the defiance which Tyali's people were showing, impressed Colonel Somerset with the necessity of strong and immediate measures. The force at his disposal, however, was always too small for the dangerous work to be accomplished, and the mere handful of men which was usually sent against great hordes of savages safely ensconced in bush-covered hills, more often than not invited disaster. On such a mission Lieutenant Sutton of the 75th Regiment, with one sergeant and twelve privates of the Mounted Rifles, set out from Fort Beaufort, on December 10th. Their object was to drive out a large body of Kaffirs which was congregated on some high land situated between the Mancazana and Gaga Rivers, and not far from the present town of Alice. Arriving in those parts, the small force with much difficulty dislodged a large number of the intruders, but undoubtedly only a small proportion of those who were in hiding and who, probably, were watching their movements. On the return journey a wooded kloof was visited, to which some horses, which had been stolen from Fort Beaufort some days previously, had been traced. At this place some empty huts and kraals containing cattle were found, but no Kaffirs were to be seen—for a time—at all events. The soldiers set fire to the huts and took the cattle (the number not stated) as compensation for the stolen horses. While this was going on, some other cattle were seen, at a distance, to emerge from the bush into the open. The sergeant with six men were sent to take these also. Then the tactics of the hidden Kaffirs became apparent. Having thus succeeded in dividing the patrol into two smaller bodies, they rushed out and endeavoured to surround both. The two smaller parties managed to rejoin and immediately commenced a retreat. They drove the cattle before them slowly towards Fort Beaufort, defending themselves against a force of about 300 Kaffirs armed with assegais, who were kept at bay by shots which either fell short or passed

over their heads. In this manner they reached, at dusk, a gloomy ravine through which their path lay. To enter this they felt would be certain death to all as the steep and bushy slopes on both sides of the road were suspected of harbouring other hostile Kaffirs. Halting there, they found their surmise to be correct. Kaffirs suddenly arose on all sides in great numbers. One party of them rushed for the cattle and succeeded in driving the animals away, while another endeavoured to surround the patrol. The fight then took place at closer quarters and became more severe. Two Kaffirs were killed and two were wounded; while on the side of the patrol one man and two horses were wounded by assegais. The firing in the otherwise still summer evening was heard in Fort Beaufort, about three miles distant, when a large force instantly set out to their assistance and rescued them from their perilous situation.

Although on the whole this may be regarded as a small affair, there were two incidents in it which, at any other time, would probably have passed unnoticed, but in the prevailing war-like disposition of the Kaffirs were looked upon—or pretended to be looked upon—as of so serious a nature as to be matters of national alarm and reasons for immediate attack upon the Colony. These were firstly, the seizure of cattle which were the personal property of a chief. This has reference to the cattle which emerged from the bush and which were seized by the seven soldiers. They were said to belong to Tyali himself. But this the men, under the circumstances, could not know. Moreover, there can be but little doubt but that they were deliberately driven forth with a view to rendering an attack upon the patrol more certain of success. Secondly, during the fight at the entrance to the ravine, one of the Kaffirs who was wounded was Xoxo, a brother of Tyali, a man of little repute and consequence among the tribes. But at this juncture the wounding of this petty chief became an insult to the memory of their national ancestor, Rarabe, and could be expiated only in Colonial blood. The extent of the wound itself may be judged from the following account of the Rev. W. Chalmers, the missionary at the Chumie among those people. "Hearing Xoxo was most severely wounded in the head," says Mr. Chalmers, "I

CHAP. II. thought it necessary to request my assistant, Mr. Weir, to accompany me to visit him. We were never more astonished when we entered Xoxo's hut and found him as healthy as usual, having no bandage round his head, nor any appearance of a wound, although his head was shaved. We asked to see the wound and were surprised to find it a mere scratch."

The news of this collision spread throughout Kaffirland with incredible swiftness. For days messengers were running in all directions raising the blood-curdling war-cry and assembling the hostile clans. Within a very short time, Hintza heard of it and gave as his answer to the envoy, "You have been badly used by the English, and as you have already begun to fight, go on". The numerous followers of the Ndhambi chiefs, Umhala and Gazella, living nearer to the coast, welcomed the news and prepared immediately for fight. The restless and thieving hordes of Eno and Botman, in like manner, were eager to break loose and join with those of Tyali and Maqomo. And although the Amagqunukwebi chiefs, Pato, Kama, and Congo treated the messages with contempt,¹ and for themselves personally refused to join in the movement, hundreds of their people were among the first invaders of the Colony. In spite of all this, however, until it actually occurred, the intended attack upon the Colony was unknown to all in Kaffirland except to those who were to take part in it. Not only the missionaries and traders, but even many of the Kaffirs themselves were ignorant of what was impending.²

The most important witness of the incidents connected with the first outbreak of war is the Rev. W. Chalmers, the missionary at the Chumie, who lived practically among Tyali's people, and who, as far as was permitted, was the friend and

¹ *Vide Aborigines Committee Report*, p. 659.

² The missionary, J. Laing, wrote from the Burns Hill Mission Station on December 20th to the Civil Commissioner in Grahamstown stating that the greater part of Kaffirland was in a very distracted state, and that he did not know how to account for it. The Rev. W. Shaw, missionary at Wesleyville, became aware of the intended war just as it was about to commence, *vide* his evidence, *Aborigines Committee Report*, p. 55. *Vide* also the evidence of Jan Tzatzoe, the Christian Kaffir chieftain. Answers 4547-4551, *ibid.* The Kaffir Galakaza, a prisoner in the district jail in Grahamstown, stated on June 9th, 1835, that "when the present war commenced I was residing at the Debe River with Umkye's people. I did not know of the intention of the Caffres to make war until it actually broke out. The first intimation I had was seeing Caffres proceeding to the Colony and returning with plunder."



BURNS HILL MISSION STATION



THE CHIEF XOXO

adviser of the chief himself. Mr. Chalmers tells us that, on December 13th, he left his mission station to visit Grahams-town on business, not knowing or suspecting that there was anything unusual among the Kaffirs in his district. So much so that he left his wife and children at the lonely mission station in charge of the Kaffirs. He returned on the evening of the 17th and found a great change, all was bustle and confusion. The mission buildings, huts, and lands were crowded with Kaffir women and children seeking refuge, the men having left their habitations and either taken to the forests or assembled round their chiefs, and everywhere the greatest excitement prevailed. Mr. Chalmers then received an exaggerated account of the actions of Lieutenant Sutton's patrol and the injury done to Xoxo. The next morning Tyali, with his councillors, arrived at Mr. Chalmers' house and, in a peremptory manner, told the missionary to write to the nearest military post and demand a reason for the wounding of Xoxo. Mr. Chalmers communicated with Captain Armstrong at the Kat River Post.

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The answer received was not considered satisfactory, and in no measure conciliated the angry deputation. Mr. Chalmers then advised Tyali himself to visit the post and interview the officer. He seemed inclined to do so, but his councillors would not allow it. "No," they said, "the English have murdered Eno's son, they have killed Zeko, and to-day they have killed Xoxo—one of Gaika's sons. Tyali shall not go to the post, do you wish him to be killed also? No, we must bite the white man to-day." It was after this interview that Mr. Chalmers visited Xoxo with the result already mentioned. On the 19th, Colonel Somerset, having become aware of the state of affairs, arrived at the Kat River Post and commenced his preparations for dealing with the emergency. He sent through Mr. Chalmers a message to Tyali asking that chief to go and see him. Tyali's first intention was to send the same answer as had been given to the officer the previous day. To that end Mr. Chalmers was told to write the letter and send it. Some difficulty arose, however, in getting it taken to the Colonel. In the meantime Tyali and his councillors hit upon a plot whereby they hoped to capture Colonel Somerset and probably to murder him. In pursuance of this they told Mr.

CHAP. Chalmers not to send the letter, but instead, to invite the
II. Colonel to come to the mission station accompanied by only two unarmed men when Tyali would meet him with the same number. They then talked over their troubles in a friendly manner. "Chumie was a place of peace, where God's Word was preached," he urged, "while the military post was a place of war." "Judging no evil," says Mr. Chalmers, "I wrote as requested and dispatched the messenger at 5.30 in the morning. Scarcely had he got out of sight when the Kaffirs came pouring into the village from the direction of Tyali's kraal.

"In the course of a very few minutes, the institution was surrounded by 800 or 1,000 armed Kaffirs, yelling and shouting as if they were triumphing over a fallen victim. I was astonished at this conduct, and proceeded to the foot of the village to ask what it all meant and why they had broken the word of the chief, when to my great astonishment, Tyali himself stood forth in the midst of them. I remonstrated with him on the deceitfulness of such conduct and entreated them to go home; but they answered only with a horrid yell and withdrew about 400 yards and sat down in ambush until the messenger returned. Fortunately the Colonel did not come, and his answer being unsatisfactory, I had to write to him in the name of Tyali challenging him to come and punish him and take away his cattle."

The site of the Chumie Mission Station and the scene of all this commotion was the undulating land near the base of one of the Amatola Mountains, known as the Chumie Mountain, about twelve miles from the present town of Alice. The situation is one of great beauty. Stretching away to the immediate right—the observer supposed to be standing on the mission lands and facing the mountains—is the Lushington Mountain with its majestic grandeur of wooded kloof and krantz, and still further in the same direction Pfeffer's Kop and the gigantic Hog's Back Mountain complete the magnificence of the view. The sides of these mountains are covered with dense bush and trees, and here and there enormous naked precipices stand out in bold relief. The whole scene is one of awe-inspiring, it might almost be said, depressing, vastness. For the Chumie missionary, in his isolation, it must often have been one of direful foreboding when it was realised that many

thousands of hostile Kaffirs could take cover in that bush and be able in a very short time to rush forth into the open and sweep all before them. A few small sunburnt brick houses, such as the missionary's residence and the church, and several Kaffir huts dotted about in the near vicinity constituted the "Institution". To-day there is to be seen little more of this mission station than a few ruins and the small walled-in cemetery which contains the remains of Mr. Chalmers and some of his family.

When Tyali, by sending his insolent message to Colonel Somerset, had thrown down the gauntlet, no further dissimulation of their real intentions was maintained by the Kaffir war party. Maqomo, with hundreds of his warriors, was in hiding in the Chumie Mountain fastnesses, and having waited in vain for the appearance of Colonel Somerset, he came forth and joined his forces to those of Tyali. Everything was now ready for the long premeditated onslaught on the unsuspecting Colony. On the Saturday and Sunday, scouts were sent out to watch the movements of Colonel Somerset and Captain Armstrong, and, as the last preliminary to going to war, they killed their cattle and goats and feasted voraciously on the meat. And, perhaps in observance of all due formality, Tyali went to Mr. Chalmers and told him that the land was "dead" (*ilizwe lafile*).

On the afternoon of Sunday, December 21st, the immense body of Kaffirs which had been collected was divided into numbers of smaller parties for the purpose of attacking different points simultaneously, and forthwith the work of murder, robbery, and destruction began. By ten o'clock that night a large party of Maqomo's people arrived at the farm-house of Stephanus Buys at Groot Hoek on the lower part of the Kat River below Fort Beaufort. Having surrounded the house, their noise caused Buys to come out to learn what they wanted at so late an hour. Ignorant of their hostile intentions, he appeared unarmed. In obedience to the call of his wife, who had become alarmed, he turned to re-enter his house when he was seized by the collar of his coat, pulled to the ground, and in a few moments he was lying dead, pierced by assegais. His terrified wife and six children fled out at the back of the house into the darkness, and were at no great distance when they saw their home in flames. The marauders drove off

CHAP. 230 cattle, 18 horses, and 2,300 sheep. A little later on this
II. same night, the homestead of Mr. Wessels, also in the Fort Beaufort district, was attacked by Maqomo's people, though probably not by the same individuals who had visited Buys, as those must have had enough to do in taking charge of the large number of animals which had been stolen. In like manner the farmer was enticed outside, but in this case he managed to escape with his family, though one of his servants was murdered. All his stock, consisting of about 200 cattle and 17 horses, was driven off. And in like manner the fire-brand was applied to the thatch of the house and soon all was destroyed by fire and the homeless fugitives compelled to find shelter in the adjacent bush. Undoubtedly in accordance with their preconcerted tactics, Tyali's people moved off on the Monday and turned their attention to the more southern regions, their objective being the country along the Fish River extending from Hermanus Kraal (Fort Brown) to Kaffir Drift. Fort Willshire was passed *en route* and surrounded by thousands of Kaffirs, who, for a time posted themselves on the adjacent hills, but out of range of the guns which were directed upon them. A few days afterwards this fort had to be abandoned, and all the available force concentrated at Fort Beaufort. Tyali's forces were soon greatly augmented by those of the chiefs Umkye, Seyolo, and Botman, and also by many of Hintza's people from the distant Kei—as well also by large hordes of the Amagqunukwebi, the people of the friendly chiefs Pato, Kama, and Congo.

These chiefs for themselves sent a message through their missionary, the Rev. W. Shepstone, on December 23rd, to Colonel Somerset to the effect that "at this juncture of general ferment in Kaffirland we possess the same feeling and sentiments towards the Colony as those embodied in our manifesto of September 3rd, 1833". This well-planned attack practically placed the whole of the Eastern frontier, extending from the Great Winterberg Mountain to the sea, in the hands of the Kaffirs. The onslaught was almost irresistible, for the regular military force at the command of Colonel Somerset was barely sufficient for the defence of the outposts of Grahams-town, and withal, the total amount of ammunition in the Government magazine was at its lowest ebb. The surprise

and suddenness of the attack made it impossible to collect together any large number of farmers or burghers for repelling the enemy, as, in their isolated position, each, unless murdered before aware of his danger, had to remain in his own home or assemble only in small numbers for the defence of their families and property until, overpowered by numbers, they were compelled to save their lives by flight to Grahamstown.

Those who lived in regions adjacent to the Fish River and its almost impenetrable bush suffered most, more especially those who lived in parts where the roads from the Colony into Kaffirland, such as they were, crossed the river, as at Trompetter's Drift, Double Drift, and Committees.

On the Tuesday, thousands of the enemy crossed at Trompetter's Drift, and laid waste everything in their route. A trader, Albert Kirkman, who was with his waggon near the drift, was overtaken by some of these and murdered. The farm of a Mr. Howse was visited and every head of live stock driven off; in this case, however, no life was taken. The chief Umkye and his people were among the hordes which invaded the Colony at this point, and were responsible for the murder of a young man named John Shaw, and the raid upon the farms of W. Shaw and the brothers Richard (afterwards Sir Richard) and George Southey. John Shaw, a clerk in a mercantile house in Grahamstown, having read correctly the signs of the times, became apprehensive for the safety of his brother William, who was farming near the Southneys at Trompetter's Drift. He determined to go to his assistance, and, though strongly advised not to do so, went forth on horseback alone. Arriving safely at the farm, the two brothers rode over to the Southneys to learn whether they were at all concerned at the vague rumours which had reached them. They found good grounds for their fears, for not only were the Southneys, who also had realised what was taking place in Kaffirland, preparing for flight, but the chief Umkye was upon the place, and though apparently unaccompanied, there was reason to believe that the adjacent bush was infested with his followers.

The Shaw brothers hurried back to their own place, but only to find it entirely in the hands of the Kaffirs. Seeing

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their danger they decided to return to the Southeys and to join them in their retreat to Grahamstown. William tarried a while at the farm while John went on. When William approached the Southeys' house he saw that it also was in possession of the enemy, and that an attempt to surround him was being made. By a devious path, therefore, he avoided the house and reached the top of the hill which overlooks Trompetter's Drift and the distant road, and saw the Southeys' waggons hurrying on to Grahamstown. He overtook them and found that the party had been joined by other fugitives, but his brother was not with them. After the war it was ascertained that when John Shaw approached the Southeys' house, it was full of Kaffirs, and that they allowed him to get near and then rushed out and murdered him. His gun was afterwards found in the possession of Umkye. In returning with the spoil to their own country, they must have murdered William Hogg, another trader, on his way from Kaffirland to Trompetter's Drift, for his dead body and ransacked waggon were afterwards found on the line of their retreat. On Wednesday, the Fish River was well in the rear of the advancing hordes, and the whole of the Eastern Province was now in the wildest alarm at rumours and reports which could no longer be doubted. The little village of Bathurst and Grahamstown were being thronged with the fugitives who had been so fortunate as to escape with life from their burning homes, carrying with them nothing but the clothes they wore at the time of surprise, and these in many cases, in consequence of the hurry of the departure, were of the scantiest. Cattle, horses, sheep, waggons, household furniture, all fell an easy booty to the ruthless savage. In Lower Albany on this day, homestead after homestead was raided and the fruit of fifteen years of British settler labour and enterprise vanished in a few hours. Before nightfall—it was Christmas Eve—thousands of cattle were on their way to Kaffirland, while the rightful owners were homeless or lying dead upon their ruined properties.

In the vicinity of the present Martindale, four settlers lost their lives on this December 24th. One, Robert Cramer, while driving some cattle into what he evidently hoped was a place of safety was overtaken and murdered. Messrs. Mahoney and W. H. Henderson, with their families, were

hurrying from their farm at the Clay Pits to Grahamstown when, according to the following account of an eyewitness, they fell victims to the Kaffir assegai. "My father had a farm near Mr. Mahoney's at the Clay Pits," said Mr. Whitfield. "One night about ten o'clock a Hottentot messenger came running up to the house and told us that the Kaffirs had broken out and that we were all to be killed. My father happened to have gone to Grahamstown on business, but we expected him soon to return. On receipt of this news we commenced immediately to pack up bedding and other necessaries and to place them on one waggon.

"We had not made much progress, however, when distant yells and whistling told us that the Kaffirs were approaching. They came and drove off most of our cattle. I do not know why they did not take all. They did not otherwise molest us. When my father returned at a later hour, we went over to the Mahoneys to learn what they intended to do. We considered whether we should go to Kaffir Drift Post, where we believed there were some soldiers, or whether we should attempt the longer journey to Grahamstown.

"We decided upon the latter, and without loss of time we set about preparing to move off at daylight. At the first sign of dawn our oxen were inspanned and we started. I was the leader of the oxen of the first waggon. When we had gone about half a mile and were travelling along a road which lay at the foot of a bushy hill, about sixty Kaffirs in three parties rushed out from the bush and completely surrounded us. We could do nothing, we were entirely at their mercy. One Kaffir came up to me and cut the riem out of my hand as I would not loosen my hold on the front oxen. I saw a tall yellow Kaffir throw an assegai and hit Mr. Mahoney in the side. Mr. Mahoney fired at him but the gun snapped; the Kaffir then stabbed him in the neck. Mr. Mahoney fell on his knees and again tried to fire, but again the gun merely snapped. Another assegai was thrown at him and hit him in the back when he fell forward and died. I remember the scene as well as if it had been yesterday. I did not see Mr. Henderson killed; I think he must have been stabbed while he was in the waggon. Our two Hottentot servants with my younger brother and two sisters fled into the Kap River bush. The

CHAP. Kaffirs did not follow them, and they did not attempt to kill
II. me as they could easily have done. One shouted to me 'Hamba, baleka' (go on, run), which I did at a smart pace and joined the others in the bush. Mrs. Mahoney, with little Miss Henderson (aged 6), would not come with us but walked the several miles to Kaffir Drift Post. When she got there she found it abandoned, and so returned to the scene of the murder of her husband, and then commenced the journey to Grahamstown.

"We children were in the bush three days and three nights moving slowly in the same direction. We ate 'tuma,' a kind of sweet potato which the Hottentots dug up for us. About three o'clock in the afternoon of the first day of our wanderings we came in sight of Mr. Forbes' place at Waai Plaats.

"Mr. Forbes was approaching his house, and was in sight of his wife and children who were outside, when I saw a party of Kaffirs seize him and kill him. I then saw the cattle being driven off, and in a short time the house was burning. The cattle were being driven towards the place where we were hiding, in fact, they passed within a hundred yards of us. We were very frightened. We had a little dog with us, which we killed for fear it might bark and draw the attention of the Kaffirs towards us; we approached Grahamstown by the Governor's Kop (Peddie) road. When we were about five miles from town we saw a mounted patrol coming towards us. At first we were frightened and hid in a dry vlei at the side of the road, but when they passed us and we saw that they were the Cape Corps we called out to them. They were on their way to fetch in the bodies of the murdered people. We then got safely into town."¹

Although the suddenness and unexpected nature of the invasion rendered impossible any efficient measures for repelling the enemy at this early stage, yet the experience of the older Dutch inhabitants in Kaffir warfare counted for something in giving, at least, a temporary check to the progress of the marauders. This was eminently the case in the Winterberg district, where during the past week of the war the Kaffirs

¹ The above account is the substance of an interview which the author had with old Mr. Whitfield, the leader of the front oxen on this occasion, at his farm at the mouth of the Fish River in July, 1900.

who attacked those parts met with severe punishment, though less than their due. .

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Reports of the state of affairs in the Fort Beaufort district reached the brave and indefatigable Pieter Retief, who then lived at the Winterberg, on December 22nd. With his step-son, Jan Greyling, he rode hastily from farm to farm and directed all the people to assemble at three different places, and the men to be ready for patrol or other duty. "I sent out patrols in all directions," says Retief. "On Wednesday, five of my patrol fell in with a number of Caffres driving 500 cattle and 1,000 sheep. These animals were taken and brought to my place and three of the Caffres were shot. On Thursday morning, accompanied by Field Cornet Viljoen and twenty men, we overtook a body of Caffres and about 800 cattle.

"We retook these and killed five of the thieves; the cattle I sent on to the Koonap Post. Viljoen and his patrol left my place just about sunset on that day, and scarcely were they out of sight when Caffres approached from all directions. They were mounted, clothed, and armed with guns. They came to the kraal and commenced to fire upon us; we returned the fire and a brisk engagement took place. Meanwhile the women and children were making their escape on foot. When it was quite dark, still more Caffres came. As there were only seven of us, and our ammunition was running short, we fled to save our lives. We were scarcely on the hills before all our premises were alight." There seem to have been no casualties on either side in this engagement.

On the 24th, Retief received a pressing appeal for help against a large party of Kaffirs, which was believed to be on its way to the place of a farmer named Bear. Of the thirty men he had with him only eleven could be spared for this service. These started off, and when about half an hour from their destination they saw a formidable number of Kaffirs rushing towards them. Fortunately for the farmers the Kaffirs were armed only with assegais. Taking careful aim, seven they killed outright and several were wounded by the first volley. This caused a temporary check to the assailants and enabled the patrol to rush for a steep though not very high kopje, at no great distance in their rear, to the top of which they scrambled before further attack was made. The

CHAP. Kaffirs then broke short their assegais for the purpose of
II. stabbing and attempted to storm the position. They were easily beaten back with a loss of seventy-five of their number, while not one of the farmers was wounded.

In the evening of that day, Retief collected together the three separate parties, which included 202 women and children. With their waggons, cattle, and sheep, he conducted them to the place of Jan Greyling, Kaffirs following them at some distance. Arrived at what was hoped to be a place of safety, an attempt was made to form a laager with the waggons, but with no great success, as there was not a sufficient number to enclose the large space necessary for the numerous cattle and sheep. "I then placed armed men round the cattle and house," continues Retief. "About ten o'clock that night, when it was cloudy and very dark, the Kaffirs came and first attacked the house guard, but they were repulsed. A tall Kaffir had nearly stabbed Abraham Greyling, when he was shot by Barend Greyling. Shortly after they attacked the cattle kraal. The greater number were driven back, but some managed to creep unseen among the cattle. The animals were driven out, and the Kaffirs so mixed themselves with the cattle that it was impossible for the Boers, especially in the darkness, to fire at the former without killing the latter. In this manner about 2,000 were driven off. Early next morning, Jan Greyling with his brothers and some other burghers, fifteen in all, followed up the cattle and succeeded in recovering about 500. Determined to rob the Boers of their last beast, the Kaffirs renewed their attack with increased violence on the second night. Dark though the night was, they rushed on the laager five times, hurling their assegais and endeavouring to get among the remaining cattle. Four times the party of fifty-three armed men drove them back, but on the fifth, the Hottentot herds fled and thus the Kaffirs got into the temporary kraal, and in spite of the Boer muskets nearly all the cattle were driven off. Of the 2,600 herd which the three parties had brought with them, barely 250 remained. Eight dead Kaffirs were found near the laager the next morning, and from the number of blood spoor it was evident that many must have been wounded. On the side of the defenders, two were wounded, a slave boy and a Bastard named

Piet Exsteen, who had part of his right arm shot off; this, however, may have been done by his comrades. With the assistance of some Boers from the Tarka district, the people moved off to a place of greater safety between the Great Winterberg and the Tarka.¹

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Without unduly multiplying instances, the unhappy plight and horror experienced by those who lived on isolated farm homesteads at this time may be judged from the terrible experience of the widow Matthys of the Zuurberg.

In her evidence² before the Committee for the relief of those who had been rendered destitute by this unprovoked invasion of the savages, she said: "After supper and family worship, my husband went out as usual, leaving the door open. I was sitting in my bedroom waiting for him, when a pane of glass was smashed in the window close to me, and immediately a knob-kerrie flew into the bedroom through another pane; turning towards the window in alarm, I saw a musket pointed through it directly at my breast, but it did not go off. I put the candle out as quickly as possible and stood a little on one side of the window. There was another candle still burning in the front room, and I saw a Kaffir come in and light a bundle of straw at it, and apply it to the thatch. Proceeding into the front room, I saw my eldest son Charles with his gun; he asked if he should fire on the Caffres; I told him not to do so, but to go to prayer, which he did. After this my youngest son, thirteen years of age, who was asleep in bed, being roused by the noise, went towards the door, and immediately received an assegai in his right side, and fell into the house. L. Van der Linden took him up and brought him to me in the bedroom. The Caffres then set the house on fire a second time on the opposite side, and I got part of my property conveyed to the door, ready to be taken out in case the Caffres should retire, and the house be consumed. While I was in the front room with the children and the two Van der Lindens, a ball was fired in at the door, and lodged in a partition wall, but did not touch anybody. The house was

¹ The number of Kaffirs killed by these Boers was as follows:—

Greyling's patrol 75. During the attack on Greyling places 9; while stealing sheep 1. Driving stolen cattle 1. Viljoen's party 4. Coester's party 10. Bear's patrol 7. P. Koester's party 6. Total 113.

² Vide *Blue Book Return of Caffre War*, July 12th, 1837. Case 1194, p. 318.

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now full of smoke; I desired the two Van der Lindens to take some of my goods outside the house but they were afraid. Cornelius put his head out at the door to see if the Caffres were gone, when an assegai was immediately hurled at him, and stuck in the door. Immediately after this, the Caffres set up a hideous noise, and drove all the cattle out of the fold, which was only about a hundred yards from the house.

“It was soon discovered that the fire might probably be extinguished. . . . When the fire was extinguished, and the property carried into the house again, as my husband did not make his appearance, my eldest son again inquired of Prince if he had not seen him; Prince replied that he had seen something lying in the kraal, but did not know what it was. Being informed of this, I questioned him again, and sent the children with him to see what it was; it proved to be the corpse of their dead father. They brought him into the house, and then I sent for my mother from an adjoining house, where she and my father were living. . . . When we had washed my husband, we found he had no less than thirteen assegai wounds. The following day I buried him and sent a servant to inform Mr. Hart of Somerset and to solicit assistance.” Some burghers with a span of oxen went in answer to her appeal. About four hours after leaving, the son William died of his wounds.

Considering the large number of invaders, estimated by Colonel Somerset at 20,000, the actual number of persons killed during this first rush upon the Colony was surprisingly small, viz. twenty-four farmers and people on farms, and eight traders.

And when, in conjunction with this, one takes into account the enormous number of horses, cattle, and sheep which were driven off, it would appear that plunder¹ was more the motive of the greater number of Kaffirs than wanton murder or revenge for any supposed political wrongs, though there can be

¹ *Vide Blue Book*, July 12th, 1837, p. 537:—

	Value.		
	£	s.	d.
5,715 Horses	28,575	0	0
114,930 Cattle	143,662	10	0
161,930 Sheep and Goats	36,434	0	0
456 Houses burnt	65,600	0	0
456 Household goods, etc.	15,680	0	0
300 Houses pillaged	9,000	0	0
58 Waggons	1,450	0	0
Total	£300,401	10	0

no doubt that this latter operated in the breasts of Maqomo, Tyali, and the leading men of the tribe.

A most noticeable feature of this onslaught was the respect which was paid to the lives of women and children. To the credit of the savage intruders be it said that, with one exception, and this not during the first great rush over the border, no instance of the murder of either can be recorded against them.¹ In case after case we read of women and children escaping at the back of the house and finding safety in the adjacent bush or rocks, where undoubtedly the Kaffirs would have found them had they intended to kill them. The object obviously was to get the stock, and the surest means to this end was the murder of the owner or person in charge. But towards the traders, on the other hand, over and above the desire to rob, there seems to have been a cruel and vindictive spirit which induced the Kaffirs deliberately to seek their blood as well as their goods. For in nearly all these cases, although the trader had fled and left house and merchandise to the mercy of the natives, he was pursued, overtaken, and killed. The trader Warren, for instance, who kept a store in Maqomo's county, perceiving his danger, left all and sought refuge with the missionary, the Rev. J. Kayser at Knapps Hope.

Between four and five o'clock on the afternoon of Tuesday, December 23rd, a commando of Kaffirs under Maqomo's great councillor Umaxosi arrived at the mission house and demanded the trader. Mr. Kayser's influence with the people at first succeeded in persuading them to promise that Warren's life should be spared if he delivered up all his property. On appearing at the door, however, he was roughly seized, and in spite of the missionary imploring and beseeching them in all the terms he could command, Warren was dragged to a short distance and murdered.

Whether this was with the consent and approval of Maqomo himself, or whether the councillors and people refused to respect the wishes of their chiefs in such matters is most doubtful. But it is quite certain that in restraining their followers from acts of robbery and murder the influence of the chief was

¹ This exception was the case of a Mrs. Trollip, who on May 13th, 1835, while staying at a farm of Mr. Collett at the Koonap, was stabbed to death during an attack upon that farm.

CHAP. II. at all times small. In many cases these took place in direct opposition to their wishes, not, however, that the chiefs were any more honest than those they were supposed to be governing, but because they knew from experience that they would be the first to be held accountable to the Colonial Government. When Tyali, so to speak, gave his ultimatum to Mr. Chalmers on December 21st, he assured the missionary that the lives of the traders and missionaries would be spared. But almost immediately afterwards, by his own people and near his own place at the Chumie, the trader Robert Rogers was murdered. The poor man was engaged in erecting a new building when a party of Kaffirs attacked him with knob-kerries. His little girls were with him at the time. The eldest sprang between her father and his assailants and endeavoured to ward off the blows from him. The efforts of the brave little girl, in spite of the injuries she received, were fruitless however; for in a few moments Rogers lay dead.¹

Except that no deliberate attempt was made on the lives of the missionaries, their plight was not much better than that of the traders, notwithstanding the promises of protection on the part of the chiefs. On December 28th, Mr. Kayser was advised by Maqomo to abandon his station and to repair for safety to Burns Hill. Sutú, the great wife of the late paramount chief Gaika, with her son Sandilli, a boy of fourteen, lived near the Glasgow Mission Station at Burns Hill, near which place also Gaika himself was buried. Sutú had great influence with the Gaikas and was kindly disposed towards the missionaries, hence, for a time Burns Hill was the chief harbour of refuge for both missionaries and traders. This mission is still in existence. It is situated at the foot of Mount Macdonald, one of the Amatola Mountains, and about seven miles from Middle Drift along the road from that place to Keiskamma Hoek. In pursuance of their career of spoliation, the small distinction which the hostile Kaffirs made between missionaries and other Europeans is well illustrated in their treatment of the Rev. John Brownlee. This good man was the London Society's Missionary stationed among a small clan known as the Ama-

¹Other traders who were murdered either at their stations or while journeying with their waggons were George Iles, John Stamford, Robert Hodges—Cane—Budding—Kent—Edwards.

tinde, then occupying the lands on which the present town of King William's Town now stands. The chief of the tribe was an old man named Tzatzoe, who was, however, only the nominal chief, his son Jan Tzatzoe being the actual ruler.

Jan in his youth had been a protégé of the famous Dr. Vander Kemp at Bethelsdorp, and having received such education as that institution afforded, became something of the nature of an assistant-missionary to Mr. Brownlee, when the Tzatzoe Mission was started in 1826. Under the combined influence of Mr. Brownlee and Jan Tzatzoe the Amatinde refrained for a time from joining the other Kaffirs in their war upon the Colony. Eventually, however, they entered into the general scramble and proved as conscienceless thieves as any, even with violence, and in his presence they robbed their missionary of his last stick of furniture. Abandoned by all his people except those who remained to steal his property, Mr. Brownlee with his family, and a worthy old trader named Kirkman and his wife, were left beyond reach of help from the Colony, even were their dangerous situation known. Reluctant to leave his post of duty, he refused to avail himself of the means of escape which Tzatzoe offered him and of which Tzatzoe himself had taken advantage. All his cattle were stolen and his house was burglariously entered. A vivid account of this is given by his son Charles (afterwards the Hon. Charles Brownlee, C.M.G.),¹ in recording some of the recollections of his early life. "Darkness closed upon us," says Mr. Brownlee, "our evening meal was eaten in silence. Just as we had finished, the sound of voices was heard approaching the front door, then an altercation and the sound of feet as of men running. In a few minutes more admittance was loudly demanded. My father replied that he would admit no one and ordered the unwelcome visitors to be off. Again all was silent, and the speakers appeared to leave. It was now time for family worship, and as usual the Bibles were laid upon the table and the 46th Psalm was selected, but it was hardly begun when a loud knocking was heard at the back door, and then the thundering sound of great stones thrown against it.

¹ *Vide* the delightful account of these proceedings, entitled "The Old Peach Tree Stump" in *Reminiscences of Kaffir Life and History*, by the Hon. Charles Brownlee, Lovedale, 1896.

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The door for a time resisted every effort, but at last a deafening crash informed us that it had yielded. Still amid all the din my father read through the Psalm as calmly and composedly as he had read on any other occasion, and when the Psalm was ended he said: 'Let us pray'. We all knelt, and yet, though nearly forty years have passed I still wonder at the calmness and serenity of the prayer while the fierce men were battering at our doors. By the time the prayer was ended the ruffians had effected their entrance into the kitchen, and my mother and the younger children retired into the adjoining bedroom. After all had been cleared out of the kitchen I heard the Kaffirs coming slowly along the passage towards the room in which we were sitting. I went to join those who had gone into the bedroom, and had hardly entered when a frightful crash sounded against the door opening on the passage, and then a fearful shout and then a sound of struggling. I involuntarily cried out, 'My father, oh, my father!' My mother opened the window, saying, 'Your father is killed! now fly for your lives'. With one bound I cleared the window and rushed frantically in the direction of where the Military Reserve now is."¹

Concealing himself throughout the night, partly in the garden and partly in the bank of the river which was at no great distance, he discovered in the morning that his father had not been killed and that all were still alive. Not satisfied with the plunder they had obtained on the previous evening the Kaffirs again attacked the lonely house.²

"The crowd was not long in taking every article of furniture. Every room having been cleared, an attempt was made to enter the bedroom. I resisted with all my might, and as I was being dragged from my post, my father came to the rescue, saying to the assailants, 'Every room in my house has been opened to you, and you have taken everything; in this room are my children, and no one shall enter it,' and he stood before the door. This had the desired effect. The object of the savages was plunder. They were not prepared

¹ In King William's Town.

² This house stood on the site now occupied by the Government Residency; and until a short time ago the old stump of the peach tree in which young Brownlee hid was still to be seen.

to do violence to the missionary, and the room they could not enter without violence. They left the door." Robbed of everything, flight through a hostile country to the Wesleyville Mission Station and the friendly chiefs Pato and Kama, thirty miles distant, seemed the only course open to them. So under the cover of night the party, consisting of Mr. and Mrs. Brownlee and their six children, the youngest only three, together with Mr. and Mrs. Kirkman, both of whom were feeble and in ill-health, and their two children, commenced the tedious journey on foot. About ten o'clock the next night, after a scorching hot day, they arrived at their destination, but only to find that the missionary, Mr. Dugmore, was packing up preparatory to leaving his station. Their wants, however, were attended to, and with assistance of a cart drawn by two oxen they reached Grahamstown, possessing nothing more than the clothes they stood in.

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For nearly three weeks, that is until the end of the first week in January, 1835, the Kaffirs were practically masters of the Eastern frontier. The small detachments of soldiers at Kaffir Drift, Committees, Hermanus Kraal (Fort Brown), and other posts along the Fish River could scarcely maintain their positions against the hordes which entered the Colony at those places. With but small let or hindrance they murdered, devastated, and pillaged until they could want nothing more than peace and leisure in which to enjoy their ill-gotten wealth. During this time Colonel Somerset, with the small force at his command, only seventy men of the Mounted Rifles, was incessantly moving from place to place endeavouring to stem the torrent of invasion and to protect life and property, but with little success. "I can do no good against these myriads until I can concentrate a force," he writes to Duncan Campbell, the Civil Commissioner of Grahamstown, on December 25th. "It takes me all my time to keep up a communication. I cannot describe to you the devastation on the country, and the Kaffirs are passing in large columns the whole day. . . . The destruction in the Blinkwater and Kroomie Ranges is dreadful."

The total military force on the frontier at this time was 27 of the Royal Artillery, 482 of the 75th Regiment, 20 of the Royal Engineers, and 226 of the Mounted Rifles—a total of 775.

CHAP. II. The line which needed protection was roughly ninety miles in length, extending from the Great Winterberg to the sea. In the more southern parts the dense and extensive Fish River bush offered good cover to any number of the enemy, but presented the greatest difficulties to troops or in fact to any but Kaffirs in attempting to penetrate it. Anywhere along the whole of this line, therefore, the Colony could be invaded. At the drifts near the military posts large numbers could certainly be held at bay, but at the same time hundreds could cross the river in the intervening country—as they did. And as it was necessary to keep as strong a force as possible at the garrison towns of Grahamstown and Fort Beaufort, as well also as these Fish River posts, very few men were available for pursuing stolen stock, much less attempting any punitive expedition. So that until help came from a distance, but little more could be done than remain upon a feeble defensive. Tyali and Maqomo, who had been chiefly instrumental in bringing about all this disaster, must soon have realised that retribution would inevitably overtake them. Their experience in similar but far smaller affairs had long taught them that depredation and injury to Colonial property were certain to be followed by the appearance of military or civilian forces in their country.

So, perhaps feeling the immense burden of responsibility which was upon them and hoping to stave off the evil day or palliate their crimes, on January 1st, they opened peace negotiations with the Governor, Sir Benjamin Durban, through their respective missionaries Messrs. Chalmers and Laing (of Burns Hill). “No one has told your Excellency,” says Maqomo, “how the colonists have been accustomed to deal with the Caffre people.” . . . “Colonel Somerset for a long time has killed the Caffres,” . . . “he has disturbed the peace of the land.” . . . “Colonel Somerset has also ruined me, this was in 1829, he killed one of Eno’s sons . . . he killed Zeko.” “Colonel Somerset wounded one of the sons of Gaika” (Xoxo). Tyali, with a large concourse of his people, compelled Mr. Chalmers to go into the Chumie Church and, at his dictation, to write a letter to the Governor. It recounted grievances which amounted to resentment at Colonel Somerset and his soldiers entering Kaffirland to recover stolen stock,

and yet "when they (the Kaffirs) wished to go into the Colony to see their friends, then they were seized and placed in the black hole". Towards the restoration of peace, Tyali said "the chiefs have ordered all their people to desist from hostilities against the colonists until they hear from Colonel Somerset and the Governor. To-day is now peace, and they all wish to live in peace with the English. They shall now hold up from fighting until they obtain an answer." Both these letters found their way into the hands of Colonel (afterwards Sir Harry) Smith who had arrived in Grahams-town with full civil and military authority over the frontier. He regarded them as merely a ruse on the part of the chiefs to gain time and opportunity to get the enormous amount of stolen cattle into places of greater safety before continuing further forays on the already too despoiled colonists. This opinion was borne out by the fact that two days after they were written, and when according to Tyali "to-day is now peace," a very large body of Kaffirs attacked Hermanus Kraal (Fort Brown) and captured all the cattle which were being guarded there by both the military and the farmers who had repaired hither for protection. It is scarcely conceivable that the wily chiefs could have thought for a moment, with so much Colonial property in their possession and no steps so far taken to regain it and punish the thieves, that accounts could be suffered to stand thus balanced. Colonel Smith made this clear in his reply, dated January 7th. "I require," said he, "that you immediately retire behind the boundary line established in 1819, and that you make restitution of all property you have stolen or the blood of your tribes be upon the heads of the chiefs who have thus advised them."¹

¹For the original correspondence, letters, despatches, etc., on all these matters, *vide Return of the Caffre War*, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 12th July, 1837.

CHAPTER III.

THE KAFFIR WAR OF 1835.

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS IN THE COLONY.

CHAP. III. So far, the picture of the occurrences connected with the outbreak of this war has been viewed chiefly from Kaffirland. It will be interesting now to watch the course of these events from the point of view of the despoiled and ruined colonists; to trace from the first alarm the steps which led to the subjugation of the Kaffirs and their submission to wholesome principles of law and order and—further—to the retrograde measures which re-established them in what must almost be regarded as their privilege to murder, rob, and pursue any lawlessness they pleased.

As depredations with the consequent steps to regain stolen stock, together with the defiance and resistance with which these expeditions were met, had so long been the normal condition of affairs along the frontier, the accounts of the attacks upon the parties under Ensign Sparks and Lieutenant Sutton created no special alarm or anxiety.

In Grahamstown, the most populous town in the Eastern Province at that time, and a place where, on account of the presence of the chief civil and military authorities, some inkling of what was happening in Kaffirland might be expected to be known, all were ignorant of what was impending and was so soon to overwhelm them. None knew of the confederacy between Tyali, Maqomo, Eno, Botman, and Hintza—or even, until too late, of the great meetings of Kaffirs at the Upper Chumie and Block Drift.

On the afternoon of Monday, December 22nd, the first alarm of war was raised in Grahamstown. Rumours of invasion and immediate attacks by Kaffirs spread with lightning rapidity and produced instantly the wildest consternation and

panic. Except that a farmer named Buys had been murdered the previous evening, no one knew for certain what had happened or what was to be expected, but all realised that not a moment was to be lost in preparing for the worst. For a time the greatest confusion prevailed, and the terror-stricken inhabitants rushed aimlessly from street corner to street corner until the Civil Commissioner, Duncan Campbell, and Lieut.-Colonel England, who was in command of the soldiers at Fort England (then known as the East Barracks), allayed the first excitement by calling upon the civilians for assistance in the defence of the town.

The male inhabitants volunteered their services in any capacity and placed themselves entirely in the hands of Colonel England. As the day was well advanced, it was not possible to do anything more than organise patrols and station armed parties at the principal entrances to the town. Hence during the whole of that night sentinels stood on the surrounding heights ready to give warning of the first approach of danger, while parties of mounted men patrolled among the thickets on the outskirts. Nothing happened, however. On Tuesday morning, further reports and confirmation of rumours of the most terrifying nature found their way into the town. At an early hour a messenger arrived in breathless haste bringing the news of the attack on the Southeys' farm at Trompetter's Drift, and stating further that the hills in that direction were red with the myriads of Kaffirs moving towards Grahamstown. Undoubtedly this, like many others of these reports, was an exaggeration. Nevertheless, there was need for the promptest action, and in view of the small assistance which could be rendered by the military, for the most efficient combination on the part of the inhabitants. To secure this a public meeting was convened by the Civil Commissioner at the Freemason's Tavern,¹ at which also Colonel England and Major Selwyn, the town commandant, were present. The result of this meeting was the formation of a "Committee of Safety," consisting of the officers and some of the more elderly and prominent members of the community. Its duties were, in the first place, the initiation and adoption of any measures conducive to the defence and safety of the town, and in the second, with

¹ Afterwards Wood's Hotel.

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a view to preventing the unnecessary alarm produced by false reports, the collection and dissemination of authentic information. In pursuance of the former, all men capable of bearing arms were equipped and detailed to one or other of five different sections under competent leaders. St. George's Church,¹ standing so centrally, was appropriated and used as a magazine for arms and ammunition as well also as a place of refuge for women and children²; and the main avenues opening on to the large triangular space (called Church "Square") in which the church stands, were barricaded with waggons, boards, and sacks of earth, so that the whole of the "Square" formed one large laager.³ Between 400 and 500 men seem to have been available for these defensive measures, but the supply of muskets was deficient both in quantity and quality, some of them being very old and next to useless; and further there was the complaint which was common to the whole of the Eastern districts, namely, the shortage of ammunition. Appeals for assistance were made to Uitenhage and Somerset East. Mr. Van der Riet, the Civil Commissioner of Uitenhage, was asked to send with the least possible delay a hundred fully armed men, while Mr. Ziervogel, of Somerset, was instructed to call out the whole of the civil force in his district. Scarcely had the letter to the latter been despatched when one came from him stating that he had set out with all his available men for the bushy country along the Koonap River, as the Kaffirs were reported to be there in great numbers. Captain Campbell therefore sent off five mounted men to overtake him and ordered

¹ *Vide* vol. ii., p. 192.

² The Rev. J. Heavyside says: "As I passed it (the church) this afternoon I found all the doors thrown open; the main entrance strewn with cartridge cases, and crowded with applicants for ammunition. The chancel was heaped with piles of old muskets and rusty bayonets. One gentleman was sitting at the Communion table, writing, while my own church clerk was inside the rails distributing fire-arms. At a later hour, I found the church partially lighted, a kind of Council of War was standing near the pulpit. The vestry was occupied by Lieut.-Colonel England and Major Selwyn, as their office and headquarters. The body of the edifice was full of armed men, some of whom were mounting guard, whilst the rest were reposing on their arms."

³ The barricades were placed across the lower end of High Street near the church, across the ends of Upper and Lower Hill Streets which open on to the square, and one stretched across the lower end of the square from the corner of Bathurst Street to a small building which stood on a spot near where the City Hall is now built.

him to Grahamstown, but when they arrived at De Bruin's Drift on the Fish River, they were met by a body of 200 Kaffirs and were compelled to return. On Wednesday, the results of the enterprises of Tyali and Maqomo began to be apparent in Grahamstown; for on that day parties of the homeless and destitute commenced to arrive from all directions. The more fortunate had been able to travel in their waggons drawn by a few oxen, and with perhaps also a few sheep and goats, which had escaped the notice of the robbers. But by far the greater number of the refugees, women and children, had been compelled to journey on foot, bringing with them such remnants of clothing and other necessaries as the hurry of the flight and the distance had permitted them to carry. Some found shelter with friends or with those able to give effect to their pity and sympathy, others were permitted to crowd into the unfinished Commercial Hall¹ and church, while others could find no place whatever. In the course of a few days there were nearly 7,000 of these homeless people in the town. As a temporary measure and until it was possible to establish some properly organised system of relief, those of the unfortunate people who were without food were relieved by the Commissariat Department. On the afternoon of this day, another public meeting was held, this time in the church, for the purpose of concerting such further measures as the safety of the town demanded. As great concern was felt on account of the people of Bathurst, that place being so near the Kowie forests and the Kaffirs having crossed the Fish River in large numbers, a waggon with forty stand of arms and ammunition was despatched thither under an escort of thirty men, a measure by no means unnecessary and unappreciated.

The news from Colonel Somerset at Fort Beaufort was not of a nature to inspire hope. In answer to a letter asking for assistance, he could only reply that the continued harassing duties had worn out his men and knocked up his horses, and that Grahamstown must not look to him for any help. And the next day he himself asked the Civil Commissioner to press into the public service every horse in the town and its vicinity, as so short was he of horses that he had to borrow fourteen to

¹ Afterwards the Eastern Districts Court, now demolished.

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mount a patrol. He had been disappointed in the co-operation he had expected from the Boers of the district, and, to make matters worse, a large body of mounted Hottentots, which he had stationed at the Mancazana and on which he had placed reliance, had abandoned that place and returned to the Kat River Settlement.

Thursday, Christmas Day. This day of general peace and goodwill was one of sadness for the inhabitants of the Eastern Province. It was ushered in by the news of the murders of Henderson, Mahoney, Cramer, and Forbes. As the day advanced, the festivities of the season were replaced by the gloomiest forebodings and preparation for the worst. It was believed that the Kaffirs had so far carried everything before them that the next step must be a rush upon Grahamstown itself. A large patrol went out in the early morning and reconnoitred along the hills overlooking the Fish River country from Governor's Kop to Kaffir Drift; nothing confirming their fears was seen, however. But all the same, during the whole day a fever of anxiety and apprehension prevailed. At night all the women and children were put in the church and the flat-roofed houses, that is, houses the roofs of which were not of thatch, and the most vigilant watch was kept everywhere. The night passed, however, without any visitation.

Bathurst was less fortunate, for on this Christmas Day, as was feared in Grahamstown, that place was attacked by a large body of Kaffirs which had been lurking in the dense and adjacent thickets. Bathurst at that time was a very small village, consisting of probably not more than about thirty cottages. The church,¹ a large building for so small a place, stands on a hill which commands an extensive view of the surrounding country and distant ocean. At the date of this outbreak it was not finished but was sufficiently advanced to be used as a refuge for the women and children. As soon as the news of war reached Bathurst, messengers were sent off to warn the distant farmers to concentrate immediately at the village. By Wednesday evening all had heeded the warning and had arrived, having hurriedly loaded their waggons with the barest necessaries and left their homesteads, crops, and other property to the mercies of the enemy. A "Committee

¹ *Vide* vol. ii., p. 91.

of Safety" having been formed there also, a messenger was despatched to Grahamstown to ask for assistance. With the waggons a laager was made near the church in which most of the cattle were placed, and throughout the night the men remained on guard. During the darkness, some Kaffirs made a rush upon the oxen which had been left at a distance from the temporary kraal, and in a moment the wildest excitement and panic ensued among those in the church.¹

Some shots were fired at the assailants but they escaped and took away the cattle. At daybreak on Christmas morning they came in greater force and made a most daring attack on the laager, and despite the few bayonets and pitchforks which seem to have been the chief arms of the defenders, nearly all the cattle were captured and driven off towards the Fish River. But little use could be made of the muskets as there was only a small quantity of powder among the whole crowd. The arrival, therefore, of the arms and ammunition from Grahamstown on this day was most timely.

But even with this it was felt that it would be impossible to hold the position against the hordes which might be, and most probably were, in the Kowie forests. So when, on the next day, the messenger returned with the depressing news that no further assistance could be sent, but that the people were advised to abandon Bathurst and retire on Grahamstown, preparations for departure were immediately made. The

¹ Mrs. Cawood in an interview with the author said: "We found Bathurst very full of people who had fled there for safety. We outspanned near the church. As our waggon was very comfortable we went to sleep for a time in it. But before long we heard that the Kaffirs were attacking us. My husband carried me, very sparsely dressed, into the church, where I remained until about three in the morning. I then went back to the waggon as the din of crying and yelling was so great."

Mrs. Haywood in an interview said: "I lived with my parents at Clumber. One day I was in the field minding cattle, when my father hurriedly went off to town (Grahamstown). I went to the house when my mother told me that the Kaffirs were making war and had killed old Mr. Forbes of Waai Plaats. We saw people going to Bathurst with their waggons and cattle, and from them we learnt that the Kaffirs were very near. We then started off with our cattle and joined the others, arriving in Bathurst at about ten that night. We went to the church, which was the only place of safety, and left our cattle in the road below. My father came to us late that night. He had seen many armed Kaffirs and had been chased by them. The church bell was rung loudly most of the night in the hope of frightening the Kaffirs away, but it did not, for they came and stole all the cattle left in the road, ours among them. We were in the church two or three days, and then had to walk to Grahamstown."

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Kaffirs having seized so many of the oxen, many of the waggons had to be abandoned with the rest of the property ; seventy, however, were available for the conveyance of the greater number of women and children, including a Mrs. Iles,¹ who had given birth to a child in the church during the panic. Altogether, including 300 coloured people, about 900 persons of all ages left their homes in and about Bathurst. The long and melancholy cavalcade was not permitted to wind its weary way through the bushy country of Lushington valley and Blaauwkrantz without molestation. Twice they were attacked, obviously with a view to gaining the remaining cattle, but on both occasions the escort drove the Kaffirs back, on the second, killing two and wounding several others. Thus the Bathurst people joined hundreds of others in Grahamstown, who, a few days before, had been in comparative happiness and affluent circumstances, but now were reduced to wretchedness and poverty by the insatiable greed of a nation of thieves whom the people in England were at this time being taught to regard as an inoffensive and cruelly oppressed people.

On Friday, December 26th, a party of townsmen left Grahamstown and went in the direction of the Clay Pits and the scene of the murders of Mahoney and Henderson in order to render assistance to any in these parts who could not reach the refuge of the town. Mr. Thomas Stubbs, who has left a good account of all these matters in his diary, says : " Shaw asked me to muster some fellows and go in search of his brother or any others who were in danger. After much trouble I got together twenty-nine men. We mustered at the burial ground, and then received a message from the Magistrate forbidding us to leave the town and telling us that no ammunition would be supplied to us.

" R. Southey and myself, however, went to the church where it was being served out and managed to get quite a lot with which we filled our shooting packets. We then rode off to our party and shared it. Just as we were ready to leave, Colonel England came up and asked us our intentions. We said we were going to assist our fellow-countrymen. Having appointed W. Southey to command us we started off in the direction of Collingham (Governor's Kop). On the

¹ Wife of the trader who was murdered near Trompetter's Drift.

flat about four miles from town¹ we met old Mrs. Mahoney on foot ; her bonnet was much crushed and had blood upon it. She had with her a black servant and two of her grandchildren (Hendersons). She told us of the deaths of Mahoney and Henderson. We rode on until we came to the Coombes. About half a mile beyond Purcell's house we found, on the footpath, the dead body of a man named Cramer. We buried it as well as we could in an ant hole. We then proceeded towards Mahoney's. About half a mile from the house we saw an overturned waggon on the road, the oxen gone, and a feather bed which had been ripped open and all the feathers scattered over the veld. We found Mr. Henderson lying upon his face, dead, his hand was upon an assegai wound in his stomach. He had a black coat on and his back was riddled with wounds. About a hundred yards from him we found the body of old Mr. Mahoney. There was an assegai wound in his throat, into which he had thrust the collar of his shirt to stop the bleeding. We turned the waggon on to its wheels and put the bodies into it . . . we returned, getting into town about eleven that night." There being no oxen, another party went out the next day and fetched the bodies. A Mr. Brown and his small son were also brought in. They were found in a state of great exhaustion, having been present when the two men were killed. They had spent three days in endeavouring to make their way to Grahamstown through the thick bush.

On this Saturday another search and rescue party, consisting of twenty-one mounted civilians, set out to assist any who were in distress in the country along the Kasouga and Kareiga Rivers. Having reached the bottom of the hill which passes through Howieson's Poort, they had scarcely dismounted for the purpose of giving their horses a rest when the distant screams of women fell upon their ears. From a farm-house a man on horseback was seen to be galloping towards them and beckoning to them to hurry on. The party instantly moved off in the direction indicated. On approaching the house they saw a body of Kaffirs, which they estimated at 400, hastily retreating, and found three Boers, two brothers Ferreira and Jacobus Buurman, in a clump of

¹ *Vide* vol. i., p. 366.

CHAP. bush wounded and bleeding. It appeared that these three
III. men were driving some cattle into town when they were way-laid by these Kaffirs, and a desperate fight took place, during which one Ferreira received nine and the other three assegai wounds. Buurman was only slightly hurt. Eight Kaffirs were killed. Fifty-three assegais were picked up around the spot. The wounded men were placed in a waggon, which came up shortly afterwards, and conveyed to Grahamstown. The Ferreira with the three wounds died that night. The rescue party does not seem to have met with any other adventure, or found others in need of their assistance.

The people in these parts, having made the small village of Salem their rendezvous, seem to have been able to take care of themselves. Although no larger and even more scattered than Bathurst, Salem determined to hold its own without retiring upon Grahamstown. The largest buildings, and these were but moderate size, were the Wesleyan Chapel, the minister's house, and a school-house belonging to a Mr. W. H. Matthews, all situated near one another. These were barricaded and became the fortress of Salem. Had destruction of the people rather than the acquisition of their cattle been the intention of the Kaffirs, all this would, in all probability, have been of little defensive use.

The usual course of events took place here, namely, Kaffirs approaching and throwing the place into alarm, the driving off of cattle and a party of farmers pursuing and regaining them, then the Kaffirs returning and recapturing them, and perhaps adding to them others which had been at first overlooked.

On the following Monday evening, December 29th, Colonel Somerset arrived in Grahamstown from Fort Beaufort, in consequence, so he tells us, of the excessive alarm which he found was spreading. It is curious that it should have taken a whole week for him to have realised this. His presence in the town and the reports he brought were certainly not calculated to allay any of this alarm or to inspire with hope and confidence those on whom the defence of the district was so much depending. Not only did he confirm all the depressing reports which had been received during the previous week, but he added to them further accounts which showed that the state of affairs was even worse, if possible, than was

believed. In writing to the Governor on this day he said : CHAP.
 " There cannot be less than a hundred thousand Caffres in the III.
 Colonial territory ; it is my firm conviction that the intentions
 of the chiefs are to attack this place with the whole of their
 united strength as soon as they can recall their divided forces.
 I have only to urge your Excellency to send without delay
 every disposable man from Cape Town, our position is a most
 critical one, out of which I do not as yet see my way." ¹ Al-
 though in this same despatch he disavows it, yet he seems to
 have shared in the general alarm.

In taking a general review of the whole of the proceedings
 during this eventful time, one cannot but have some misgivings
 as to Colonel Somerset's military ability and his fitness for
 so responsible and difficult a position as Commandant of this
 dangerous frontier, although there can be no question about
 his ceaseless activity, useless and misdirected as it often may
 have been. In spite of him and his forces, the Kaffirs seem
 to have done almost as they pleased ; they passed into the
 Colony with as much ease as they took the farmers' cattle ;
 their approach to military posts seeming to have been the
 signal for their abandonment, as in the cases of Fort Willshire,
 the Gualana and Kaffir Drift Posts, and, in fact, all except
 Fort Beaufort. The Kat River Post was certainly maintained,
 but then it was not attacked, for at that time the Kaffirs be-
 lieved that the Hottentots of the Settlement were going to
 join them. In no instance did the military under Colonel
 Somerset make any stand against the enemy such as that
 made by the Winterberg Boers under Pieter Retief. There
 were cooped up in Grahamstown 300 of the 75th Regiment,
 108 of the Mounted Rifle Corps, and 140 Hottentot soldiers,²
 while the purely civilian force was doing most of the patrolling
 and rescue work.

Colonel Somerset's military education and experience had
 not been of a very high order. As will be remembered, when
 little more than a youth, his father, Lord Charles Somerset, in
 his anxiety to provide for his sons, had placed him in charge

¹ *Return of Caffre War*, July 12th, 1837, pp. 72, 73.

² To these may be added the troops with all their baggage, which arrived in
 Grahamstown on the following Thursday from the abandoned Gualana Post and
 Fort Willshire. Some of the latter, however, went to Fort Beaufort.

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of the frontier. It is true that he had served in the Peninsular War, but with the exception of this and a few years in Simon's Town as its Commandant, his active service had been entirely that of chasing such enemies as Tyali, Maqomo, and their followers. As will be seen shortly, a very different picture immediately presented itself when a Peninsula Officer with a war experience in many parts of the world arrived and took charge of affairs.

While the unhappy people of Grahamstown and the hundreds of homeless refugees were looking anxiously for some communication from Cape Town in answer to the despatch which had been sent thither—while they were barely holding on, so to speak, until help or promise of help was assured them from the West—a post arrived on January 2nd, bringing little else than some numbers of Mr. John Fairbairn's newspaper, the *South African Commercial Advertiser*. This in itself was sufficiently disappointing, but when, instead of any indications of sympathy for their sufferings or a disposition to render any assistance, it was seen that the Editor had permitted himself to treat the calamity lightly and to give a false colouring to the deplorable state of affairs, general indignation and anger passed all bounds. In the heat of the moment it was decided to boycott the paper, and to that end the following declaration was signed by 479 persons: "The Editor of the *South African Commercial Advertiser* having already misrepresented an occurrence connected with the invasion of the Colony and commented on his own false statements in a measure calculated to affect our hopes of succour from other quarters, and as there is an impression abroad that former misrepresentations in that paper, as well as the visit of its Editor to the frontier are among the causes of a confederacy among the Caffre chiefs, which threatens the total ruin of a large portion of the Colony, we consider it our duty to call upon all well-wishers to their country, to inform all who would not wilfully be made instrumental in stifling the cries of the widow and fatherless for protection, to use their best endeavours to suppress the circulation of that paper during the continuance of the present awful crisis."¹

¹ Some prominent names in this list are: Rev. J. Barrow (Colonial chaplain); Revs. Young, Shrewsbury, and Haddy (Wesleyan missionaries); T. Shepstone, G. W. and R. Southey, T. C. White, W. R. Thomson, G. Wood, E. L.



Somerset

COL. H. SOMERSET, C.M.R.

From H. Ward's "Kaffirland"

It is difficult to believe that Mr. Fairbairn could have been so incensed against the Eastern Province or so lost to all sense of justice and humanity as to be capable, deliberately and knowingly, of misrepresenting the state of affairs at this time and endeavouring thereby to alienate the sympathy which the sufferers so badly needed and deserved. And yet the general tone of his articles bears this stamp. Towards the Eastern inhabitants he had certainly shown a disposition to seize upon every trifling occurrence and to twist it into some proof of their misconduct towards the natives. Every measure for the protection of the frontier inhabitants he distorted into an accusation of an excuse on their part for seizing the Kaffir cattle or territory; every depredation or violence committed by the Kaffirs he represented either as a falsehood or as just retaliation for previous misconduct by the colonists themselves. And now when sudden and almost complete ruin had overtaken the country, he treated the accounts of the disaster as exaggerations or as "the expressions of fears arising from conscious guilt". Even so late as January 21st, when there could not have been much doubt in the public mind as to the attitude of the Kaffirs, he stated that "Hintza was quiet"—though the plotting of that wily rascal was soon patent to all—that "Eno and Maqomo were not engaged," and that "it was the people of Tyali alone, and only six or seven hundred of these, who were invading the colony"; in short, that a great mountain was being made of an ant hill.

Fearing the effect such statements as these might have on those at a distance, and especially in England, where public opinion was already worked up against the Colony by Mr. Fairbairn's father-in-law, Dr. Philip, and, in the hope of counteracting the further evil likely to be produced, another declaration was drawn up by the leading men in Grahamstown and signed by 234 persons. It was: "We the undersigned, witnessing the misrepresentations of the Editor of the *South African Commercial Advertiser*, Mr. John Fairbairn, with respect to the

Kift, G. Dyason, the Bowkers and Cawoods, Revs. McClelland and Heavyside (Colonial chaplains), Lieutenant Rubidge, Captain Crause, J. C. Hoole, Lieutenant Bisset, W. Currie, B. Booth, J. Howse, T. Stubbs, W. Gilbert, etc.

One of the statements referred to above was that appearing in the paper for July 4th, 1829: "The murders of which the Colonial Government prates so fluently are to be found only on the lips of lying men, or in the imagination of the timid Cockney pin-makers who shrink from the bold eye of a natural man".

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Caffre outrages on the frontier, in his leading article of the 21st inst., are persuaded that the same arise from a cruel and malignant feeling towards the inhabitants generally of the Eastern Province, by casting imputations on their courage and by mockery of their distress, which is calculated to stop the current of sympathy of the British Government and people, when the case of the sufferers shall come before them—that the circulation of such statements is dangerous at the present moment, and that we do hereby declare our determination to do all in our power to check the propagation of such cruel and wanton attacks”.

The first news of the outbreak of war reached Cape Town on Sunday afternoon, December 28th, when the Governor, Sir Benjamin Durban, received by express post a letter from Colonel Somerset bearing date 5 a.m., December 22nd, and, from Grahamstown, others from Colonel England and Captain Campbell, the Civil Commissioner. For a day or so the public was not informed of what was taking place in the distant East, but, immediately and quietly, preparations for moving against the Kaffirs were made. Arms, ammunition, and stores were collected, and a wing of the 72nd Highlanders, under command of Colonel Peddie—after whom the town of Peddie is now named—was embarked at Simon’s Town in the brigs *Mary Jane* and *Kerswell*, and set sail for Algoa Bay on the 31st. Before daybreak on the following morning Colonel H. G. (afterwards Sir Harry) Smith, who was second in command of the forces, left Cape Town on horseback for Grahamstown, a distance of about 600 miles, in order to be at the scene of the disturbance with the least possible delay. It was on New Year’s Day, 1835, when the people of Cape Town were thrown into consternation by the news of war. The Honourable Sir Henry Cloete tells us¹ that on New Year’s Eve he attended a convivial party at Government House, having just returned to Cape Town from circuit with the Chief Justice, Sir John Wylde, when “I could not help dilating somewhat at length on the hostile disposition of these tribes, to which His Excellency appeared to listen with particular interest; but nothing else indicated the slightest disturbance in society, except (what was only remembered afterwards by

¹ *Vide History of Great Boer Trek*, p. 78.

some of us) that Sir Benjamin had occasionally absented himself for a few minutes from the party.

“ Good humour and hilarity prevailed until we had hailed in the New Year, when every one gradually retired to their homes ; but on the next morning, on returning to town, I found the astounding intelligence universally spread abroad that the evening before His Excellency had received the account that the Kaffirs, to the number of 12,000 or 15,000 men, had invaded the whole frontier from every quarter.”

Great excitement prevailed, and there was a general eagerness to assist the Government at this crisis. The male inhabitants expressed their willingness to do garrison duty so as to liberate as many soldiers as possible for the East, and benevolent schemes for the benefit of the sufferers were set on foot. The burghers of the districts of Worcester and Swellendam readily responded to the call to arms, and in due course were on the march to the front. Sir Thomas Bladen Capel, the Admiral commanding H.M. ships in the East Indies, who happened just then to be at the Cape, placed at the disposal of the Governor H.M.S. *Wolf* for the conveyance of stores to Port Elizabeth as well as for general assistance and support, an offer which was gladly accepted. Martial law was proclaimed in the Eastern Districts on January 3rd.

The Governor himself, though anxious to be at the seat of turmoil, was not able to leave until the completion of certain legislative provisions for the new conditions of the labouring classes and apprentices, which were then in progress. On January 8th, however, he handed over the management of the civil affairs of the Colony to the Colonial Secretary, Colonel Bell, and sailed from Simon's Town in H.M.S. *Trinculo*. He took with him another company of the 72nd ; two others having been already despatched overland with large supplies of gunpowder.

It was most fortunate that at this time there was in the Colony an officer who, on account of his experience, commanding personality, and withal his tact, was peculiarly fitted to take the supreme command in all matters connected with this upheaval. Colonel H. G. Smith,¹ from his youth up, had

¹ *Henry George Wakelyn Smith*, the second son of John Smith, a surgeon of Whittlesea in Cambridgeshire, was born in 1788. His military career began

CHAP. III. been inured to war; the battlefield with its hardships and

in 1804, when, sixteen years of age, he joined a Volunteer Corps, the Whittlesea Yeomanry. In the following year, however, he entered the army proper by being gazetted a second lieutenant in the 1st Battalion of the 95th Regiment. He soon commenced to see active service, for in 1806 his regiment sailed for South America and was engaged in February, 1807, at the siege of Monte Video and the action at Buenos Ayres. In recognition of his services thus far he was given the command of a company. He returned to England, but not for long, for, under the command of Sir John Moore, he went first to Sweden and then to Spain, where he took part in the battles of Salamanca, Corunna, Talavera, and the Coa—one of the most severe contests in the Peninsular War. In the last, he was badly wounded in the ankle, but after a short rest, in spite of the pain and the ball being still in his foot, he remained with his regiment until a less stirring time permitted him to go to Lisbon to have it removed.

In 1812 he played a distinguished part, first in the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, where he earned his promotion to captain; and secondly at the fearful and bloody storming of Badajos, when he earned something which was far dearer to him. He himself tells us that "the atrocities committed by our soldiers on the poor, innocent, and defenceless inhabitants of the city no words suffice to depict. Civilised man, when let loose and the bonds of morality relaxed, is a far greater beast than the savage, more refined in his cruelty, more fiend-like in every act; and oh! too truly did our heretofore noble soldiers disgrace themselves, though the officers exerted themselves to the utmost to repress it. Yet this scene of debauchery, however cruel to many, to me has been the solace and the whole happiness of my life for thirty-three years. A poor defenceless maiden of thirteen years was thrown upon my generous nature." He was standing at the opening of his tent when two Spanish ladies in terror hurried towards him. They begged his protection against the horrors which were being committed. The elder threw back her head-dress and showed him blood which was trickling down her neck from a wound which had been inflicted by some brutal soldier in tearing her ear-rings from her ears. She was, however, more solicitous for her younger companion, a girl of barely fourteen, "whose face," Smith continues, "though not perhaps rigidly beautiful, was nevertheless so remarkably handsome, and so irresistibly attractive and surmounting a figure cast in nature's fairest mould, that to look at her was to love her, and I did love her". About a year afterwards he married her, and then she shared the hardships and fatigues of his restless life of war in every quarter of the globe. When Colonel Smith, as Sir Harry Smith, was Governor of this Colony she became endeared to both white and black as will be seen in the sequel.

The town of Ladysmith and the military village of Juanasberg, at the foot of the Amatola Mountains, which was destroyed by the Kaffirs in 1850, were named after her.

Through the Peninsula campaigns of 1813 and 1814, Harry Smith continued to serve with the same dash and distinction, and then, that war ended, he went to America and was present at the battle of Bladensburg and the capture of Washington. He was on the Continent again in 1815 and took part in the battle of Waterloo, when he was promoted to the rank of Lieut.-Colonel and decorated with the C.B. In 1825 he accompanied his regiment to Nova Scotia and acted as A.D.C. to the Governor, Sir James Kempt. Two years afterwards he became Deputy-Quartermaster-General in Jamaica, where he did much towards improving the sanitary arrangements of the cantonment, and thereby reduced the ravages of yellow fever. In 1829 he was transferred to the Cape, where he remained until 1836, when he left to win greater distinction in India. We shall meet with him again in Cape Colony.



COL. (AFTERWARDS SIR) HARRY SMITH

discipline had almost ever been his home. Always ready to act upon the instant and to ignore danger and difficulty, it was only characteristic of him that, in order to reach his sphere of action, he should have preferred a 600 miles' gallop on horseback rather than the less arduous passage by sea with its uncertainty of wind and wave. In six days at the hottest time of the year he performed this journey.

Arrangements had been made previously whereby the magistrates and field cornets of the different districts through which he had to pass were warned to have in readiness a horse and guide to convey him on his arrival to the next stage. Colonel Smith was therefore able to start off on each day's journey before daylight and to complete it in the afternoon, when he opened mail bags, wrote letters, instructions, or despatches, and took some rest before starting again. By dint of belabouring lazy horses, and, with the forcible language so characteristic of him, inciting lethargic field cornets and others to greater activity, he travelled over execrable roads, dangerous mountain passes and through rivers—under a burning January sun withal—at the rate of about 100 miles a day. On the day he arrived in Uitenhage, he had done 140. When about ten miles from Grahamstown, he found awaiting him the luxury of “a neat clipping little hack of Colonel Somerset's (such as he is celebrated for), and an escort of six of the Cape Mounted Rifles”. Thus accompanied, he rode into the barricaded streets of Grahamstown at about five o'clock on the afternoon of Tuesday, January 6th, 1835.

“Grahamstown presented a most melancholy picture,” he tells the Colonial Secretary, Colonel Bell, in describing what he found upon his arrival; “a great concourse of the neighbouring and numerous population burnt out of their homes, or who had fled from the impending dangers being congregated together in the deepest distress and affliction; in many instances destitute of every article of clothing except what was on their persons; subsisted by the Commissariat; in deep lamentation for the loss of husbands and brothers who had been cruelly murdered or slain in the defence of their property . . . the whole appearance of the town was one of a city long besieged and momentarily awaiting the assault.” Until late that night Colonel Smith was at Oatlands, the residence

CHAP. III. of Colonel Somerset, in conference with Colonels Somerset and England and Captain Campbell, the Civil Commissioner, learning from them all details of the state of affairs and of the steps they had taken in dealing with them, most of which he seems to have *disapproved*.

The next morning he saw clearly the policy he ought to adopt and the line he should follow. He determined to convince the people that if their resources were collected and properly applied, the invaders might be immediately repelled, and that the strictest attention to principles of a more military nature would be a far better defence than being cooped up behind doors, windows, and barricades. His first act on this day, therefore, was the promulgation of martial law in the Eastern Province, not knowing that the Governor had already done so. He ordered all male inhabitants between the ages of sixteen and sixty in any of the districts, unless exempted by their profession or infirmities from military service, to enrol themselves under their respective field cornets, under pain of being considered deserters and treated accordingly in the event of their neglecting to do so. In the case of the male inhabitants of the town itself, Colonel Smith called upon them to form themselves into a properly organised Volunteer Corps under officers of their own choosing. All had arms of some kind or other, if not guns, then pistols or swords, but so great was their want of co-operation and their consternation that, so he told them, in the case of alarm, especially in the dark, one half would set firing upon the other. So ready was the response to his orders that within two hours the Grahamstown Volunteer Corps (consisting of four companies of infantry and one of cavalry under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sparks of the 38th Regiment) came into existence.

The Committee of Safety took the first opportunity of calling upon Colonel Smith and of giving him every information respecting the arrangements they had made on the first alarm of the invasion and offering their continued service. The existence of such a body as this, however, had no *raison d'être* in Colonel Harry Smith's schemes. He communicated to them his esteem for them, and the high sense he entertained of their good intentions; and then assuring them of the gratification it would give him in making His Excellency

acquainted with the extent of their services to the public, he relieved them of all further duty.¹

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He entirely disapproved of the abandonment of Bathurst and the military outposts, regarding such retreat as little less than cowardice. He therefore made the re-establishment of some of these another of this day's actions. Lieutenant Forbes of the 75th was sent with a party of soldiers to re-occupy Bathurst, while another force under Lieutenant Moultrie was despatched to Kaffir Drift. Further, at other outposts such as Manley's Flats and Waai Plaats, men were stationed in order that the most vulnerable parts of those districts might be patrolled. He authorised the purchase of 200 horses and saddles, ordered Colonel England to mount fifty of his men who "had been taking care of the barricades half a mile distant, and to bring them out for the protection of Grahamstown," and then having issued numerous orders and instructions to the Commissary-General, Ordinance storekeeper, Medical Officer, and having presented guns to the surviving Ferreira and Buurman as a reward for their bravery, he finished his first day's work in Grahamstown. All this activity, show of his authority and determination, not unmingled, perhaps, with a little bluster, had its due effect on the depressed populace. Confidence and a degree of cheerfulness began to take the place of resignation and despair, and "men moved like men, and felt that their safety consisted in energetic obedience".

The troops and stores which had been sent from Cape Town had not yet arrived, nor had any considerable number of the burgher reinforcements. Colonel Smith, however, did

¹ His determination to be guided only by his own judgment and to bend all to his will, is well indicated by his less official attitude towards this venerable body. He tells us that in the formation of the Volunteer Corps, he permitted the people to assemble to elect their own officers, but there were too many talkers and too few actors, so "I deemed this a good opportunity to display my authority". He continues: "When I went in there was a considerable assembly of very respectable-looking men. I asked what was the cause of delay in executing my demands. One gentleman, a leader in what was called the Committee of Safety, stood up and began to enter into argument and discussion. I exclaimed in a voice of thunder: 'I am not sent here to argue, but to command. You are now under martial law, and the first gentleman, I care not who he may be, who does not promptly and implicitly obey my commands, he shall not even dare to give an opinion, I will try him by court martial and punish him in five minutes.' This sally most completely established my authority."

CHAP. not permit this to deter him from commencing his retaliatory
III. measures against the Kaffirs.

The misdeeds of the chiefs Eno and Tyali, and the large numbers of their people still marauding in the Colony, pointed to an attack upon their strongholds as an effective way of doing this. Accordingly, at daybreak on Saturday, January 10th, a force of about 200¹ men, consisting of Cape Mounted Rifles, Grahamstown Volunteers, and the Uitenhage burghers under the command of Major Cox, set out for Eno's kraal, near the right bank of the Keiskamma River. The destination of this force was kept secret, it was not even divulged to the men themselves until they were twelve miles from Grahamstown. Their route lay past Governor's Kop, down the hill to Driver's Bush, and then through a difficult and bushy track to the Committees Drift on the Fish River, which they reached and crossed at midday. Continuing then through the bush in the direction of Breakfast Vlei, they came upon the spoor of Kaffirs and sheep. Twelve men, at their own request, were permitted to ride ahead and follow this, and if possible to recapture the animals. They were completely successful. They overtook a dozen Kaffirs driving about 300 sheep and 40 horses which had been stolen from Hermanus' kraal, whither they had been sent by a Mr. Tomlinson, of Koonap, for protection. The Kaffirs fled leaving the animals to the captors. There was, therefore, abundance of mutton for the evening meal. It is not clear what happened to the rest of the sheep and horses. Resting until eleven that night, the men saddled up and then in the dark made their way through bush, kloofs, and ravines in a manner worthy of the Kaffirs themselves. At daylight they reached more open country, and came in sight of the distant collection of huts which formed Eno's umzi or "great place". It was at no time an easy matter to catch Kaffirs napping, more especially when their places were approached on horseback; rolling stones, the breaking of twigs or something else was sure to give an alarm and in a moment all

¹ In the *Government Gazette* and official statements of Colonel Smith, it is stated that there were 400 men taking part in this expedition, and that they left Grahamstown on the 9th and attacked Eno on the 12th. The statement above, taken from the account written by one who was present, is more likely to be correct. The actual numbers were 76 Grahamstown Volunteers, 90 Uitenhage burghers, and 40 of the Hottentot Corps.

would be awake and fleeing for safety. So it was on this occasion; all was life and bustle before the commando could get near enough to capture Eno. He escaped, clothed in the kaross of one of his daughters—so it was said. All the huts were abandoned, and the Kaffirs sought refuge in the adjacent thickets. A desultory fight ensued when about thirty-five Kaffirs were killed, among them the two brothers and son of the chief, while of the assailants only one was slightly wounded. Moving from Eno's deserted village about midday, the force rode in a northerly direction and arrived at Fort Willshire towards evening (Sunday).

It was found that, since its abandonment, the Kaffirs had attempted to destroy it; most of the thatch roofing and woodwork had been burnt, and everything of any value, except a store of corn forage, which at this juncture proved of great use, had been taken away. Major Cox kept his men at the fort during two days, and then left for Block Drift (on the outskirts of the present town of Alice) at three o'clock on Wednesday morning. At daybreak on Thursday they moved off from that place for Tyali's kraal, near the foot of the Chumie Mountain, about twelve miles distant. There seemed, at first, to be some prospect of catching Tyali, for it had rained during the night, and when the start was made in the early morning, there was a heavy mist which enabled the column to move unobserved by the Kaffir spies, who were undoubtedly endeavouring to watch Major Cox's movements. "Through a lane of thickly studded mimosas and other evergreens," continues the chronicler of this expedition, "we came to an open space, and at this moment, as if by magic, the vapours ascended, and disclosed as fine a nook as ever the imagination formed of fairyland. Surrounded by huts of greater magnitude and better construction than any we had yet seen, that of Tyali's rose superior, and bespoke its master, the chief of chiefs. Its interior was ornamented by a double row of pillars of straight, smooth wood, carefully selected, which supported the spherical roof; this being composed of compact materials which bid defiance to the rain, and the whole being plastered, conveyed an idea of neatness which we did not expect to find among Kaffirs." Tyali evidently had been warned of the approach of this commando, for the whole place was found deserted and

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not a single Kaffir was to be seen anywhere. All the huts were set on fire by Major Cox's men, and the village entirely destroyed. Another party of 140 men, under Major Burney, had left Fort Beaufort on this same errand, but did not arrive at Tyali's kraal until the work was finished. The object of the expedition was thus attained, both parties returned to Grahamstown, where they arrived on the 18th.¹

By attacking Eno and Tyali in this prompt manner—besides showing the enemy that there was both the will and the power to punish them—Colonel Smith's intention also was to clear the Colony of Kaffirs by withdrawing them to the assistance of their chiefs. And to hasten their departure, smaller forces were despatched in different directions, which, co-operating with those at the newly-established posts, were to scour all places where marauders were likely to be lurking. This latter became the more possible on the arrival of the reinforcements of burghers from the distant districts.

On the 10th, the Graaff Reinets burghers, under the command of their Civil Commissioner, W. C. Van Ryneveld, reached Grahamstown, having on their journey thither driven Kaffirs out of the Mancazana Valley and Kagaberg. These were shortly followed by others from the district of George, under Field-Commandant J. I. Rademeyer, and others from Port Elizabeth and Swellendam, and further, the Company of the 72nd with the stores and ammunition which left Cape Town on the 2nd arrived about this time.

Colonel Somerset with a force of about 400 of these burghers undertook to clear the woody fastnesses of the Zuurberg Mountains and Bushman's River.

He made Commadagga his base, and from this place patrols were sent out in all directions. Some brisk skirmishes ensued. In one, twelve Kaffirs were killed and 400 cattle and 130 horses captured, while in another, which took place in the thick bush along the Bushman's River, 100 of his men engaged between 1,000 and 1,500² Kaffirs; forty of them were killed,

¹ *Vide Aborigines Committee Report*, p. 326, also Godlonton's narrative of the 1835 War, p. 55, and Letters of Colonel Smith in *Documents Relating to the Kaffir War of 1835*, arranged by Dr. Theal and published by the Colonial Government, 1912.

² These numbers are those given in the official account. It must, however, have been always difficult to estimate the numbers of Kaffirs in bushy country, when only a few could at any time be seen.

and one of the colonists was shot through the thigh. On the whole, however, these operations do not appear to have been very successful. Colonel Smith, in giving an account of them to Sir B. Durban on January 22nd, said: "I am disappointed in the result of these extensive preparations. I have to lament that, although the enemy had been successfully attacked on the 15th and 16th, before the junction had been effected (i.e. with the Graaff Reinet burghers), this large and highly effective portion of the troops under my command have been inactive from the 16th to the 22nd, with the exception of the brilliant affair above alluded to, whilst the enemy has been carrying on his depredation and even threatening the district of George."¹

The party at Bathurst under Lieutenant Forbes had acted similarly. Cattle to the number of 1,340, which had been secreted in the Kowie bush, awaiting safe opportunity to be driven to Kaffirland, had been captured. Numerous attempts were made by the Kaffirs to regain them, but without success. They therefore endeavoured to starve them by burning off the grass in the vicinity, and among other incendiarism they set fire to the small Wesleyan Chapel on the hill at Port Frances (the Kowie). To the region of the Clay Pits, where it was believed that Kaffirs were congregated in large numbers, twenty-five of the Hottentot Corps under the command of Mr. Brown were sent. This Mr. Brown was the man who was present at the murders of Mahoney and Henderson. He was chosen for this particular service because he was acquainted with the intricacies of those parts, and, moreover, owning property at that place and having been engaged in the red clay business, he knew a great many of the Kaffirs personally. His stronghold was a two-storied house which had been built by the late Mahoney for a brewery. The small force was scarcely ensconced within it before it was surrounded by a large crowd of armed Kaffirs, and every endeavour was made to storm it. Failing in this, some of the natives with whom Mr. Brown had previously been on friendly terms, expressed a desire to confer with him, and made such professions of good faith, that, in the end, he was so unwise as to permit himself to be persuaded to

¹ But Sir B. Durban, writing to the Right Honourable Spring Rice, January 30th, said: "Colonel Somerset has effectually scoured the woody and important district of the Zuurberg, which is now cleared of the savages".

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go out to talk with them. He was accompanied by a Mr. Whittaker. As soon as the Kaffirs had enticed them to a distance beyond the reach of the muskets in the house, they fell upon them and murdered them. Two of the Hottentots on seeing what had happened escaped at the back of the house and fled to Grahamstown with the news. In the meantime the command devolved upon a Hottentot named Piet Louw, who maintained the position against the assailants until a party of soldiers under Ensign Lowen came to their assistance. Colonel Smith was so pleased with the prudential measures which Piet Louw had adopted, as well as his bravery, that he promoted him to the rank of ensign in the Hottentot Corps.

On Tuesday, January 20th, while all this activity was in progress, His Excellency the Governor Sir Benjamin Durban, arrived in Grahamstown. He had landed at Port Elizabeth on the 14th, but before proceeding to the frontier he remained there for a time in order to make arrangements with the Commanding Royal Engineer, Colonel Thomson, for the safety of that place, and then he proceeded to Uitenhage, where, in conjunction with the Civil Commissioner, Mr. Van der Riet and Colonel Cuyler, he assured himself of the assistance he might expect from that district in the military operations then in contemplation. On the evening of his arrival a message was received from a party of missionaries and traders at Burns Hill stating that they were still in the territory of the hostile chiefs and felt themselves in peril of their lives. There was good reason for their concern, for the Kaffirs were returning from their first irruption into the Colony, flushed with victory and laden with spoil, and further, the scouring of parts of their country by the Colonial troops and the reprisals made upon their ill-gotten wealth incited them to still further violence, and perhaps to the belief that the missionaries were in league with their enemies. In any case the mission stations were no longer respected. Mr. Ross, the Glasgow missionary at the Pirie, a station in, at that time, a very dangerous part of Kaffirland, was advised by Sutu, the great wife of the late Gaika, to take refuge at Burns Hill, and sent a waggon and escort for his safety. Mr. Kayser, of Knapps Hope, after the murder of the trader Warren, whom he tried to protect, went there, as also did Mr. McDiamid and some traders with their



SIR BENJAMIN DURBAN

families. Within about an hour after the receipt of the message, Major Cox, accompanied by Lieutenant Wade, started off to the rescue of these people. During the night they made their way along the dangerous road to Fort Beaufort, and there they collected detachments of the 72nd and 75th Regiments, some of the C.M.R., and a number of mounted Hotentots from the Kat River Settlement—in all about 250 men. It was felt to be unsafe to enter Kaffirland on this mission with a less force. They moved out of Fort Beaufort on the 25th and encamped at Block Drift during that night. Next day, passing through Middle Drift, Burns Hill was reached in the afternoon. As it was raining and therefore feared that the rivers might come down and cut off their retreat, the people, numbering thirty-five, with what property they could carry, were hurried off immediately. Among them were two petty chiefs, Matwa and Tinta, who had become converted to Christianity and wished to dissociate themselves from the misdeeds of their countrymen. On passing the Lovedale Mission Station, the Rev. J. Bennie with his family joined the party. As at this time the Rev. J. Brownlee had not left his station on the Buffalo, a message was sent to him advising him to retire to the Mount Coke Mission where it would be possible to help him at any time. No opposition was offered to the passage of these people on the return journey, though at one place numbers of Kaffirs driving cattle in the distance were seen. These were followed by a part of the escort and a hundred head of cattle were captured. On January 29th all reached Grahamstown.¹

The direction in which the benevolent Sir Benjamin Durban felt impelled to act upon his first arrival in Grahamstown was that of instituting some better and more systematic procedure in the relief of the distress which met him on every side. Having invited suggestions from all and the co-operation of those most capable of assisting in this good work, he established within a few days a "Board of Relief," consisting of seven gentlemen,² who were authorised to receive and

¹ For further details of these necessary trials, *vide* 40th Annual Report of the Glasgow Missionary Society, *Return of Caffre War*, July 12th, 1837, p. 169.

² They were in the first instance: Rev. J. Heavyside (Chairman), Revs. J. Barrow, R. Haddy (Wesleyan), J. Barrow (English Secretary), Messrs. Miles

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investigate all applications for food, clothing, lodging, and medical aid, and to issue requisitions on the Assistant Commissioner-General for the supplies. In fairness, however, to the humanity of the inhabitants of the town, it should be stated that it had not been necessary to wait for some such movement as this before the anxiety to render assistance to the distressed was called forth. By means of private charity and public subscriptions some eighty families, including between 300 and 400 individuals, had been supplied with groceries, bedding, and second-hand clothing before the establishment of the Board of Relief. Two rooms in a convenient situation having been secured, one for office and the other for store, the Committee sat from four to six hours every day. In conjunction with this central Committee, others for the collection of subscriptions were formed spontaneously in Cape Town, Stellenbosch, and Graaff Reinet; while in Cradock, Fort Beaufort, and the Kat River Settlement, there were others for the distribution of the relief in the respective districts. Altogether, during the year, exclusive of the cost of the rations and other supplies from Government, the Committee administered £3,390, and the total number of individuals participating in this was 11,820, irrespective of nation, sect, or colour.

The relief of distress and the clearing of the Colony of Kaffirs were, however, but small parts of the work which Sir Benjamin Durban and Colonel Smith had in view. The invasion of Kaffirland and the punishment of the tribes for the destruction they had wrought were the measures which chiefly demanded their attention, and towards which every preparation was in progress. But in view of the magnitude of the contemplated movement and the difficulty and uncertainty of communication, the collection of the necessary supplies, the assembly of the burghers from the distant parts, and their equipment on arrival took considerable time. And delay in these matters was effected by the Kaffirs themselves; for having been driven from the Zuurberg and Oliphant's Hoek and other places, they congregated in immense numbers in

Bowker (senr.), J. Munro, and D. Wainwright (Dutch Secretary). For further information concerning this Board of Relief, see the Report, *Return of Caffre War*, pp. 296-331.

the intricate fastnesses of the Fish River bush, from which they menaced the Colony quite as effectively. This was discovered by a Captain Harries of the Port Elizabeth Yeomanry, who with his company was patrolling the country along the right bank of the Fish River when he saw such indications as led him to believe that the ravines and forests on the left bank were harbouring large numbers of the enemy.

He reported accordingly to Headquarters. It was clear that no advance into Kaffirland could be made while a hostile force, and perhaps a very large one, was lurking in these parts. The Kaffirs undoubtedly expected that some punitive expedition would be made into their territories, and there can be but little doubt that it was their intention to assemble and hide in the Fish River thickets until the force had gone forward and then to do further damage in its rear. Receiving Captain Harries' report on February 3rd, with the promptness of action characteristic of him, Colonel Smith despatched 300 mounted men under Colonel England and Major Gregory to gain further information. They had orders to cross the Fish River at Committees Drift and then, turning to the south, to reconnoitre along the left bank as far as Trompetter's Drift, no easy task. The force started almost immediately. Leaving Grahamstown by the Governor's Kop road and passing over Botha's Hill, they descended the Pluto's Vale Mountain and reached the river in the afternoon. It was in flood, running deep and strong; nevertheless man and horse entered the water and the dangerous passage was safely made, albeit some were swept down the stream, but eventually were rescued.

At daybreak the next morning a move was made through the bush towards the high precipices and ravines which skirt the river in that direction. The barking of the dogs, the bellowing of cattle, and the smoke rising from the numerous camp fires in one of the kloofs betokened the presence of Kaffirs, but no information as to their number could be obtained. A skirmish ensued during which twenty-seven huts were burnt and 120 head of cattle captured; but very few Kaffirs were seen, as on the first approach of danger, they found it an easy matter to escape into the adjacent bush, only a few yards distant. The Hottentot soldiers under Lieutenant Sutton caught some of the women, who, after having been

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interrogated, were allowed to escape. According to these, the Kaffirs hiding thereabouts were Dushani's people; the Hottentots, however, recognised some as belonging to Eno. As a matter of fact, it was discovered afterwards, that concealed in these secluded glens, there were hundreds of the followers of Eno, Botman, Maqomo, and Dushani. In this affair one Hottentot was killed and one wounded, the number of casualties on the Kaffir side is not stated. After having moved about in those parts for two days, Colonel England was satisfied that the situation was sufficiently serious to warrant the employment of a much larger force than that then with him. He therefore placed those in positions from which it was hoped the movements of the enemy could be watched, while he himself hurried back to Grahamstown, where he arrived on the 6th, to report to the Commander-in-Chief. On receipt of this intelligence, Colonel Smith decided forthwith to take the field himself, and thus add to his varied experience the hide-and-seek operations which constituted the greater part of bush warfare with the Kaffirs. The next morning, namely, that of February 7th, hurried preparations were made, and troops and stores were sent off to Trompetter's Drift, where the temporary Headquarters' Camp was formed. Later in the day the Colonel himself left Grahamstown and arrived at this camp in the evening. The forces available for this service were some companies of the 72nd and 75th Regiments with a number of artillery men, a troop of the C.M.R., and the burghers of Uitenhage and George, the Albany Sharpshooters, the Port Elizabeth Yeomanry, together with a party of Hottentot levies, in all about 1,200 men. These were formed into three divisions of roughly equal strength. The centre column, under the command of Colonel Smith, operated from Trompetter's Drift, the left under Colonel England from Committees, and the right under Colonel Somerset from Kaffir Drift.

The main idea was to make a frontal attack at as many points as possible, and then by the flanking columns moving inwards and forwards and concentrating with the centre column at Eno's old kraal near the Line Drift on the Keiskamma, to sweep the Fish River bush clear of Kaffirs. It was a big project. The Fish River bush is not a level or un-

dulating country over which military operations may be conducted by merely cutting passages through the trees and tangled scrub. It is for the most part a succession of thickly wooded hills, abounding in high precipices and deep wooded glens which are bounded by steep and dangerous sides and which present the greatest obstacles to the passage of any but baboons and Kaffirs. All this was favourable to the mode of warfare peculiar to the Kaffirs. Such places were the haunts of the hostile natives, and therefore the objectives in these punitive expeditions. Their accurate knowledge of these intricate parts, the ease with which they moved from one to the other and dispersed themselves in case of danger, their vigilant watchfulness against surprise when enemies were believed to be in their neighbourhood, and their modes of attack, as skilful as if directed by able and veteran tacticians, made them, under these circumstances, no mean enemies, contemptible though they were in the open.

The centre column, which had commenced to collect at Trompetter's Drift on the 7th, had all its preparations for advance completed by midday on the 10th, when the Albany Sharpshooters (Europeans) with further supplies arrived on the scene. In consequence of the flooded state of the river, however, little could be done. Colonel Smith made a reconnaissance from the top of the hills overlooking the camp, and saw parties of the enemy on a high and distant ridge on the far side of the river. At noon the next day, Wednesday, the water seemed to be subsiding, and immediate preparations for taking advantage of the first opportunity to get part, at least, of the force through, were made. By two o'clock it was deemed safe to send cavalry across. But before any movement was made Colonel Smith collected his men and addressed them on the subject of bravery and proper conduct in the presence of an enemy, and threatened to bring to a drum-head court martial anyone who committed any violence on Kaffir women. By about seven in the evening, men, horses, and two field pieces, a six-pounder and a howitzer, had all crossed the river without any mishap. In accordance with the plan of campaign, the force was divided into four large parties; one consisting of two companies of the 72nd and eighty Hottentot Sharpshooters, under Major Maclean, with orders to make

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their way about four miles up the bank of the river and to lie quietly without lights at the bottom of a bushy kloof until daylight ; another consisting of two companies of the 75th and eighty of the Hottentot Sharpshooters, under Captain Halifax, and a smaller party of fifty Hottentots, under Lieutenant Sutton, took similar positions. All these were provided with competent guides, and had, at the proper time, to co-operate with the force above by entering the bush below and driving Kaffirs and cattle upwards before them. The remainder, under command of Major Gregory, formed the party which was to attack from the top of the bush. These, after leaving the river and winding their way up the steep hill, arrived on the flat and open country at the top and then marched to a spot on the Hlosi River¹ about two miles distant, where they formed camp.

About the middle of this serene moonlight night, the approaching sound of horses' hoofs and the rumbling of the wheels of cannon broke the stillness and announced that Colonel Somerset had also succeeded in getting across the river and was then on his way to Mount Somerset, about two miles to the north-east of the present town of Peddie, where he formed his camp. A far more serious affair, however, disturbed the peace of the party under Major Maclean. It is believed that one of the soldiers of the 72nd in a dreaming and half-awakened state fancied he saw Kaffirs, perhaps he really did. In any case he jumped up, shouted "Kaffirs," and fired his gun. In an instant all were on their feet, and before the officers could give any orders the men in the confusion and alarm were firing at one another ; three were killed outright, one was so badly wounded that he died the next day, and three others were severely wounded.

At daylight on the morning of the 12th the action began. Major Gregory, having moved his men with the six-pounder and the howitzer from the Hlosi to the upper edge of the bush, fired some shots into the kloofs below. This was the signal to those who were waiting near the edge of the river to commence their operations. The Kaffirs were on the move immediately. At first they were seen to be driving cattle down towards the river, evidently unaware of the advance of

¹ Called on the maps and in despatches the Chusie and sometimes Clusie.

the infantry upwards. But soon the animals were moving in the opposite direction and pouring in hundreds from out of the different glens; the Kaffirs at the same time fighting furiously to prevent them from being driven into the open. After several hours of action of this kind, 2,500 head of cattle, together with a large number of horses and goats were captured, and seventy-five Kaffirs were said to have been killed. On the Colonial side, eight men were killed and several were badly wounded. A good idea of the nature of this bush fighting may be obtained by following in detail the doings of one of the Albany Sharpshooters.¹ After the guns had been fired into the kloofs and the Kaffirs were well on the move, a Sergeant Howell of the Port Elizabeth Yeomanry with a party of twenty irregulars was ordered to go down through the bush to an open space on which huts and cattle could be seen. Having put their horses in a place of safety, they entered the bush and descended some distance, when ten went ahead while the remainder stood on some projecting rocks in order to cover their comrades with their fire while they approached the Kaffir stronghold. After waiting for some time and not seeing them emerge from the bush, and having heard firing in the ravines below, they became anxious and decided to follow them. Making their way down by what seemed to be the shortest route they were soon brought to a standstill by finding themselves at the edge of a high precipice. From this eminence, however, they saw the party going cautiously forward and arrive at the kraal; further they saw them take cattle and horses and drive them towards the bush when Kaffirs emerged from their hiding places and followed them.

Realising the danger, they shouted to them to warn them and then hurriedly sought another path to their assistance. They had not gone far when they met three men returning with the news that there had been a fight and that some of the burghers had been killed. In all actions in this formidable bush, it was almost impossible for a force to keep together or to avoid being scattered and lost in the dense and tangled thickets. This had been the case with these. The rescue party, which for the same reason had now dwindled to three,

¹ *Vide* the diary of T. K. Stringfellow, in the Albany Museum, Grahamstown.

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moved on and soon met two more men coming from below ; they were bleeding and in a fainting condition ; one of them was Sergeant Howell. The Kaffirs had waylaid them and from the ambush had, with their assegais, pierced Howell through the thigh and his comrade through the arm. They were assisted out of the bush and conveyed to the camp where they were cared for by Dr. A. G. Campbell. In due course, nearly the whole of Major Gregory's column reassembled at the Hlosi camp, and the greatest concern was felt for those who were absent, as the fighting had been at close quarters and it was considered more than likely that some had been killed. After resting for a time a party of about forty went to search for the missing men. Thirty entered the bush and made their way down to the huts and scene of conflict, the others remained to take charge of the horses. Although the Kaffirs undoubtedly were not far off, not one was to be seen and everything—huts, cooking pots with food in them and other things—was abandoned. The narrator of these events acknowledges that the party did not relish this piece of work and that they made but a very partial search. Having accomplished nothing, they returned to the camp. But as has been stated the combined movement resulted in the capture of a large number of animals and the killing of seventy-five Kaffirs.¹ The cattle were driven on to Colonel Somerset's camp which by this time had been shifted to near Eno's old kraal, where also there was a large number which Somerset's division had collected in its wanderings. All these were left in charge of some burghers and some of Pato's friendly Kaffirs until, at the end of the proceedings, they were driven into a safe place near Salem by a party of burghers under Field-Commandant Rademeyer of George.

Operations in these parts completed, Major Gregory marched his men back to Trompetter's Drift, where they arrived on Friday afternoon. But their work was not at an end. The bush on the right side of the river now claimed their attention, as it was believed to be harbouring large numbers of

¹ The men killed on the Colonial side in this affair were : J. F. Goodwin, R. Bland, W. Weston, F. van der Schijff, Piet van Rooyen, Helligert van Rooyen, Caspar Loetz, and Hans, a Hottentot, and during the night alarm, J. Robinson, corporal of the 75th, and P. McGarigal, A. Watt, and W. Brown of the 72nd, twelve in all ; and twelve were severely wounded.

Kaffirs. Accordingly at seven o'clock on Saturday morning the whole force moved in the direction of Committees from which place Colonel England was acting. As before a number of smaller parties was formed for simultaneous action at different points.

Having moved on for some hours, they found themselves, so one who was present tells us, in a wild and romantic country, through which the only paths were the tracks made by elephants. Leading their horses, as it was not possible to ride them, they climbed a steep ascent through the overhanging foliage, and at intervals could discover, in the bright moonlight the deep and solitary ravines on each side of them. On reaching the top, they saw the fires of the enemy in the distance and having approached as near as was deemed safe, they slept at their horses' heads until daylight. At the first appearance of dawn, they were again on the move, endeavouring noiselessly to get as close to the Kaffirs as possible. It was a failure, however. The nearest of their eagle-eyed scouts discovered them and in a moment the alarm was being shouted from hill-top to hill-top. A rush was then made to their place, but on reaching it all had disappeared, and the only signs of them were the fires on which meat was boiling and the raw meat hanging in plenty on the branches of the adjacent trees. The force moved about in the vicinity but found no Kaffirs. Colonel Smith seems to have taken this as evidence that the work of the 12th and 13th had been more successful than was at first believed, that is, that the Kaffirs had been driven out of the Fish River bush over the Keiskamma. It is curious, however, that in none of the accounts of these operations, or in the despatches, is there mention of anyone having seen the Kaffirs retreating over the flat and open country which must be traversed in order to reach that river. This extensive bush country is quite large enough for many thousands of natives to lie hidden and to defy the efforts of a much larger force to prevent them from dodging from place to place than was then in action against them. It is quite possible therefore that the Kaffirs were not driven out, but that they were merely in hiding until danger was past. This is rendered the more probable by the occurrence of events yet to be recorded. Before leaving those parts, another attempt

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was made to find the bodies of the men who had been killed on the previous Thursday. Forty-five of the Sharpshooters and five of the C.M.R. (Hottentots) visited this place. As usual the huts were empty with signs of very recent occupation; for instance, there were calabashes full of milk. The surrounding bush was more carefully searched, when the bodies of the two van Rooyens were found, and presumably were buried. At no great distance were the bodies of two dead Kaffirs. Parched with thirst, the men went to drink at a small pool of water and in it found the fustian jacket and a black waistcoat which were known to have belonged to Goodwin, but of his body, as well as that of Bland, no traces could be found. Having done here all that was possible, the men rejoined the main column and then all marched back to Grahamstown.¹

The Kaffirs, by this time, had little doubt as to the attitude of the Hottentots. They had seen them firing upon them in the different skirmishes, and the people of the Kat River Settlement had not joined them as had been expected. As soon, therefore, as other matters permitted them, Tyali's people, with a number of Hintza's, turned their attention to that settlement with a view to pursuing the same course there as had been adopted in the more southern regions. Vague rumours of intended attacks had been rife for some time, but had not been taken seriously.

About the middle of February, however, Captain Armstrong came to hear of two Kaffir women who had visited the settlement and warned some of their friends of impending danger. At daylight on the 19th, therefore, he sent out a number of patrols to the tops of the mountains, which bound the settlement on the north, to watch for the approach of any hostile bands. They had not long to wait, for large bodies of Kaffirs were even then descending the kloofs towards the settlement, and very soon a rush was made towards the cattle which had all been collected at one place. Captain Armstrong had expected this and had made due preparation. A furious fight ensued during which sixty-seven Kaffirs were killed and not a single head of cattle was taken. On the side of the Hotten-

¹ *Vide* the reports of these matters. *Documents Relating to the Kaffir War of 1835*, collected by Dr. Theal, pp. 49, 55-65, 68-71.

tots only two were killed. After this the Kaffirs beat a hasty retreat in the direction from which they had come. CHAP.
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While these affairs were taking place, and as far as they permitted, preparations for the invasion of Kaffirland were in progress. Additional burghers and stores were arriving in Grahamstown, and places of rendezvous were being established beyond the Colonial boundary in the Ceded Territory. A central camp for the assembly of the troops was being formed at Fort Willshire, to which place waggon loads of timber had been despatched for repairing the damage recently done by Maqomo's people, and to which place also Colonel Smith went on March 6th, preparatory to the general move eastwards. Under the protection of a party of forty burghers of Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage, a large punt or ferry was being constructed at Trompetter's Drift for conveying commissariat and other stores over the river in case of flood. One large body of burghers, which was to form part of the right flank, had already been sent to the lower reaches of the Keiskamma, while another in connection with the left flank had reached Ox Kraal in the north. But all this received a severe check when news reached Grahamstown that the Kaffirs in hundreds were again invading the Colony. Whether they had been expelled from the Fish River bush during the previous operations, as was believed by Colonel Smith, and had returned, or whether they had never left at all is a question difficult to decide; certain it is, however, that at the beginning of March, those difficult parts were infested as badly as they had ever been. This was discovered, on March 6th, by a patrol under Field Cornet Piet Nel, which came across the spoor of a large number of Kaffirs on the Kaffirland side of Committees but leading into the Colony. Nel immediately sought the assistance of Captain Jarvis of the 72nd with a party of his men, as well also as the large burgher force under the Field-Commandant J. I. Rademeyer of George. Moving cautiously through the bush along the left bank of the river, Kaffirs, in numbers estimated at 700, were seen on the open spaces on the hills. Some shots from a three-pounder were fired in their direction and then they were chased towards Trompetter's Drift. Three were killed and eighty-three head of cattle were captured.

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The party which was building the punt at Trompetter's Drift was taken by surprise and suffered badly. Kaffirs suddenly appeared on the opposite side of the river and seized the draught oxen which were then grazing there. As soon as Captain Harries saw this he ordered his men to saddle their horses and move off quickly to the rescue of the animals.

But before they were ready to start, the Kaffirs in hundreds commenced to pour from the bush in many parts and cross the river. The horsemen turned in the direction where the Kaffirs seemed to be most numerous, but had not gone far when they felt it wiser to return to the camp and rejoin their comrades. It was then seen that both to the right and the left of the camp the Kaffirs were crowding out of the defiles and paths down the opposite hills, evidently with the intention of surrounding them; in fact, that is what they actually did within about ten minutes of their first appearance. The case was desperate. The burghers fought furiously and succeeded in cutting, or rather shooting, their way through their assailants losing nine men, five Europeans and four Hottentots, in doing so. But they lost everything. The camp, waggons, baggage, tools, and the unfinished punt all fell into the hands of the enemy.

After repelling the Kaffirs, as already stated, Commandant Rademeyer with 175 men moved in the direction of Breakfast Vlei and patrolled the heads of the great kloofs down to the left bank of the Fish River. On the afternoon of March 9th, he was returning from Trompetter's Drift to his camp at a place called Moodelyke's Kop on the Hlosi, when he saw smoke issuing from the bush not far from the spot where Howell's men had been engaged on February 12th. With twenty-five of his men¹ he entered the bush, and descending some distance they got into a difficult and rocky place, and almost before they were aware of it, Kaffirs, many of them with guns, had surrounded them at close quarters. A desperate fight took place. The Kaffirs were so close as to be almost on the muzzles of the men's guns. In the *mêlée* between sixty and seventy Kaffirs were killed, while Rademeyer had five killed² and

¹ Some accounts say forty.

² The killed were: A. Boshoff, J. Bernard, J. Meyer, H. Wessels, and A. van Zyl.

seven wounded. The sound of the firing drew the attention of the remainder of the patrol which immediately made its way to their assistance. The Kaffirs retreated leaving the burghers to carry off their dead and wounded. Sir Benjamin Durban in speaking of this affair said: "I think Rademeyer's desperate combat and extrication of his party from the Kaffirs in the kloof on Monday evening, one of the most brilliant examples of intrepid determination, able management, and distinctive personal prowess that is upon record". As soon as news of the state of affairs reached Grahamstown, all preparations for the move into Kaffirland stopped. Supplies which were going forward were returned, and men who ought to have been leaving for Fort Willshire received orders to move towards lower Albany. Colonel Somerset, with as many men as he could muster, marched to Trompetter's Drift, while Major Bagot, with the Provisional Hottentot Infantry, went to the bushy country along the Kap River—a small tributary of the Fish River in the district of Bathurst. And as further indications of the success of the Kaffirs in checkmating, for a time at all events, these military preparations, Colonel Smith himself returned to Grahamstown, arriving on the 13th. Since the 9th, with 300 men, he had been in the saddle almost continuously, chasing large bodies of the enemy out of the Keiskamma bush and driving them into the Amatola Mountains. There had, however, been no definite action. Leaving his tired men to protect the Fort, he himself returned to Headquarters.

CHAPTER IV.

THE CAMPAIGN IN KAFFIRLAND.

CHAP. IV. NOT the least important part of the preparation for the invasion of Kaffirland was that of deciding whether the paramount chief Hintza was to be regarded as friendly to the Colony or in league with Maqomo and Tyali. There had been so many rumours and reports from traders, missionaries, and others, more or less trustworthy, which if true indicated that he was no less an active enemy than those who had done their worst with the assegai and firebrand, that with his sanction, if not his direct orders, the stolen cattle were being driven to and secreted in his territory, and, in short, that he was the chief instigator of all the mischief. But there was nothing tangible which could be brought against him; great as was the suspicion, there was nothing on which he could be clearly convicted. The fact that there were hundreds of his followers among the invaders did not incriminate him, as the same was the case of Pato, who was without question amicably disposed towards the Colony, but was unable to control his people. To put an end to this uncertainty, therefore, and to arrive at a clear understanding with Hintza and thus to obviate the evil of bringing disaster upon the innocent, it was decided to interview the chief himself. Fortunately, for this duty there was available the service of Stephanus van Wyk, the upright and greatly respected old Field-Commandant of the Tarka, who had acted so timely and discreetly in connection with the Slagter's Nek affair, twenty years previously, and who moreover was well known to Hintza. Having taken the field at the first outbreak of the Kaffirs in December, he volunteered in January to undertake this mission. Sir Benjamin Durban approved of this, and instructed him to assure the chief that he (the Governor) was disposed to believe still in his friendly professions and that he now expected from Hintza a reciprocity

of that friendship which had been extended to him when the Colonial Government went to his assistance against the Fetcani in 1828. He was to be asked to intercept all stolen cattle which were driven into his country, and to state when and with what forces he would be prepared to assist the Colony in its struggle against the hostile chiefs. At this time (January, 1835) van Wyk with his commando was encamped on the Koonap River somewhere near the great Winterberg. Hintza, as has been stated, had abandoned his place at Butterworth and had taken up a position nearer the Colonial boundary in order, so it was believed, to be the better able to assist Maqomo and Tyali. It was a matter of no great difficulty, therefore, for van Wyk to get in touch with him. Christian Muller was sent to find Hintza and to invite him to go to van Wyk at the Koonap camp, guaranteeing him personal safety and good treatment. Hintza acquiesced. In due course, the paramount chief accompanied by Mapassa, the chief of the Tambookies, and about thirty followers, unarmed but all on horseback, approached the camp. The Boers recognised some of the horses as those which had been stolen from themselves, but, under the circumstances, they thought it politic to make no mention of the fact. After the tedious preliminaries and a good deal of the beating about the bush so characteristic of an "indaba" with Kaffirs, Hintza was at length got to focus his attention on the Governor's message. He acknowledged that he knew of the confederacy against the Colony; he remembered the good services rendered him against the Fetcani in 1828, and assured van Wyk that in the event of further trouble he would not fail to ask again for assistance. Asked whether he thought he ought not now to come to the aid of the Colony, he replied that he wished to know the cause of the war, and when told that the Kaffirs had wantonly invaded the Colony, burnt houses, murdered helpless people and stolen all their goods, he answered that he would not assist, that as the war was between two brothers on the one side and the English on the other, he would remain neutral and that he knew no reason for the war. He could not promise to restore the stolen cattle as he would not know which they were, but if the colonists would go with him and point them out he would assist in their recovery. The interview ended with but little satisfaction to

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van Wyk, Hintza's answers had been equivocal and evasive in the extreme, and had made it perfectly clear that not the slightest reliance could be placed upon him. And if further evidence had been necessary to demonstrate the duplicity of the wily and treacherous savage, it was to be found in the conduct of Hintza immediately after his return to his temporary residence. According to the account of four friendly Fingoes who were living among his people, the petty chiefs, on hearing that van Wyk with a small party of Boers might be expected to visit them with a view to recovering Colonial cattle, stood up with one accord and declared themselves on the side of Maqomo—a perfectly unnecessary proceeding considering that they had already been as active robbers as any. A plot was then concocted for massacring the expected party. The Boers were to be received in a friendly manner, treated hospitably, and towards evening a number of Colonial cattle was to be handed over to them; three huts were to be prepared for them, and while they were asleep in these the thatch was to be set on fire, and while the inmates were endeavouring to escape, they were to be stabbed to death with assegais. The four Fingoes managed to get information of this intended diabolical plot conveyed to the brother of the friendly Tambookie chief Vadana, who in turn communicated it to Captain Armstrong at Camp Adelaide (afterwards Fort Armstrong), and thus van Wyk himself came to know of it. On receipt of van Wyk's unsatisfactory report, Sir Benjamin Durban instructed the Field-Commandant to move his camp to the Ox Kraal River, more to the north, in order as far as possible to watch Hintza's movements, and further, to send to Hintza another message, demanding him to state unequivocally "whether the Governor is to consider Hintza at peace or war with the Colony; if the former, then he must openly separate himself from the hostile chiefs, must prevent them from entering his territory with plunder, and must send back the stolen property already there". He was to be told that a large force was about to enter Kaffirland, and that unless he unquestionably showed himself to be a friend, he would necessarily be confounded with the enemy and be treated as such.

On March 6th, van Wyk moved his large camp from the Koonap. For the purpose of carrying out the Governor's

further instructions, and in view of his knowledge of the intended plot, he decided to approach Hintza with a force of not less than 200 of his armed men. With this number he rode towards the Zwart Kei and formed an encampment at some little distance from the place where the chief was believed to have his kraal. Two Tambookies were then sent forward to ask Hintza to go to van Wyk's camp and to hear a message from the Governor of the Colony. The messengers soon returned with the information that Hintza had gone on an expedition to recover cattle which had been stolen from him by the bushmen. About an hour afterwards, a petty chief, Klabaklabak, went to van Wyk, and reiterating the above statement, said that he had authority to act for Hintza and to receive any message. Dissatisfied with all this, van Wyk, on the 9th, rode up to the kraal with fifty armed men. He found there hundreds of Kaffirs of a distinctly hostile disposition, and he also saw a large number of stolen Colonial cattle; in fact, there were so many in these parts that concealment of them was out of the question. Again he was told that Hintza was away hunting. Van Wyk, on returning to his camp, was told by Hermanus,¹ the interpreter who accompanied him, that Hintza all this time was at the kraal in hiding until the fancied danger was past. As nothing could be done van Wyk moved back to the Colony and arrived at Balfour on the 12th, when he sent a report of his proceedings to the Governor.

Besides that of Hintza, there were two other chiefs whose neutrality or co-operation it was a wise policy to obtain before commencing the campaign in Kaffirland. One was Vadana,² the acting chief of the Tambookies, who lived near the Wesleyan mission station of Clarkebury, about forty-five miles from Butterworth, and the other was Faku, the chief of the Pondos. Both had good reasons for being on friendly terms with the Colony, for they had near them stronger and hostile tribes which kept them in a state of continual poverty and danger, and, like Hintza, had looked to the Colony for assistance in

¹ This is the man who was shot while leading the rebel Hottentots into Fort Beaufort in January, 1851.

² Vadana was regent, acting for Umtirara, the minor son of the late chief, Vusani.

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their broils with their enemies. In the early days of the outbreak, both chiefs, through the missionary, the Rev. W. J. Davis, sent to the Governor assurances of their friendly dispositions. Vadana, in fact, had collected all the traders in his country and afforded them what protection he could at Clarkebury. It was to this place Mr. Ayliff with his family fled (Feb. 17th) when he found it dangerous to remain any longer among Hintza's people at Butterworth. Vadana had further committed himself by taking from the Gcalekas some of the stolen cattle which had been driven as far as his country. To these two chiefs Sir B. Durban, in approbation of their conduct, sent presents of tiger skins, and told them that he hoped they would stop the progress of the hostile tribes if they should rush through their territories in escaping from the just vengeance of the English forces. Neither tribe, however, was called upon to act on behalf of the Colony in subsequent proceedings. On the other hand, the Tambookies were so violently assailed from the north-east by the Amabaca under the war-like and bloodthirsty chief Ncapai, the son of a Zulu chief, who had revolted from Charka and had become a great scourge to the surrounding country, that the refugee traders at Clarkebury, about thirty in number, had to fight the battle of their would-be protectors. On March 18th it became known at the mission station that the Amabaca were descending the distant mountains on murder and plunder intent. In their predatory course, they killed a large number of Tambookies, seized 2,000 cattle, and completely devastated a tract of country twenty miles long by ten miles wide. The traders, with the advantage of their guns, joined the defenders and succeeded in putting Ncapai to flight. One trader, R. Rawlins, was killed. The goodwill of Vadana and Faku towards the Colony was therefore assured.

When Sir Benjamin Durban had, at length, reason to believe that the Fish River bush had been scoured and cleared of the enemy, and when the temporary outposts had been withdrawn, he instructed Colonel Smith, on March 14th, to continue with the interrupted preparations for the general assembly of the forces at Fort Willshire. Forthwith the various regiments commenced to leave Grahamstown and join those already at the Keiskamma. On the 15th the Provisional

Corps of Infantry, under Majors Stockenstrom and Bagot, marched out of the town, and on the next day they were followed by the 72nd Regiment, which acted as escort to the long line of commissariat and other waggons, nearly five miles in length.¹ On Saturday the 21st, Colonel Smith with his staff left for the camp to make the final arrangements for the forward move.

The Governor was detained in completing the arrangements for the first and second lines of defence. The former consisted of 24 Artillery, 461 officers and men of the 75th Regiment, 30 of the Cape Mounted Rifles, 982 burghers, and 502 of Groepe's half-breeds and Hottentots, in all 688 Cavalry and 1,313 Infantry; they were under command of Lieut.-Colonel England, with Headquarters at Grahamstown. This force was for the defence of the, then, large districts of Albany and Somerset.

The second line, consisting of the Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage burghers and Volunteers under the command of Colonel Cuyler, was deputed to protect the Uitenhage and Zuurberg districts.

On the afternoon of the 26th, however, Sir B. Durban with his staff and last instalment of soldiers left Grahamstown and arrived at Fort Willshire on the 28th. After all the bustle and confusion of the previous weeks, Grahamstown then became as quiet and dull as the festive mansion after the departure of the wedding guests. On his arrival in the camp on the 22nd, Colonel Smith's first concern was the whereabouts of the enemy and the best direction in which to move his forces. On the next day, therefore, with a view to reconnoitring the position held by Tyali in the Amatola Mountains, he set out with the two Field Cornets, Greyling and Nel, and rode over the country to somewhere within the

¹ The route taken by the troops from Grahamstown was via the present *Peddie* road over Botha's Hill and then down the *Ecca* Pass (now the Queen's Road) to where the road to Grasslands branches from that to Fort Brown (then Hermanus' kraal). At this point the regiments took different directions, some continuing to Fort Beaufort, while others, those under Colonel Somerset, took a more southerly direction so as to reach Line Drift on the Keiskamma. The 1st Division, with Headquarters, and the waggon train went in the direction of Grasslands and descended to Double Drift where the Fish River was crossed. The long and steep ascent on the other side having been scaled, the route lay in almost a straight line to Fort Willshire, about sixty miles from Grahamstown.

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vicinity of Middle Drift, passing Block Drift and the old Lovedale¹ mission station, which they found had been fired by the Kaffirs. Although the Colonel did not go far in the direction of Debe Nek, he seems to have learnt that large numbers of the enemy were occupying positions in the thick bush of the Tabindoda Mountains, and further, that it was the intention of the Kaffirs to attack, in the first place, the chief Pato and the line of Keiskamma posts and then to attempt to regain the fastnesses of the Great Fish River.

Having returned to the camp with this information, Colonel Smith decided to make forthwith a demonstration in the more distant mountains. At three o'clock on the morning of the 26th, a force consisting of 200 of the Swellendam burghers with their old Field-Commandant Linde,² 100 of the Albany Burghers (*Royal Tigers* as they were facetiously called), a detachment of the Cape Mounted Rifles (Hottentots), and 30 of the Corps of Guides, left Fort Willshire under the command of the Colonel himself. They crossed the Keiskamma at the Fort Willshire Drift, and leaving Block Drift a long way to the left, they rode thirty miles in the direction of Tabindoda, and halted about five miles from that mountain at a stream called the Umdesina (now the Green River). The force was then formed into three divisions, each entering the forests on the mountain sides at different places. Except on the high and distant ridges and far out of range, very few Kaffirs were to be seen. This was to be expected, as it was not likely that a body of 400 men would approach the mountains over a comparatively level country without being observed by the alert Kaffirs on the higher lands. Some, however, are reported to have been killed during the ensuing skirmishes, but how many, if any, the tangled bush and

¹ "Old Lovedale" was on the Ncera River or stream, about four miles from the present Lovedale. A small portion of the ruins of the old station is still standing.

² Jacobus Linde of Swellendam was nearly eighty years of age when he insisted upon doing his share of duty in the 1835 war. He had already served in four Kaffir campaigns, and might with good grace have rested at home and seen the younger men go forth. But the call to arms apparently rejuvenating him, he could not withstand the temptation of leading his burghers again to the front. The appearance of the patriarchal old Boer with his long white beard riding into Grahamstown at the head of the Swellendamers at the beginning of the war was a sight long remembered.

difficulty of seeing the enemy made it impossible to determine. According to the official report, 1,200 cattle,¹ besides a large number of horses and goats were captured, and 500 huts burnt. The force then commenced the return march to the camp and arrived there at one o'clock on the morning of Friday, having ridden the sixty miles, scoured the bush from the bottom to the top of the mountain, and worked the enemy much woe, all in *twenty-two hours*—good evidence that Colonel Smith was there.

The force available for the invasion of Kaffirland was 25 Artillery with six field guns, 371 of the 72nd Regiment, 358 of the Cape Mounted Rifles, 1,537 burghers of Swellendam, Graaff Reinet, Somerset, and Albany, 62 Beaufort Volunteers, 40 of the Corps of Guides, and 761 Hottentot levies, a total of 1,997 Cavalry and 1,157 Infantry. These were arranged in four divisions, and assigned stations from which to commence simultaneously the forward move. The 1st Division was under the command of Colonel Peddie, and had Fort Willshire as its starting-point. With this, Sir Benjamin Durban and the Headquarters were attached. The 2nd Division, under the command of Colonel Somerset, had Line Drift on the Keiskamma as its place of entry into Kaffirland. The 3rd, commanded by Major Cox, took Fort Beaufort, while the 4th, under Field-Commandant van Wyk, was stationed much farther to the north—beyond the Winterberg. Each Division had a month's supplies and depôts for their renewals at Fort Willshire and Fort Beaufort. The 2nd and 4th Divisions were all cavalry.

All these arrangements having been completed by the 28th, the general move eastward commenced on the morning of Tuesday, March 31st. The 1st Division crossed the Keiskamma by the Fort Willshire Drift and followed the route into Kaffirland which was taken by Colonel Smith a few days before. Up the long and steep hill on the other side of the river and threading its way through the less bushy tracks, there crept slowly, so an eyewitness tells us, a motley assemblage of men of every hue and in costumes infinitely varied, and, intermingled with an interminable train of ox-waggons, produced a scene which in other countries can be afforded only

¹ The account of this given in the private diary of T. H. Bowker says 600.

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by a theatrical exhibition. Having reached the top, the prospect presented was that of a gently undulating country extending to the bases of the distant Amatola Mountains. Though treeless, mimosa bushes diversified the scene, and the freshness and greenness of the grass, due to recent rains, gave that portion of Kaffirland, at least, a very prepossessing appearance. The 1st Division marched about seven miles during the first day, and halted for the night at a ruined trading station belonging to a man named Driver. Near, there were some abandoned Kaffir huts and the bodies of two dead Kaffirs. The next morning, the march was continued towards the Tabindoda—the conspicuous landmark in the lesser Amatolas—and, about four miles from its base, probably near the site of the present Fort White, the 1st Division formed its camp. There the men remained inactive for two days, waiting for the arrival of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions. On April 2nd, the Governor himself, with a large escort, made a reconnaissance in the mountains, as smoke from many Kaffir fires was seen on the heights. Late in the evening of that day (April 2nd), Major Cox, with the 3rd Division, rode into the camp, having started from Block Drift and patrolled the country at the base of the mountains, and probably passed over the site of the present village of Middle Drift. About an hour afterwards, Colonel Somerset with the 2nd Division approached the camp from the south. They had left the Line Drift on the Keiskamma and had scoured all the country up the left bank of that river. According to the pre-arranged plan, all met at the Debe. In the meantime, van Wyk with the 4th Division was marching over the country from the Klipplats River, near the Shiloh missionary station, to the Bontebok Flats and making his way to Keiskamma Hoek.

Before the 2nd and 3rd Divisions had had any time for rest, the whole camp was under orders to be ready to march at midnight. Four large parties were formed, and to each a position or path leading up the mountains was assigned. One party, under the immediate command of the Governor, took a path which ascended the Tabindoda on the right, while Captain Warden with a hundred of the Swellendam burghers took another to the left. Major Cox with his men moved to the extreme left towards the Chumie, and Colonel Somerset with



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FORT WHITE WITH TABINDODA
Near this the troops assembled

the 4th Division went to the Pirie bush on the extreme right. All having arrived at their respective positions, they waited until daylight when a simultaneous move into the forests on the mountains was made. The combined result of all this was the capture of almost 1,100 head of cattle and the burning of many Kaffir huts. Of actual fighting there was none. The Kaffirs fled from these parts and retired to the still more difficult heights of the sources of the Buffalo River. The following is an account of the movements of the 2nd Division by one who took part in them: "At the first appearance of daylight (on the morning of the 3rd April) we halted, and separated into three divisions, the centre proceeding up the gorge of the mountain with the three-pounder and howitzer, and the other two round the hills to the right and left. On reaching the heights we had before us an extensive view of deep woody ravines, but not the least appearance of any inhabitants. The whole country was deserted: it was evident that it had recently been thickly populated. Here the right division joined us, having found it impracticable to proceed by the route proposed in consequence of the impervious character of the thicket. We shortly afterwards reached the missionary station of Pirie, which we found totally destroyed. While here we distinctly heard the firing of guns in the direction of the sources of the Keiskamma; we therefore resumed our march, proceeding to the extremity of the mountain-range in view, and beyond which the main sprouts of the Buffalo have their rise, being separated by high mountains from those which, falling to the west, form the Keiskamma River. From the position we had taken it was calculated that if the enemy should be pressed on the sprouts of the Keiskamma, he must descend into those of the Buffalo, in which case we were in a situation to intercept him, as well as any cattle that might pass in the same direction. Having proceeded some distance, we observed a strong body of the enemy assembled on the summit of a mountain which bounded our view in that direction. On a nearer approach, this mountain was found to present a sort of natural bulwark, and was joined by a small low neck of forest country to another range a little in the rear, stretching to the eastward, and descending a large nook, from whence issue the several springs which form the source

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of the Buffalo. From this lofty position the enemy continued watching our progress, and he must from thence have had a view also of the whole of the country subject to the simultaneous attack of the several divisions. Suspecting that the enemy might be concealed in the adjacent kloof, the howitzer was moved to a commanding ridge, and several shots and shells were fired, but without effect. In the meantime we detached several parties to endeavour to bring the enemy to action, but these only succeeded so far as to capture a few cattle. In the afternoon we returned to Pirie, remained there half an hour and then continued our march in thick misty rain to the camp, which we reached about 9 p.m. excessively hungry and fatigued, having been on horseback nearly eighteen hours."

The captured cattle were sent in charge of an escort of a hundred burghers to Grahamstown, whence another party drove them on to the depôt at Salem.

On the 5th, some burghers of van Wyk's force arrived at the Debe camp with the news that the 4th Division had reached Keiskamma Hoek, about twenty-two miles distant. It appeared that the division had come into contact with considerable numbers of the enemy in the mountain passes and that a brisk fight ensued, during which nine Kaffirs had been killed and 2,300 head of cattle captured. The only casualty on the part of the Boers was that of van Wyk himself, who had been badly wounded in his hand by an assegai. The difficulty of holding and protecting the large number of cattle was the reason of the appearance of the messengers in the Debe camp. It is not clear from the official documents what was done with these, as orders were almost immediately given for the breaking up of the camp and the continued movement towards the east. Long before daylight on the 6th, the tents were struck, the waggons repacked, and all was in readiness for the march towards those parts to which it was believed the main body of the Kaffirs with their cattle had retired, namely, the mountains in which the Buffalo River takes its rise. The whole force moved in one column as far as the Pirie mission station, when the 1st Division continued along the base of the mountains while the 2nd made a detour to the south. All, however, at the end of the day rejoined and encamped on

the far side of the Buffalo River, near a mountain afterwards called Murray's Krantz. Orders to be in readiness to move up the mountains at three o'clock in the morning were issued. Accordingly, about three hours before daybreak on the 7th, the light company of the 72nd Regiment, under Captain Murray, three companies, 280 men, of the 1st Provisional Battalion, and 100 of the Swellendam burghers left the camp to demonstrate to the Kaffirs that their fancied strongholds were as accessible to British troops as to themselves. Having ascended to the top of the first ridge, another and still higher one came into view but separated from them by a deep valley. On this higher and distant land six large droves of cattle with intermingled Kaffirs were seen, moving evidently towards the forests which clothed those parts of the mountains. The three companies of Provisionals were detached and ordered to overtake them and to make a flanking movement. Under the command of Captain Crause the men gained the heights with great difficulty, so steep was the rocky passage that they had to pull one another up by their muskets. On arriving at the top both Kaffirs and cattle had disappeared. The force then moved towards the forest. Captain Crowe with 30 men was posted at a place at the edge past which it was expected the cattle would be driven, while the remainder in two bodies entered the wood in two directions. Very large numbers of cattle were soon seen in different parts, and the attempt to take them was the signal for a general action. The Kaffirs were Eno's people and were being led by the chief himself. But few of them had guns, hence the attacking party seems to have been easily able to drive them further into the forest and to capture no less than 4,000 cattle, which were driven out into the open spaces. Several Kaffirs are said to have been killed, while on the side of the Provisionals, a Hottentot Sergeant, Cobus Kievido, was shot. While this was in progress, firing was heard at a distance in another part of the mountain. In that direction, therefore, a large body of Provisionals went to render any assistance which might be required of them. They found at the edge along the top of a steep krantz a number of Kaffirs, estimated at 600, under the leadership of Siyolo, the son of Dushani, attacking the 72nd Regiment which was immediately below them. Large stones

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and assegais were being hurled down. On the approach of Captain Crause's force, however, the Kaffirs had to turn their attention to the new danger and a fierce fight soon took place. For a time the enemy stood his ground stubbornly, but his ammunition becoming expended nothing was left but flight. Some jumped from the precipices and were killed instantly, while others found hiding places in the holes and caves in the rocks beneath. Among those who were captured in these places was a Hottentot, named Louis Arnoldus,¹ a man who had distinguished himself, not only by his misdirected bravery, but also by the size and sound of the huge elephant gun which he carried, and which had been conspicuous in the previous fight in the Fish River bush. Instead of shooting him, as was first intended, he was kept a prisoner, as, being in the confidence of Eno, it was hoped to make use of him in future operations. Altogether thirty-seven were killed in this affair.

What had happened below during this time was that after the departure of the Provisional Battalion to the heights, the 72nd Regiment, under Captain Murray, with a view to scaling it, marched direct to the foot of the krantz on top of which numbers of the enemy were seen. But the shower of large stones and assegais caused the soldiers to retire and to endeavour to find a more practical path. Captain Murray and four others were wounded during this fusilade. While making this detour they were joined by more men from the camp, and all seem to have reached the top.

The Kaffirs having fled to the forests, the soldiers turned their attention to getting the large number of cattle driven down the mountain. They were divided into lots of about eight or ten, and men were detailed to drive each down to the large kraals which had been prepared for them near the camp by some of the 72nd who had preceded them. The descent from the mountain took about five hours, during which the enemy made ineffectual attempts to regain the cattle. With the exception of the casualties mentioned all arrived safely in the camp at nightfall. The whole force rested the next day when the 3rd Division under Major Cox arrived. On

¹ *Vide* Deposition of Louis Arnoldus in *Blue Book, Return of Caffre War*, July 12th, 1837, p. 235.

the 9th another expedition was made into these same mountains, but nothing was done beyond adding another 200 head of cattle to those already captured. The Kaffirs seemed to have moved entirely from these parts. On the morning of the 10th, the 2nd Division, under Colonel Somerset, left the camp in order to make its way to the Kye River by a southern route, and thus dislodge the tribes which had moved towards the coast. The 1st Division was under orders to be in readiness to march early the next morning by a direct route to Hintza's country, while the 3rd was to remain to harass all straggling parties of Kaffirs and to prevent any combination of the enemy in the Buffalo and Amatola Mountains—not a very difficult matter, for hitherto the want of co-operation among the chiefs had been most conspicuous—as well as to act in concert with the first line of defence. The very large number¹ of captured cattle was placed under an escort consisting of 50 George burghers, 40 Swellendam burghers, and 30 of the Kat River Legion (Hottentots), and was driven to Fort Willshire, in the first place, and then on to Grahamstown.

¹ In the Government notice (*vide Documents Relating to the 1835 War*, p. 128) the number of cattle taken in these operations is given as 15,000. It is curious that when it is possible to compare the rough official numbers of cattle with those obtained from private sources, the former nearly always seems to be far too high. Perhaps the non-Colonial soldier was not so easily able to estimate the number of cattle in large herds as the Colonial. In the present case, it is difficult to account for so large a number as 15,000. Four (T. H. Bowker in his private diary says three) thousand were taken on the mountain; assuming that the 2,300 which van Wyk had at Keiskamma Hoek were added, also the 2,000 taken by Somerset on the 10th, and then allowing a liberal margin, 9,000 seems to be nearer than 15,000.

The Rev. W. B. Boyce in his *Notes on South African Affairs*, p. 12, says: "The amazing number of 60,000 head of cattle, reported as captured by the Colonial troops, when subjected to a careful examination, shrinks within a very narrow compass. Military men, and others not accustomed to estimate the numbers of cattle grazing promiscuously, are sure to make serious mistakes. For instance, 6,000 head of cattle, reported as captured in the Buffalo Mountains, when counted by an experienced person, were found to amount to 2,400. The cattle captured in Hintza's country, estimated then at 30,000, were found to amount to but 11,000. From the difficulty of herding, a large number of every lot captured were retaken by the Kaffirs, so that the cattle actually received by the Colonial commissariat, and disposed of on account of the Colonial Government, amounted only to 18,300. Admitting that many had died, and that all taken were not properly brought to account, even yet, the total loss of the Kaffirs in cattle could not exceed 30,000; whereas they took from the Colony 111,418, besides horses and sheep."

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At daylight on the 11th, the Headquarters' Division moved from the camp on the Buffalo, leaving behind the greater number of the waggons. The route lay over an open and apparently uninhabited country to a small rivulet—a branch of the Kameka or Yellow-woods River, twenty miles distant, which was reached at about four in the afternoon, and there the camp for the night was formed. The next day the march was continued to the Gonubie River, which was crossed, and then the tops of the high hills through which that river flows having been gained, a fine view of the distant mountains of the Kei regions and Hintza's country was obtained. The division bivouacked on a small stream called the Gunga, six miles beyond the Gonubie, where it remained during the 13th, as Sir Benjamin Durban expected that he would have been joined there by the 2nd Division on that day. Colonel Smith in writing to his wife said: "We were all ready to march at daylight on the 13th, when Master sent for me, and because Somerset's division is not yet up, has ordered a halt. I remonstrated with him, but it was no use." Although in all their relations, official as well as private, Sir Benjamin Durban and Colonel Smith worked together in the greatest harmony and mutual esteem, yet in their views on the proper courses to be adopted in this warfare there were very wide differences of opinion between them. The former was slow, almost over-cautious and prepared to take no risks, while the latter was impatient and ever ready to dash forward regardless of danger. Sir Benjamin seems to have regarded Kaffir warfare as comparable with what he had experienced in the Peninsula, while Colonel Smith, on the other hand, looked upon it with contempt, and as but little better than "Smithfield market cattle driving". "You gallop in," he said, "and half by force, half by stratagem, pounce upon them (the Kaffirs), wherever you find them, frighten their wives, burn their homes, lift their cattle, and then return home in triumph." According to the impetuous Colonel, Sir Benjamin Durban was far too "scientific" for these guerilla procedures, "always full of combinations, reserves, rears and fronts, and too cautious of dangers and false movements. The greatest fault one can be guilty of is dash, and yet it is the only thing." Thus on this uneventful 13th, instead of pushing forward, Colonel Smith had to endure the

patient reconnoitring of the surrounding country, and the gaining of information regarding the sources of the rivers, position of the hills, and other topographical details. "All this," says the Colonel, "the dear old gentleman sets down to the credit of science, and thinks my guerilla ideas far too wild." "In your view of the case," the Governor remarked to Colonel Smith in defending his policy, "there is no combination, all is trusted to a succession of chances." "General," replied the Colonel, bristling up, "war itself, like all other games, is a succession of chances. But science must be its basis, and the great science of war is to adapt its principles to the enemy you have to contend with and the nature of the country. If you do not, then you give him so many chances of the game."

On the 14th, the 2nd Division not having arrived, the force moved on and encamped at a place about where the town of Komgha now stands. Perhaps with a view to presenting to Sir Benjamin an example of being up and doing and discouraging any further delay, Colonel Smith, with his escort and advanced guard, appeared before the Governor's tent at daybreak the next morning and awaited his commands. To the Colonel's great gratification, Sir Benjamin with his usual politeness said: "Pray, don't wait for me, Smith, go on". The camp consequently soon disappeared and the long cavalcade commenced the descent to the Kei River. The distance was about fifteen miles, but on account of the bush—which, however, is not as thick and impenetrable as the Fish River—the edge of the water was not reached until noon. As numerous Kaffirs had been seen on the distant hills on the further side of the river, to get into communication with some of these was Colonel Smith's first intention. For a time, however, none could be persuaded to approach the opposite bank. But one of the Kaffir guides, who had accompanied the division, got through the river and, unarmed, made his way up the opposite hill, when one of the Kaffirs was eventually persuaded to go down to the river and to talk across to the Colonel through the interpreter, Mr. (afterwards Sir) Theophilus Shepstone. At this juncture Sir Benjamin Durban arrived. This man was one of the Amapakati of Buku, the brother of Hintza. He stated that he had been sent by Buku to learn the reason of the

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approach of so large a command ; he asked the Colonel whether he knew the name of that river—a euphemistic way of asking him whether he knew that he was in a country where he had no right to be—and he forbade the men to drink the waters of the Kei. In reply, he was told that the army was going into Hintza's country with peaceable intentions, and that if Hintza answered satisfactorily the questions which had been put to him by van Wyk, all would be well, but if he did not, then war would follow. The Governor added that if both Hintza and Buku would come to him and talk, their safety would be guaranteed, and they would be treated with every kindness.

The troops then commenced the passage of the Kei. But before doing so, in order that no injury might be inflicted upon an unoffending people, and in view of the fact that, as unlikely as it seemed, the prevailing suspicions regarding Hintza's conduct might prove unfounded, Sir Benjamin Durban, with his characteristic caution, issued a General Order that "upon crossing the River Kei, the troops will enter a country which, unless express orders be given to that effect, is not to be treated as an enemy's. Commanding officers will therefore explain very clearly to their men respectively this difference between the country they are now entering and that which they have quitted ; and that unless hostilities be commenced first by the inhabitants upon them . . . they are upon no account to commit an act of hostility . . . no kraals must be burned or pillaged, no gardens, woods, or corn fields meddled with but by regular parties under officers appointed for the duty, to get the requisite supplies of vegetables, corn, etc. . . . any person infringing these orders will be tried by a court martial and punished with the utmost rigour of military law, . . . and to see that no more (vegetables) are taken than are absolutely required for the use of their troops, and whenever any arrangement can be made for remuneration it will be invariably done."

All having safely reached the other side of the river, and having toiled up the steep Kei heights, the march was continued for another ten miles to Shaw Fountain, the place where the trader Purcell was murdered in the previous July ; there the division encamped until the morning of the 17th.



THE KEI RIVER

A party of Hintza's people, including some petty chiefs, prompted probably by curiosity, hovered near the camp for some time; eventually they were induced to approach and interview the Governor. At first they denied all knowledge of Colonial cattle being in the country but afterwards admitted that such was the case. By these people, Sir Benjamin again endeavoured to get a message through to Hintza, and in the hope of receiving some communication from the chief, the division remained at Shaw Fountain during the 16th. But none arriving, the troops made a final move to their destination, Butterworth, or Gcwa as the Kaffirs called it, the "great place" (umzi) of the paramount chief of the Amagcaleka, Hintza, and the Wesleyan mission station of the Rev. John Ayliff. Hintza, however, was not to be found; as has been stated, he had long left this place for the White Kei, and Mr. Ayliff, for safety, was at the mission station of Clarkebury, forty-five miles more to the east. Near the mission station, which the hostile Kaffirs had almost demolished, the Headquarters of the invading army were established.

Before the tents of the camp had long been pitched, all must have been startled and felt that a bloody contest was imminent, for in the distance several hundreds of natives, armed with shields and assegais, were seen to approach. The alarm, however, was short-lived, for the people turned out to be a tribe—or, perhaps more correctly, the remnants of some tribes, called Fingoes, who had been living in bondage among Hintza's people, and had been very badly treated by them—they were, in fact, slaves to the Amagcaleka. These Fingoes, on hearing of the arrival of the British troops in the country, determined not only to seek their protection, but to offer to assist the British against the Kaffirs. With this object in view, about 1,000 of them went to the camp in the first instance, and during the following days these numbers became greatly increased. They had in their possession large numbers of cattle which they had been herding for their masters—but which Hintza's people in their hasty departures had not been able to take with them. From this time the Fingoes continued to play an important part in Kaffirland history, and in no small measure complicated the affairs of the East. The Governor, reluctant to regard

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Hintza as an enemy, and anxious to allow him ample time to reply to the messages which had been sent to him, decided that the terms of the General Order of the 15th should be observed for five days, that is until the 20th; the truce, however, was extended until the 24th. The men at Butterworth, therefore, had time to look to their clothes and equipment. The weather at this time was very wet and cold, and as the provision waggons from Fort Willshire for some reason had been delayed, all had been on half rations since the Gonubie camp. Add to this that firewood was scarce and that on the night of the 18th a violent storm of cold wind and rain thoroughly soaked everything in camp, it is not surprising to learn that all the persuasive and *other* language of Colonel Smith was needed to suppress the threatened insubordination among the Provisional Corps. The appearance of supplies, however, and especially of "Howison's canteen," did much to raise spirits generally.

On the 20th, along the route leading from Butterworth to the Colony, there was seen approaching the camp, a large and straggling crowd of people. As it drew nearer it became evident that they were Europeans, the greater number of whom were on foot, while many were leading lame and jaded horses. It soon became clear that this disorderly and funeral-like procession was the 2nd Division under Colonel Somerset, which had been expected at the Gonubie, and which was last seen as a corps of cavalry, but now approached Headquarters as one of very dejected infantry. This division had had a very arduous time. In the first place, the burgher element of it had been in the field under Colonel Somerset since the preceding January; in the second, since leaving the camp at the Buffalo, its operations had been conducted over the roughest parts of the country, namely, that nearer the coast, where the rivers were wider and the ravines deeper and more dangerous. And, as a consequence of the protection which such country could afford to the enemy and stolen cattle, the 2nd Division had had to do something more than simply march over a comparatively level country as had been the case with the 1st Division. Tyali and Maqomo, according to Colonel Somerset, had secreted their cattle in the coast country between the Nahoon and Chalumna Rivers, while the

Ndhlambi Kaffirs had theirs more towards the Kei. The spoor of thousands had been seen everywhere and the enemy was on the alert for their protection. Great trouble and labour with the waggons and the field-gun—which was overturned and so damaged as to be useless—had been experienced on the difficult and dangerous paths, unimproved by the recent rains. The over-work and shortage of food had so told upon the horses that a large number had fallen by the way and had had to be shot. In spite of all this, however, over 2,000 cattle were captured and twenty-nine Kaffirs killed. When the division arrived at Draai bush on its way to, and a few miles from Komgha, Colonel Somerset, writing on April 17th stated that he was scarcely able to move on account of the wretched condition of the remaining horses, they could not be ridden, but had to be led along by their riders; he could not rely upon any of them to go another five miles. His force, moreover, had been thinned by 100 burghers who had been sent into the Colony as escort to captured cattle and had not returned. He had then upon his hands the 2,000 cattle which had just been taken and was reduced to sending horseless burghers on foot with them to the distant depôts. It was a fortunate thing the Kaffirs did not know of this weakness. In this worn-out condition the division pushed on slowly and crossed the Kei on the 19th. At half-past three on the morning of the 20th, according to the account of one who had accompanied it, “we again marched. The morning was excessively cold with driving showers of rain, the wind occasionally very strong and impregnated with moisture. We halted at seven o’clock on a large woodless, shrubless, and comfortless expanse of country; the cold had penetrated every part of us, and the fire obtained was so scanty as to be barely sufficient to boil our kettle, and make us feel the absence of that renovating element more severely. We gladly upsaddled at half-past-eight, at which time very few waggons had reached us, and but few of the burgher force—which at all times irregular in its movements was now particularly so. The Dutch farmers cannot stand cold, but yield to it, and become from its effects inactive and spiritless. The inclemency of the weather had in fact completely broken us up, and our march towards Headquarters resembled more

CHAP. the state of fatigued (and this indeed we were), disheartened,
IV. and defeated troops, than that of a conquering division. At ten we arrived at the missionary station of Butterworth . . . Friday, 21st. All the forces marched out about a quarter of a mile in front of the camp, to be inspected by the General. We were cold and spiritless: rumours of various kinds had been afloat in the camp during yesterday afternoon, to the effect that we were censured—not praised—for what we had done—and we felt it severely. This afternoon a General Order was promulgated, in which the manner of approach of the 2nd Division to Headquarters yesterday was censured. This is rather more than we expected. Though our success has not equalled our own expectations, yet we have not been entirely unsuccessful. In the course of the last ten days we have defeated various parties of the enemy, scoured the country to the sea, killed 29 of the enemy, and taken 2,255 oxen—above 160 of them out of the sea itself.”

The 2nd Division formed its camp on the top of a bleak hill at some little distance from that of the Headquarters, and being poorly provided with tents and blankets felt severely the cold and wet weather. Besides these two divisions, the land around the Butterworth station was further enlivened by the crowds of Fingoes which quickly assembled, there being, before long, about 6,000 in the immediate vicinity, all clamorous to be taken under British protection.

While all were waiting, inactive, the pleasure of Hintza to send some sort of answer to the messages which he must have received, Sir Benjamin Durban had leisure to consider the rescue of those Europeans, missionaries, traders, and others who were taking refuge at the Wesleyan mission station of Clarkebury, forty-five miles distant. For this duty, on the 23rd he sent forth Captain Warden, of the Cape Mounted Rifles, with fifty men of that corps and a number of armed Fingoes who were eager to assist in this work. This party, which was joined *en route* by two other parties of Fingoes who had been despoiled and chased from their homes by Hintza's people, arrived at its destination on the 24th. The Revs. J. Ayliff, Davis, and Palmer, together with traders and their families to the number of sixty-five, were found there. The Rev. Mr. Satchell was still with the Pondo chief Faku, who, though

with no unfriendly feeling, would not allow him to depart. The Tambookie chief, Vadana, to whom Sir Benjamin sent cordial greetings, expressed his willingness to take 5,000 of his people into the field against Hintza if the Governor desired it, and further, he also asked to be taken under British rule as he felt he was obnoxious to, and in danger from, Hintza and Ncapai in consequence of his friendly relations with the Colonial Government. Captain Warden accepted this offer of Vadana. On the 27th the combined force attacked a large number of Hintza's people who were living near the Bashee and took from them 4,000 cattle. With these and 65 Europeans, 24 Hottentots, 524 Fingoes, and 19 waggons he returned and joined the 1st Division on May 5th, when it had moved to the Ndabakazi.

Having waited in vain until the 24th for the long-looked-for word from Hintza, the Governor determined to commence hostilities against him. First blood had already been shed, for two days previously a man named Armstrong was brutally murdered when but a short distance from the camp and on his way to the Colony with letters and despatches. Accordingly on the morning of that day, this decision was announced by the firing of one of the field-pieces, and at the same time, in response to their supplications, the Fingoes were declared to be British subjects. Before a move was made, however, Sir Benjamin interviewed a Gcaleka, named Kouba, believed to be one of Hintza's councillors, who happened to be near the camp. The whole situation was placed before him, and the reasons for the troops being in that territory were carefully explained and interpreted to him.

At ten o'clock the tents were struck and the 1st Division commenced to move to the north-west, as in that direction Hintza was suspected to be in hiding. After a march of about twenty miles, a camp was formed on the banks of a small stream called the Zolo or Izolo, a tributary of the Tsomo, into which it falls a little higher up than where the latter joins the Kei. The 2nd Division with the greater number of Fingoes remained where it was, as Butterworth, for a time, was to be the depôt for the cattle which were expected to be captured. Colonel Smith, with 300 cavalry, very soon detached himself from the slow-moving 1st Division and galloped

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IV. ation of camps. His movements must have surprised these Kaffirs, as the result of this day's expedition was the killing of twenty and, according to his report, the capture of no less than 14,000 cattle. With these he returned to Butterworth before sunset. A similar expedition on the following day added another 1,200. In all these forays the cattle seem to have been recovered very easily. There were, in those parts, such large numbers, and the only protection the Kaffirs could find for them was that afforded by the wooded kloofs which—they must have found to their dismay—were as accessible to Colonel Smith's troops as to themselves. Further, Hintza's people having very few or no fire-arms, they could only flee from danger on the approach of their assailants and leave the cattle to be driven to the British camp.

At five o'clock on the morning of the 26th, Colonel Smith with two companies of the 72nd Highlanders, three companies of the Provisional Battalion, sixty men of the Cape Corps (Hottentots), and about 300 Fingoes set out from Butterworth on a more extensive expedition, hoping to capture, besides cattle, the great chief Hintza himself. This force moved in a north-westerly direction towards the high lands of the Tsomo and crossed that river at a spot about ten miles from the Izolo camp. The great quantity of spoor, both of cattle and Kaffirs, indicated that the right direction was being taken. The cavalry, under the immediate command of Colonel Smith, was detached from the main body in order to move more speedily from place to place, while the infantry with the Fingoes were to operate in the denser bush and steeper sides of the hills which led down to the beds of the Tsomo and Kei Rivers. Hintza at this time was at a kraal he had formed on a small stream called, in the despatches, the Gongobolo. In this direction the cavalry galloped. Their approach, however, was discovered, though almost too late, for Hintza and those with him had barely time to escape before Colonel Smith arrived at the huts. So hasty had been the departure that cooking was abandoned, and the great wife, Nomsa, had not had time to gather together her personal "jewelry" which with all else was sacrificed to safety. A quantity of fine cattle belonging to the great chief himself was captured. During this and

the following two days, with but the shortest possible halts, the cavalry was kept constantly on the move, and finally with several hundreds of cattle joined the infantry at the Kei. The infantry on its part had scoured the parts of the country to which its movements were more adapted, and also succeeded in obtaining many cattle, sheep, and goats. The combined effect of all resulted in the acquisition of between four and five thousand cattle. On the side of the Colonial forces, only one casualty was reported, namely, a Hottentot sergeant who was badly wounded by an assegai. Nothing is stated regarding the numbers of Kaffirs killed, most probably there were but very few. The whole affair was little more than a "Smithfield market cattle driving" expedition. The sight of the Fingoes acting in concert with the white man in these exploits greatly exasperated the Kaffirs, and towards that unfortunate race their wrath was mainly directed. Before daylight on the 29th, this force with its booty left the Kei, and, towards the afternoon, reached the Headquarters' camp on the Izolo.

All this activity of Colonel Smith, the easy capture of the hundreds of cattle in those wild parts, and—by no means the least—the painfully sudden appearance of the soldiers in the very kraal of Hintza himself, so opened the eyes of the great chief to his danger, that, at length, he saw the wisdom of communicating with the Governor. On the 27th and 28th he endeavoured to open negotiations by means of messengers, but the time for that was past. Sir Benjamin Durban would see and talk with none but Hintza himself. Shortly after the arrival of Colonel Smith's force a large party of Kaffirs, armed and on horseback, was seen to be approaching. It was soon evident that the long-looked-for meeting with Hintza was about to take place. Lieutenant Beresford having been sent forward to conduct the party to the camp, Hintza, with an escort of about sixty of his councillors and people, drew near to the Governor's tent. Colonel Smith described him as "a very good-looking fellow, his face, though black, was the very image of poor dear George IV." The paramount chief, in his tiger skin kaross and ornaments, dismounted and was then taken forward to the Governor who received him with the ceremony proper to the occasion. His Excellency recounted to him the wrongs of which he was accused and formulated

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the terms on which hostilities would cease. These terms were, that 50,000 cattle and 1,000 horses were to be restored to the Colony. Of these, one-half was to be forthcoming immediately or as soon as they could be collected, and the remainder was to be sent in a year's time; that Hintza, being paramount chief of the whole of Kaffirland, was to command Tyali, Maqomo, Eno, Botman, and the other chiefs to cease hostilities and to deliver up to the Governor all the fire-arms they possessed; that for each of the murders of the trader Purcell and the settler Armstrong, 300 head of good cattle were to be given to the relatives of those unfortunate men; and finally that two approved hostages were to be left with the Governor for the due fulfilment of all this. Hintza was given forty-eight hours to think over it. "On hearing this he sighed, apparently despondent, gave his head a toss, and said he would consider it." In the meantime, he became the guest and protégé of Colonel Smith, who treated him with every kindness though he seems to have looked upon him as a curiosity of great interest and amusement. On his first night in camp, with one of his councillors, Hintza dined at the Colonel's table. He thoroughly enjoyed himself, so the Colonel tells us, ate voraciously, drank no wine but "took lots of coffee with pounds of sugar in each cup". Hintza so soon felt at home that he called Colonel Smith "his father," while the Colonel reciprocated by calling the chief "his son". After dinner, Hintza showed a disposition to talk politics, so the tent having been cleared of all except the chief, one of his councillors, and the interpreter, a long discussion ensued. Hintza would only talk in whispers. In the end he swore eternal amity and friendship to the British Government, and privately accepted all the terms which had been dictated to him an hour or so previously. This seemed a happy conclusion of the war, as Hintza was willing to give affirmative answers to the Governor in the morning.¹ Accordingly, early on the 30th, the whole camp was turned out to witness the formal declaration of peace. After the conference between the Governor and Hintza, Colonel Smith, in the theatrical manner which, subsequently, so characterised his negotiations with the

¹ See the interesting evidence of Umzuta, who was present during all this, in the *Blue Book on the Caffre War*, p. 233.

natives, stood forth and shouted: "Now let it be proclaimed far and near that the great chief Hintza has concluded peace with the King of England, and let the cannon fire," whereon three loud reports from the field-pieces half-deafened all and reverberated among the distant hills. Hintza was then presented with ten new saddles and bridles, twelve spades, five blankets, two rolls of duffle, two rolls of brass wire, and 150 pounds of beads, all of a total value of 1,319 dollars, or £98.

Thus far encouraged, Hintza, later in the day, asked to be allowed to have his son Kreli with him in the camp. Anxious to conciliate the chief in every respect, Sir Benjamin Durban granted this request, and sent messengers, with presents for the great wife Nomsa, to fetch Kreli. He soon arrived, also with a large body of armed attendants, and was treated in the same royal manner as his father. It was expected that five days would be necessary to gather together the first instalment of cattle and horses. When Hintza was told that hostages were required for the due fulfilment of this part of the treaty, he replied: "Here am I, I and my son will remain with you". He was given to understand clearly that he was not a prisoner, that he and his son were at liberty to depart at any moment. It is not clear from the official documents, in this early stage at all events, that the Governor intended even to insist upon other men of lesser rank to act as hostages for them. He acknowledged that the proceedings of Hintza appeared so frank and satisfactory, prepared as he was for wiles and treachery, that he was completely disarmed of suspicion, and was glad of having this excuse for sparing Hintza's people from a further continuation of war. But up to this time neither the Governor nor Colonel Smith knew Hintza. They had yet to learn that while he was receiving all this kind treatment and calling Colonel Smith his father, he was planning their destruction; that when those messages were sent to his people to bring forth the cattle, they were really being told to drive them further into the country for better security; they had yet to learn also that Hintza's messages to the Amatola chiefs, Tyali, Maqomo, *et hoc genus omne*, were to the effect that he was a prisoner with the British and that they had better take care of themselves. Thus at a time when these chiefs had been so harassed by Major Cox as to be on the

CHAP. point of coming to terms of peace, this message from Hintza
IV. determined them to further resistance and prolonged the war.

As hostilities with Hintza had ended, or were believed to have ended, the Governor commenced to move the troops out of his country. Another camp was to be formed before the Kei was re-crossed, hence there would be ample time for the expected cattle to arrive before that river was reached. Accordingly on May 2nd, the Izolo camp was broken up and the cavalcade, now increased by the followers of Hintza and Kreli, amounting to nearly 100, moved in a south-westerly direction. On the way they were met by Buku, the brother of Hintza, who, with another party of followers, also joined the procession. The armed natives with the European force now amounted to about 150. Buku brought with him *twenty* head of Colonial cattle, and, in handing them over, stated that those were all in his country! Towards the afternoon of this day, the Governor's trust and confidence in Hintza received a rude shock when, in breathless haste two mounted burghers galloped up from the direction of Butterworth with the news that, by the orders of Hintza and Buku, all the Fingoes were to be massacred, and that the carnage had commenced by the killing of thirty near Colonel Somerset's camp. In justice to Hintza, it must be said that this order, in all probability, had not been given while he was with the troops, for these murders began on the 26th, and at places widely distant from one another.

The humanity of the benevolent and large-hearted Sir Benjamin Durban was greatly outraged by this wanton bloodshed inflicted upon an inoffensive people he was hoping to deliver from oppression and cruelty. Instantly he summoned Hintza before him and in wrath told him what had been reported. Hintza did not improve matters by answering, "What then, are they not my dogs?" Guards were then placed round the whole of the natives who were accompanying the column, and Hintza was ordered to send messengers immediately to stop the murders. The Governor threatened that, if after a lapse of three hours, any more Fingoes were killed, he would hang Hintza, Buku, and Kreli from a branch of the tree under which they were then sitting;¹ and further

¹ One account says that three ropes with nooses at their ends dangled over the chiefs during those three hours.

that for every Fingo murdered after that time, two of Hintza's people would be shot. There is little doubt that, on this occasion at least, Hintza carried out the Governor's behest without subterfuge or evasion.

After the discovery of this treachery, real or apparent, on the part of Hintza, the presence of so many armed Kaffirs with the troops did not appear so harmless as at first. It is not clear, in any case, why such a large number was allowed to remain. It seemed to Colonel Smith, therefore, a prudential measure to deprive them of their assegais. As soon as Hintza heard of this intention he suggested, somewhat mildly, though undoubtedly by way of intimidation, that the first attempt to carry this into effect might incite his followers to throw their weapons. In fact many were untying their bundles obviously for this purpose. Colonel Smith instantly called out a body of thirty men to form up in front of them and the Corps of Guides to stand behind—all presumably with loaded muskets—and then all assegais were ordered to be placed upon the ground. This was done and in a few moments all were collected.

Sir Benjamin Durban considered that all this changed the relation in which Hintza stood with regard to himself. The whole of his conduct seemed so suspicious that the Governor felt warranted in closing his grip upon the chief, and giving him to understand that he and those with him were, for the time, prisoners of war and would be treated as such.

Continuing the march until evening, the column reached a place called Ndabakazi and encamped near a kloof where there was plenty of wood and water. It was on the high road from the Kei River to Butterworth, and therefore a convenient place for receiving and despatching into the Colony the cattle expected in fulfilment of Hintza's treaty. But even more important than this was the advantage which the position offered to the Governor in effecting his liberation of the Fingoes from Hintza's country. As has been seen these unhappy people had been congregating at Butterworth under the protection of Colonel Somerset's guns, and by this time some thousands had collected. So the removal of this large number of people with their own and, undoubtedly, some of the belongings of the Gcalekas, down to the Kei and over that river into the

CHAP. Colony necessitated the 1st Division, with Hintza under strict
IV. surveillance, remaining at Ndabakazi, while the 2nd, with these Fingoes, marched past, and, it was hoped, got out of reach of their oppressors. On the 6th, therefore, all left Butterworth and arrived at the edge of the Kei on the 8th—a distance of about twenty-four miles. Meanwhile the five days given to Hintza to cause the promised cattle and horses to be delivered had elapsed, and only thirty-five animals had been sent in. It was clear to all that he was acting with duplicity and had done nothing of what he had promised. That the right and proper extent of trust was, at length, placed in him is evident from the fact that he and his companions were closely guarded by a body of men consisting of one captain, two subalterns, four sergeants, eight corporals, and ninety men of the 72nd Regiment. The honour is the greater when it is taken into account that, with the exception of the few forming the suites of the chiefs, all the Kaffirs who had come with the column had had their assegais returned to them and had been sent away. The three chiefs, together with a councillor named Umtini, were objects of much solicitous care on the part of Colonel Smith. When they dined with him in his tent, the conversation was brightened every now and then by the Colonel shouting to the sentries outside, "Are you there?" and receiving the response, "All well, Sir". As guardian angels round the tent in which they slept "every minute during the night," says Colonel Smith, "I made them (the sentries) sing out 'all right'; 'all right' from sentry to sentry". Even when Hintza wished to go a few yards from his tent to see whether some horses which a party of Fingoes brought in were his, a body of thirty armed men accompanied and took care of him. All this vigilance and restraint was entirely unlooked for by Hintza, and must have taxed to the utmost his ingenuity in planning an escape. In a measure, however, he succeeded, as will be seen in the sequel. It was not until the second day of his stay in this camp that he sent the messengers to Tyali and Maqomo, and then only after Colonel Smith had stormed at him with the treaty in his hand and threatened to send all four to Cape Town for imprisonment on Robben Island. But the Colonel did not gain much, for the message actually sent was very different from

what was desired. In every respect Hintza acted in bad faith, and, as his after-conduct showed, he had not the slightest intention of performing any part of the promises he had made.

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As soon as the Fingoes and the 2nd Division were considered to be in safety, and as soon as the rain permitted, the 1st Division moved from Ndabakazi towards the Kei. This was on the morning of the 8th. But the roads or rather tracks over the veld were so slippery and in places so dangerous that only a few miles were covered on this day, and the still steeper and more dangerous descents to the river were made on the 9th, when, in consequence of the oxen being unable to gain footholds on the greasy ground, some of the waggons were overturned, the Governor's among them. The banks of the Kei were reached about midday. A lively scene then presented itself. On both sides of the river were mixed multitudes of soldiers in uniform, burghers, and provisionals in all kinds of costumes, and immense crowds of Fingoes, men, women, and children, in their karosses and other native dress; and intermingled with all these were the thousands of animals—cattle, horses, sheep, and goats—which were to be driven into the Colony. Nor was all this animation confined to the immediate banks of the river. The greater number of Fingoes, with many of the burghers, had already crossed and were toiling up the hills on the distant side, their path and progress being evident by the long line of the white tops of the tents of the waggons which were seen moving above the scrub and bush. The number of Fingoes taking part in this exodus are given as 2,000 men, 5,600 women, and 9,200 children, having in their possession no less than 22,000 cattle. The procession, if it may be so called, of all these people and cattle, together with their protectors, was eight miles long and one and a half miles wide. The men with their shields and assegais drove along the cattle in small lots, while the boys took charge of the goats and sheep. The women, on whom according to native custom the greatest burdens were always imposed, had piled in two or three stories upon their heads such necessaries as sleeping mats, cooking pots, baskets of corn, and other *lares* and *penates*.

In addition to this some had a baby—others two—fastened to their backs by means of the karosses, and carried in one

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hand a calabash of milk for these children. By means of long stout sticks these poor creatures supported themselves and their loads and steadied themselves while wading through the drifts of the swiftly running water. They were accompanied by armed burghers who took up positions along the sides and rear of this irregular column, as it was to be expected that attempts would be made by the Kaffirs to wrest from the Fingoes some of the coveted cattle—a precaution which proved not altogether unnecessary. The refugees had before them a journey of about eighty miles.

By the evening of the 9th, all the Fingoes and the 2nd Division had left the Kei and were moving westwards. The 1st Division, with Hintza, did not then cross the river but remained for an important ceremony which was to be performed the next day (Sunday, May 10th), namely, that of formally declaring all the country from the Fish River to the Kei to be British territory. It seems to have been assumed that Hintza's message to the Amatola chiefs had had the desired effect, and that war was now at an end. There was therefore nothing further to be done but to claim the country of those chiefs as a right of conquest. Accordingly on the morning of the 10th, so says an eyewitness, "all the troops were drawn up in two columns, with the artillery on the right, and at eight o'clock Hintza, with his son Kreli, Buku and all his councillors, marched up between the lines attended by a strong guard. The General, with Colonel Smith and the staff, then took their place in the centre of the troops, on the right of Hintza. Colonel Smith first read aloud the Proclamation¹ of

¹ "Whereas in the months of December and January last past, the Kaffir chiefs and their tribes inhabiting the country along the Eastern frontier of His Britannic Majesty's Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and between that line and the River Kye, viz. Tyali, Maqomo, Eno, Botman, T'Slambie, Dushani, and others, their connections and dependents, with the concurrence and countenance of Hintza, chief of the country between the Kye and the Bashee, and paramount chief of Kaffirland, during a period of established peace and amity between the Colony and these chiefs—without provocation or declaration of war, suddenly and unexpectedly broke into the Colonial frontier along its whole extent; at the same time laid waste the whole country with fire and sword; savagely murdered the unprepared inhabitants of the farms; plundered and burned their houses, carried off their horses, cattle, sheep, and leaving these districts a desert. And whereas, with the troops of the King, my Master, I have defeated, chastised, and dispersed these chiefs and their tribes, and overrun and conquered their country, and thence penetrated into that of Hintza, compelling him to sue for peace and

His Excellency, after which the General himself read his declaration, taking over the land extending east from the source of the Kei in the Stormberg to the sea. A royal salute of twenty-one guns was then fired. This had a great effect on Hintza and his suite. "Hintza was in a profuse perspiration the whole of the time, either from terror or anxiety, and most of his followers were in the same state; this is not at all to be wondered at, for the report (loud enough at any time to stun the ear unaccustomed to such sounds) was immensely increased by the precipitous cliffs that surrounded us on all sides. Each shot was like a tremendous clap of thunder, while the echo reverberating from crag to crag till it was lost in the distant windings of the river, had exactly the same effect as distant discharges; the wind, too, blew gently from the guns along the ranks so that in a few minutes Hintza was concealed in a cloud of smoke. The loud hurrahs and cheers for King William, with the waving of hats, finished the ceremony." The wildness of the scenery gave additional effect to the whole scene. Part of the troops then re-crossed the Kei to occupy the territory thus added to His Majesty's Colonial Dominions. By a general order of the Commander-in-Chief it was honoured by bearing the name of Her Most Gracious Majesty and was accordingly designated the Province of Queen Adelaide. Before the troops crossed the Kei, Hintza was again pressed in connection with the non-appearance of the promised cattle. The Governor told him that these delays, as well as other

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to accept the terms of it, which I had offered, and which he has ratified. And whereas it is absolutely necessary to provide for the future security of the Colony against such unprovoked aggressions, which can only be done by removing these treacherous and irreclaimable savages to a safer distance, I now, therefore, in the name of his Britannic Majesty, and by virtue of the power vested in me as His Majesty's representative, Do hereby proclaim and declare, that the Eastern boundary of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope is, henceforward, extended eastward to the right bank of the Kye River; its new boundary, effected by this extension, being henceforth a line commencing at the source of the Kye River in the Stromberg Mountains, thence following its course along the right (or western) bank through the White Kye into the Great Kye, and thence to the mouth of the latter. From the aforesaid country—which they have lost by the operations of the war which they had so wantonly provoked, and which they have justly forfeited—the above-mentioned chiefs, namely, Tyali, Maqomo, Eno, Botman, T'Slambie, and Dushani, etc., with their tribes, are for ever expelled and will be treated as enemies if they be found therein. By His Excellency's command, H. G. Smith, Colonel, Chief of the Staff Headquarters on the Kye, May 10th, 1835."

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indications of bad faith, had caused him to regard him with suspicion, and reminded him that he was now a hostage for the fulfilment of his treaty. To this Hintza replied that his people had not yet obeyed him, but that they would do so if he appeared among them with the support of some of the troops, and asked that this course might be adopted. Sir Benjamin Durban approved of this. It is curious that in this continued demand for cattle, the Governor took no notice of the very large numbers which the Fingoes took away. He must have known that so many could not have belonged to the Fingoes themselves, but must have been the property of the people who were now being punished. It is true that many of them were cattle stolen from the Colony, but even then the recovery of so many thousands by the Fingoes should have been a reason for reducing the demands which were made upon Hintza. The chief himself did not raise this point. He probably had other schemes in view. Accompanied by Hintza, Colonel Smith with two companies of the 72nd Highlanders, 1st Provisional Battalion of Hottentots, the Kat River Legion and the Corps of Guides, in all about 500 men, set out on that day at ten o'clock and returned to the Transkeian territories.

The remainder of the 1st Division, with Buku and Kreli as prisoners, crossed the Kei¹ into the new province and marched a distance of about five miles where they encamped. It was near, and at the top of, a precipitous kloof called the Impotshana.

A part of the scheme for controlling the new province was the establishment of a series of fortified posts of occupation. From these, as bases, small bodies of armed men were to patrol certain portions of the country, and thus, it was hoped, the Kaffirs resident in those parts would be kept under some sort of restraint and order. The Governor decided that the first and most easterly of these forts should be at the Impotshana. Hence shortly after the camp was formed, he chose a site and forthwith the men were set to work on the construction of a fort afterwards called FORT WARDEN. It could not have been a very elaborate structure, for it was finished and

¹ The drift over the Kei where all this took place is not where the main road now crosses that river, that is, where the waggon and railway bridges now are—but some fifteen miles lower down, on the old and now disused road into Kaffirland.

in occupation within ten days from the commencement. It seems to have consisted of earth ramparts, four feet high, enclosing a square space in which cattle could be protected; the whole surrounded by a ditch five feet wide and three feet deep. At a distance of fifty yards it was surrounded by an impenetrable hedge of thorn bushes, and for some distance all round scrub and bush of all kinds were cleared off in order that no Kaffirs should approach without being observed. CHAP.
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Many of the burghers of the 1st Division were now permitted to return to their homes, as the campaign seemed to have come to an end. They do not appear to have been best pleased with the treatment they received, more especially in connection with the captured cattle. Many of the farmers recognised their oxen and claimed them, but they were not allowed to take them, as all had to go to the common depôts and be disposed of for the public good. A great many had to be slaughtered for food for the troops, and hundreds died, some from eating tulp and others from over-driving.¹

It will be well now to follow, in some detail, the proceedings of Colonel Smith's force in complying with Hintza's request to take some troops into his country for the purpose of making his people give up the cattle. It is the more necessary to elicit the truth of what actually happened during this expedition, as at a later date, and for party purposes, most untrue and malicious accounts were sent privately to the Secretary of State, and, unfortunately, were believed and acted upon in England. "The murder of good King Hintza" was a prominent subject of debate in the House of Commons and of execration at Exeter Hall. In no small measure the unauthorised and private communications to Downing Street at this time contributed to the calamities which were yet to befall the Colony and to alienate from the suffering Eastern Province inhabitants the sympathy of their kith and kin in the Homeland. All this will be dealt with in its proper place. Colonel Smith, against whose word there can be no shadow of doubt, thus gives us his account of the first stage of this affair: "I was directed to view the chief (accompanied by Umtini

¹In the following July, for instance, 2,270 were sent from King William's Town to Grahamstown, but only 1,523 arrived, the remainder having fallen out and died along the road.

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his great councillor, two other councillors and one servant) as a hostage, but to treat him with the greatest respect and kindness, an injunction scarcely necessary, as the chief had lived at my table for nine days, had been loaded with presents of every description, calling himself my son, and saying that he should ever remember my kindness to him with gratitude. The chief invariably rode with me although under charge of the Corps of Guides,¹ with every mark of confidence and satisfaction, and upon our ascending the mountains from the Kei, he requested through the interpreter to know in what position he stood both as regarded himself and his subjects. My answer was distinct and definite: 'Hintza, you have lived with me now nine days, you call yourself my son, and you say you are sensible of my kindness; now I am responsible to my King and my Governor for your safe custody, clearly understand you have requested that the troops under my command should accompany you, to enable you to fulfil the Treaty of Peace you have entered into with His Excellency. You have voluntarily placed yourself in our hands as a hostage, you are, however, to look upon me as having full power over you, and if you attempt to escape you will *assuredly be shot*. I consider my nation at peace with yours, and I shall not molest your subjects provided they are peaceable; when they bring in the cattle according to your commands I will select the bullocks and return the cows and calves to them,' an arrangement with which he appeared most fully satisfied, and said, 'that he came to fulfil his Treaty of Peace, and with no intention of making his escape, which his having left his son in our hands must prove'. I said: 'Very well, Hintza, act up to this, and I am your friend; again I tell you, *if you attempt to escape, you will be shot*'. The troops under my command reached a streamlet running into the Gona² about four miles

¹ Hintza was under the personal care of George Southey, who, with his brother William and a Mr. Shaw, had to keep near the chief. With this supervision, Hintza was at liberty to ride at any part of the column he chose and to carry his assegais.

² This river which Colonel Smith calls the Gona is the Gcwa. In all the despatches of this time, the Transkeian rivers are given names which they do not bear to-day, and most probably did not then. The difficulty has been the proper spelling of the Kaffir names. The "Kabecca," which is mentioned later, is the Ngqabara. The "gq," the "r," and "gc" are clicks, sounds which cannot be described in writing, but must be heard to be understood.

on this side of Butterworth ; at half-past four in the afternoon, one of the Corps of Guides reported to me that two Kaffirs with five head of cattle were near the camp, and that Hintza said 'as they are afraid to approach, he has sent one of his people to bring them in'. In place of the Kaffirs coming into the camp, they went away, and I afterwards ascertained that Hintza had sent with them a horse, to which procedure he would give no explanation. I begged to know where it was he wished I should conduct him ; the only answer I could procure was, 'You are going right'. At seven o'clock on the 11th inst. I marched and continued my route passing the Guadana hill, until half-past four in the evening, and bivouacked on a tributary stream of the Guanga. I again requested Hintza to state where it was he wished us to go ; he, this evening, was rather communicative, and said : 'Take a direction towards the mouth of the Bashee, by a route which I will point out, and march at twelve o'clock'. It was evident that the cattle from all the kraals in the neighbourhood had been driven in the direction he pointed out, and I readily acquiesced in his desire, and at twelve o'clock at night the troops again marched and continued to do so until eight o'clock in the morning. The spoor or track of the cattle was recent and numerous, but the troops having been marching eight hours, I was compelled to halt and cook on a streamlet running into the Guanga. At breakfast, the chief appeared particularly uneasy, and said : 'What have the cattle done that you want them, or why must I see my subjects deprived of them?' I explained to him that *he* knew *why* far better than I did, and that 7,000 of my countrymen were in a state of absolute want from the atrocities of his nation. At ten o'clock . . . I again marched. The chief appeared in high spirits, was most volatile, and after about three miles he said : 'You see how my subjects treat me, they drive their cattle from me, in spite of me'. 'Hintza,' I said, 'I do not want your subjects' cattle, I am sent for the Colonial cattle which they have stolen and *which I will have.*' He said : 'Then allow me to send Umtini, my principal councillor, forward to tell my people that I am here, that they must not drive their cattle, that the cattle of your nation alone will be selected'. I had no objection to this arrangement, as it was a chance in my favour, although I already could observe

CHAP. that he was meditating mischief. I told Umtini, 'Mind now
IV. you come back to me to-night'. 'Depend upon it,' he said. I allowed him and Hintza's servant to depart, which they did at full speed; Hintza was enraptured, and said: 'Now we need not go to the Bashee, you will have more cattle than you can drive on the Kebaka'.¹ Upon our approach to the Kebaka it was evident the great spoor of the cattle divided, one track going to our left up a stupendous mountain, the other to the right up a very high, abrupt, steep, and wooded hill upon the banks of the Kebaka, below which its bed is rugged, precipitous, and covered with bushwood. Hintza said: 'We must go to the right, the cattle up the mountain are lost to us'. It had been observed that this day Hintza rode a remarkably fine horse, and that he led him up every ascent; the path up this abrupt and wooded hill above described is by a narrow cattle track occasionally passing through a cleft in the rock. I was riding alone at the head of the column, and having directed the cavalry to lead their horses, I was some three or four horses' lengths in front of every one; having previously observed Hintza and his remaining two followers leading their horses behind me—the Corps of Guides close to them—when nearing the top I heard a cry of 'Hintza,' and in a moment he dashed past me through the bushes, but was obliged from the trees to descend again into the only path. I cried out, 'Hintza, stop'. I drew my pistol and, presenting it at him, cried out 'Hintza,' and I also reprimanded his guard who instantly came up; he stopped and smiled, and I was ashamed of my suspicion. Upon reaching the top of this steep ascent the country was perfectly open, and a considerable tongue of land running parallel with the rugged bed of the Kebaka upon a gradual descent of about two miles to a turn of the river where were several Kaffir huts. I was looking back to observe the march of the troops, when I heard a cry of 'Look, Colonel'. I saw Hintza had set off at full speed, and was thirty yards ahead of every one; I spurred my horse with violence and coming close up with him called to him; he urged his horse the more, and could beat mine. I drew a pistol, it snapped; I drew a second, it also snapped. I then was some time galloping after him when I spurred my horse alongside of him, and

¹ Ngqabara.

struck him on the head with the butt-end of a pistol; he redoubled his efforts to escape, and his horse was three lengths ahead of mine. I had dropped one pistol and threw the other after him and struck him again on the head; having thus raced about a mile, we were within half a mile of the Kaffir huts. I found my horse was closing with him, I had no means whatever of assailing him, while he was provided with assegais. I therefore resolved to attempt to pull him off his horse, and I seized the athletic chief by the throat, and twisting my hand in his kaross, I dragged him from his seat and hurled him to the earth; he instantly sprang upon his legs and sent an assegai at me, running off towards the rugged bed of the Ke-baka. My horse was most unruly, and I could not pull him up till I reached the Kaffir huts." Colonel Smith's horse having run away with him, the pursuit of Hintza was continued by the leader of the Corps of Guides, Mr. George Southey, and Lieutenant Balfour, 72nd Regiment, A.D.C. to Colonel Smith. It will be better therefore now to follow the accounts given by these eyewitnesses and others who gave evidence at the official inquiry into this affair which was held, by order of the Secretary of State, at Fort Willshire in August, 1836.

As soon as Hintza, on Colonel Smith turning his back upon him for a moment, dashed forward between his two keepers, Messrs. G. and W. Southey, and as soon as was heard the shout "Look, Colonel, Hintza is off," there was a general mounting of the horses which were being led up the steep and rocky hill. George Southey, ahead of all the rest, pressed forward his jaded and weary animal, and thus with the little delay caused by Colonel Smith throwing Hintza to the ground, Southey was enabled to get up to within firing distance from him. But his horse was "blown" and slackened his speed, so Southey jumped to the ground and ran forward on foot, calling out to Hintza to stop or he would be shot. No heed being paid to this, he fired and hit the chief in the leg. Hintza fell, but in a moment he was upon his legs again and rushing his hardest towards a long line of bush about a mile ahead. By this time Colonel Smith, who had gained control over his horse, rejoined the chase. He followed Southey and Hintza who were now racing down a slope towards a bend of the

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Ngqabara River. On observing Hintza taking no notice of Southey's orders and his threats to shoot him, the Colonel shouted out, "Fire again, Southey". Southey did so. The ball this time passed through Hintza's side and chest and made a wound from which he must soon have died. But he had not yet sold his life sufficiently dearly. After falling for a moment, he again got upon his feet, rushed forward, reached the bush and disappeared. At this juncture Lieutenant Balfour arrived. Both Southey and Balfour now entered the bush. They had to drop down a perpendicular rock of about fifteen or twenty feet deep and then to scramble on their hands and knees through the tangle of branches and undergrowth, Southey taking a direction up the stream while Lieutenant Balfour went down. Southey fought his way through the bush almost down to the water's edge and was standing upon a large stone or rock when, behind him, he heard a noise like that of an assegai knocking against the stone. Turning quickly round he saw the head of a Kaffir and an uplifted assegai, the latter so near to him that he had to spring back to get room for his gun. Without taking any particular aim he fired, and the body of a Kaffir rolled out from behind the rock down to the water's edge. *That Kaffir was Hintza.* Lieutenant Balfour tells us that as soon as he heard the shot he shouted to Southey, "Hullo, is he dead?" and that Southey answered, "A Kaffir is". Making his way to the spot, he found the body of Hintza in a half-sitting and half-lying posture in a hollow part of the rock at the water's edge; his head was smashed to pieces. In his right hand was the assegai intended for Southey, and in the left a bundle of others. Thus died the paramount chief of Kaffirland.

Hintza was richly endowed with all the vices of the savage, cruelty, treachery, avarice, and the deepest cunning, all of which had actuated him during the last few days of his life. But he had over-reached himself on this occasion, and was caught in the trap he had set for others. It was but too clear why the troops had been led into that wild region, and also what would have been the fate of a small force had it accompanied him; for the hills and immediate surroundings were crowded with his people. And if there had been want-

ing any further evidence of the mischief premeditated by Hintza, it was supplied by the presence of Umtini and the servant with the fresh horse which had been sent so mysteriously from the camp and which was there in readiness for the chief. Hintza got no more than the reward for his perfidy. Mr. George Southey, having removed the brass girdle from Hintza's waist and taking his assegais, joined Lieutenant Balfour, when both ascended the hill and returned to the force, all of which had by this time arrived.¹ By order of Colonel Smith, Lieutenant Pulestone of the 75th, with a small party of soldiers, went down into the ravine to fetch the body of Hintza. It was carefully wrapped in the kaross, borne out of the thicket and deposited near the Kaffir huts in the distance, where it was examined by Surgeon-Captain Ford. All this was done in full view of large numbers of Hintza's people, to whom the disposal of the body of their chief was then left.

Hintza thus removed from further participation in this expedition, the troops would have been left without a guide had not the vast amount of spoor indicated the direction in which the cattle had been driven. The column having been reformed, the march was continued until about four in the afternoon, when the waters of the Bashee River came into sight, and, on

¹ In view of the investigation into the charges of brutality and the mutilation of Hintza's body which were afterwards brought against Mr. George Southey, it will be well here to emphasise the following. In the rush after Hintza, Mr. Southey was alone; and although all pressed forward, Lieutenant Balfour was the only one who reached the bush just as he entered it. Further, Mr. Southey had not had time to reach the water at the bottom of the ravine before he was compelled to shoot Hintza. There was, therefore, no possibility of any of the Hottentots of the Provisional Corps reaching the spot until *after* Hintza was dead. What then are we to think of the statement that two Hottentot soldiers came up to Hintza, who was sitting in the water, and on their approach cried out "Taru nkosi" (mercy, master), and that so humane were they that they spared Hintza; but when Southey arrived, although the chief made the same appeal to him, he had not the fine feelings of a Hottentot, but murdered good King Hintza in cold blood! Further, Mr. Southey is charged with having cut off Hintza's ears and taken them away as trophies. Lieutenant Balfour says: "I can most positively assert that Southey did not cut off Hintza's ears, for we left the bush together, and at that time Hintza was not mutilated in any way except by the wounds of the shot". So widely were these statements spread in England that the Government ordered a special Commission to investigate the whole affair. The origin and the dissemination of these falsehoods and their transmission, *privately*, to the Secretary of State will be dealt with later.

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the stretches beyond them, great numbers of Kaffirs with hundreds of the promised cattle. Although man and horse had been on the move almost continuously for fourteen hours, Colonel Smith decided upon an attack forthwith. Down a precipitous cattle track to the river and up through a narrow cleft in the huge masses of stone on the other side, through which only one horse could pass at a time, the column made its way and then rushed towards the cattle and Kaffirs. The latter seem to have fled without showing much fight, while, according to Colonel Smith's account "upwards of 3,000" of the former were captured.¹ With these the force returned to the bank of the river and encamped for the night.

At three o'clock the next morning another move was made, but some of the men and horses were so knocked up that it was thought better to leave them at the camp. This, however, was no great disadvantage as a guard for the cattle which had been captured the day before was necessary. Among those who remained was Thomas Charles White, Major in the Grahamstown Volunteers, one of the best educated and most enterprising of the British settlers of 1820. Major White was an excellent mathematician and an enthusiastic military land surveyor. In 1816 he had been employed in a survey of the island of Guadeloupe. During this campaign, so far, he had taken every opportunity of making topographical observations and sketches of the country through which he was passing, and of which very little was then known. He had been frequently warned of the danger to which he so often exposed himself, but he seems to have paid no attention to it. In spite of seeing so many hostile Kaffirs about the hills, he yielded to the temptation of leaving the camp for the purpose of investigating the course of the Bashee. He was accompanied by a corporal and four privates. While standing upon a hillock sketching, some Kaffirs crept noiselessly through the long grass, and before their presence could be known, both Major White and the corporal were stabbed to death. The four surviving men got safely back to the camp and gave the alarm. How contemptible an enemy the Kaffir was when deprived of the cover of darkness

¹ According to the diary of Mr. T. H. Bowker, who was at Fort Warden when this force arrived, only 700 cattle were brought in.

and thick bush, and how easily they were kept at a distance by a state of preparedness, is well illustrated here. It was estimated that there were between three and four thousand on the hills surrounding this camp of a mere handful of men and yet they were afraid to attack it. The despatches, however, speak of them as audacious and daring. CHAP.
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Colonel Smith, shortly after moving off in the direction of the Umtata, detached sixty Hottentots under Captain Bailie to scour the country towards the mouth of the Bashee. But neither party, though traversing much country during the day, succeeded in recovering any more cattle, as the Kaffirs had driven them so far away. From a Kaffir who was captured as well as two Fingoes who joined him, the Colonel learnt that two days previously when Hintza was professing to lead the troops to the places where the cattle were concealed, he sent orders to his people to drive them beyond the Umtata.

The next morning the return march to the Kei was commenced. With the large numbers of Kaffirs hovering near and the narrow gorge through which all, men, horses, and cattle, had to pass in making the passage of the river, it was expected that considerable danger and difficulty would be met with. But the guards were so disposed and the paths so protected that no mishap of any kind occurred. Not far from the Bashee, the column was joined by 150 Fingo families, amounting in all to about a thousand souls, who from their remote situation had not been able to join their countrymen at Butterworth. Thus rescuing these from the barbarities they would certainly have suffered when their cruel taskmasters had leisure to think of them, the force moved in easy stages to the Kei and thence to the Headquarters at Fort Warden, where, after covering 218 miles over a rugged and mountainous country in seven days, Colonel Smith with his zealous and hardworked followers arrived in the afternoon of May 17th, 1835.

While these affairs were taking place in the Transkei, another action, similar though smaller, was in progress in the distant north. Of the very large numbers of cattle which had been taken into Hintza's country for safety, many hundreds were driven as far away as the Wittebergen, or

CHAP. IV. White Mountains, in the present district of Herschel. The Kaffirs seem to have taken them as far as the Stormberg Mountains, when they were met by Mantatees and other tribes from the north, who then drove them to more inaccessible regions. These Mantatees, further, marauded on their own account and robbed the farmers who were nearest to the northern boundary of the Colony. Hence during April, from the Field Cornets of these parts, various rumours and reports of invasions and robberies reached Mr. Ziervogel, the Magistrate at Somerset East. According to the Field Cornet Vorster, writing from Sterrenberg (Stormberg?) Spruit, Brak River, on April 17th, three "captains," Sepperrie, Moirosi, and Macowan, were the active parties, and numbers of their people were continually going backwards and forwards, bringing up cattle from the south. Vorster was anxious to take the law into his own hands and with a commando of burghers to attack these people. But he found great difficulty in getting the people of his Field Cornetcy to do their duty. Although a body of ninety Kaffirs and Bushmen had crossed the Kraai River with a view to killing all the colonists they could find, the burghers would neither assemble nor remain at their posts of guard. "Come to my assistance if possible," he says, writing on April 17th, 1835, "and send me such orders as will enable me to check those that are disobedient, and, if you can, send me a sketch of what martial law is." Mr. Ziervogel having brought all this before the notice of Colonel England, he was authorised (May 1st) to go to assist Vorster. He seems to have collected together a large number of the northern farmers, and, with the leadership of Vorster, to have made a successful, though somewhat harsh, raid upon these people. As the natives drove the cattle into the difficult parts of the mountains (Wittebergen), a general hunt appears to have taken place, during which large numbers were recaptured. On the return the chief Macowan was taken into the Colony, presumably to Somerset East, as a prisoner. It is not clear from the documents relating to all this how many of the natives were killed. In any case the conduct of Ziervogel met with the disapproval of the Governor. "It is apparent to His Excellency," his Secretary writes on November 16th, "that the chief Moirosi was grievously wronged, and even

pillaged of his property on that occasion, thereby compromising the character for good faith of the Colony, and imposing upon it the task of endeavouring to efface that imputation by nearly £400 sterling, which His Excellency for that purpose has been obliged to incur." With reference to Macowan, Ziervogel was commanded to treat him with all kindness and to send him back to his own country. In defence of Ziervogel and his men in this case, as in all others of its kind, it may with justice be urged, that a party of armed men meeting with the robbers who have despoiled them and then finding their lives endangered by close contact with the desperadoes, cannot be expected to be too solicitous or tender hearted at a moment when it is a case of choosing between "I must kill" or "I must be killed". It is always an easy matter for those at a safe distance to say what should have been done in the time of danger, and not having suffered loss themselves, to counsel mercy, forbearance, and forgiveness in those who have.

CHAPTER V.

KAFFIRLAND CAMPAIGN CONTINUED AND TERMINATED.

CHAP. V. BEFORE following further the course of this war, it will be well to become better acquainted with the people known as the Fingoes who, while the events narrated in the last chapter were taking place, were moving slowly, in long procession, towards the Line Drift on the Keiskamma River. According to the authority of the Rev. J. Ayliff, who had been a missionary among them for five years in Hintza's country, they were the remnants of eight of the many tribes which had occupied the present country of Natal, but which in consequence of the devastating and bloody wars of Charka had fled from that country to seek safety in more distant parts. The cause and rise of this great native upheaval are interesting. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Natal was densely populated by numerous tribes of natives, each tribe being more or less independent of its neighbours and governed by its own chief. Tribal wars were common, but as, in the earlier days at all events, there was no idea of co-operation or combination among them, the adjustment of their jealousies and quarrels was not necessarily a very sanguinary affair. It needed but the enterprise of a man of dominating personality and perhaps also possessed of superior knowledge to weld these insignificant forces into a powerful whole, and thus to build, as it were, a nation out of a number of petty and mutually hostile states. Such a man appeared. About 1780, there dwelt near the Umvolsi River a small tribe called the Amazulu (Zulus) under a chief Senzengakoma. This tribe was so small, and presumably so defenceless, that it was willing to acknowledge allegiance to, and to accept the protection of a much larger and contiguous tribe known as the Abatetwa, the chief of which was one Dingiswayo. Filial affection and respect seem never to have been outstanding features of native

character. In the case of chiefs, if, as he grew to manhood, the son became possessed of those virtues which commanded the admiration of the tribe, such as a muscular and handsome figure, personal bravery, and withal the genius of acquiring, either by force or stealth, other people's property, he would be sure to incur the jealousy of his father, who saw his own power and influence wane as those of his son increased. This would lead to plots for the son's destruction with perhaps counter-plots for the death of the father.

In accordance with the above principle, Charka, the son of Senzengakoma, found it expedient to abandon his father's kraal. He went to the place of Dingiswayo where he was welcomed by that chief. Dingiswayo may have been moved to this hospitality, not only by the prospect of including in his ranks a promising warrior, but also by a fellow-feeling, for he himself had, in his youth, had to escape from the machinations of *his* father, Jobe. His exile was the more remote, while the harbouring of Charka was the more proximate cause of the rise of the Zulu nation. Dingiswayo, during several years of wandering, had made his way to the more civilised parts of Cape Colony and had come in contact with European soldiery. He seems to have been impressed with the order, discipline, and combination of action among the troops, compared with the total want of anything like it among his own people, and he saw in this the secret of military success. Hearing eventually of the death of his father, Dingiswayo made his way back to his own country, creating surprise not only by his reappearance, but also by riding upon the back of a beautiful animal, the like of which the people had never before seen, namely, a horse. He became forthwith the chief of the Abatetwa, and soon commenced to introduce among his warriors some of the military procedure he had witnessed in the Colony, but he does not seem to have combined it with cruelty. This was the state of affairs when Charka joined him as a refugee. After a time Senzengakoma died, and Charka became chief of the small Amazulu tribe, though he still remained with Dingiswayo. Then Dingiswayo being killed in a fight, in spite of his military prowess, Charka was acknowledged chief also of the Abatetwa, thus uniting this tribe with the Amazulu and commencing that combination among

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CHAP. V. the Natal tribes which before long raised the Amazulu from an insignificant tribe to the most powerful and formidable nation of natives in South Africa. Charka having developed and adapted to his own purposes the military ideas he had imbibed from Dingiswayo, and having not the least regard to the sacrifice of human life, commenced to spread his kingdom by well-organised attacks upon the tribes immediately surrounding him. Resistance was practically impossible. Like a veld-grass fire, the butchery and carnage spread until the independent tribes had either to conform to his wishes by joining or to choose between extermination or flight from the country. The whole population being thus set in commotion, further bloodshed was caused by one tribe having to invade another in its flight. Thus the numerous Amangwane under the famous chief Matiwana, who became a Charka on his own account, came into deadly conflict with the equally numerous Amahlubi. And still further, the dislodged tribes fell upon one another when they were in countries far out of the reach of Charka. Very many thousands of natives from Natal thus became scattered over South Africa from the Zambesi to the south coast and in a westerly direction as far as Bechuanaland.

Those with whom we are chiefly concerned are the fugitives who took a south-westerly direction. Some went forward with a view to treating distant tribes as they themselves had been treated. These invaders were the Fetcani. Others entered the Transkeian districts as supplicants, seeking refuge with any who would receive them. These were the Amamfengu or Fingoes. The date usually given for this influx into Hintza's country is 1828. But it was probably before that, for as early as 1826 some of the stragglers had got as far west as the Chumie Mission.¹ These tribes, the remnants of which eventually went into Cape Colony, were the following:—

The *Amahlubi* (meaning the people who tear or pull off).

¹ In a manuscript book of reports of the *Glasgow Missionary Society*, now in the possession of the authorities at Lovedale, there is an entry by the Rev. W. R. Thomson, at the Chumie, under date October 5th, 1826, to the effect that four Umfengus went to reside at the station. Further the Rev. W. Shaw mentions that he saw an Umfengu at Wesleyville near the Fish River in 1825 (*vide Story of My Mission*, p. 525).

This tribe occupied country along the Umzinyati, a river which falls into the Tugela. They were a warlike people. Though dislodged by the Amangwane they did much killing on their own account. The chief, Umhlambiso, on approaching the Gcalekas, sent presents to Hintza asking to be permitted to live in his country. The request was granted, and thus the Amahlubi dwelt for a time on a small stream which runs into the Kei on the east, and was known in those days as the Isixwonxweni.

The *Amazisi* (the people who bring) came from the upper reaches of the Tugela in the north-east of Natal. Of the tribes which got as far as Hintza's country, this seems to have been the most numerous. Their chief was Jokweni.

The *Amantozakwe* (the people whose things are their own; a meaning of peculiar significance, for, as subsequent events showed, they were disposed, when opportunity offered, to regard other people's things also as their own. They had the charge of Hintza's cattle on the Shixini River until they joined the exodus under Colonel Somerset, when they looked upon the animals as their own and took them along with them). Their chief was Unomtshatsho.

The *Amabele* (the people of mercy), chief Umkwenkwezi.

The *Amaqobizembi* (the axe benders) came from the Inkunzi River which falls into the Tugela.

The *Abasekunene* (the right-handed people) came from another tributary of the Tugela, the Indaka. Their chief was Uhliso.

The *Amarelidwani*, under the chief Matomela, from the north of Natal.

The *Abashwawo* (the people who revile or reproach). They came from the Umzimkulu in the south, their chief was Umkwali.

The *Abayimani*,¹ a small tribe under the chief Umkuzangwe.

¹ It will be noticed that among these extraordinary names, the term "Fingo" or "Fengu" does not appear. Tradition has it that when these fugitives approached Hintza's people, they sang out "Siyamfengusa," "Siyamfengusa" (we wish to serve, we wish to serve). The Kaffir verb *ukumfengusa* means to wander about in search of employment, and from it the noun *Amamfengu*, which was more particularly applied to these people, is derived. Further, from their abject condition and the hatred with which they came to be regarded by the Kaffirs after their liberation, the term Fingo or Fengu came, for a time at least, to be used in a spirit of revilement and contempt. The more respectful name for these people is the *Abambo*, i.e. those from the east.

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In return for such hospitality as these people received from Hintza and his Gcalekas, they had to submit to a kind of slavery and to be looked upon as "unowned property"—as a people who had been "picked up". "Are they not my dogs?" asked Hintza, when Sir Benjamin Durban stopped the murdering of them. They became the cattle herds and general drudges to the Gcalekas. But so small was the recognition of their services that any little property, such as cattle or corn, which by their industry and thrift they had managed to accumulate, had to be carefully hidden in order to keep it for themselves. Even their women and girls were never safe from the violence of their oppressors. Excuses for murdering and despoiling them could always be found by the witch doctor, who laid to their charge the causes of drought and sickness, and accused them of bringing all kinds of evil upon the people by holding nightly intercourses with wolves and baboons. Their lives, from the oppression and cruelty of Hintza's people, became so intolerable that for some time before the outbreak of the 1835 war, the Fingoes had been on the verge of revolt. They may perhaps have been the more inclined in this direction from their communications with the missionaries and traders, and also by some of their own people having visited the Colony and given accounts of the better treatment of natives by the white man. In any case, as has been shown, no sooner had the troops crossed the Kei, than, in a body, all who could immediately sought British protection and eagerly offered their services for hostile action against their oppressors.

How, under the protection of Colonel Somerset and the 2nd Division, the Fingoes left the Kei on May 11th, has already been narrated. On the 14th, with all its cattle, the straggling column crossed the Keiskamma River at Line Drift. Twice the rearguard had been attacked by ambushed Kaffirs. On the first occasion, in the Gonubie valley, four Kaffirs and two Fingoes were killed, while on the second two Kaffirs were killed and one Fingo was wounded. Now, however, they were out of the land of bondage, were become British subjects, and were to take their part in the making of history of the Eastern Province.¹ The Keiskamma River crossed, they were

¹ As sources of information respecting the origin of the Fingoes, the author has interviewed the oldest of them he could find in the Transkeian territories.

in the country which Sir Benjamin Durban intended to allot CHAP.
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Generally speaking, they all give similar accounts, supporting what has been said above.

Basi, a very old man, probably nearer a hundred than ninety years of age, said, in substance: "I am a Fingo, one of Matiwana's people. I was born on the other side of the Tugela. My father was Nikiwe. Charka made himself a great chief and for no particular reason drove a lot of people out of the country. Some went into Hintza's country, but Matiwana's people did not. We went among the Tembus, not as supplicants but with the intention of driving them out of their country. We did not succeed, so we submitted to them. Matiwana returned to his own country and was killed. We remained in Tembuland, just above the Umtata; the place was called Mbolompo. Very many of the Fingoes did not go to Peddie, i.e. did not join in the exodus under Somerset. I have never been on the other side of the Kei (i.e. the Cape Colony side). Malangeni was our chief, he was a younger brother of Jokweni. I never saw Hintza, I think he treated the people badly. The people (Fingoes) at first went out a few at a time as opportunity for escape offered itself. I took part in various fights between the Tembus and Gcalekas, but I never fought against the English. . . ."

Interview with Pamla at Willowvale. He said: "I am a Fingo. My grandfather, Pamla, was the son of Batanda, a chief and witch-doctor living at the Umzinyati on the borders of Natal. He prophesied that the nations would be scattered. Old Pamla belonged to the Amahlubi. Charka, the son of Senzengakoma, began to fight with all the nations in the east. The Amahlubi were on the borders of Charka's country and were the only people who dared to show fight with him. The Amahlubi fled, leaving behind the chief Langalibalele with a few followers. They ran as far as the Tugela. The Amazizi, of whom old Veldmann, now living—or perhaps dying—near Butterworth, is a representative, also ran when they saw the Amahlubi coming on. The panic then extended to the Amabele, who also joined in the flight. All these people drove on before them the smaller nations which were in front of them. They became scattered in different directions. Some kept along the coast regions, others went into Basutoland, while others again arrived round about here (the Transkei) in or about 1820. They had a song by means of which they terrified all listeners, it was:—

Utongo malindebeka ndafela ecaleni kwendlela
God must look upon me here, I die alongside the road.

"Whenever they were interrupted by anyone asking who they were or where they were going, they would say 'Siyamfengusa,' 'Siyamfengusa,' meaning, we wish to serve. We were a scattered nation and were in search of shelter. A large number of these people were drowned in the rivers along the coast regions, some were eaten by wild animals, while others were murdered by the Fetcani, who were the Amangwane, another of the tribes driven out by Charka. When the people got as far as Butterworth, Ayliff, who had come to be a missionary to Hintza, took charge of them, and many of them became Christians. Hintza did not, he said the Gospel was very good for Fingoes, but it was no good to him. When the Fingoes had been with Hintza some time, they began to be prosperous. On this he looked with an evil eye and made them bring back the cattle he had lent them. All the people became very frightened on the day the cattle were taken away. Hintza went to the Mission station armed. Mrs. Ayliff was bold enough to go out to him. She said: 'Look here, Hintza,

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to them, and which was to be known as Fingoland. This tract of country was bounded on the east and west by the Keiskamma and Great Fish Rivers respectively. The northern boundary was an imaginary line drawn from the point where the Chumie joins the Keiskamma to that where the Kat River joins the Great Fish. On the south, the boundary line was the Chusie (Iggushwa), which falls into the Fish, and the Gwanga, which falls into the Keiskamma.

Everything which foresight could suggest for their safety, happiness, and comfort was directed to be carried into effect. Besides taking into consideration such important matters as healthy and convenient sites for their locations, due regard was to be had to the placing of tribes and families in such positions as should best please them. Judicious and discreet persons were to be placed among them to explain to them the laws under which, as British subjects, they were to live and be protected, and that, beyond showing obedience to these laws, they were free agents and their own masters. They were, by exercising vigilance and assembling promptly, to do their share in defending themselves, and indirectly the Colony, against the Kaffirs, and generally by industry and good behaviour to prove themselves worthy of all that was being done on their behalf. How far all this was realised is yet to be seen.

When, on Colonel Smith's return from the Bashee, Sir Benjamin Durban came to hear of the death of the faithless Hintza, his attention was naturally turned to the chieftainless Gcalekas and to Kreli, who was with him in the camp at Fort Warden as hostage for his father's good behaviour. In the presence, therefore, of Kreli's councillors and the Governor's staff, Sir Benjamin Durban held, on May 19th, an interview with the young chief for the purpose of inducing him to act as a more peaceable and honest ally than Hintza had been. "Hintza being now dead," said the Governor, "if his son you will not milk these cows three years hence,' meaning that his country would be taken from him."

For a good account of the conditions under which the Fingoes lived while they were in Hintza's country, and the methods by which their own industry procured for them the cattle they possessed, see the "Declaration of the Fingo Chiefs residing under British protection at Fort Peddie, with regard to their relations to the Kaffirs" in the "Speeches, Letters, and Selections from important Papers of the late John Milford Bowker," Grahamstown, 1864, p. 39.

Kreli here present as one of my hostages for the due fulfilment of the aforesaid treaty of April 30th last, will now solemnly take its execution upon himself, I will acknowledge him as his deceased father's successor, chief of the country between the Kei and the Bashee . . . and will uphold and support him in the maintenance of his authority over his people." A further short treaty was then read and translated to him, with the terms of which he expressed his perfect understanding and which he promised to accept and perform. They were, in short: (1) "There shall be peace between His Majesty the King of England, His Majesty's subjects and Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and Kreli, son of Hintza. . . (2) The King of England's Colonial Dominions now extend to the line running along the right bank of the River Kei . . . which boundary line is hereby acknowledged by Kreli as that of the Colony." (3) That British forces will correspondingly respect the opposite or left bank as the border of Kreli's country. . . . (4) There shall be good faith and amity between Kreli and the Governor of the Colony, who will not object to the Amatola chiefs and their people entering his country, provided he forbids them coming thither with Colonial plunder. (5) and (6) That no hostilities against Vadana and the Tambookies for any part they have taken in the war as allies of Great Britain, will be countenanced by Kreli."

All this having been amicably arranged, Kreli with his suite was permitted to leave the camp. A guard of honour under Captain Warden escorted him to the bank of the Kei, and then, with presents for himself and his mother Nomsa, he crossed the river and entered upon his Kingship of the Gcalekas. The chief Buku, the brother of Hintza, with his councillor Kinki, was not permitted to accompany Kreli. As Buku was known to have exercised a bad influence over Hintza, it was thought politic that Kreli should, at least, have an opportunity of starting upon his government without any such disadvantage. Those two, therefore, remained in the camp till an escort could conduct them to the prison in Grahamstown. The Civil Commissioner, Captain Campbell, was instructed to prepare a comfortable apartment for them "within the prison," to treat them well and protect them from "the curiosity of gazers". They remained there two months.

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The first stage of the Governor's measures for the protection of the new Province of Queen Adelaide was completed on May 20th, when Fort Warden was finished. Having detached 150 men consisting of artillery, cavalry, and infantry to form the garrison, the remainder of the 1st Division with a number of Fingoes, who were accompanying the column, marched back to the Gonubie heights on the 21st and reached their halting place the same day. There the next fort was to be built. It was the one known shortly afterwards as FORT WELLINGTON. The position, as was afterwards discovered, was not a good one for the purpose. Water and wood were scarce, and what there was was too dangerously far from the site; further, in winter time the weather was so bleak and cold that horses and cattle died. Fort Wellington, however, was not a very elaborate and costly structure. It was intended more as a post of communication on the line of forts than as a place of occupation. According to the authority of Mr. T. H. Bowker, who was stationed there and helped to build it, it consisted of a circular earth bank about sixty feet in diameter with a ditch on the outside. In the centre of this there was a sentry box mounted high upon four tall stumps of trees; also within the eastern walls there were a powder magazine, a plastered store-room, and four tents. On the outside, a cattle kraal was built, and there were also the huts built by the Fingoes. The few men stationed there were under the command of a Lieutenant Leslie. Being such a small and comparatively defenceless establishment, it received much annoyance from the Kaffirs, who probably thought it a safer business to try for the few cattle at Fort Wellington than the larger herds at Fort Warden. The Governor having marked out the site for Fort Wellington and having left directions for its construction, the Headquarters' Division moved on the Buffalo—to the deserted and ruined house of the Rev. J. Brownlee. Near that ruin another fort, FORT HILL, was immediately commenced. This was to be the chief and central post of occupation—the military headquarters—for the whole of the New Province. But Sir Benjamin Durban looked ahead and saw greater possibilities in the situation than its becoming merely a glorified camp for the purpose of keeping Kaffirs at bay. He foresaw the rise of a thriving and peaceful



THE GCALEKA CHIEF KRELI



THE GAIKA CHIEF BOTMAN

population on the fertile lands through which the clear, rapid, and beautiful river made its way. "There never was a site more perfectly prepared by nature for a splendid provincial town," he said, writing to the Civil Commissioner of Albany, on May 24th. On this day he issued a general order¹ establishing a township, which he named KING WILLIAM'S TOWN, in honour of His Majesty King William IV. "With God's Blessing if what I have done be confirmed at home, at some future period, here will spring up a beautiful provincial town."²

But all this having been so satisfactorily arranged, the war was by no means at an end. The tribes in the Amatola and Buffalo Mountains were still in arms, and had regained the positions from which, a few weeks before, they had been driven. Not only in the high lands, but in the regions nearer the coast, along the lower reaches of the Buffalo and Keiskamma, and even on the west of the Fish River in Lower Albany, the hostile Kaffirs were as active as before. To these Colonel Smith turned his attention as soon as he had finished with the Gcalekas. When the Governor with the 1st Division left Fort Warden on the 21st, Colonel Smith took a detachment consisting of 300 of the Somerset and Cradock burghers, two companies of the 1st Provisional Battalion (colonists), and one company of the 72nd and marched more to the south, towards the mouth of the Buffalo, where it was believed the enemy had assembled in very large numbers. The usual "Smithfield market cattle driving" seems to have taken place. On the 28th, when the force was making its way down the right bank of the Buffalo and approaching Mount Coke, a very large body of natives was seen in the


CAMP ON BUFFALO,
May 24th, 1835.

¹ *General Orders (No. 21).*

The River Buffalo, from its source in the mountains of its name to the sea, is established as the central line of occupation of the Province of Queen Adelaide, and the ground on both banks of this clear, rapid, and beautiful river, along an arc crossed by four fords, to which corresponding roads from all parts of the country converge (near the former Mission House destroyed by the savages), is hereby appropriated and set apart to such an extent as may hereafter be judged expedient, as well up and down the stream as on each of its banks respectively, to the purpose of building a town, which, with the site now selected for it, is named KING WILLIAM'S TOWN.

H. G. SMITH, *Col., Chief of Staff.*

² Letter from Sir B. Durban to Colonel John Bell, June 2nd, 1835.



Rough Sketch of
KING WILLIAMS' TOWN
 taken by the Eye 92° 47' 46"

distance. To the surprise of all, as the force drew nearer, the natives made no attempt either to escape or to show fight. Fortunately no act of hostility was commenced against them, for on closer acquaintance they turned out to be the chiefs Pato, Kama, and Umkye, with upwards of a thousand of their warriors, prepared then and there to assist the troops. There were in addition 500 Fingoes and a new Hottentot levy which had just been formed. With this magnificent reinforcement Colonel Smith, during the next three days, was enabled to scour very completely, not only the bushy fortresses of the Buffalo, but all the country up to the Nahoon River and beyond, the more thoroughly as these natives knew so well the haunts of the enemy. As rain fell in torrents during this time, the ground became almost impassable for cavalry, and therefore the hundreds of fugitives were not pursued beyond the Nahoon. There seem to have been no casualties on either side, though between seven and eight hundred huts were destroyed.¹

On May 31st, Colonel Smith with his irregular force reached the site occupied by the Governor's camp and missionary's ruined house—called King William's Town. The next day they were again on the move, to assist the 3rd and 4th Divisions in the work which had engaged them while the 1st and 2nd had been in Hintza's country, but with which they had made but little progress. This seems to have consisted in driving the hostile Kaffirs from one range of mountains to another, and then in dislodging them from the second and driving them back to the first. This, however, is no slight on Major Cox's activity, for Colonel Smith with a much greater force did no better. Whatever disposition to surrender or to come to terms of peace the Amatola chiefs may have felt, it was entirely altered by the second message which they received from Hintza, namely, that he was a prisoner with the British and that they had better take care of themselves. The first message was the one which, in accordance with the Governor's orders, Hintza told the chiefs that peace was made and that they were to abstain from fighting. This seems to have been received; for Sutu, Gaika's

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¹ Vide Colonel Smith's report, *Theal's Kaffir War of 1835*, p. 194.

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wife, and the most influential woman among the Kaffirs, sent a message to Major Cox asking to be permitted to go to him and "Talk about her children". This was, of course, complied with. It was arranged that Sutú should persuade Maqomo likewise to interview the Major.

Early on the 13th (May), a message was received from Major Cox that the chiefs would meet him on the plain at the foot of the Tabindoda. At the appointed time, Lieutenant Garnet with two dragoons were sent to the large body of Kaffirs, which was seen to be assembling, in order to conduct the chiefs to the Major's tent—the camp being at no great distance. When Lieutenant Garnet got up to the Kaffirs, he was told that the chiefs were up on the hill and that he must go to them there. Unarmed as he was and accompanied only by his interpreter, he passed through hundreds of armed natives, a proceeding which needed no little courage as it had the appearance of walking into a certain death-trap. Maqomo, however, advanced and welcomed him with respect and even kindness. The result of the interview was that Maqomo refused to meet Major Cox until he had had another interview with Sutú. When Sutú heard of this she went again to Maqomo, but did not return. After waiting some time, it must have been a day at least, Major Cox with Lieutenant Garnet and two dragoons went to the foot of the mountain, when Maqomo, Tyali, and Xoxo descended to the plain and met the small military party; at no great distance some hundreds of their armed followers, with assegais held erect, formed themselves into a semi-circle. Major Cox recalled to Maqomo the conditions under which the Governor was willing to cease hostilities. They were, that all fire-arms must be given up and all who surrendered were to be ensured present safety, protection and possession of their cattle and effects; that the chiefs and those who had been guilty of the murders of British subjects must transport themselves over the Kei; and that, in consideration of the excellent conduct of Sutú, that chieftainess and her son, Sandilli, as well also as Nonibe, the widow of the late Dushani, were to be upheld and have large tracts of territory assigned to them. Nothing, however, could come of all this, for just before, Hintza's second message had arrived. This probably accounted for the chiefs

going to the meeting so well protected; further, they were not sufficiently beaten as to be obliged to submit to be turned out of their country and to retire over the Kei. It is something of a tribute to the character of these chiefs that they behaved in the peaceable manner they did, considering the nature of these conditions and how completely in their power Major Cox and those with him were. So the meeting terminated and the war continued.

To Major Cox's camp on the Debe, therefore, Colonel Smith with his regular soldiers, burghers, provisionals, Kama's people, and Fingoes, upwards of 2,000 men, went on June 1st. During two days the usual scouring of the Tabindoda and Keiskamma Mountains and the poorts of the Buffalo was accomplished, when, until the force retired, the Kaffirs found a temporary refuge more to the east. A brother of the chief Eno was killed and also the son of a petty chief Casa. Thirteen hundred cattle and thirty horses were captured, and many huts and much corn were destroyed. The force returned to King William's Town on the 3rd. But almost immediately they left again for the Line Drift and Keiskamma regions, as the newly located Fingoes were being robbed and murdered by the Kaffirs in those parts. During three days' operations "upwards of 1,200 huts, new and old, have been burnt, immense stores of corn in every direction destroyed; 215 cattle of all sorts captured; several horses and nearly 2,000 goats have fallen into our hands. The women were very numerous, and I therefore caused them to be amply supplied with beef and biscuit, and dismissed them with the assurance that the atrocities of their husbands had made them forfeit their homes."¹

On their return to King William's Town after this foray, the burghers of Cradock, Somerset, and Swellendam were released from service and permitted to go to their homes, but on condition that they understood that they were liable to be called out again should their services be deemed necessary. Further, they had to leave as many of their horses as were required for the remaining force, these horses to be paid for at a later date at a fair valuation.

¹ For details of these affairs, *vide* Col. Smith's report in Theal's *Kaffir War of 1835*, pp. 194, 201, 205.

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Apart from the murders at the outbreak, the greatest disaster and loss of life on the side of the British during this war occurred about now. On June 25th, Lieutenants Bailie and Biddulph (sons of 1820 settlers), each with thirty men, were sent from King William's Town to scour again the well-worn paths and frequently visited haunts on the Tabindoda Mountain and adjacent Umdezini bush. According to a plan suggested by Lieutenant Bailie, Lieutenant Biddulph and his party were to go to the bottom of certain kloofs on the Umdezini Mountain, that is, the high hills about three miles from Tabindoda on the King William's Town side, there bivouac for the night, and then having made their way upwards through the bush at daylight, to move along to the foot of Tabindoda and rejoin Bailie's party the next evening. Bailie in the meantime was to operate in the bush on Tabindoda itself. Lieutenant Biddulph carried out his part and arrived at the rendezvous at the right time, but though they waited anxiously all night, Bailie and his men failed to appear. It was certain that some action was going on in the distance as eleven shots were heard. They waited all the next day, during which desultory firing was again heard, but the men did not return. Lieutenant Biddulph and his men then went back to King William's Town. For a long while the fate of Lieutenant Bailie and his company was shrouded in mystery; not a word of information or explanation of any kind concerning them could be obtained, and nothing was known beyond that so much time had elapsed since their disappearance that there could be no hope of any of them being alive. Some time afterwards it became known that Maqomo was in possession of Bailie's bible, which he (Bailie) always carried with him. This Maqomo gave up. On a fly leaf was a short statement to the effect that they had been surrounded and that their ammunition had failed. To this further information was afterwards added by some natives who were at the fight. It appears that Bailie's entrance into the Tabindoda bush was observed by the enemy who was there unseen in great force. They continued to give him fresh spoor, that is, some went ahead unobserved so as to leave their footmarks and thus enticed the party into more intricate parts. This spoor must have been followed the whole day so that by evening the

Kaffirs had drawn them far beyond the reach of their comrades. It was then that the first shots were heard by Lieutenant Biddulph. Bailie, probably discovering he had been entrapped, tried to retrace his steps, but darkness coming on they bivouacked at the edge of a high ridge. At daylight the next morning the Kaffirs attacked them in considerable force and killed one of them. A fierce fight ensued, when the enemy was driven off with some loss. Evidently thinking the path had been cleared, the party attempted to descend and had nearly reached the bottom, though they were a long way from where they ought to have been, when they found themselves completely surrounded. This took place in a valley called "Malindee," about two miles south of the Pirie mission station. They were just crossing the Mnxesha River when the enemy sprang up from the long grass and fell upon them with great violence. Bailie's party fired and fought until all their ammunition was expended, and then used the butt end of their guns until the last man was speared to death. Long afterwards the remains were found and buried in two graves. The place to this day is known as "Bailie's grave," though there is not much to mark the spot but an inconspicuous mound of earth.¹

In spite of all this activity of the troops in these mountains and the exertions of the first line of defence near the border, the Kaffirs were having much their own way in Albany. Many small parties were scattered over most of the district, even as near to Grahamstown as Manley's Flats and Grobelaar's Kloof. It was dangerous to pass from farm to farm; cattle herds were killed here and there and the animals driven off. At the Koonap, the farm of Mr. Collet was attacked,

¹ Charles Theodore Bailie was the son of John Bailie, head of Bailie's party of 1820 settlers. The death of this exemplary young man was a great misfortune for the British settlement. Although only ten years of age when he arrived in the Colony, he seems to have acquired a better education than was the case with others under similar circumstances, and withal he was a most upright and truly pious man. He built a small church at his own expense and exertion, and acted as minister to the otherwise spiritually uncared-for people of his neighbourhood. He also started a school, both week-day and Sunday, for the children, he himself being the teacher. He was an intrepid hunter, and he "was as good and gallant a soldier as ever served His Majesty, and who from the commencement of the war until his death had never ceased to merit approbation and thanks," said the Commander-in-Chief in General Orders, No. 29.

CHAP. V. the Kaffirs entering the homestead itself and deliberately stabbing a Mrs. Trollip. This, by the way, is one of the very few cases where the Kaffirs killed a woman. As has been mentioned, as a general rule they spared women and children. Two young men, Chipperfield and Bently, in going to their place at the Nottingham party, were waylaid and murdered, so also was a youth named Jubber, who had gone but a short distance from Bathurst in search of a horse. Similar fates befell Jan Greyling, Andries de Lange, James Jenkins, and Faber.

The murders of their relatives, the desolation of their homes, and the destruction of all their properties did not make up the whole of the sufferings which the unhappy Eastern Province inhabitants had to endure. Almost more painful than all these put together was the sense of loneliness, and not only the want of sympathy, but the active hostility of their countrymen, who were too ready to regard all these calamities as no more than the just retribution for oppression and cruelty to "the poor natives". The writings and unfair statements, to use no stronger term, of Philip and Pringle were still fresh in the minds of the sufferers, and they were but too well aware of the effect these were having upon public opinion in England. "For any real or fancied injury (such as the loss of cattle)," said the *Spectator* for May 17th, 1834, "it is in the power of the pettiest magistrate to send forth a commando, surprise and plunder the village, burn the hovels, massacre the men, and carry the women and children into captivity, frequently shooting them on the road, out of wantonness and impatience at their foot-sore pace." On July 1st, 1834, in the House of Commons, Mr. (afterwards Sir) T. F. Buxton said: "The treatment of the Aborigines by the colonists is one of the darkest and bloodiest stains upon the page of history, and scarcely any are equal in atrocity to the conduct of the Dutch Boers, ably seconded of late, according to Pringle, by some of the more degraded of the English settlers".¹

¹ Major Dundas, who had been resident in Grahamstown for some years as Landdrost of Albany, said in giving evidence before the Select Committee on Aborigines in 1836: "Upon my faith I declare I do not believe that the British settlers of Albany had any right to expect the conduct the Kaffirs have displayed towards them. I have never heard of a well-attested fact of their having made inroads or aggressions upon them. I am talking of the British settlers. There

In the Colony itself there was a small, but—on account of the notice they received in England—powerful clique in Cape Town, composed of a few well-to-do gentlemen, who, 600 miles from the scene of danger and with no property at stake, could afford to treat with contempt the cry of the widow and fatherless, and state publicly that “there never was any danger, but a clamour raised by conscious guilt to conceal terror and mislead the official avenger”. In the *South African Commercial Advertiser*, the official organ of this clique, Mr. Fairbairn, the editor, had stated some time previously in connection with other outrages on the settlers by the Kaffirs, that “the murders of which the Colonial Government prates so fluently are to be found only on the lips of lying men, or in the imaginations of timid Cockneys and pin-makers, who shrink from the bold gaze of a natural man”. It is difficult to account for the hostility which always characterised the attitude of the *Commercial Advertiser* towards the Eastern Province colonists. It is scarcely conceivable that the editor, Mr. Fairbairn, was actuated by no higher motive than that of currying favour with the powerful party in England, which, undoubtedly acting in good faith, was too ready to listen to such misrepresentations as were to be found in that paper. Yet some, at least, of the accounts of the progress of the war have the appearance of being either deliberate distortions of the truth, or of such an over-anxiety to cast odium upon those in authority, that no time was spent or trouble taken to verify statements which any impartial mind must have regarded as doubtful.

On July 18th Mr. Fairbairn said: “The conduct of the Colonial forces has been unjust and ferocious beyond parallel. They have incited the Fingoes—a people who when fugitives had been hospitably received by the Kaffirs, and so kindly treated that they had while sojourning in the land of their protectors accumulated considerable property—to rise against their benefactors and join in the pillage and plunder of those whose bread they had eaten. . . . The atrocity of the proceedings of the colonists is without a parallel among civilised

certainly were at times young men who broke through the rule and joined a commando, but the commandoes were the Dutch and the military.”

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people. The Kaffirs are termed savages, but it is the colonists who are most entitled to the appellation. . . . The colonists have not one spark of humanity, their purpose is to kindle an unquenchable flame of hatred, and to check all sympathy in the hearts of mankind towards the people whom they have resolved to extirpate. . . . A war of extermination in which women and children are not spared."

Needless to say, this factious opposition to all that was being done at this crisis, and the malign influence it was sure to have upon the Home Government, were causing grave anxiety to the good Governor and those in immediate authority under him. It seemed probable that whatever course was taken for the protection of the frontier inhabitants, or whatever success was achieved in the war, would be met with disapproval and possibly with censure. As will be seen in the sequel, this is what actually happened. Colonel Bell, who was acting for the Governor at Cape Town during his absence in the East, said, in writing to Sir Benjamin Durban on May 29th, 1835, that he was glad to hear of the formation of the Province of Queen Adelaide, but that he had no doubt that "it will give mortal offence to a party," and referring to the death of Hintza, "I understand that they are, in Cape Town, already making it out to be a most atrocious murder". Sir Benjamin himself, in writing to the Earl of Aberdeen, the Secretary of State, on June 19th, said: "I have reason to believe that this important measure of extension will be assailed by Doctor Philip and of course by the London mission, on the ground of injustice in itself, and very probably (since it is a party peculiarly liable to exaggeration in statement when an object or theory is to be supported) of severity in its execution". He gave it as his opinion that if the new province were not retained, the district of Albany certainly, and the greater part of Somerset probably, would be immediately abandoned and deserted. Speaking of the death of Hintza: "I would rather perhaps that this event had not happened thus, inasmuch as it may, however unjustly and unfairly, be made a handle of by a party at home".¹

Against the crusade of calumny, under which the frontier

¹ *Vide* letter from Sir Benjamin Durban to the Earl of Aberdeen, June 19th, 1835, Theal, *Kaffir War of 1835*, p. 208.



MR. JOHN FAIRBAIRN

Editor of the *South African Commercial Advertiser*

From R. Kilpin's "Old Cape House," by Permission of T. Maskew Miller, Esq.

inhabitants, but more especially the British settlers, had so long smarted no united action had so far been taken. True it is that the able and upright editor of the *Grahamstown Journal*, Mr. (afterwards the Hon.) Robert Godlonton, had fought their battles in the columns of his paper, but his words had not received much attention outside the Colony. As at this time despatches, containing full accounts of the progress of the war so far, were being sent to the Home Government, the frontier colonists thought it expedient to transmit a petition to His Majesty the King in the hope that greater security for person and property would be their fortune in the future. Further, as Sir Benjamin Durban was about to return from Kaffirland and all were anxious to express their sense of gratitude for what he had done, the inhabitants of Grahamstown decided to convene a public meeting for the purpose of considering "the propriety of presenting an Address to His Excellency the Governor, on his late measures for the settlement of the frontier; and also of preparing and transmitting a Petition to the King in Council on the same subject".

The meeting accordingly was held on June 6th, in the Freemason's Tavern,¹ in the large room which, in those days, was used as the General Assembly Hall. There were many speakers and the speeches were long. The following resolutions were unanimously passed:—

"1. The most grateful thanks of the inhabitants of the Eastern Province are due to His Excellency the Governor for his anxious solicitude on their behalf, and for the efficient measures adopted by him for alleviating the distress of the sufferers by the late irruption of the Kaffir hordes.

"2. That in consequence of the frequent murders and continual plunders which have been committed on the farmers along this frontier during a series of years by the Kaffir tribes adjacent thereto, and which may be mainly attributed to the inefficiency of the policy hitherto pursued in our relations with that people, it is the opinion of this meeting that an entire change of measures is necessary for the future security of the lives and property of the inhabitants.

"3. That it is the deliberate opinion of this meeting, founded

¹ Now Wood's Hotel.

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on the result of experience, that the boundary hitherto maintained between the Colonial and Kaffir territories is perfectly indefensible against the predatory incursions of the natives, and further, that the only line of demarcation which can be maintained with any probability of success is that formed by the bold, precipitous and open banks of the Kei River.


“4. . . . this meeting is of opinion that His Excellency's determination to annex that country (i.e. between the Keiskamma and the Kei) to the Colony will be attended with the most beneficial consequences to the inhabitants at large.

“5. That an Address be presented to His Excellency the Governor, expressive of the most heartfelt gratitude of the inhabitants of this frontier for his late humane and efficient arrangements on their behalf.

“6. That a Petition be prepared and transmitted forthwith to His Majesty the King in Council, embodying the sentiments contained in the foregoing resolutions, and praying that such compensation may be made to the sufferers by the recent Kaffir irruption for their overwhelming losses as the justice and humanity of the British nation may deem meet.”¹

On June 12th, the Governor arrived in Grahamstown where he was welcomed with great jubilation. In accordance with the fifth resolution an Address was presented to him. In reply, among other matters, he stated, in connection with the annexation: “I adopted it after the most mature and careful consideration, and with a full sense of its responsibility, trusting, as I firmly do, to the gracious approval of the King; because I felt it to be my imperative duty as a faithful servant of His Majesty, and as a conscientious Governor to whom had been confided the interests of such a Colony, not to let slip

¹ It is worthy of note, in view of subsequent occurrences, that a certain Dr. Ambrose George Campbell had signed the requisition for the meeting, but did not attend. He sent a letter in which he protested against according thanks to the Governor for annexing 10,000 square miles of territory to the Colony, “when he has not made known his ulterior intentions”. At this time certain letters of a character hostile to the colonists were appearing in the *Commercial Advertiser* and another Cape Town paper, the *Zuid Afrikaan*, of which Dr. Campbell was believed to be the writer. In fact, in the latter paper for June 26th, there appeared an open letter to the people of Albany in which he expressed his disapproval of their “bloodthirsty and unchristian feeling”. This was over his own signature. It gave great offence. In 1840 he started a small newspaper, called the *Echo*, in opposition to the *Grahamstown Journal*.



THE HON. R. GODLONTON

From the Painting in the City Hall, Grahamstown

the occasion of doing, now that it could be done with the most rigid adherence to the principles of public justice, that which sound policy and the future security and prosperity, nay, I may truly add, the very existence of the Colony, alike demanded”.

Another public meeting was held on the 17th, when the Petition to the King was approved. It was a long document, giving a history of the settlement since 1820, and leading up to the ruinous outbreak of December, 1834. And the cause of all this, they continue: “Your Majesty’s most humble and dutiful subjects, the Petitioners, deem it their bounden duty to Your Majesty, and to themselves, to state explicitly their deep conviction that their present calamitous situation may be directly traced to that disregard which has been shown to their repeated and urgent Petitions for protection and redress of existing grievances, and which disregard they cannot hesitate to attribute in part to those calumnies on their characters, as loyal British subjects, and to those misrepresentations of their actual conduct, situation, and circumstances, and of the dispositions, habits, and character of the tribes beyond the Colonial boundary, which have been published to the world by mistaken or designing writers, and so widely disseminated to their prejudice in every part of Your Majesty’s Dominions”. This Petition received about seven hundred signatures, collected presumably from the whole of the district, and was transmitted to England in due course.

But this spontaneous action was not confined to Grahams-town and Albany. Every part of the Colony, sometime before the end of the year, presented similar numerously signed addresses to the Governor. On June 30th, a very large meeting was held in the Commercial Hall in Cape Town, when, in spite of the Philip-Fairbairn faction, an address signed by 420 of the leading citizens was sent to His Excellency. Like most of the others, it expressed gratitude for the protective measure of making the Kei the boundary of the Colony, and also for the Governor’s humanity in liberating the Fingoes from Gcaleka thralldom and his action in alleviating the distress of the homeless and ruined.

On July 13th, like action was taken at Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage, and at subsequent dates at Stellenbosch, Swel-

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V. Perhaps, not surprisingly, this last-mentioned place, from its proximity to the scene of action, took up this matter as feelingly as had Grahamstown. Further, it had become known that Mr. Buxton, in speaking in Parliament just after he had heard of the first outbreak of the war, said: "Acts of cruelty have been committed on the Kaffirs in the name of England enough to make any Englishman blush". Graaff Reinet, therefore, also sent a long Petition to the King, dealing with the history of the frontier and its relations to the Kaffirs in even greater length and detail than the Albany Petition had done. And in the Address to the Governor, they said: "It is with deep humiliation that we perceive that this Colony contains a small number of mistaken or factious persons capable of misrepresenting the object and tendency of these beneficent measures, or incapable of justly appreciating them; but when we observe that the opinions of these persons received no countenance among the judicious and well-informed colonists, but owe the degree of credit they may have acquired with a portion of the British public chiefly to their own partial and fallacious statements, we cannot doubt that sound information will be sought from better and more authentic sources; that the full inquiry prayed for by the frontier colonists will at length be granted, when such of our fellow-subjects in Great Britain as have been hitherto incorrectly informed regarding our affairs, will, however tardily, be led to acknowledge that the colonists, and in particular the inhabitants of the Kaffir frontier, are actuated by a feeling very remote from that spirit of aggression and hostility which have been so unjustly attributed to them; and when it will be discovered that those measures which are most likely to advance the general interests of humanity and civilisation, and to redound to the advantage and to the honour of England, are also those which are most consonant to the works and interests of the colonists.

"We would not, sir, dwell so long upon this topic were it not painfully evident that the same spirit of partial philanthropy, which seeks gratification in untrue statements of the

¹ For all these addresses *vide Return of Kaffir War, Blue Book*, July 10th, 1837.

Colonial and of the savage character, has a direct tendency to give an undue stimulus to the desires or the pretensions of the savages, and has been actively and successfully exerted in rendering nugatory the imperfect means of defence against external enemies."

In his reply to this particular part of this Address, the Governor said: "I, too, have observed with a regret corresponding to that expressed in the Address, and I acknowledge, not without painful astonishment, the dangerous efforts of some (I would fain hope but a very few) persons within the Colony to sacrifice the cause, and to degrade the character, of their fellow-countrymen, in defence of those of a savage and treacherous enemy; nor do they scruple even to pass over unnoticed, or to hold as trifling, the almost unequalled sufferings of the former in the barbarous invasion which laid the frontier districts in blood and ashes; while they earnestly invite all commiseration for the case of the latter. Whatever may be the real and ultimate object of this perversion of facts and inferences, its manifest and immediate tendency is—at home, to deceive and mislead His Majesty's Government and the people of England, by making the 'worse appear the better cause,' and so to shut the sources of sympathy and the assistance there against the sufferers; here—in the Colony, to paralyse the operations, and impede the success of a war, not of choice, but of stern necessity, and waged (if ever war were waged) PRO ARIS ET FOCIS."

In the short space of six months a great revolution took place in the Governor's opinion of the Kaffir character. On his arrival in the Colony, he had been disposed to adopt the prevailing view in England and to regard the frontier natives as an innocent and ill-used people. Under the impression that they were more to be pitied than blamed, he was averse to allowing Colonel Somerset to pursue the necessarily strong measures against even those who were actually caught plundering. During this time of his innocency, he was the "idol" of the "philanthropists," "a Governor who could afford to have a conscience," as they described him. But having gone to the frontier and received three months' education in contact with the Kaffirs themselves, he came to the conclusion that they were "treacherous and irreclaimable savages".

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While all this wordy warfare was going on, and in spite of the doubts as to whether Sir Benjamin Durban's measures would be approved and allowed to be matured, the construction of the forts and military posts was in rapid progress. Forts Warden and Wellington, as has already been pointed out, were finished within a few days of their commencement. FORT HILL (afterwards King William's Town) was on a somewhat larger scale, as that place was to be the military headquarters of the new province. It was a square redoubt consisting of low earthen walls with flanking bastions for three field-guns. It contained wattle and daub huts for about four hundred men, a stone hospital, and a prison. The whole was surrounded by a deep ditch. The missionary's ruined house, situated at a short distance, was repaired, and became the residence of the military Governor, Colonel Smith, who, shortly after taking up his residence, was joined by his wife. Within a stone's throw of Fort Hill, but on the other side of the river, was another fort, FORT HARDINGE, which, with the former, probably formed part of one and the same establishment. About ten miles to the north of Fort Hill on an upper reach of the Buffalo, near Murray's Krantz, was FORT BERESFORD. This was a smaller post of a hundred and twenty feet square with three redans. It afforded accommodation for thirty cavalry, for the purpose of patrolling the bushy mountains in these parts. By June 25th it was finished. "Fort Beresford is completed, and a beautiful little work it is," said Colonel Smith in writing to the Governor on that date. Nine miles to the south-west of Fort Hill, on a small tributary of the Buffalo, FORT MURRAY—old Fort Murray in contradistinction to a later Fort Murray—was built. It was very near Mount Coke and about five miles from the ruins known to-day as Fort Murray. In its dimensions and general construction it seems to have been a replica of Fort Beresford. It was soon found that the site chosen for Fort Wellington was very unsuitable. It is described as being "literally on top of a mountain," "colder than one can describe". In writing to Sir Benjamin Durban on October 5th, 1835, Colonel Smith said: "From the storm the other night eleven horses died and upwards of forty head of cattle. This post has cost us £400 in horse-flesh." He recommended therefore the abandonment

of Fort Wellington and the establishment of another on a picturesque spot situated on the Kamegga, a small river which runs into the Gonubie. It was about twenty-five miles from King William's Town and near Mount Keane, or Tab' Umhala, as the Kaffirs called it. The site had the further advantage of being about a mile from the chief Umhala's "great place," and in a district thickly populated by Kaffirs who would be none the worse for a little surveillance. This proposal was acted upon and a new fort called FORT WATERLOO came into existence. It also was like Fort Beresford in all respects.

Of all the forts which were constructed at this time, the most important from its strategic position and the one occupying the most daring and dangerous situation was FORT COX; daring, because of its proximity to the very stronghold of the hostile Kaffirs, and dangerous on account of its being immediately beneath and partly surrounded by high mountains covered with dense bush and forest. Fort Cox was built on the highest point of a long and gradually rising tongue of land along the sides and around the end of which the Keiskamma River flows. The scenery around the fort is perhaps the most wild, yet appallingly grand, of any in all the Amatola Mountains. Facing north, there is on the right hand, the steep slopes of Mount Macdonald almost within gun shot, while on the left the Seven Kloof Mountain towers high above and menaces the position. Immediately in front one looks into the beautiful Amatola basin—a fairly level plain about five miles across, completely shut in by the surrounding mountains, and out of which, in those days, there was no road or path, except the intricate tracks up through the forests known only to the Kaffirs. The view towards the south is not so romantic, being only slightly undulating country bounded in the far distance by an irregular line of low hills. To the left, about two miles distant along the flat, might then, as now, be seen the small mission station of Burns Hill, while to the right, to-day, the village of Middle Drift is clearly visible. The position was one from which, co-operating with Fort Beresford, patrols could operate effectively in the valleys of the different branches of the Keiskamma and Amatola mountains. The fort itself, as judged from the ruins now to


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be seen, consisted of four well-hewn stone walls forming a square about sixty paces across. There was a wide entrance in each wall. Inside there was a very strongly built powder magazine, officers' quarters, stables, and a cook house. But there does not seem to have been any accommodation for the men—probably they lived in tents. Outside the fort opposite each entrance and about ten paces from it there was a peculiar triangular stone sentry box, the base of the triangle being towards the gate. These sentry-boxes must have been for the purpose of watching the slopes down to the river, for without them it would have been quite possible for the Kaffirs to have crept up unseen to the very walls.¹ The garrison consisted of six Royal Artillery, one company of British Infantry, and one hundred and sixty Hottentots.

In after years, namely in 1851, Colonel Smith, who had much to do with the establishment of this fort, had, when he had become Sir Harry Smith and Governor of the Colony, the unpleasant experience of being shut up in it and kept a prisoner by the Kaffirs.

FORT WHITE, named after Major T. C. White, who was killed in Hintza's country, is situated on the Debe flats, on the summit of a gentle rise of land about two miles in front of Tabindoda and about twenty from King William's Town. The object of this fort was to have a post of communication between King William's Town and Fort Cox, as well as to have a stronghold from which to act in intercepting the passage of Kaffirs from Line Drift to their haunts in the mountains. Sir B. Durban had considered the Umdezini (Green River) as the more effective situation, but the opinion of Colonel Smith was allowed to prevail, and thus on August 27th, 1835, Lieutenant Montgomery Williams, the Royal Engineer who planned and superintended the construction of these forts,

¹ Colonel Napier in his *Excursions in Southern Africa*, vol. ii., p. 191, in describing Fort Cox, says: "There was no other accommodation for its garrison, save the small bell-shaped tents furnished by the commissariat, and which tottered under the storm of wind and dust by which the fortress was then as usual assailed. It was altogether a most miserable place, replete with inconveniences and discomfort of every kind, and from whence when once shut up within its confined precincts, there appeared no visible means of escape. . . . In consequence of the difficulty of conveying stores to this almost inaccessible spot, its garrison had frequently during their occupation been exposed to the severest privations of hunger and want,"



FORT COX
From an Oil Painting

was instructed to mark out the site. Fort White was much smaller than Fort Cox, though strongly built. It consisted of four high, stone, loop-holed walls forming a square, inside which were the usual buildings and permanent cavalry stables for twenty-six horses.

The only time the Kaffirs made any serious attack upon it was during the 1851 war, when, with the weapons they had, they found it impregnable.

FORT THOMSON, one of the smaller forts, is situated just on the outside of the town of Alice on the old Fort Beaufort road. It is still in a fairly good state of preservation and is used as a police camp. Sir B. Durban in a letter to Captain Halifax, July 22nd, 1835, describes it "as a permanent post on the Chumie's right bank between the two waggon fords of Block Drift and that lower down leading to Lovedale". And to Colonel Smith, on the same date with reference to its position, "on the Chumie on its right bank, on a plateau formed by the confluence of it with the Gaga rivulet". Fort Thomson is of stone and substantially built. It accommodated a garrison of ten horse, thirty British and thirty Hottentot Infantry.¹ Being on the *right* bank of the Chumie this fort was really in the old Neutral Territory and not in the Province of Queen Adelaide.

FORT MONTGOMERY WILLIAMS.—Following the Chumie to the south and having passed some miles beyond the point where it flows into the Keiskamma, Fort Willshire on the river's edge is reached. About three miles further down in a straight line and on high land about three miles from the river itself, the ruins of Fort Montgomery Williams may be seen. Judging from these ruins it was a small, star-shaped fort. The site was marked out by Lieutenant Montgomery Williams in July, 1835, and the stonework commenced forthwith. The object of it was to be a position from which, by means of patrols, the country along the Fish River from Committees to Trompetter's Drift could be watched, and also to be a connecting link in the chain of Willshire, Line Drift, and Peddie Forts. This fort could not have been in existence long, for difficulty soon

¹ Fort Thomson must not be confused with Fort Hare. This latter was not built until 1846, and was on the *left* bank of the Chumie, but also just on the outside of the town of Alice.

CHAP. V. arose in connection with the supply of water, and it seems to have been abandoned before the end of that year.¹

LINE DRIFT FORT.—The main road or pathway from Kaffirland into the southern parts of the Colony followed a somewhat tortuous course down the bushy steeps on the eastern side of the Keiskamma and up those on the western. The drift where this road passed through the river was, and still is, called Line Drift. Near this drift the troublesome chief Eno (Nqeno) had his great place, but at the time now under consideration, he had found it expedient to seek a temporary residence in the distant mountains. About three-quarters of a mile from the actual drift, on the Colonial side of the river, a structure was built which can scarcely be regarded as a fort. It was sometimes spoken of as a "relay post". It seems to have been a large square space bounded by stone walls of the roughest description. There are no signs or remains of buildings such as are to be found in the ruins of most of the other forts. This place was in all probability occupied only occasionally, for it is not clear that any garrison was ever placed there. There is a mound of earth near the wall facing the river which may have given position to a field-gun. This place must have been an important post at the time the Fingoes needed protection from the Kaffirs during their first sojourn in the Colony.

In all these measures for the protection of the Colony, it was not likely that the boundary which had been the object of so much concern to the former Governors—the Fish River with its extensive bush—would be overlooked. On the immediate banks of that river three forts were erected, namely, FORT BROWN, DOUBLE DRIFT FORT, and TROMPETTER'S DRIFT FORT. These took the place of simpler structures which had remained from former times. At that drift where the main road from Grahamstown to Fort Beaufort crosses the Fish River, there was before 1835 a small military post called Hermanus' Kraal.² As part of

¹ Unless the exact site of this fort is known, it is not a very easy matter to find these ruins to-day, for they are much grown over with bush and prickly pear. They are on the left of that portion of the King William's Town road which leads from Breakfast Vlei to the Keiskamma River, and about three miles from Breakfast Vlei.

² From Hermanus Xogomesh, who led the rebel Hottentots against Fort Beaufort in 1851 and was shot in the act.



TOWER OF FORT ARMSTRONG



FORT ARMSTRONG

Sir Benjamin Durban's measures, this was replaced by a much more pretentious establishment—a number of separate buildings enclosed within high stone walls and protected by a large square gun tower situated at one corner. The new place became known as FORT BROWN. It was one of the largest of these frontier forts. It afforded ample accommodation for both man and horse, and though standing in what was then dangerous country, it could always be well supplied with all that was necessary from Grahamstown, seventeen miles distant. The square tower was a characteristic feature of these larger forts. It was about twelve feet square and was entered by a flight of stone steps leading into a room with loop-holed walls. Under the floor of this room there was a cellar—the powder magazine—and on the top of the tower there was an arrangement whereby a large swivel gun could be turned round and pointed in any direction. Fort Brown was of great importance on account of its being on the main highway from the Colony into Kaffirland. A few years after this date this highway was properly made and became known as the "Queen's Road," extending from Grahamstown past Fort Brown, over the Victoria bridge in Fort Beaufort on to Post Retief, the most northerly post.

DOUBLE DRIFT FORT was lower down the Fish River in a part of the country which was almost as dangerous and menacing as that surrounding Fort Cox. It was about ten miles in a straight line, but about thirty following the tortuous course of the river from Fort Brown. Although well built of stone, with a gun tower at one corner, it could not have been of much use for any other purpose than a post of communication, as it was so small. The old main trading route passed through the wild country around, and crossed the Fish River at the old post which gave place to this one.

TROMPETTER'S DRIFT FORT was at this date the Fish River fort nearest the coast, being about seventeen miles from the mouth of the Fish River. Old Kaffir Drift Fort was six miles lower down, but it had long been abandoned. Trompetter's Drift Fort was one of the same type as Fort Brown, but it was not so large. Its use was to protect the drift, as well as to be a station from which to act in the densely bushy country around. The road through the drift was the main road to

CHAP. V. Fort Peddie and the lower parts of the old Neutral Territory. All the forts thus far enumerated were either in Kaffirland or on the immediate Colonial boundary; there were, however, two others which were situated well within the Colony, FORT ARMSTRONG and POST RETIEF. The former took the place of the old Camp Adelaide, a temporary post on the upper part of the Kat River near the foot of the Katberg. Fort Armstrong, named after Captain A. B. Armstrong, was a large place. Within its stone walls there were, besides the usual purely military buildings, a number of small houses, probably of wattle and daub, for the accommodation of the Hottentot soldiers and their families. The object of both Camp Adelaide and Fort Armstrong was the protection of the Kat River Settlement. The fort was attacked and seized by the rebel Hottentots in February, 1851, and the consequent bombardment of Colonel Somerset's forces accounts for the ruined condition in which we find it to-day.

POST RETIEF was more of a military police camp than a fort. Experience had shown that the farmers in the Winterberg districts needed more protection than was to be obtained from so distant a place as Fort Beaufort or even Fort Armstrong. Post Retief, therefore, was established for the purpose of providing this. It is situated about four miles from the foot of the Didima Mountain, over which the road to Balfour and Fort Armstrong passes. It consisted of the usual buildings for the accommodation of the men and stabling. It was named after the famous Voortrekker, PIETER RETIEF.¹

During the months of June, July, and August, 1835, there continued in the Province of Queen Adelaide those guerilla operations which, for the most part, constituted this Kaffir war. The British, from the various military posts, patrolled the country, driving the enemy from one stronghold to another, capturing cattle, burning huts, and destroying corn; the object

¹ Sir B. Durban, in writing to Lieut.-Governor A. Stockenstrom in March, 1837, said: "If I am not mistaken, this gentleman, Mr. Retief, is the same whom in the latter end of 1835 I appointed a Field Commandant, for his active and judicious conduct at a period of difficulty and danger; and if so, he is one who has always, I believe, maintained an excellent character; indeed, so favourable had he been represented to me by Colonel Somerset and others, that wishing to give him a mark of my good opinion, and to do him honour, when in 1836 I caused a military post to be established under the Winterberg, I named it *Retief*."



TOWER, FORT BROWN



FORT BROWN

of the Governor and Colonel Smith being to compel the hostile Kaffirs to retire over the Kei by depriving them of their means and subsistence and shelter in their old haunts. The Kaffirs on their part checkmated these moves, and made the most of every opportunity of attacking weakened posts, small patrols, and Fingo locations. The following illustrates the kind of procedure which went on at this time: On June 16th, a patrol of thirty men, following up Kaffir spoor near the Buffalo, fell in with a large body of Gcalekas and Ndhlabis, many of whom possessed guns and ammunition and were mounted. A brisk bush fight ensued, resulting in the capture of 455 cattle. The next day Lieutenants Leslie and T. H. Bowker, with all the available men from Fort Wellington, operated along the Gonubie, killing eleven Kaffirs, wounding several, and securing 230 cattle and many goats. During the week, June 23rd to the 30th, for instance, all the skirmishes in Adelaide resulted in the killing of thirty-four Kaffirs, capturing 1,894 cattle, twenty-four horses and 440 goats, besides the destruction of numerous huts and much corn. These small patrols, however, were not uniformly successful. As superior as the gun was to the assegai, the Kaffirs did not always come off second best. They recaptured cattle and horses, and at times caused their assailants to retire at a very quick "double". Elated by these partial successes, they showed a tendency to assume the offensive. All this called for a "demonstration" on the part of Colonel Smith. Accordingly on July 4th and 5th, a force consisting of regular soldiers, provisionals, and Hottentot levies, drawn from the different posts and numbering about 300, made a combined move in the country extending from the mouth of the Kei to that of the Nahoon. Thirty Kaffirs were killed and cattle estimated at 4,000 head were captured. During these operations a detachment, under a Captain Ross of the Mounted Rifles, having got into a thick bush, was attacked in a spirited manner, resulting in two men wounded, Ross narrowly escaping with his life, and losing twelve horses and saddles. Shortly after this, namely on the 20th, undaunted by this "demonstration," the Kaffirs made a combined attack on Fort Wellington. Lieutenant T. H. Bowker, who was then in the fort, tells us in his diary that towards evening of that day the dogs commenced barking

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violently—generally a sign that wolves or jackals were hovering around. On this occasion, however, the barking was soon accompanied by shouts of “Kaffirs,” “Kaffirs” from some of the men who discovered the danger. Instantly there was a rush to arms and firing on the approaching hordes commenced. This was answered by a return *fire* on the part of the enemy. The fort was being attacked from six different directions. In spite of the stubborn resistance, the Kaffirs advanced. Two parties were armed with assegais and shields only, but most of the others had guns, and apparently plenty of ammunition. Fortunately they had not become expert, or even competent, in the use of fire-arms, for they fired too high and did surprisingly little damage. One man, however, Robert Storey, of the 72nd, was shot. The fight lasted for about an hour. The Kaffirs showed great courage; in spite of the continuous fire which was kept up upon them, they rescued and carried away their dead and wounded, and succeeded in taking away every horse belonging to the fort and the six remaining sheep—the men’s rations. A feature of surprise in this affair was the number of guns and the quantity of ammunition possessed by these Kaffirs. On another occasion, when a patrol under Major Maclean was attacked, the Kaffirs kept up an incessant fire for over three hours. The discovery of the means by which the enemy was supplied with fire-arms and gunpowder was a problem which tried Colonel Smith sorely. All kinds of regulations and restrictions in the trade in gunpowder had long been in existence, but all failed to prevent it getting into the hands of the natives. Writing to Sir B. Durban on August 11th, Colonel Smith said: “Some accursed fiend and traitor to his country is the aider and agitator of all these; so convinced am I of it from inferences I draw, that Your Excellency may depend upon it that such is the case”.¹ Had Colonel

¹ Colonel Smith suspected the Rev. J. Read, the London Missionary Society’s missionary at Philiptown in the Kat River Settlement. “One thing is certain,” he says, writing to the Governor on July 28th, “Mr. Read had a box of arms secreted in his house, and that he was fully aware of the system of barter which was carried on with the Kaffirs.” In justice to Mr. Read, it should be pointed out that the Kat River Settlement, like an ordinary farm, was allowed to have arms and ammunition for its own defence, and that these guns in Mr. Read’s possession may have been those which were to be supplied legitimately to his own people in defending themselves against the Kaffirs, no unnecessary precaution.



TOWER OF DOUBLE DRIFT FORT



DOUBLE DRIFT FORT AND FISH RIVER


Smith been better acquainted with the barter which went on between the cattle traders from the Colony and the Griquas and other tribes living nearer to the Orange River, he might have discovered the channel by which these dangerous goods found their way to the Kaffirs.

At this time the two hostages, Buku and Kinki, were still in prison in Grahamstown. Kreli, so far, had shown every disposition to act up to his promises, and as he had sent to the Governor a white ox as the most solemn testimony of his good will and sincerity, he (the Governor) was not averse to listening to the chief's request when, through the mediation of Captain Warden, he asked that the two prisoners might be allowed to return to their own country. Accordingly, Captain R. Southey of the Corps of Guides, in whose safe keeping they were, was instructed to provide them with horses, clothes, and all else necessary for their journey, and to escort them to the Kei. On July 31st they left Grahamstown, and in due course arrived in King William's Town. There Colonel Smith, in his own peculiar manner, took the opportunity of instilling into their minds such wholesome and moral precepts as inculcated respect for the might and benevolence of the British Government. He pointed out that there was no enmity between the British and the Kaffir *people*, but that it was the *chiefs* who were to blame for leading these people astray; that peace had been offered to them, and the war now therefore continued at their option. He informed them that large reinforcements of troops had arrived from England, and that unless Kreli and Buku exerted themselves in collecting and sending in the promised cattle, he, at the head of these soldiers, would, in a month, be over the Kei again. To impress them still further with the gravity of his words, he showed them round Fort Hill and fired off one of the nine-pounders, "the ball ricocheted fifty times at least, and ultimately popped over the hill to the right of the road to the yellow wood trees, and killed one of my horses; rather a practical ratification of a treaty".¹ Buku and Kinki were duly impressed, and profuse in their thanks for the kindness they had received during their detention. Promising, apparently in all good faith, to assist Kreli in the

¹ Letter, Smith to Durban, Theal's *Kaffir War*, 1835, p. 297.

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V. They were still in the care of Captain R. Southey, but were now provided with an escort befitting their dignity and loaded with presents for themselves and Kreli. When the party arrived at the Komgha River, Buku asked to be allowed to dispense with the escort and to make his way by a shorter path to his own place. This was acceded to. So presenting the two men with the horses and saddles on which they were riding and handing them a copy, in Kaffir, of the treaty with Kreli, Buku and Kinki wended their way back to Gcalekaland.

The benevolent measures proposed by Sir Benjamin Durban for the settlement of the Fingoes in the Peddie district miscarried. The problem was more difficult than at first appeared. In the first place, the common tribulation of these tribes when scattered in Hintza's country had done little or nothing towards uniting them in bonds of mutual sympathy and reciprocal service. Quarrels among them, arising from petty tribal jealousies, commenced almost before the last of the procession was over the Keiskamma. Further, there was much difficulty in connection with the cattle. The very large number of beasts which had been brought from the Kei consisted of those which actually belonged to the Fingoes, together with those they had taken from the Gcalekas, and also the large number which had been captured by the troops and were Colonial property, many, in fact, belonging to the burghers who were then present on active service. The Fingoes showed no fine distinction between *meum* and *tuum* in this connection, their gratitude to their deliverers was expressed by seizing every unguarded animal, and even turning back, when they could, the droves which were on their way to the Colony. Then, unfortunately for the success of the scheme, there was much delay in the steps taken to settle these people in their new homes. They had crossed the Keiskamma on May 14th, but it was not until July 13th that Sir B. Durban issued his detailed instructions for locating them and appointed the officers who were to undertake this duty. By that time the greater number had disappeared. In the meantime, left almost to themselves, they became dissatisfied and frightened and commenced to migrate to other parts. This is not surprising, for knowing full well the enmity with which they were regarded



POST RETIEF



FROM INSIDE OF POST RETIEF

by the Kaffirs, they realised the danger of being bounded on the east by the thick bush of the Keiskamma and by that of the Fish River on the west. Many of them therefore moved out of the Peddie district and congregated at places where protection was more in evidence, such as King William's Town, Fort Thomson, and Grahamstown. Others were found in the Kat River Settlement and in the service of the Boers. On May 21st, Mr. John Mitford Bowker was appointed Government Resident among them, and the Rev. J. Ayliff remained with them for a time, but these gentlemen had no authority (then) to do other than advise them and act *in loco parentis*. Mr. Bowker found them a most unsatisfactory people. They stole one another's cattle and goods, quarrelled and settled their disputes with the assegai. It was impossible to arbitrate between them as all lied so glibly and persistently, the chiefs being as bad as the people. To make matters worse, dysentery, which was attributed to the waters having been bewitched, broke out among them and several died. For these reasons they seemed determined to find locations for themselves. Jokweni and all Amazizi gradually left and collected together near the walls of Fort Hill.

Five tribes oozed away and settled down on both banks of the Chumie and Gaga Rivers near Fort Thomson. In August there were in those parts, 334 men, 496 women, and 1,186 children; while remaining in the Peddie district in October, of the large number which came from Hintza's country, there were only 210 men, 204 women, and 284 children. These matters thus settled themselves. As the Chumie Fingoes were, presumably, under the protection of Fort Thomson, and as the people did their own sorting out and arranged themselves in locations according to their liking, the Governor approved of this and assisted them with seed corn and goats.¹ All these locations were within a short distance from the fort; one of them, at least, must have occupied part of the site of the present town of Alice.

This proximity to forts, however, did not give the Fingoes that immunity from Kaffir attacks which was hoped for. The Chumie Fingoes were located in the country of the Gaikas

¹In October, 1835, two waggon loads of seed corn and 2,000 goats were sent for distribution between these Fingoes and those still remaining at Peddie.

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who resented it. Seizing the invaders' cattle probably seemed to the Gaikas no more than a just toll for the use of the land ; in any case cattle were continually driven away, and all the influence and moral suasion of Fort Thomson failed to prevent that or the numerous conflicts between Fingoes and Kaffirs. At King William's Town, even under the very nose of Colonel Smith himself, the Kaffirs showed but little respect for the frowns of Fort Hill. On August 7th, the stillness of midnight was suddenly broken by heartrending shrieks and yells. The garrison turned out quickly and found that about 200 Kaffirs were attacking the Fingo location. One of the nine-pounders at the fort having been fired in the direction of the enemy, they retired. They were followed by the Fingoes for about three miles when they turned and a fierce fight took place, dark as it was. The 1st Provisional Battalion went to the assistance of the Fingoes, and the Kaffirs were finally driven back, leaving thirteen of their number dead ; and among these was a son of the great chief Dushani.

These Fingo locations at the Chumie and King William's Town did not last long. For reasons yet to be narrated, these as well as the fort itself were abandoned, and all other wise and beneficent measures of Sir Benjamin Durban for the protection of the Colony and the welfare of the natives were reversed. The Fingoes were removed to the Tzitzikamma, to the west of the Uitenhage district, " to a tract of country which the experience of a century had proved to be utterly worthless for such a purpose.¹ Governor-General Napier, who succeeded to Sir Benjamin Durban, eventually saw the unsuitability of that country and moved the Fingoes back to the Peddie district, which became known as Fingoland."

It may, perhaps, be of interest to note here, that, in connection with these Fingo locations on the Chumie and Gaga, the famous Missionary Institution of LOVEDALE came to be established on its present site. Before this, it had been situated on the side of the hill near a small stream called the Ncera, about four miles east of the present town of Alice. But as these buildings had been burnt and ruined by the Kaffirs during the war, and as the missionaries, in consequence of

¹ Boyce's *Notes on South African Affairs*, 1839, p. 139.

this congregation of Fingoes about Block Drift and a number of men stationed at Fort Thomson, saw a wider and more convenient sphere for their labours nearer the Chumie, they decided to spend their money in erecting entirely new buildings on a new site rather than rebuild the old ones. Hence the situation of Lovedale where we see it to-day.¹

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¹ LOVEDALE. The Chumie Mission station was founded by the Rev. J. Brownlee in June, 1820. For a time it was the only mission station in Kaffirland. By 1824 it had so far developed that it was thought right to extend its influence by forming an out-station at a place about ten miles distant to the south-east. A spot was chosen on the slope of a hill near a stream called the Inxhra, now the Ncera, and in due course a small church, schoolroom, and missionary's house appeared upon the site. In 1826 the "Inxhra Station" took the name of *Lovedale*, after the Rev. J. Love, D.D., one of the founders of the old Glasgow Missionary Society. Lovedale, or old Lovedale, as this place was called in contradistinction to the present Lovedale, seems to have answered the purpose for which it was created. The number of natives receiving instruction gradually increased until the outbreak of the war when there were about seventy. In January, 1835, when the Kaffirs were pursuing their career of bloodshed and spoliation in the Colony, Mr. J. Bennie, the resident missionary, with his family had to join the party which under the protection of Major Cox was being escorted from danger to safety in Grahamstown. Very soon after Mr. Bennie's departure, the Kaffirs set fire to all that would burn and in other ways ruined the buildings. Towards the end of 1835, after the close of the war, the Kaffirland missionaries were allowed to return to their stations (a privilege it was thought expedient to refuse to Mr. Read of the London Missionary Society). At old Lovedale some attempt was made to repair the damage and render the place again habitable. A few months afterwards, namely, in July, 1836, when the Fingoes had become well established in the vicinity of Fort Thomson, the Revs. Laing and Ross visited them and reported that there were sixty-seven hamlets of Fingoes in those parts. It was then proposed that the site of Lovedale should be changed. Accordingly a committee of inspection, consisting of Messrs. Chalmers, Niven, Laing, and McDiamid, visited the Chumie and decided upon a spot on the *left* bank of that river, called by the natives *Entiliyo bende*—probably on or very near the site on which Fort Hare was afterwards built. It is not clear what buildings were erected at that place, nothing of it remains now. This site was soon changed for another—for one on the right bank of the Chumie where the Lovedale of to-day stands. In April, 1837, Fort Willshire had been abandoned, and the Lieut.-Governor of the Eastern Province, Andries Stockenstrom, anxious to preserve those buildings, offered them to Lovedale for missionary purposes. They were at least twelve miles from Fort Thomson. Not that this was any matter, however, for in the general upheaval of everything by the Home Government at this time, Fort Thomson was abandoned and the Fingoes were turned out of Kaffirland. Besides Fort Willshire, which was not accepted, the house of the official known as the "Government Resident among the Gaikas," Captain C. L. Stretch, was also offered to Lovedale. It is the house now standing in the Lovedale grounds and known as *Domira*. It was about a mile and a half from the *Entiliyo bende* Lovedale, and on the *right* bank of the Chumie. Lovedale accepted this, and forthwith, i.e. in April, 1837, decided to commence school there and build a church in the immediate vicinity. Mr. Bennie was then in charge. On May 17th he


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During the month of July there was, in the Colony at all events, a lull in the war. Many of the burghers had returned to their homes, had done their sowing, and, for a time, had been left in peace; but all were very poor, bordering on destitution. From the unprecedented ravages by the Kaffirs and the clear sweep they had made of all stock—cattle, horses, sheep, and goats, the farmers, both Dutch and English, with difficulty found the means of bare existence. In many cases only the blackened walls of their homes remained. Nor was the relief which was to be afforded by the captured cattle very encouraging; for the number in possession of the authorities was but a small proportion of that which had been taken, and of these many were required for feeding the men still in the field. The burghers in several instances, in recognising their own animals, drove them off and retook possession of them, but this was forbidden as all had to go into the common stock. In consequence of the Governor discovering that some of the Somerset burghers had acted in this manner, he issued, on May 15th, a circular letter to the Civil Commissioners of the

commenced the foundation of the new mission house, and thus the third, or new Lovedale was started. By July, 1838, the thatchers were at work on the church and schoolroom. These places must have been badly wanted, for on January 3rd, 1838, Mr. Bennie tells us that he had a Dutch congregation in the parlour of the Residency and a Kaffir congregation in a Kaffir hut. By March, 1841, when Mr. Govan became "teacher" and the head of the embryo institution, Lovedale consisted of the church and missionary's house, both still standing, and the "seminary," which was at the back and has since given place to more palatial buildings. To supply the place with water a fine large furrow was dug which took the water from an upper reach of the Chumie to a convenient part of the mission lands (*vide* plan). From this small beginning the magnificent Lovedale of the present day, the largest Missionary Institution in South Africa, has sprung. Instead of the few small thatched buildings of 1841, there is now an assemblage of substantial buildings which entitles Lovedale to be regarded as a small township. The "Education Building" is a fine stone pile of two storeys with square tower. It contains spacious classrooms, a large assembly hall, used as a church, and a library of nearly 10,000 volumes of educational works. The large boarding houses, providing accommodation for between seven and eight hundred natives, male and female, have airy dormitories and general arrangements worthy of any European school. There is a well-equipped hospital with resident medical officer, and various workshops for waggon making, carpentry, printing, and bookbinding. To all this may be added the private residences of the missionaries and industrial instructors, and—an observatory in which some of the most important astronomical work in South Africa has been done.

Lovedale flourishes while the parent—the Chumie Mission—has long passed out of memory, the ruins of the chapel and the graves of the Chalmers family being to-day the only trace of its former existence.

In 1819 a Company of the 38th Regt to which the sketch belonged, was employed at the Tyumie Forests to cut timber for the use of Fort Willshire, a large Yellow-wood Block (a tree) stuck in the Gaga River, and hence the name "Block Drift".



A B C D E
 Sketch of the Lands, (the property of the Free Church and Charles Sirech) as the Grant appeared when Caffraria was invaded by the British Troops on the 9th of April 1846.
 C. L. STRETCH

a b c d e. New water course constructed at the expense of the Lovendale Mission, the Society of Friends and Charles Lennox Sirech, for the benefit and improvement of the Ama-kosa.

George Philip & Son, Ltd.

Longmans, Green & Co., London, New York, Bombay, Calcutta & Madras.

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Eastern districts stating that as the plunder of public property (cattle) had been carried on by the burghers of districts other than Somerset, and as this would defeat and render abortive the measure he had in view, namely, that of amassing a large quantity of cattle and ultimately effecting a fair and just distribution, those officers were to make lists of persons so offending so that the irregularity might be stopped by legal proceedings.

The question of compensation was somewhat complex. Had no one lost anything but cattle, it might have been possible to distribute proportionately those which had been regained. But cattle, more especially poor Colonial and Kaffir animals, could not compensate the horse breeder who had lost his thorough-bred stallions and brood mares, nor the sheep farmer for his woolled sheep, nor even the grazier for his thorough-bred Fatherland cows, much less for loss of household effects and even home. The procedure finally adopted was to sell by auction all the captured cattle which were not needed for military purposes, and then having found out the individual losses, to compensate in cash. But the unfortunate thing in connection with this was that many could not afford to buy at the auction, even with the two months' credit; they had therefore to suffer their losses with whatever fortitude they could command.¹

The indiscriminate sale of gunpowder was another important matter to which His Excellency gave his attention while in Grahamstown. Licences to sell this article were freely given to any who would pay for them, and these in their turn sold any quantity of powder to all who would pay for it; thus the extensive and profitable trade which was carried on by the hawkers and traders with the natives on the northern

¹ The following are notices in the *Grahamstown Journal* of July 9th, 1835, in this connection :—"NOTICE. All persons who have had cattle stolen by the Kaffirs since December 20th last, and are now desirous of obtaining sufficient to enable them to recommence their pursuits on their farms, may receive from the undersigned an order to *purchase* at any Sale of Captured Cattle, either in Town or Country, to a certain amount in proportion to the number of cattle they have lost. H. Hudson, Government Commissioner, Grahamstown, July 8th, 1835."

"SALE OF CAPTURED CATTLE. A sale of Captured Cattle will be held at the Pound at Grahamstown, on Saturday the 11th inst. Sales will also be held at Salem, on Tuesday the 21st inst., and at the place of C. van Aardt, at the Koonap, on Tuesday the 28th inst. George Jarvis, Commissioner of Captured Cattle."

and north-eastern borders. "For a small tea-cup full of powder two cows, and sometimes more, could be obtained," the cows most probably having been stolen from the farmers. The cows could be disposed of at the rate of three pounds for a pair, and as powder was about two shillings per pound, the business was a profitable one. Sir Benjamin Durban recalled all the licences, and forbade the sale of powder anywhere except at the Government stores, and only in such small quantities as barely sufficed for the protection of person and property.

On July 9th, a small coasting schooner, the *James*, became short of wood and water, so it was said, and in order to replenish sent a boat ashore near the Chalumna River in Kaffirland. In the boat there was a number of guns. A party of Kaffirs went down to the beach to meet the men and at first appeared to be friendly disposed. Recalling, however, the fate of D'Almeida on the shore of Table Bay in 1510, the natives fell upon the intruders, and only two, by battling through the surf and swimming back to the ship, escaped. Colonel Smith was of opinion that this expedition was not entirely disconnected with a trade in arms and ammunition with the natives. Unless the *James* was bound for the embryo settlement in far away Port Natal, which is scarcely likely and this has not been suggested, it is not clear what legitimate business could have attracted a trading schooner with guns along a coast where there was not a single port or any white inhabitant.

Although Sir Benjamin Durban had been in the east six months he had seen nothing of the country, other than the Kaffir inhabited parts through which he had passed in connection with his military movements. On July 8th, therefore, he commenced a tour of visitation along the more settled border. He went first to Bathurst, the old 1820 settler capital, where, for the better protection of that place and the country immediately surrounding, he gave instructions for the erection of a fort on the hill overlooking the village, since known as Battery Hill, and stationed there a small party of soldiers. And as the unfinished church was no longer required as a fort or haven of refuge, it was handed over to the contractor for completion. From Bathurst he visited what remained of the abandoned village of Port Francis on the eastern bank of the Kowie River, and thence went to the villages of the friendly

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Gqunukwebi chiefs, Pato and Kama, in the old Neutral Territory, crossing the Fish River at Kaffir Drift. Moving then in a northerly direction he visited the Fingo locations and saw the partial failure his scheme for these people had been. It was then that he issued his belated instructions for the settlement of the Fingoes. Thence on to Fort Willshire, King William's Town, and, by a route over the mountains not easy to trace, he made his way to the Kat River Settlement. There he spent some few days with the Hottentot settlers, encouraging them with his kindly words and commending them for the part they had taken in the war. In connection with this visit, he states, in writing to Colonel Smith from Fort Beaufort on July 22nd: "In the Kat River district I have learned the extremity of danger which the Colony incurred some months ago through the proceedings of Dr. Philip and his agents . . . but whether I shall arrive at anything which can be brought against them is very doubtful; they proceeded with the most consummate art". From the Kat River he went to Fort Beaufort where he established a Matrimonial Court in order to save parties the trouble of journeying to Grahamstown. He then returned to Grahamstown, arriving there on the 27th.

The guerilla warfare in the mountainous districts continued, and, with the small operations then being carried on and the greater number of burghers at their homes, there seemed but little prospect of a cessation of hostilities. Fortunately at this time, reinforcements from England were arriving in the Colony. With the addition of these and the burghers who were to be called out again, there seemed to be a likelihood of bringing the war to a close by making a very general and thorough sweep of the whole of the Province of Queen Adelaide, whereby the whole of the Kaffirs in those parts should be driven over the Kei. But while these warlike and extreme measures were under consideration a very different means of ending the war was proposed to the Governor. The Rev. W. B. Boyce, a Wesleyan missionary, a man of considerable ability and uprightness of character, who had worked for some years among the Kaffirs and had gained the esteem of both chiefs and people, wrote to the Governor on July 28th, suggesting the following procedure. It should be stated, however, that Mr.

Boyce was not alone in this movement, he had the support of all the Kaffirland Wesleyan missionaries. The idea was to take advantage of the regard and personal goodwill which the chiefs had always shown towards their Wesleyan missionaries, and under the pretence of secrecy and on their own account, to communicate with the chiefs, thanking them in the first place for their orders to their people, at the beginning of the war, to spare the missionaries, and then, on the principle of one good turn deserving another, to advise them to end the misery in which they were then living by sending a message to the Governor asking for peace. Mr. Boyce would then offer to intercede with His Excellency on their behalf. They were to be warned that Kaffirland was to be invaded again, but with greatly increased forces, and that unless they acted upon this advice, still greater trouble would overtake them, leading in the end to their expulsion over the Kei. All this could reach the chiefs by means of the wives of Pato and Kama, who were sisters of Maqomo, and, being women of rank, could move about in safety. The Governor was to be a party to this in so far as he would know why the submission came from the chiefs; but as his name would not be mentioned and ostensibly he would know nothing about it, he would be unfettered by any promises or statements of his own and thus be enabled to impose such terms as seemed expedient. The Governor approved of this. Accordingly on August 3rd, the Revs. Boyce, Shepstone, and Palmer left Grahamstown, and by way of Cawood's Post and Kaffir Drift arrived at the kraals of Kama, Pato, and Cobus Congo at noon of the 5th. Kama received them with very friendly demonstrations and willingly entered into the business. Having listened to what the missionaries said, he answered: "The object of your visit is good and worthy of the children of God, it is good, very good, yea, so good that it is not good, it is a wonder you never thought of it before". On the 6th four women left Kama's kraal in quest of Maqomo and Tyali. "Tell these chiefs," they were instructed, "that the missionaries send messages advising them to ask for mercy while there is yet time, tell them to send women to Colonel Somerset and say, 'you are tired of war and want a place where you may sit down (hlala) and plough,' and when you have done this the missionaries

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will go to the Governor on your behalf." It must have taken some time to find these chiefs, for it was not until the 17th that the women returned to Kama's place. They had been successful and had delivered the messages as desired. Having waited until their arrival the missionaries then returned to Grahamstown.

Whatever good results the Governor looked for from this mission, he did not allow them to influence him in his proposed measure for bringing the New Province into a more advanced state of subjection. The details of a second invasion of Kaffirland occupied the minds of both himself and Colonel Smith notwithstanding. On August 10th, Sir Benjamin issued a circular letter to the Civil Commissioners of Albany and Somerset, Uitenhage, Graaff Reinet, and Beaufort (West), instructing them to call out the burghers again. It was to be explained to them that they had been allowed to return to their homes at the earliest possible date in order to enable them to do their sowing, but on the understanding that they would have to return to the forces should their services be further required. Circumstances now called for those services. From each district a proportion of men of ages from eighteen to forty-five, provided with two serviceable horses each, was to assemble at one of the following places: Fort Beaufort, Lieuwfontein (near Fort Beaufort), and Cypherfontein, near Grahamstown. In due course the burghers were at their posts of duty. The horses seem to have been needed more than the men, for Colonel Smith, a few days before the issue of the circular letter, stated, that with the exception of his escort, there was not one horse (at King William's Town) fit for the duty expected of it; he was unable to mount a patrol of twenty men or even send a mounted party with the post to Fort Warden. Other places, however, were not so bad as this.

In his scheme for bringing greater pressure upon the refractory chiefs, Sir Benjamin did not lose sight of the possibility of gaining his ends by more peaceable methods. He could not be certain that the overtures of Mr. Boyce would end in success; if they did not, then he saw a good prospect of peace and a more satisfactory settlement of the country in offering the hostile chiefs a modification of the terms he had already dictated in return for their submission. In

any case, shortly after the departure of Mr. Boyce, he sent a confidential communication to Major Cox instructing him to seize any opportunity of conferring with the chiefs which might arise in the course of the military operations, and to inform them that in the event of their surrendering they would be allowed to occupy lands in their own country instead of being driven over the Kei. Such an opportunity arose and the first preliminaries of peace were effected. The incidents leading up to this were the following: On the night of August 9th, a force of 160 of the Kat River people (Hottentots) and twenty-five of the Beaufort levy, under Captain Alexander, marched out of Fort Armstrong for the purpose of patrolling the Chumie Mountains. They were reinforced the next day, while in the mountains, by seventy Fingoes from Block Drift, thus making a force of 225. Nothing much was effected that day. Large numbers of Kaffirs with numerous cattle were seen on the distant hills, but, though followed up, they kept beyond musket range. They were so pressed, however, that they could not get the cattle along quickly enough and so stabbed them and left them dead. In another part of the mountains, later in the day, Captain Alexander was more successful. He sent out a small party of Fingoes as a decoy, keeping the main body of his men in hiding. The Kaffirs, as was expected, followed these as they retired, and thus got within reach of the Hottentots' guns, when a brisk fusillade was opened upon them. Maqomo himself was seen riding upon a white horse. The Kaffirs tried to surround the men, but were driven out into the open, when a struggle ensued, resulting in the Kaffirs finally escaping, but leaving twenty of their number dead. Major Cox, hearing the firing, sent an order to Captain Alexander to join him at Fort Cox. He did so. There the force halted during the next day.

On the morning of the 14th, the troops at Fort Cox, reinforced by Captain Alexander's levies, left the fort in three divisions. Captain Alexander's force moved into the bush again—in the direction of Tabindoda—and was so fortunate as to gain a decisive victory over Maqomo's people. It appears that the force fell in with a large body of these Kaffirs, when a fierce fight ensued, resulting in the repulse of the enemy into a place so surrounded by high and steep precipices

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Colonel Smith afterwards expressed his great dissatisfaction with this procedure. He considered that he (Alexander) ought to have pushed with greater vigour the peculiar advantages of his victorious situation, by taking the whole lot prisoners. He looked upon this action of the Kaffirs as merely a ruse to extricate themselves from their difficulty without any good faith of keeping their promise. As after events showed he was probably not far from the truth.

The centre column, under the command of Major Cox, seems to have moved in a southerly direction from Fort Cox. About eleven o'clock in the morning, while passing over a fairly flat and bush-free country, a large body of Kaffirs, estimated at about 500, came into view. Instead of commencing any hostile demonstration, Major Cox straightway sent to them a sergeant and corporal with a flag of truce. At first the Kaffirs hesitated in receiving it, but realising that all was right they did so and soon disappeared, while Cox's force retired to bivouac somewhere near the Keiskamma. At nine o'clock in the evening an old Kaffir, Ganya, the venerable advisor of the late Gaika, and a man of wisdom, who, from the beginning had opposed this war, arrived at the bivouac and having listened to the "word" for Maqomo and Tyali, returned to his people. The "word" was a proposal for a conference between those chiefs and Major Cox. Early the next morning messengers arrived to say that the chiefs were willing to meet the Major, and very shortly afterwards, small parties of Kaffirs were seen to be congregating about three miles distant. At midday, when it was estimated that 800 had collected, a message that Maqomo and Tyali were ready to talk with Major Cox was received. Major Cox with Major Warden, who had reached Fort Cox

on the 9th with the Governor's message and who had now joined Major Cox at the bivouac, then moved towards the assembly. They were accompanied by Klaas Dirk, the interpreter, and three others, all unarmed. On their approach, Maqomo dressed in a military coat and trousers and Tyali arrayed in a superb tiger-skin kaross, followed by all their councillors, stepped forward and received them with all dignity and politeness. After shaking hands, Maqomo said, "I see by the defenceless state in which you come that you are sincere". Major Cox, in reply, said, "Come, let us sit down and talk," an action which seemed to inspire all with confidence. Needless to say that these men were completely at the mercy of the armed Kaffirs, 300 of whom had muskets. The conference lasted about one and a half hours. Maqomo, in the course of his remarks, said that the Kaffirs were tired of war, that all their best men had been killed, and that their women and children were without homes. "Gaika is dead," he said, "and we have no father over us, so we want to be the children of the Governor, whom we have heard is as well disposed to the black man as to the white"; he hoped the Governor would not drive them over the Kei; he was sure the Kaffirs would not steal any more from the Colony, but the Fingoes were a bad people and would give more trouble than the Kaffirs. In the end Maqomo and Tyali offered their submission and as token thereof, they handed two assegais to Major Cox, which were to be handed to the Governor. Tyali then wished to discuss the cause of the war, but this was not permitted. In this apparently satisfactory spirit the conference closed and all dispersed.¹ The two assegais in due course were transmitted to the Governor.

In connection with this meeting, it should be noticed that only Gaikas were present; there were no representatives of the Ndhlabhis, who were as numerous and who had been as active as the Gaikas in their destruction and plunder of Colonial property. Further, the wily Maqomo had been the chief spokesman. Majors Cox and Warden, and possibly also the Governor himself, seem to have been willing to give

¹ *Vide* Memorandum of a Conference with Caffre Chiefs, Theal's *Kaffir War of 1835*, p. 323. Also report of Aborigines Committee, Major Cox's evidence, 3225-3233.

CHAP. V. him greater credit for sincerity than he deserved. The attitude of Tyali, no adept at dissimulation, must at least have been a discouragement to the confidence these officers were obviously anxious to place in the chiefs, for though he condescended so far as to offer an assegai, it was clear he would rather have hurled it at the officers. His contempt for the whole proceeding was quite inconsistent with the attitude of one conquered and sincerely seeking or desiring peace. The sending of a flag of truce by the British to the Kaffirs, too, had something of the appearance of acknowledging them as conquerors. An impartial spectator, knowing all the circumstances, could scarcely have been sanguine in looking for good results from this meeting. So great was Colonel Smith's distrust of the apparently submissive deportment of the Kaffirs on the 15th, that viewing "Maqomo as a remorseless and relentless savage," he promptly sent three nine-pounders and 700 of his best men to reinforce Fort Cox. Probably his view was right, for during the nominal cessation of hostilities, there was a marked recrudescence of daring and activity on the part of the Kaffirs in the Albany district.

When the Governor received Maqomo's message and the two assegais, he instructed Majors Warden and Cox to arrange for another meeting with the chiefs. But "these officers," he said, "will be so good as to observe more precautions for their personal security than on that former occasion, when with a recklessness of consequences to themselves, which I admire and praise, but which must not be repeated, they placed themselves at the mercy of the doubtfully-intentioned people". Certain terms were to be offered to them, which, if accepted, peace was to be made then and there, but if rejected, then Major Warden was to declare that hostilities would recommence in twenty-four hours from the time of the conference. The meeting took place on August 24th, on a spot about 600 yards from Fort Cox. This time the chiefs were accompanied by four or five thousand armed warriors. It was clear from the beginning, that whatever disposition to submission there had been at the meeting of the 15th, the attitude of the Kaffirs now was one of presumption, if not of defiance. Conscious of the power of the large number of armed supporters with which they were surrounded, they assumed an air more

of equality than that of a conquered people. In reality, though they had been driven from mountain to mountain, they were not a conquered people. Again unarmed and with the interpreter and a few attendants, the officers went out of the fort to the meeting, and read the following "communication from His Britannic Majesty's Governor of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope to the Chiefs Maqomo and Tyali": "I have received the assegais which you have sent me by Captain Warden, who has also delivered to me your word, whereby I have heard the expression of your penitence and contrition for your late evil conduct towards the King, my master, in unjustly committing hostilities against his Majesty's Colony; your representation of the destitution, hunger, and utter wretchedness, into which the consequences of that conduct have plunged yourselves and your people, your supplication for forgiveness and to be taken under His Majesty's government and protection, and your offer of unconditional submission to my disposal and implicit obedience to my orders. Willing to save your people from the total destruction which must inevitably befall them, if I again attack you, as I am preparing to do, with the increased forces now at my disposal (having received more troops from England and having again called out the Boers, whose sowing season, for which they were sent home, is now finished), I have sent to you, as you know, Captain Warden, to afford you opportunity now, before it is too late, from escaping from the fate otherwise prepared for you, by timely submission; and I rejoice for your sake and that of your people that you have availed yourselves of the occasion thus afforded you. Moved, therefore, by your expression of contrition, by the sufferings of your people, and by your promise of better conduct for the future, I will in some degree relax the severity of the terms which I formerly proposed to you, through Major Cox, in the beginning of the month of May last; and the following are the conditions upon which I will now grant you peace. If you accept them, it is well for you and your people; if not, I will renew the war with forces which you cannot resist, and will carry it on to the last extremity, and not cease until you shall be utterly rooted out of the country. You know well, for it has been long ago clearly explained to you, that the King of England's Colony

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now extends to the River Kei, and you also know that it has been my just intention to drive you all beyond it; but now, for the reasons I have given above, I will yield to your supplication to live under His Majesty's government and protection, and retain you within the Kei. But that this may be, you must immediately, implicitly, and faithfully observe and perform the following conditions:—

“I. You must place under my care and protection Sutu and her son, Sandilli; Captain Warden will receive them accordingly.

“II. You must, one and all, man, woman, and child, quit the country of the Amatola, Chumie, Keiskamma, Tabindoda, Debe, and Buffalo Mountains, and all repair to King William's Town, where you must deliver up to Colonel Smith, my commander there, all your guns and ammunition; not your assegais, however, these I do not demand from you.

“III. You must at the same time also give over to Colonel Smith all the Hottentot subjects of the King of England who may now be among your people.

“IV. This done, at King William's Town you shall be well and kindly treated, and conducted into the country between the Kabousi, the Kei, and the Gonubie, wherein hereafter you shall reside unmolested and protected, as subjects of the King of England, so long as your conduct is good and peaceable.

“V. In that country your settlement shall be arranged and regulated by three Commissioners whom I have appointed for that purpose, and who will take every care of your interests. These are Colonel Smith, my representative and commander in that country. Captain Warden, whom you all know to be your friend, and the Rev. Mr Shepstone, whose fatherly care and solicitude for your welfare you have just experienced.

“VI. You shall return and take with you all your property of every sort; and from that period you will be under my care and protection, subjects of the King of England. For the due fulfilment and performance of all the above on my part, I pledge my word; and I earnestly entreat you, for your own sake and that of your people, instantly to accept these terms, and thus avoid the ruin which must otherwise befall you.

“Given under my Hand and Seal at Grahamstown, this 20th day of August, 1835.”

This communication was read to them and translated into Kaffir sentence by sentence. The Governor's intention was that that was all that should have been done except getting a simply straightforward "yea" or "nay" from the chiefs. But the Kaffirs required a little explanation here and some enlightenment there, which could not well be refused, until the officers, apparently off their guard, allowed the meeting to develop into a conference of some hours. The adroitness with which the Kaffirs argued questions concerning the benefits that were to accrue to them in case of submission, savoured more of bargaining than that of a dejected and contrite enemy pleading for peace and mercy. It is true that Maqomo acknowledged that they were reduced to a low condition and wished to be the children of Government, and that they were willing to fight for the Government; but, taken as a whole, the meeting was most unsatisfactory, and made it clear that the Kaffirs did not regard themselves as a conquered people. They succeeded in persuading the officers to ask the Governor to modify his already modified terms.

While these peace negotiations were in progress, and while, as far as the Colonial forces were concerned, there was a cessation of hostilities, the Kaffirs kept the whole frontier line from the Winterberg to the sea in a state of continual alarm by their depredations. They may have been driven to this at this time by hunger, for the Gaikas certainly, in the course of the military operations, had lost heavily in their cattle. The Ndhambis under Umhala along the coast from the Keiskamma to the Nahoon, on the other hand, were still well off in this respect. Jalousa, one of Kreli's petty chiefs, was raiding in the Winterberg district; then down along the Koonap and Mancazana, isolated farms were attacked and the stock driven off. The Kowie bush was again infested by robbers, and nearer to Grahamstown predatory operations were carried on as briskly as ever, in fact, during the first week of September, excepting the period at the first outbreak, there were more depredations and violence in those parts than in any other week during the war.¹

¹As an indication of the kind of truce observed by the Kaffirs at this time, the following examples will suffice: On August 18th, a party of twenty armed Kaffirs was discovered on the farm on the New Year's River, about twelve miles

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All this did not point to any very hopeful results from the peace negotiations. It was evident that something more than mere threats or promises of reward for good behaviour were called for to intimidate the thieves and protect the frontier colonists. But further drastic measures, as has been stated, were in contemplation. On July 24th, Colonel Smith drew up an elaborate scheme whereby Kaffirland was to be invaded simultaneously at several points by a combination of the 72nd, 75th, and 27th Regiments, the burghers Provisional Corps, Hottentot Levies, Fingoes, and all the people of Pato and Kama, and to make a clean sweep right up to the Kei, driving every Kaffir out of the new Province. For this purpose the burghers were already called out. The 27th Regiment was not at that time in the Colony, though it was nearing the South African shores. It eventually marched into Grahamstown on September 8th, and encamped on the Drostdy ground, "at the foot of the rocky height on which the Selwyn battery had been recently constructed". It should be stated that this regiment had not been sent from England as a reinforcement to assist in the war, but merely to replace the 98th. Sir B. Durban, however, retained both regiments. Colonel Smith's scheme was found to be unworkable on account of the poor-ness of the horses, both in quantity and quality. On September 1st, therefore, he suggested a less extensive, though perhaps equally efficient movement, and all concerned were under orders to be in readiness to move at any moment. Should Maqomo not accept the terms of peace then all would be in motion. If he did; then having detached the Gaikas from their confederacy with the Ndhlabisi, who so far had

from Grahamstown. The Field Cornet Bezuidenhout with seven of the neighbouring farmers attacked them, killing seven and wounding all the remainder. The Governor commended Bezuidenhout for his prompt action and encouraged other farmers thus to combine for mutual protection.

On 29th, another party of twenty succeeded in driving off the greater part of the cattle of a Mr. Stanley, about twelve miles to the south of Grahamstown. On the following day, all the cattle from the farm Collingham, nine miles from Grahamstown, were driven off, and from the Fingo location in the vicinity, 300 head were taken. From Manley's Flats, 400 were stolen, of which seventy-five were recaptured, while Lieutenant Griffith lost 1,000 sheep, and Mr. Bowker, near Bathurst, most of his horses. Two hundred cattle belonging to the Government contractor while being driven from Cradock to the Kat River Settlement were seized and were entirely lost to the contractor. It is estimated that about 2,000 cattle were taken during this period of "truce".

shown no disposition to come to terms, those forces would be called upon to act against that tribe.

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The Governor, on receipt in Grahamstown of the unsatisfactory account of the conference of the 24th, and still anxious to come to terms with Maqomo without resort to hostilities, sent further instructions to Captain Warden. In accordance with these, Colonel Smith, if possible, was to preside at the meeting and read another communication to the chiefs. In it the Governor remarked on the change of attitude of the chiefs which indicated that they had forgotten the mercy he had shown them in stopping the advance of the troops. He noticed that they now asked, not only to be permitted to remain on the west of the Kei, but to be allowed to retain the country in which they were living. As Maqomo, however, had reiterated his desire to become a British subject and to be amenable to British rule, Sir Benjamin expressed himself as not disinclined to meet him in this. As a matter of fact, both he himself and Colonel Smith had come to the conclusion, that even if Maqomo's people were located in the Gonubie or Kabousie countries, they could easily get access to the mountains in which they had been such a nuisance, and, further, by keeping them in their own country and holding Maqomo, as a kind of magistrate, responsible for their good behaviour, it seemed that more control over these people would be gained. Hence the willingness to comply with the chief's request. As all this could be better arranged by a personal interview, the Governor sent an invitation to Maqomo to meet him at Fort Willshire, guaranteeing him every possible kindness and promising that "I will grant him all that he can reasonably ask as a subject of the King of England, and he shall occupy as much of the country in which he desires to remain as is consistent with the security of the Colonial frontier". Sir Benjamin, however, doubted whether Maqomo would consent to meet him, so he authorised Colonel Smith to treat with the old pakati, Ganya, as representative of Maqomo, a trustworthy old fellow who would most probably have no compunction or fear in attending the proposed interview. But it was to be understood that whatever conditions were agreed to and ratified by Ganya should be binding on Maqomo and Tyali. Messages having been sent to all

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concerned, Ganya with ten others, but *not* Maqomo, arrived at Fort Willshire on September 8th, and were met by Colonel Smith and Captain Warden; Sir Benjamin Durban left Grahamstown on this same day for Fort Willshire, but he was not present at the meeting. The interview consisted of Colonel Smith putting a number of questions to the old man and eliciting replies, the substance of which is the following: "I am much in the confidence of Maqomo. I am humbly thankful to you for the mercy which has been shown us, and now I want to talk of nothing but peace. It was contrary to my advice that the people went to war. We have suffered; we asked you for mercy and you gave it to us; we wish to be British subjects and to live under British laws. You say the Governor is good, we therefore pray that our native hills and the grave of Gaika may remain to us; do not drive us out. I am an old man and of few words, but peace and goodwill I desire. There should be one great man over us all. 'English Kaffirs,' 'British Hottentots,' all should be under the same law." He was about to speak on behalf of Umhala when Colonel Smith stopped him and said, "I cannot hear of the Ndhlabhis until Umhala has been to me and, at my feet, asked for mercy". Ganya said that was right, "Maqomo has asked for mercy and he was greater than Umhala". He (Ganya) acknowledged that magistrates and military posts ought to be established in different parts of the country so as to maintain order. "All our people have lost their cattle," he said. "We have nothing, we starve. If we come under British laws, we shall become a civilised people and by industry become rich, we shall know the use of money, clothe ourselves, build houses and villages and learn the use of the plough." With no further attempt to come to terms than this, the meeting ended. Maqomo was probably not far from the fort all the time, waiting to see what fate would befall Ganya. On the evening of the following Friday, September 11th, with Tyali, Xoxo, Eno, Ganya, and a few less notable people, Maqomo ventured to the fort to meet the Governor. The next morning, Sir Benjamin Durban and Colonel Smith, with much pomp and ceremony, and perhaps with some of those theatrical touches which Colonel Smith always considered necessary in formal dealings with the Kaffir chiefs,

received Maqomo and Tyali. The usual matters were again gone into; the Governor dwelling upon the sincere contrition of the chiefs saving their people from being driven over the Kei, his preparedness at any moment, however, to take even that step should their behaviour necessitate it. The articles of a Treaty of Peace were then read and the chiefs given until the next day for their final assent and ratification.

The chief points of these articles were: "(1) . . . these chiefs . . . having supplicated for mercy and peace at the hands of the Governor, and prayed to be admitted and received as subjects of the King of England, and to live henceforth under the protection and authority of the English laws . . . and His Majesty's Governor having granted the said prayer, these Articles of Treaty are hereby mutually agreed on between the aforesaid contracting parties, Maqomo, Tyali, Kusia, Eno, and Fadani (for Botman) . . . promise and engage to bear true allegiance to, and to be faithful subjects of His Majesty, the King of England; to be friends to His Majesty's friends, and enemies to his enemies . . . and to live in submission to the general laws of the Colony. (2) . . . these laws inflict severe punishments, even death itself, upon those who commit the crimes of *Treason* (viz. rebellion, or taking up arms against the King or the Government of the Colony), *Murder, Rape, Setting Houses or Property on Fire, Theft*, whether of horses, cattle, sheep, goats, or other property, such penalties will be equally incurred, if they are committed by any members of the above tribes against each other . . . any offence against the persons or property of the Fingoes will incur the penalties of the laws . . . any proceedings . . . for the pretended offence of witchcraft . . . will be severely punished. At the same time, the English laws do not apply to the domestic and internal regulations of their tribe and families, nor with their customs, in so far as these do not involve a breach of the above cited laws. (3) The chiefs to send out immediately positive orders for the recall of all parties of their respective families and dependents, now employed in predatory inroads upon the Colony, and to prevent all such predatory incursions for the future. (4) The chiefs to deliver up . . . into the hands of Colonel Smith . . . all the Musquets which may be in their possession. (5) . . . the Governor

CHAP. V. upon his part promises to afford all due protection and support for the maintenance of their rights, their property, their security, and welfare, equally with other subjects of His Majesty. (6) Had reference to the lands the Gaikas were to occupy. (7) Chiefs shall, in token of fealty to the King of England, and of acknowledgment of holding his lands under His Majesty's sovereignty, cause to be delivered to such officer as the Governor shall appoint, *one fat ox* in the course of the first month of every year. (8) Ministers of the Gospel, Schoolmasters, and, where necessary, English Magistrates or Residents will be duly appointed within the above locations . . . they and the heads of families shall act as Magistrates of the Colony, each in his location. (9) Chiefs and Representatives shall communicate to the Colonial authorities any overture of any person tending to the prejudice or danger of the country. (10) Chiefs shall prevent, by every means in their power, inroads into the Colony of robbers to steal cattle or other property . . . in the case of any cattle or property so stolen being brought into their respective locations, they shall secure and deliver it to the nearest Colonial authorities; well understood, that the Governor will justly hold that chief responsible for restoring Colonial cattle or other property, into whose location it shall have been traced. (11) Colonel Smith, Lieut.-Colonel England, Rev. W. Chalmers, and Captain Stretch to form a Commission for the location, establishment, and regulation of the aforesaid chiefs. (12) An agent to be appointed to reside among the locations, who shall be the intermediary between the chiefs and the Governor. (13) For the present none of these 'new subjects' to be allowed to cross the Chumie or Keiskamma below its confluence with the former without a pass, and then unarmed; a departure from this condition will expose the individuals infringing it to be shot. . . .

"Given under my Hand and Seal at Fort Willshire, this 17th day of September, 1835. Signed B. Durban, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope."

This Treaty should have been ratified on the 13th, but unfortunately, good Sir Benjamin's belief in the sincerity of the Kaffirs received something of a shock when, on this day, he

received from Lieutenant Moultrie, at Fort Peddie, a report that a party of about sixty of Tyali's people attempted to drive off a large number of cattle belonging to the friendly chief, Jan Tzatzoe. According to this report, Piet Uys with twenty-two burghers were sent to attack them. The Kaffirs finding they were discovered retreated towards the Keiskamma, but the burghers, now joined by Tzatzoe's people, followed them into a kloof near Line Drift. Uys sent a messenger to them to tell them that if they gave up their assegais no harm would befall them; their only answer, however, was the murder of the messenger. A fierce fight then took place during which eighteen Kaffirs were killed and all the cattle captured.

On receipt of this report Sir Benjamin Durban sent the following note to Colonel Smith:—

“ FORT WILLSHIRE,
“ *Sunday morning.*

“ MY DEAR SMITH,

“ Be so good, this forenoon, to call together Maqomo, Tyali, and Ganya, read to them the marked passages, and say to them from me, ‘That their treacherous proceedings render them unworthy to treat with me; that they have never ceased to break the boundary imposed by the truce granted them, and that if they do not in three days cause all these parties to be recalled out of the Colony, I will not detain them, they shall freely return to their tribes—but I will instantly attack the Amatola and its dependencies with my whole force, and never cease till I have swept them over the Kye or destroyed them.’

“(Signed) B. DURBAN.

“ *September 13th, 1835.*”

Whatever contrition for their outrages, or desire for peace, the *chiefs* may have felt—and it is at least doubtful whether their sincerity in these respects was as real as Sir Benjamin Durban was anxious to believe—it is very clear that these sentiments were not shared by their followers, as their actions at this very time demonstrated. At the end of the three days, that is on the morning of the 17th, the chiefs returned to Fort Willshire. The Governor satisfied with what they had done, then ratified the Treaty of Peace. Thus ended—on paper—the 1835 war.

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How well this "peace" augured for the frontier inhabitants may be judged from the outrages which were committed on the very day it was signed. In the evening, a party of about forty Kaffirs poured down the woody heights of Grobbelaar's Kloof, about ten miles from Grahamstown, and in spite of seven armed herdsmen, drove off 200 cattle belonging to some English settlers who had assembled there for mutual protection. The robbers were followed, but night coming on the pursuit was then abandoned. It was resumed the next day, and at night, when the men were at some distance, the same or other Kaffirs renewed the attack, seizing the remainder and killing two Fingo herds. Some of the cattle were afterwards regained. This same night the contractor for the post between Grahamstown and Somerset East had his kraal broken into and all his horses stolen. The next day, a man named Tobias Tharrat was murdered, shot in the back while passing the tenth milestone on the road leading from Grahamstown to Fort Brown. In this week also the Theopolis Mission Station and the Kat River Settlement were attacked. Thus commenced a period of "peace" which was not much better than a state of actual warfare.

CHAPTER VI.

THE AFTERMATH.

THE frontier colonists, both British and Dutch, viewed with apprehension the concomitant conditions of peace. After the nine months of warfare with all its losses and anxieties they saw the Kaffirs permitted to retain their hold upon the fastnesses of the Amatola Mountains and to be settled down in the parts of the country from which they had committed their ravages upon the Colony. With great disappointment, not unmixed with anger, they realised that the greater part of the cattle which had been stolen from them was still in Kaffirland, and of that which had been captured, barely one-fifth had been available for distribution among them. It had been most galling, on recognising their own particular beasts among the stolen cattle, to be refused permission to take them, but to see them driven to the Government kraals and slaughtered for the use of the troops. And, for a time at least, unaware of or misunderstanding the policy which Colonel Smith was pursuing in King William's Town, they regarded with disapproval, if not with disgust, the kind attentions which were being paid to Maqomo, Tyali, and other Kaffir chiefs. Further, when the despoiled inhabitants remembered that the Kaffirs had "supplicated for mercy" by assembling armed in thousands—many having guns of the murdered farmers—and assuming an attitude little short of defiance, and also that during the time of the negotiations depredations vastly increased, they could only regard the Treaty of Peace with distrust and look to the future with no great hopefulness or confidence. The sudden invasion found the British settler quite unprepared and defenceless, and left him driven from his home, deprived of his resources, and in many cases without the means of subsistence, so much so, that destitution was but a mild term to express the misery of many. The Dutch, with their life-long

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CHAP. VI. experience in struggles with the natives, were scarcely more fortunate. "The Boers, poor fellows," said Sir Benjamin Durban, in writing to Colonel Smith on June 3rd, 1836, "I cannot but regard them with strong feelings of sympathy, they have had hard measure."

The loss sustained by the inhabitants, through no fault of their own, was 456 houses and 58 waggons—burnt or otherwise destroyed—5,715 horses, 114,930 cattle, and 161,930 sheep and goats driven off, besides the destruction of household furniture, all estimated at a total value of £300,401 10s.;¹ an enormous sum when it is considered that the community as a whole was a poor one. All, however, had confidence that their sufferings would be recognised by the Home Government and that some compensation would be accorded.

When the excitement and worry of actual warfare were ended and the losses were fully realised, attempts were made to repair these broken fortunes. The charred remains of homes were made as habitable as possible and lands were ploughed and sown. In the course of three or four months these industrious people were rewarded with crops which found a ready market. Those who lived nearer to the Fish and Koonap Rivers, that is nearer to Kaffirland, and were in a position to recommence farming operations, reoccupied their places with less alacrity, for they felt that such a state of security and freedom from robbery as should justify them in attempting to accumulate stock of any kind, was not yet attained. Many could not recommence life at all in consequence of having lost everything. To afford assistance in such cases, a Board of Relief did all in its power, but its funds were inadequate to meet all the legitimate calls upon it. Some, especially Boers in the north-eastern parts of the Colony, did not seem to be aware of this source of help. It was a complaint among them that they were far removed from a magistracy and that Proclamations and Government notices seldom reached them. They may, therefore, have been ignorant of the notice which Mr. Hudson, the Commissioner of Relief, issued on October 21st, 1835, stating that "such burghers who have not yet applied to the Commissioner, Mr. Hudson, for temporary relief

¹ *Vide Return of Caffre War*, p. 337.

in their distress from depredations, are required to do so without delay". It is equally probable, however, that they did know of this, but preferred rather to abandon their places and quit the Colony altogether—as many were doing at this time. Whatever scheme or policy for the protection of the frontier farmers was in contemplation, a condition of *bellum in pace* along the border was for a time inevitable. The Kaffirs were in reality not subdued; and the power of the chiefs then, as at all times, was less capable of recalling and restraining their people from rapine than it was of exciting and sending them forth—the latter accorded with the inclination of the savage, while the former thwarted it. Depredations, therefore, continued, but far less frequently, though sufficiently so to keep all in a state of constant alarm and to give rise to all kinds of groundless rumours. Although, as will be seen, the thousands of the immediate followers of the great chiefs, such as Maqomo, Tyali, and Umhala were in the country allotted to them and under strict surveillance, yet very large numbers of natives were wandering about the Colony without passes or any visible means of subsistence, and by their presence were keeping up the unrest which so widely prevailed. Among the most troublesome of these were those who, by the benevolence of Sir B. Durban, had been rescued from bondage and given a haven of rest and security nearer to the Colonial boundary, namely, the Fingoes. They were a most restless people. As servants in the employ either of the farmers or the townspeople, they proved, for the most part, failures. They were found wandering everywhere, even so far up the country as the Orange River. In their defence, however, it may be said that they stood in continual fear of the Kaffirs; and the fact of their being located so near to them, it might even be said, among them, undoubtedly accounted for their desire to leave the sites which had been allotted to them. But besides the Fingoes, there were Kaffirs who seem to have disowned their chiefs and broken away from their tribes, and who were living entirely in the Colony. Further, in the north-eastern parts there were large numbers of Mantatees, Bechuanas, and others from the more distant north. All these vagrants were living upon what they could steal from the Colonial farmer. With a view to putting a stop to this, the Governor, on October

CHAP. VI. 14th, 1835, issued instructions to the various Civil Commissioners to arrest all natives found wandering without passes or visible means of subsistence. This was undertaken by Colonel Somerset and those acting under him, as far as the difficulties of the country would permit. All were treated with the greatest kindness and leniency. The Fingoes were provided with food and escorted back to their locations, or indentured to the inhabitants according to law; the Kaffirs were conducted over their own boundaries, while the northern natives were either sent back over the Orange River, or indentured as servants—whichever they chose. But all this was of little use, for, since the country was so vast and so thinly populated, the small force available for police work of this nature could produce no permanent result, and the vagrancy continued as rife as ever. The continual loss of stock due to this was one of the contributing causes of the Dutch farmers abandoning the Colony at this time. A Mr. Hartly, writing from the Tarka on July 1st, 1836, in connection with this immigration, said that the Tambookies and Kaffirs were then in great numbers upon the branches of the Zwart Kei and Smit's Rivers and stealing cattle with impunity; "one Kaffir was seen driving off six oxen without fear, which is an everyday occurrence and must continue as long as they are permitted to roam about without passes".

Among the different measures for protection of the Colony which Sir B. Durban had in contemplation at the close of the war, there was one, the announcement of which gave the greatest dissatisfaction to the Dutch community; one towards the effecting of which, though they did not show their disapproval openly, they placed every obstacle in their power. On September 28th, 1835, the Governor authorised the Civil Commissioners to instruct the Field Cornets to produce lists of all men in their respective districts, who were between the ages of sixteen and fifty-five, together with details respecting their possession of guns and horses—for the purpose of forming a local militia. "The Colony of the Cape of Good Hope," he said, "is the only one of His Majesty's dominions without a local militia force for the mutual defence and protection of the inhabitants as well as against insurrection within the country as invasion from without." His idea must have been

to have had some better organisation of the burgher force, for he could not have been ignorant of the commando system, which had been in existence ever since there had been Boers in the country, or of the fact that they had always responded to the call to arms in defence of the frontier. The Boers saw in this the life of a soldier with service under regular military officers, and perhaps with long compulsory periods of absence from their homes for the purpose of drill and training. They opposed it from the beginning and looked upon it as one of the grievances they were called upon to suffer under British rule. Time went on during which the Field Cornets offered all sorts of excuses for the non-appearance of lists, which, in reality, they were refusing to obtain. Some pleaded ill-health, others the difficulty of getting the ages of individuals; one Dreyer, in the Winterberg district, declared that he would rather quit the Colony than be instrumental in forwarding a measure so generally obnoxious to the inhabitants. Pieter Retief, in recounting the grievances of the Dutch, in his letter of April 11th, 1836, said: "The inhabitants also desire to be allowed to call your attention to the circumstances of the great alarm and anxiety which have been created in consequence of the proposed enrolment of a militia. They know nothing of the nature of such an establishment or the duties to be performed, and they do not perceive the necessity for such an enrolment, when they reflect that hitherto they have never been backward in rendering their country all the assistance which has been required of them. . . . They would also with all submission offer their opinion that a system so approximate to a military life is unnecessary and uncalled for."

Civil Commissioner Meintjes of Beaufort (West), perhaps mindful of the difficulty there had been in getting together the burghers in those parts in 1833, when their services were required in connection with the Hantam murders, took a somewhat different view. As the 99th Ordinance "for explaining and amending the laws relating to commandos" had been disallowed by the British Government,¹ Meintjes thought that some organisation as that proposed was necessary. As, however, the Boers were not only expert in riding and shooting, but also in the guerilla warfare characteristic of the country,

¹ *Vide* vol. ii. of this work, p. 448.

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he agreed that it was useless to call upon them "to perform military evolutions or to act in bodies with military precision". His return seems to have been the only one sent in. For reasons yet to be given, nothing came of all this. But all the same, the Dutch inhabitants entirely misunderstanding the Governor's motives, looked upon this as an attempted act of unjustifiable coercion. The suspicion and opposition to this measure might perhaps have been less pronounced had there not, at this time, been other circumstances which were disquieting their minds.¹

Among the rumours, some true, some false, which prevailed, there were some to the effect that, in England, they were being blamed for all the misfortunes which had fallen upon them. Mr. Jarvis, the Assistant Commissioner for Relief, who made a tour through the country for the purpose

¹ The following extract of a letter from Mr. J. Collett, a well-educated English farmer at the Koonap, may be of interest in connection with this. It is written to Sir Benjamin Durban and is dated December 15th, 1835. "The farmers appear very dissatisfied and averse to the proposed measure of enrolling them as a militia; they also greatly complain at being kept so short of gun-powder, particularly at the present time, it being very generally believed among them that the Kaffirs are on the eve of making another attack on the Colony; they also appear very apprehensive that the Hottentots are preparing to join them, and some farmers have actually abandoned their farms under that impression and are leaving this part of the Colony; nearly the whole of the farms in the vicinity of the Beaufort road are again forsaken, considerable flocks having passed here within the last few days. I have, however, prevailed with my immediate neighbours to remain, having promised them any assistance I can give them with my little party, should they stand in need of it, so that I expect in a few days the farms near me will be the only occupied farms on the front line. They further complain of the Kaffirs being allowed to hold possession of their choice horses and cattle, great numbers of which they say they have lately seen in their possession; they feel aggrieved at the leniency of the British Government towards the native tribes, at the inefficiency of the present law to protect or recover lost property, at not being allowed to chastise a bad and insolent servant, but being compelled to ride a great distance to a magistrate's court to complain, at not being enabled to obtain payment for supplies to the burgher force, as also adequate payments for horses sold to Colonel Smith, at the emancipation of their slaves, at not being enabled to secure their title deeds to their farms, at the incompetency of their Field Cornets to correspond with the authorities or discharge the various important duties that devolve upon them, insisting it is impossible their wants and necessities can be fairly or respectfully shown to the Government through such unqualified channels . . . they very generally complain at the great delay and apparent backwardness of the Government in compensating them for their losses by the Kaffirs (note by author, at this time England barely knew of what had happened), being many of them left in such destitute and distressing circumstances as to almost drive them to despair or desperation."

of getting information respecting the distress of the inhabitants, said in his report,¹ that there was "a spirit among the Dutch inhabitants that an inquiry should be made into the causes of the late war, it having been got into circulation among them, that it had been reported in England that the late war had been caused by the conduct of the inhabitants themselves; and I have heard it remarked with much bitterness of feeling, that these unwarrantable assumptions and accusations form a heavy and undeserved addition to the miseries of murdered friends, empty kraals, and blackened houses, the melancholy traces of an unprovoked war upon a peaceable and a defenceless people".

Judging Sir Benjamin's attitude towards the Boers from his letters and despatches, it is very clear that he had the greatest sympathy for them—no less than for the British-born. And it is probable that he was unaware of the offence he had given until a later date. In the same spirit in which he proposed the formation of a militia, he (Oct. 19th, 1835) suggested methods of rendering isolated homesteads more impregnable and more easily defensible. Plans and sketches of loop-holed towers and walls and of other simple structures were made and distributed among the farmers. But nothing much in this or any other direction was done, as the greatest uncertainty prevailed as to the attitude the Home Government would take towards the Governor's measures; in fact, at this early date, rumours were not wanting that all would meet with disapproval—a misgiving in which Sir Benjamin himself shared.

Towards the end of the year (Nov., 1835) all the missionaries, with the exception of James Read, were permitted to return to their respective stations.² But they were to hold their lands under different conditions from those which

¹ *Vide* Blue Book, *Return of Caffre War*, July 12th, 1837, p. 340.

² Namely, Mr. Chalmers to the Chumie, Mr. Laing to Burns Hill, Mr. Ross to the Pirie, Mr. Bennie to the old Lovedale, which shortly afterwards was abandoned and refounded on a new site (see p. 198), Mr. Kayser to Qadushe or Knapps Hope, on the Keiskamma, Mr. Brownlee to his old station with Tzatzoe's people at King William's Town, Mr. Shepstone to Wesleyville, Mr. Boyce to Mount Coke, and Mr. Ayliff to Peddie. With reference to Mr. Read of the Kat River Settlement, the official communication states, "that from the knowledge acquired by His Excellency during his recent visit to the settlement as well as by the collateral sources of information, he does not think it expedient that the Rev. Read should return thither" (Nov. 11th, 1835).

CHAP. VI. obtained before the war. Then, they occupied their stations by permission of the chiefs; but now that the country had been conquered and annexed to His Majesty's dominions, the chiefs themselves occupied the country only by permission of the King. The missionaries, therefore, had to apply for what were now portions of Crown lands on behalf of their missions, and to have them granted on title-deeds in the usual manner. Although the negotiations were commenced, the change in Colonial policy which soon took place rendered their completion superfluous.

It will be well now to see what was taking place in Kaffirland during the few months immediately succeeding the close of the war. The Governor having arranged everything along the old border line from the Keiskamma mouth to the Winterberg, he left Colonel Smith at the embryo city of King William's Town for the purpose of trying an entirely new experiment in frontier policy. This was no less than that of endeavouring, gradually, to bring the Kaffirs under the influence of British laws, and to attach them to the Colony by having a common interest and feeling with British subjects, thus, eventually, rendering the border secure by having a barrier of civilisation in its immediate contiguity. It was hoped to break down, or modify, both the power of the chiefs and the spirit of clanship among their people, and to replace these by the operation of the Colonial law; to introduce habits of civilisation and industry by humane coercion and example, and, with the concomitant blessings of religion and morality, to convert a savage and vexatious enemy into peaceable and useful subjects. It was a heavy task, but Colonel Smith was exactly the man to undertake it, and, as will be seen, there was only wanting the support, which the British Government refused, and a sufficient time for its development to make it a success.

The position to commence with was that the erstwhile hostile Kaffirs were still in the same parts of the country as they were before the war. The Governor realised that even if, by incurring the necessary additional loss of life and expenditure, he had succeeded in expelling them entirely from that country, no permanent good would have been attained, for it would have been impossible to prevent them from

regaining access to the mountains and forest, whence, with a spirit of revenge, they would have been a greater scourge than ever. His policy, therefore, was to destroy his enemies by making them his friends.

Colonel Smith's first procedure in assuming the office of what was practically the Military Governorship of Kaffirland was to locate the tribes in such parts of the country as would enable them to be controlled and governed from King William's Town. To carry out this, officers and others who were personally known to the chiefs and people were appointed to assist in selecting suitable positions and marking boundaries. Although some little time must have been necessary to select the proper men—the appointments being made on October 7th—Colonel Smith, so soon as September 22nd, five days after the signing of the Treaty of Peace, was chafing at what seemed to him undue delay; he therefore commenced forthwith to take the whole matter into his own hands. On the 25th he summoned together the Gaika chiefs and their councillors at Fort Cox and then in a manner which in anyone else might be considered bluster, he announced himself as their "Inkosinkulu," or great chief, and re-read to them the articles of Peace. Perhaps further to demonstrate his power and authority, he "acted a storming passion" towards Maqomo on account of the depredations which were taking place in the Colony. Holding the treaty in his hands, as if prepared to tear it to pieces, he demanded in stentorian tones of the frightened chief whether he wanted a continuation of war. Maqomo, with the military array around him, could only answer that he desired peace. These theatrical affectations were a very characteristic feature of all Colonel Smith's dealings with the natives; they seem always to have had the desired effect, however.

A few hours after the meeting, Colonel Smith and Captain Stretch were riding with Maqomo over the territory which was to be apportioned to the Gaikas. It was the country between the Keiskamma and Chumie Rivers, extending down as far as the junction of those rivers. The horsemen then made their way more to the east and arrived at the top of the Incanda hills, two prominent heights between the present site of Middle Drift and Debe Nek. There Maqomo, probably

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realising that Smith's bark was worse than his bite, summoned up sufficient courage to ask to be allowed to have, in addition, the lands on the east of the Keiskamma which were between that river and the Debe River. Throughout his management of these people, Colonel Smith seems always to have been disposed to grant Maqomo every indulgence. He had the chief, as it were, at the end of a long rope and felt he could afford to allow him to go certain lengths, but he (Smith) held the other end of the rope and could at any time curtail the chief's liberties. So now, although it was contrary to what was intended, Maqomo was given permission to have land on the wrong side of the Keiskamma. Sir B. Durban disapproved of this as a dangerous precedent, but nevertheless allowed it to stand. Shortly after, Colonel Smith went even further by permitting Maqomo to graze his cattle on the right side of the Keiskamma, below its junction with the Chumie. The Governor insisted on this permission being withdrawn.¹ On October 7th, the special Commissioners² for the location of

CAPE TOWN,

February 12th, 1836.

¹ MY DEAR SMITH—I cannot refuse my belief to the authenticity of the enclosed document, upon which I will only here observe that this permission in my opinion is pregnant with infinite mischief, and that I beg you as smoothly as you possibly can, unless you have compromised yourself so deeply that you cannot retract (which God forbid), get out of this most perplexing position, and, if you can't do it in any other way, state to Maqomo that I disapprove it and will not suffer it.

Ever yours faithfully,
B. D'URBAN.

P.S.—The more I reflect upon this, the more I see cause for regret that this door has been opened. Nothing but ill consequences can result. It is the white squall cloud, not larger than the hand in itself, but the unerring precursor of disension and confusion.

Enclosure.

KING WILLIAM'S TOWN,

January 28th, 1836.

The Chief Magistrate, Maqomo, may allow his own private cattle to graze on the right bank of the Keiskamma, until it may be located by settlers and during the heat of summer.

H. G. SMITH, *Colonel.*
True copy, C. L. STRETCH,
Commissioner.

Seal of the Honourable Colonel Smith, C.B.
To all whom it may concern.

² They were—For the tribe of Gaika and its dependents: the Honourable Colonel Smith, Lieut.-Colonel England, Rev. W. Chalmers, Captain Stretch, Mr. Weir, and Lieutenant Melville.

For the tribes of Ndhlabi and dependents: Honourable Colonel Smith,

the tribes were appointed, and by the end of the month they had completed their duties. With the exception of Sutu and her son, Sandilli, who were given lands near the Burns Hill Mission station, the Gaikas were placed in the country already mentioned. The Amagqunukwebi, namely, the people of Pato, Kama, and Cobus, were allotted a strip of country some nine or ten miles wide, extending along the coast from the Fish River to the Buffalo River. The Ndhlabhis, under Umhala, Seyolo, and Gazela, were located in a tract of country between the Nahoon and the Kei Rivers, bounded on the south by the sea and on the north by a line running a mile south of the high road from King William's Town to the old drift across the Kei, near Fort Warden; while the country contiguous to that and between the Nahoon and the Buffalo was reserved for European settlers. As has been pointed out the Fingoes were placed partly at Peddie and partly in the Gaika country at Fort Thomson. With each of the tribes a Government agent was stationed. His duty, generally, was with tact and sympathy to act as the friendly adviser of all, more particularly to guide and control the chief in the government of his people, to prevent the sale of ammunition and intoxicating liquors, and in bad cases of crime to take the preliminary examination. For the Gaikas, Captain Stretch was appointed and was stationed at Fort Cox; for the Ndhlabhis, Mr. Fleetwood Rawstone, at Fort Waterloo. For the followers of Tzatzoe, Umkye, and Siwani, Mr. R. Southey was stationed at Fort Murray, and with the Gunukwebis, Mr. J. M. Bowker had been placed at Peddie in the previous July.

Matters being thus far arranged, it was possible to obtain some information as to the magnitude of the community which was to be dealt with under this new jurisdiction. A census of the population was therefore taken and completed within about a month. The numbers can only be regarded as rough approximations. In all there were 90,500 individuals


Lieut.-Colonel Peddie, Rev. W. Boyce, Captain Rawstone, Captain Lacy, Messrs. R. Southey and J. Kidd. For the Amagqunukwebi and followers of Nonibe, Umgwali, etc., Rev. W. Shepstone, W. Currie, sen., W. Bowker, and Captain Forbes.

Colonel Smith was appointed Chief Commissioner, and his colleagues were directed on all occasions, when he was not present, to report proceedings to him and receive his concurrence before any measure was finally carried into effect.

CHAP. —men, women, and children. Of this number the Gaikas
VI. constituted 54,300, the Ndhambis 9,200, the Gunukwebis 7,500, the Tindis (people of Tzatzoe) 1,000, while the Fingoes numbered no less than 18,500.

A great difficulty encountered in this first settlement of Kaffirland was that of the location of the tribes in the parts of the country which were assigned to them. Many natives were either loath to leave the positions they had chosen for themselves, or built their huts on lands belonging to other tribes, or on sites reserved for military occupations, or for the formation of towns. And in spite of the constant patrols, they crept back again into places from which they had been dislodged. All this necessitated the continual burning of huts. Within the three weeks ending with November 10th, 1835, no fewer than 2,700, in different parts of the country, were destroyed by Colonel Smith's orders. In all cases the people seem to have been given due notice of what would happen if they refused to move or formed their homes on lands which did not belong to them. As the building of a hut was a fairly simple matter and could be done in one or two days, the destruction of one was not a very great affliction.

The form of government under which all these people now came was unique. It was a combination of martial law with "Smith" law. Force of arms had enabled Colonel Smith to become their "Inkosinkulu," very great chief—or chief of all chiefs. The first principle on which he acted was that of unquestioning and immediate obedience to his word, a principle he was able to call into practice by the aid of the soldiery at his command. But as the wisdom in the formation of any code of laws consists in their adaptation to the state of society in which they are to operate, and as any rapid transition from one system to an entirely different one would only defeat the object in view, he aimed at the gradual change from the existing degraded state of justice, caprice, and tyranny to the submission to and the adoption of a more enlightened jurisdiction. The first necessary step to this end was that of curtailing the power of the chief and of undermining that of the witch doctor, thus putting an end to the cruelties and robberies among the natives themselves which were the results of the practice of witchcraft and chiefcraft. The status of the chiefs was not



KING WILLIAM'S TOWN IN COL. SMITH'S TIME

lowered, although his power and authority were called upon to act in a different direction. The chiefs Maqomo, Tyali, and Umhala were made "magistrates," but not magistrates in the ordinary sense of the word. Although they were to be held responsible for the good behaviour of their people and—nominally at all events—to assist in bringing the evil-doer to book, the idea was more to keep them themselves out of mischief and to have a reason for being in continual touch with them. These chiefs were never inordinately enthusiastic over this honour, though probably the ceremony of their investiture lived long in their memories. It took place on November 17th. For reasons yet to be given, two delegates from Kreli and three from Buku had arrived at King William's Town. What could have been more fortunate or fitting than that the installation of the chiefs should take place in the presence of these messengers, and thus ensure the spread of the news all over Kreli's country? The ceremony took place in a large room, probably one in the Rev. Mr. Brownlee's house,¹ which had been repaired and was being used by Colonel and Mrs. Smith. At one end of the room a throne was erected, and near this were places reserved for the "Court". At nine o'clock in the morning a big gun was fired; this was a signal for the assembly of the chiefs with their amapakati and other elders among the people. Hundreds of natives seem to have gone to King William's Town to see what was to take place and "to hear the news". A second gun was fired when the band struck up with "God save the King," and the "Inko-sinkulu" with his suite in full regimentals moved with stately dignity to the places allotted to them. Colonel Smith ascended the throne. He commenced the proceedings with a long prayer, at the close of which the band played "Glory to Thee, O God". Maqomo, Umhala, and Ganya (Gaika's old councillor, who was acting as proxy for Tyali), who had been dressed in showy semi-military costume, then approached the throne and knelt down before it. Large medals or seals of office² were hung about their necks, and they took the Oath of Allegiance to the King. Colonel Smith then drawing his sword,

¹ Now the Residency in King William's Town.

² A jeweller in Grahamstown was paid £12 for two silver chains with seals and medals for Kaffir chiefs, May 27th, 1836.

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proceeded to give his "word". He inculcated honesty and religion and all kinds of high morals; he demanded the instant cessation of stealing and the respect due to the new boundaries. The chiefs were given permission to keep any cattle caught grazing on the wrong sides of these boundaries, and were empowered to drive back the people—thus saving him the necessity of burning their huts. The band again struck up "God save the King," and the impressive proceedings came to an end. Sir Benjamin Durban, perhaps misunderstanding Colonel Smith's motives, disapproved of what, to him, seemed a too hasty action towards these chiefs. "I apprehend," he said, in writing on November 22nd, "that you have gone a little too far about the appointment of the Gaika chiefs as magistrates. The Treaty is not signed and executed, as required by the 11th article, and until that be done the appointment of these gentlemen to be magistrates under the British Government is therefore obviously premature. Further, the English Resident Agent and Magistrate is not yet appointed . . . the chiefs have been made Colonial magistrates before they had become competent to be so by the ultimate and final ratification of the Treaty." In reply, Colonel Smith said (Nov. 30th): "Your Excellency must not view my appointments of magistrates in their literal sense, but in a collateral one. It is a great object to get rid of the clanship and chieftainship as fast as possible. Among themselves they thus do not lose their authority; I gain absolute power over them. I can now send for an individual or numbers from any part of the country; he dare as well hang himself as not come. The people of all tribes look up to me as the Great Chief under Your Excellency, so pray, Your Excellency, let me go on *play-acting* and have my great meeting as soon as possible. Rely on it, the importance of it is indescribable." Very shortly afterwards, the formalities referred to by the Governor were completed, and Mr. Houghan Hudson was appointed chief magistrate with his residence in Grahamstown. Maqomo and his associate chiefs then became legal magistrates. But a black man, any more than a white one, could not be expected to perform the duties of a civil servant *con amore*. In the case of these Kaffirs, it actually entailed a loss of revenue, for, by virtue of their office, they were called upon to suppress the

custom which so enriched them in cattle, namely, the "eating up" system in connection with witchcraft. Colonel Smith at first proposed a *pro rata* tax in cattle. Maqomo objected, however. He would not take his people's cattle, he said; if he wanted a beast at any time there were plenty of people who would give it to him. Payment in money was then recommended. To this the chiefs agreed; but nothing came of it, as before long everything was *in statu quo ante bellum*. The "*umhlahlo*" or "smelling out" for witchcraft with its "eating up" and attendant horrors, which was to be stopped entirely under the new régime, was a means whereby a wealthy individual could be deprived of all his cattle and goods and himself submitted to the most frightful tortures, the spoil being shared by the chief and those instrumental with him. The procedure was simple. Some misfortune, such as sickness among the people or cattle, or perhaps even drought or failure of crops, formed a convenient ground for accusation of being in possession of bewitching matter (*ubuti*) or of having exercised some magical and malign influence. Although only the chief could order the "*umhlahlo*," it was quite competent for any one to bring before him the suspicion which was desired to be attached to any individual. In many cases the discovery of the "guilty" party was left to the discretion of the witch doctor, who knew quite well whose downfall would give the greatest satisfaction, the innocent victim being all the time ignorant of what was in store for him. The charge having been laid and the chief's permission or order obtained, the people met in large numbers at the kraal of the witch doctor where the ceremony was to take place. They formed themselves into a large hollow circle, leaving an entrance for the dreaded doctor-priest, who at this time would be "robing himself" in an adjacent hut. The music then commenced. This consisted of a rhythmic beating of ox-hides with long sticks by the women and of the shafts of the assegais being struck together by the men, the whole accompanied by a peculiar humming or droning on the part of all. After a time, the hideous witch doctor, clad in all his finery of baboon skins and extraordinary trinkets and charms, rushed into the circle and commenced his *umxentsa*—a frantic and exhausting dance. The excitement of all increased, and when the "doctor" had

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worked himself up to the proper degree of frenzy, he rushed at an individual in the crowd—it might be more than one—and by literally smelling him announced his discovery of the *ubuti*. All instantly fell back from the unfortunate victim as from a leprous person, and left him standing alone. He was then seized and, having been stripped of his kaross and ornaments, was led away to be tortured. Orthodox methods of punishment were binding the arms and legs of the wretched victim and placing him, naked, near a nest of black ants; these savage little creatures swarmed over him, and by their biting during hours, it might even be days, caused the most acute agony. Or, another common form of torture was to heat large flat stones and place and replace these on the body until the helpless creature was almost roasted alive. It was extraordinary what endurance and tenacity of life the natives showed under these circumstances. Even after these sufferings they often survived and met with the strangulation which awaited them. In some cases, by making some sort of confession and acknowledging that witchcraft had been practised, an individual could save his life, and further, by certain sacrificial acts which the priest performed—for a consideration—he could be rehabilitated and recommence business. While all this was going on, his cattle were being seized and divided among those concerned, the greatest number going to the chief. Hence the necessity of giving these magistrate chiefs some pecuniary compensation for the loss they sustained in the prohibition of this custom.

According to Colonel Smith's code, "eating up" was regarded as theft and punished as such; but he himself used the system, without the torture, of course, as his chief means of punishment for all offences. As soon as he heard of any misdemeanour or a non-compliance with his dictates, a party of soldiers was instantly despatched to the offending kraal, whether of quondam chief or commoner, and all the cattle except the milch cows were driven off. In some cases, when reparation or promise of better conduct in the future had been made, all were returned, or some may have been retained as fine or recompense. After a short time, Colonel Smith had all the people so completely under his thumb that there was no need to send a party of soldiers to fetch a reluctant

subject. He had made a number of sticks. Each had a brass knob at one end and a point at the other. When it was desired to summon an individual to the presence, from no matter what part of the country it might be, a messenger took one of these sticks and just stuck it in the thatch or some other part of the hut; the offender had then immediately to take it back to Colonel Smith. "He would as soon hang himself as refuse," so the Colonel tells us. All this, at first, worked well. Maqomo was loyal and did his duty. He even enforced the law against his brother Anta—a chief of almost equal rank to himself. On hearing that Anta had "smelt out" a woman for witchcraft, Maqomo, spontaneously, went to Anta and said, "You know the English law, you are no child". He then recommended the Commissioner to fine Anta ten bullocks which were to be given to the injured woman. This was done. "Thus you see, General," said Colonel Smith in writing to the Governor, "my play-acting will lay the foundation of permanent regulations." But witchcraft was too deeply ingrained in Kaffir sentiment to be eradicated as easily as this action of Maqomo might indicate. In fact, as will be seen, Maqomo, although his action in the above case may have been sincere, was himself only following the example of his "Inkosinkulu" and also was "play-acting".

The Ndhlabi chief, Umhala, was always of doubtful loyalty. The Amandhlambi still remembered Makanda (Makanna), and still believed that that great wizard had been decoyed and entrapped by Stockenstrom. They therefore looked with the utmost suspicion on the knob-stick and other matters in connection with the new government, and obeyed only so far as compelled by soldiery. "In Umhala's tribe, I heard of an awful case of his 'eating up' a man for witchcraft," says Colonel Smith in his autobiography, "and afterwards cruelly burning him with red-hot stones. The poor wretch, so soon as he could move, came to me and showed me the cicatrized wounds all over his body—how he had lived was a wonder. I kept him closely concealed. I sent for Umhala and his English magistrate and council to come to me immediately. This Umhala was a man of superior intellect, and the only one who could judge cause and effect, and future results. He never quailed in the slightest, as all others did,

CHAP. VI. under my violent animadversions. He gave me more trouble to render obedient than all the other chiefs. Still, he respected me, and I him; and he afterwards showed more real and permanent affection for me than the others.

“Upon his arrival, he did all in his power to find out what I wanted him for, and he apprehended the real cause. So soon as he and all his people were assembled in my courthouse, I went in *with my wand behind*, borne by my great councillor Ganya. Umhala then saw something was coming. I came to the point at once, as was my custom. ‘Umhala, did I not give the word—no more witchcraft?’ He boldly answered ‘You did’. ‘Then how dare you, Umhala, one of my magistrates, sworn to be obedient to my law, infringe the word?’ He stoutly denied it. I then brought in the poor afflicted sufferer, and roared out, ‘Umhala, devil, liar, villain, you dare to deceive me, deny now what I accuse you of’. He then confessed all, and began to palliate his conduct. To this I would not listen, but seized my wand to give word. ‘Hear you, Umhala, you have eaten a man up. Give back every head of his cattle, and ten head of your own for having eaten him up. And you forfeit ten head more to me, the Great Chief, for my government.’ He was perfectly unmoved, but I saw that he intended to do no such thing. I then deprived him of his medal of office, and said, ‘Now go and obey my orders,’ and I desired the English magistrate to report to me in two days that he had done so. He had thirty miles to return to his kraal. . . . The hour arrived when the news of Umhala’s obedience should be received by me. The report came that Umhala had not obeyed my order nor did Captain Rawstone think he would. This letter was brought me by two Kaffir messengers. I had held two troops of cavalry ready to march to reinforce the post of Fort Wellington at Umhala’s kraal. I sounded the assembly, and in five minutes they were on the march. When I ordered Rawstone to ‘eat up’ the chief, a thing never done before in Kaffirland, my old councillor Ganya asked me in consternation what orders I had given, and when I told him, he said, ‘Then the war is again over the land’. For in old times such an act as seizing the cattle of a chief was regarded as a formal declaration of war. I roared out: ‘Either obedience or war. *I will be Chief,*

and Umhala shall see it—and every chief and man in Kaffirland.’ I seized all Umhala’s cattle, and I desired the magistrate cautiously to count every head, to give him a regular receipt and send a copy to me. The cattle were to be guarded by Umhala’s own people. I saw that now was my time to establish or lose my power throughout my government. For this Umhala was much looked up to throughout Kaffirland, and regarded as the boldest warrior, having distinguished himself by many daring acts in the war.

“The news was sent out, and I immediately summoned to my ‘Court’ Maqomo, Tyali, Sutu, and Gazela. I knew that this would so intimidate all parties that there would be no danger of a war. Scarcely was Umhala’s cattle seized than he sent in succession the most penitent messages, promising to obey my orders and never transgress again. I would not ‘listen’ but desired Umhala to come to me, and meet the chiefs for whom I had sent. I then held a council, told everything that had occurred, and asked if Umhala merited what I, the Great Chief, had done to him, being one of the magistrates who had sworn allegiance and obedience. There was a mutter of assent. I said: ‘Now, Umhala, you see how insignificant you are, unless obedient, and how powerful I am. I will be obeyed, and I will “eat up” every chief who dares disobey me or sanction witchcraft. Here is your medal of magistrate, which I place under my foot.’ The crowd were perfectly petrified and looked at old Ganya, who stood up and made a most eloquent speech. After Maqomo also had addressed the crowd, I said to Umhala, who had sat unmoved all the time, ‘Now, Umhala, all depends upon you, can I “listen” or not?’ He spoke modestly but powerfully. I made a merit of forgiving him, put his medal again on his neck, ordered his cattle to be restored the moment he had returned the cattle of the burnt man and paid the fines. This decision and determination established most effectively my absolute power.”

Besides acting as the stern and inflexible ruler of Kaffirland, Colonel Smith aimed at being the “father” of all these people. He endeavoured to gain their confidence by holding out every encouragement to them to go to him with all their perplexities and troubles. Not a day passed, he tells us,

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during which he did not spend four or five hours with some or others of them, advising here and admonishing there, but always making the opportunity of giving them instruction in the ways of civilisation—the use of money in preference to barter, the use of clothes, methods of trade and such matters. In all this he was assisted by his no less indefatigable wife, who instructed the women in the use of the needle and domestic and religious matters. Sutu (the great wife of the late Gaika) and Nonibe (the great wife of the late Dushani) seem to have been her almost constant attendants and willing pupils. There can be no doubt that the hold these two good people were gaining on the tribes of Kaffirland was great. Colonel Smith's "play-acting" in his teaching as well as in his government was not without its effect. His lesson on the value of the rain-maker is worth telling in his own words.¹ "One day when the great rain-maker was in my camp, and many others, as well as an unusually large number of Kaffirs, I assembled them all for the avowed purpose of hearing a disputation between the 'Great Chief' or 'Father,' as they invariably called me, and the rain-makers. My first question to them was, 'So you can make rain, can you?' I never saw in men's countenance more caution. I said, 'Speak out, speak freely to your father'. The rain-maker said he could. I then showed him one by one the articles on my writing-table, knives, scissors, etc., my clothes, my hat, boots, etc., asking, 'Can you make this?' 'No!' 'Do you know how it is made?' 'No!' Having explained everything and how it was made, through the medium of my valuable interpreter Mr. Shepstone, I then called for a tumbler of water. I showed all the people the water, and asked the rain-makers if what was in the glass was of the same quality as the water or rain they invoked. All agreed, 'Yes'. Their anxiety was intense. I then threw down the water on the dry ground, which immediately absorbed it, and desired the rain-makers to put it again in the tumbler. They were aghast and said 'We cannot'. In a voice of thunder I said, 'Put the rain again in this glass, I say'. I then turned to the spectators, 'Now you see how these impostors have deceived you. Now listen to the *Word*.' I

¹ *Vide Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*, vol. ii., p. 81.

took my wand of office, planted it violently before me and said: 'Any man of my children hereafter who believes in witchcraft, or that any but God the Great Spirit can make rain, I will "eat him up"'. I then left the meeting and the rain-makers thunderstruck and confounded."

During October it appeared to Colonel Smith that Krelî had had sufficient time to comply with that article of the Treaty which bound him to send forthwith 25,000 cattle and 100 horses into the Colony—the half of the fine imposed. The position at this date (Oct. 12th, when Colonel Smith reminded the Governor of it) was that, altogether, only 900 had been restored, and none had been received for some months previous to that date. Krelî had stated that he could get no more from his people as he lacked the support and assistance of his uncle, Buku, who was then a prisoner in Grahamstown. Buku was liberated, but it made no difference in the recovery of the cattle. It was deemed expedient, therefore, that unless Krelî was to be allowed to back out of his obligation—a proposition Colonel Smith could not entertain—steps should be taken to force the agreement; or if it should appear that he was genuinely unable to do so, to enter into further promise of peace and goodwill. Besides the cattle belonging to the colonists, those also of the Gaikas and Ndhambis had been driven for safety into Hintza's territory before and during the war. Now, the Gcalekas showed as little consideration for their Cis-Keian kinsmen as they did for the Europeans, for they kept all. Maqomo, Umhala, and others chafed at this, and had Colonel Smith permitted it, or more especially had he assisted them, they would have made a raid into the Transkei and helped themselves. This ill-feeling was of use to Colonel Smith as, by means of it, he was enabled to maintain a state of constant ferment and anxiety among Krelî's people. Umtanini, an unofficial messenger from Krelî, though probably a spy, arrived at King William's Town and stated that, according to Maqomo and Umhala, a commando under Colonel Smith was about to visit Krelî's country for the purpose of reprisal; that so great was the consternation and uncertainty that none dare sow; and that Krelî himself was with his mother at the Heemraden tree prepared at any moment to flee to the Ameva.

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In order to arrive at some definite understanding, messengers were sent to Kreli and Buku asking them to depute some of their councillors to meet Colonel Smith at King William's Town; but as so long a time seemed to him to elapse without any notice being taken of his message, he meditated strong measures. The Governor agreed with him. "We must press Kreli, and that very urgently, to fulfil to a certain extent his condition of Treaty," he said on October 23rd, though he was averse to pushing matters to the length of war. Colonel Smith, on the other hand, advocated this extreme measure. "Justice to the Colony," he answered, "and mercy towards the Kaffirs alike demand on our part that we compel the completion of the conditions of the Treaty. I think mercy to the Kaffirs, because I am clearly and decidedly of opinion that any display of weakness on our part would encourage certain portions of the Kaffir tribes to recommence hostilities upon each other, and thus again involve us in war. The value of the cattle is not worth a thought, but the *moral effect* produced through Kaffirland by our proving to the Kaffirs that we have the will and power to enforce the payment of the cattle is of the *utmost importance*, and we are not strong enough to dispense with that comparatively cheap defence of our power. Viewing the matter also in connection with our new British subjects, it appears to me highly important and expedient that they should be impressed, by our vigour and determination in this one case, with a proper respect for our power and ability to compel the completion of the Treaties into which they themselves have entered. Much as war is to be deprecated, yet there are times and circumstances when war is the least of two evils. If Kreli be permitted to violate his agreement with us, the present peace rests upon a very poor foundation; all respect for our power or our good sense will cease from one end of the country to the other, no fear of consequences will ever deter a Kaffir from future transgressions; the Kaffir subjects, judging of us by our conduct to Kreli, would consider our clemency and mercy towards them rather the result of weakness or of fear than generosity. . . . On the other hand, the advance into Kreli's country, if he do not pay the 25,000 cattle, etc., within the period limited, with 400 troops and the warriors of our new

subjects would show them we really mean what we say. . . . If Your Excellency's decision should be 'advance' upon Kreli, I have plenty of troops for the purpose—cavalry and infantry—leaving a garrison in all my redoubts; our 400 infantry and 100 cavalry would be ample with two six-pounders and my sable warriors of new British subjects. Ten days from hence and back will suffice. The expense would be a few additional waggons."

The great caution, deliberation, and forethought of Sir Benjamin Durban, as compared with the impetuosity of Colonel Smith, are perhaps no better illustrated in any of their joint actions than in this matter. The initiative and dash of the one contrasted very strongly with the slow, judicial method, which arose from the fear of making a mistake, of the other. And yet they worked together so perfectly harmoniously. Well would it have been for this country had this partnership been allowed to continue, and received the support and encouragement which, at a later date, it was seen to deserve. Sir Benjamin's answer to the above was: "Now let us review your suggestion of 'going over the Kei into Hintza's country to take the cattle with 400 of our troops and the auxiliary Kaffirs of our new subjects'. This, in the first instance, supposes and requires on my part a *formal declaration of war* against Kreli, *previously* made, without which such a movement is altogether out of the question, first, because I should otherwise violate a great moral and political principle (and take, in fact, the banditti step with which we have justly reproached the Kaffirs of December last); next, because it will be called in England, and with reason, a predatory inroad into the country of our Allies, and, with equal reason, meet with no quarter. Well, then, suppose war declared at the moment when it is, on account of expenditure and several other circumstances, most expedient to avoid it. Who is to tell to what lengths it may become necessary, unavoidable indeed, to pursue it, and where it will terminate, to say nothing of turning savage loose upon savage, at our instigation and for our purposes (including their own, to be sure, but still at our bidding), all whose atrocities (and they would not be a few) would be heaped upon our heads, at once in England and in the Colony? And what are likely to be the fruits of the

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measure? The country will be driven(?) of its cattle, depend upon it, and into distant and impervious places of hiding, where the following and taking it will cost twenty times its value. . . . Assure yourself, my friend, that we should be making war for a phantom, and after an exhausting and expensive and perhaps bloody pursuit, catch but a bubble."

Recognising, therefore, the small likelihood there was of ever obtaining anything like the number of cattle which had been promised, the Governor, as an alternative, suggested to Colonel Smith the expediency of entering into negotiations with Kreli for the cession "in full possession and sovereignty to the King of England and to become part of His Majesty's Colonial Dominions in South Africa, the tract of country extending two miles on the right and two miles on the left of the High Road, leading from the great ford on the Kei River, below Smith's tower, to the passage of the Kogha River, opposite the old kraal and Heemraden tree of the late Hintza, embracing the valley and mission station of Butterworth". If this failed and no further attempt was made to restore the cattle, then would be the time to consider the extreme measure of war. Fortunately, early in November,¹ the delegates from Kreli and Buku arrived in King William's Town, as has already been mentioned, and on behalf of their principals agreed to more than the Governor at first proposed. For, according to the document² which they signed, the tract of

¹ Colonel Smith says the 12th, but it must have been before this as the document signed by the delegates bears the date December 11th, 1835.

² *Vide* Blue Book, *Return of Caffre War*, July 12th, 1837, p. 15. The following conversation led up to this. The delegates were asked why they had not paid the cattle according to the Treaty—they asked: "How did Hintza incur the fine seeing that he did not enter into the war?" *The Colonel*: "Let Kreli answer. I sent for you to answer why the Treaty is not fulfilled." *Delegates*: "When Kreli returned to his own country he found all the cattle dead." *Colonel*: "It was only the other day that you complained of not having room enough for your cattle." *Delegates*: "They are all dead." *Colonel*: "Then I will waste no more words, I will go and look. The question is, whether the Treaty with Kreli shall be fulfilled or not. Now here is the 'word'—I now call upon Kreli and Buku to fulfil the Treaty duly and faithfully; if they do, peace and goodwill will be between us. Unless, therefore, by the 1st January, 2,500 bullocks and 100 horses, in part payment, be delivered to me here at King William's Town, in which are to be included all the Colonial cattle said to be in your country, Almighty God, who rules armies, will decide between us, and the blood of your subjects be on the heads of your faithless chiefs."

Letter, Colonel Smith to Sir Benjamin Durban, January 10th, 1836.

country, instead of being four was ten miles wide, with a circumference of forty miles round Butterworth and the right of road, without let or hindrance, to the Bashee River in one direction and to the Clarkebury Mission station in the north in the other. This was in lieu of the second instalment of the fine; they were still expected to do their best to complete the first; this they promised to do. Affairs having been thus far satisfactorily arranged, there still remained the pacification of the tribes on the east of Kreli's country, namely, those of Faku and Vadana. The enmity of the former against the Gcalekas still existed, and as that chief had been asked, and had consented, to act against them on behalf of the British, it behoved Colonel Smith to quell those hostile feelings. Further, Faku was not on friendly terms with Vadana of the Tambookies; here, therefore, was another opportunity for the peacemaker. To accomplish all this as well as to make the final arrangements with Kreli in connection with the grant of land, it was decided to send a military embassy over the Kei. The Governor approved of this measure, but thought it advisable to delay it until the appearance of more cattle gave better assurance of Kreli's good faith; and further, Colonel Smith's "Great Day" was approaching, when all the possible military array would be wanted in King William's Town. This historic event took place on Thursday, January 7th, 1836. Although there had been one ceremony for the investiture of Maqomo, Tyali, and Umhala as magistrates, Colonel Smith, as more consonant with the importance of the initiation of British rule in Kaffirland, desired a much larger and more representative gathering, before which the new laws would be expounded, and also at which further officials, such as sub-magistrates and field cornets, would be appointed.

The "word" of the proposed meeting having been sent all over the country, the Kaffirs commenced to assemble on the previous Wednesday afternoon. From the Headquarters there was seen to be approaching and descending the slopes leading to King William's Town, a warlike body of 500 horsemen and 1,500 men on foot, carrying their assegais and shields, shouting their war songs and whistling in a peculiarly shrill manner. They were the people of Maqomo, Tyali, Sutu, Eno, and Botman, accompanied by Captain Stretch from Fort Cox.

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They halted at a small rivulet called the Charka, when to prevent misunderstanding and the sending forth of the soldiers, Maqomo sent a messenger to Colonel Smith, to ask to be allowed, as an honour to him, to come to the camp with their arms; but, on the other hand, if he preferred it, they were ready to ground them at the Charka. The answer was, "Ground them at the Charka". "A compact body of about 500 horse and 1,500 foot then commenced to move down by Fort Hardinge and thence up to Fort Hill, headed by the chiefs and greater men. Their singing was exceedingly fine. When they approached me they all halted. Then the cavalry of their own accord made a circle round us all. I had the band of the 75th Regiment with me, and desired the whole to say, 'Long live our noble King, William IVth'. The deep-toned melodious yell of these 2,000 fellows was extraordinary. Nothing could exceed the decorum of their behaviour. I then gave them some bullocks, and the cavalcade retired over the Buffalo to the Charka and bivouacked." On Thursday morning the precincts of the camp presented a very animated appearance. Many more Kaffirs as well as the Fingoes arrived, bringing the number of natives up to over 3,000. These with detachments of the 72nd and 75th Regiments, a company of the Cape Mounted Rifles, Artillery, Sappers, and Miners, arranged themselves round a large space which was left for the officials. At twelve o'clock a big gun was fired. A procession was formed, headed by Colonel Smith in his magnificent uniform, surmounted by a cocked hat with white plumes; with him was Mrs. Smith on one side and Mrs. Major Burney on the other. Following these were the great chiefs, who had been clothed in coats and trousers of a beautiful blue and with black velveteen waistcoats, on which the better to display their medals of office; then came the Field Cornets-elect, in shooting coats (and presumably also shooting trousers), and hats. The rear of the cavalcade was brought up by the missionaries and visitors from India and Cape Town. All moved to their appointed places, the band, the while, playing "God save the King". Three rounds from each of the five guns were fired, and all shouted "Long live King William". Colonel Smith then took the centre seat. On his right was Maqomo, and on his left Tyali. In the other places of honour were the

Kaffir ladies—Sutu and Nonibe—and the chiefs Cobus, Pato, William Kama, Jan Tzatzoe, Matwa, Tinta, Botman, and Stock (Eno's eldest son). Umhala was not present. Colonel Smith then, by groups, made all the natives take the Oath of Allegiance. This was followed by a long prayer in Kaffir, offered up by the Rev. Mr Chalmers. At the conclusion of this, Colonel Smith arose and proceeded to give the "great word". It consisted of a long speech, which he read, and which was translated, sentence by sentence, into Kaffir by Mr. Theophilus Shepstone. He pointed out that, as, at their own request, they had become British subjects, they must be governed by British laws, and that they had now been called together to have these explained to them and to show them how to act when crime was brought before their notice. Reminding them that though Gaika, on his death-bed, had conjured them to hold fast to the word of peace, they had nevertheless made war and brought upon themselves the sufferings through which they had so recently passed. They were naked and ignorant, so they said, but so were the Englishmen many years ago, but by good laws, industry, and the gradual advance of civilisation they had thrown off the yoke of despotism and barbarism, carried on an honest trade with each other, built houses and were well dressed, "as you see your brother Englishmen". "Do you suppose we have all these things by sleeping all day under a bush?" These blessings and others were to be gained by (1) ceasing "to eat up one another," that was theft; (2) ceasing to murder or kill anyone; (3) refusing to believe in witchcraft; (4) not committing perjury; (5) not setting houses on fire and destroying property; (6) not committing rape; and (7) not committing treason.

After complimenting Maqomo and Tyali on the willingness they had already shown in falling in with his measures, he proceeded to appoint the Field Cornets for the different tribes. Altogether twenty-eight were appointed. "You are responsible to the Field Commandants," he said to them, "they to the English Resident Agents, the whole to me, I to His Excellency the Governor." "From you, pakati (i.e. councillors), much do I expect; many of you were the councillors of your chiefs, aid them now to do good by the English law—strive to prevent crime—attend Divine Worship—send your

CHAP. VI. children to school, and show that example which the confidence in you demands." Turning to the heads of kraals and villages, he besought them to see that none of their people were absent without their knowledge, and that no stolen cattle or horses were brought among them, "see that your people are active and industrious, that they work in their gardens". Referring to the barbarous custom of dragging a dying person from out of a hut and leaving him or her to perish in the bush, or perhaps to be devoured by wild animals, Colonel Smith strove to introduce decent burial. "How can you bear to see those whom in life you loved and cherished—your aged father who taught you your manly exercises, and provided you with food; your mother who nursed you as a child, who attended you in your sickness, who for years watched over you; your brother, sister, or dearest friends—dragged out from amongst you ere dead, and thrown out as a dog."

To the first man who had the misfortune to lose a relative and buried him decently, an ox was promised. Finally, "At this great meeting, let me impress upon you, that all previous animosities amongst yourselves be forgotten, and while the great English nation now regards you as British subjects, love your neighbour as yourself. Fear God, and honour your King, and the Governor, his representative. Now let any man speak who wishes." In response to this invitation Maqomo said: "Although my people are stupid, ignorant, and naked, I and they are perfectly sensible when good words are spoken to us. I will always tell you anything that happens among my people." Tyali briefly thanked the Colonel for all his goodness. The proceedings then terminated, and the Anglo-Kaffirs moved off leisurely to their homes.¹

Umhala and his people did not arrive until the 9th and thus missed the display, but all the same, Colonel Smith went through the document with them, and administered the Oath of Allegiance. There happened to have arrived on the previous day, with 200 head of cattle, the delegates from Kreli and Buku. These were present at the ceremony; they also knelt down and asked to be allowed to become British subjects.

¹ For the text of this address, *vide* Blue Book, *Return of Caffre War*, p. 247.

Although they were told that there was no need for them to do so, they, with the others, took the Oath of Allegiance. CHAP.
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The cattle which arrived on the 8th were the result of a message which Colonel Smith sent to Krelî on the 3rd, reminding him that the moon was getting old, but that his soldiers could march as well in the dark as in the light. There was validity in the excuses which Krelî sent, and which Colonel Smith accepted, accounting for the delivery of so small a proportion of those due, namely, that the country had been impoverished by the large numbers of cattle which had been taken away by the troops and Fingoes during the war, and further, that, not only had disease thinned the numbers of those remaining, but that very many cows and calves had died in consequence of the hard driving from place to place. Thus satisfied with this indication of Krelî's good intentions, Colonel Smith decided to send forth the embassy of peace into the Transkeian territories.

It consisted of fifty-five men of the 75th Regiment, twenty-two of the Cape Mounted Rifles, Dr. Chappini, Messrs. W. Fynn and A. Aldum as interpreters, the Rev. S. Palmer, Wesleyan Missionary, and Mr. Mandy of the Commissariat, with six waggons with their twenty leaders and drivers, the whole under the command of Captain De Lancy of the 75th. Crossing the Kei on the 23rd of January, they reached Butterworth on the 24th and halted at the ruined mission station of Mr. Ayliff. The next day Krelî, with 800 of his men, visited the camp. The negotiations were perfectly satisfactory. The Treaty of Peace was duly ratified and Captain De Lancy, in the name of His Majesty, the King of Great Britain, took possession of the tract of country which had been marked out. Nomsa, Krelî's mother, spoke and approved of all; she called the ceded tract the "Land of God," and thanked the Governor for taking her son "out of the bush" (i.e. getting him out of trouble). The force, accompanied by two of Krelî's councillors, the bearers of peaceful messages to Vadana, then moved on to Clarkebury to interview that Tambookie chief. Vadana with 700 of his followers met the embassy at the mission station, which was still in good order, having been protected by the Tambookies during the absence of the missionaries. He, in like manner, welcomed the prospect of peace which this visit inaugurated,

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and promised to remain the friend and ally of the British nation. He also added two of his councillors to the cavalcade in order that his goodwill might be expressed to his enemy Faku, to whom Captain De Lancy next conducted the embassy. Passing the ruined mission station of Morley near the Umtata River, the journey was continued to Buntingville in Pondoland, where Faku with 1,200 welcomed them. Faku was no less willing than the others to join in the general peace, and, as a token of his sincerity, sent elephant tusks to the Governor and Colonel Smith. Having established these happy relations, the return march was commenced. On reaching Butterworth, Buku, who had not been present on the 25th, now, with a great crowd of his people, met the embassy and declared himself a partner with Kreli in his amicable actions and sentiments. With all these tidings of peace and goodwill, Captain De Lancy arrived back in King William's Town on February 17th.

But the pacification of, and the introduction of law and order into Kaffirland, were but parts of a still larger problem. The boundaries of Kaffirland, including the Transkei and Pondoland, were fairly well defined; each tribe had its allotted territory, and the whole was practically under the thumb of the indefatigable and ever wakeful Colonel Smith. Outside of and to the north and north-west of these regions, there was a country of boundless extent. Beyond a hundred miles or so from the indefinite southern boundary next to nothing was known of it, or of the tribes and peoples who occupied it. But it was known that renegades, both white and black, found a refuge in it, and that from it many hundreds of natives flocked into the Colony. The present districts of Albert, Wodehouse, Aliwal North, and Barkly East were outside the Colony, while even the most southern portions of the Orange Free State and Basutoland were almost unknown. The present district of Queenstown was, at that time, known somewhat indefinitely as a part of Tambookieland. Near where Whittlesea now stands was the village of the Tambookie chief, Mapassa. It will be remembered that it was the people of this place who were murderously attacked by Maqomo in 1829, and that that affair led to the expulsion of Maqomo from the Kat River. Mapassa was a quiet, indolent man, quite lacking that enterprise and

warlike spirit, the possession of which would have enabled him to hold his own against the bolder spirits from the south. He took no part in the war, though his people, without actually fighting, seem to have taken every advantage of stealing cattle wherever they could. As Mapassa's own disposition towards the Colony and the strength of his tribe were not known with any certainty, and further, as even before this time the Boers had commenced to move out of the Colony and seek homes in those unknown parts, Sir Benjamin Durban, almost immediately after the end of the war, decided to send Colonel Somerset on a mission of general investigation into the circumstances of the north-eastern border. According to the instructions issued to him on October 16th, he was, in the first place, to let all know that the tribes of Gaika and Ndhlabi had become British subjects, and that there was peace in the land. Mapassa, in particular, was to be told that if he and his people behaved themselves, they would be allowed to remain where they were, otherwise they would be driven over the Kei.¹

With regard to the Boers, Colonel Somerset was to do his best to remove the misapprehensions under which they seemed to be labouring in connection with the attitude of the Government towards them. "He will assure them that the Governor is unfeignedly desirous about their welfare, and deeply sensible of their distresses, which have been forcibly pressed upon the attention of the Government at home. That while here, as they must be well aware, he has taken every means within his power to alleviate them; in proof of which it need only be stated that during the present year, rations of provisions to the amount of at least £16,000 sterling have been issued to the destitute—£7,000 from the Colonial funds applied to the relief of agricultural losses, and £9,000 to making good, in part, the value of plundered cattle to the losers, the last item having accrued from the sale of cattle taken from the enemy during the campaign and sent into the Colony. That those who have not received relief are those who have failed to apply for it, as an office for distributing such relief has been open in Grahamstown since February last, and every possible notice given of it, and that whoever has told them that the receipt of

¹For the document signed by Mapassa, *vide* Blue Book, *Return of Caffre War*, p. 6 (July 12th, 1837).

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As far as Mapassa was concerned, the mission was a success. He desired to be taken under British rule and to receive the protection which that implied. He said he was much harassed by certain Ndhambi and other petty chiefs, who were leaving Kaffirland and making his territory a refuge for stolen cattle until they could be driven further north. More especially, however, he complained of one Jalousia, a Gcaleka, a bold and intrepid fellow, capable of any mischief. He was originally one of Gaika's men, but having driven off a large number of cattle belonging to that great chief, he went and allied himself with Hintza. During and after the war he stole cattle from Kreli and then tried to re-ally himself with the Gaikas by becoming a follower of Maqomo. During the peace negotiations he was said to be the most active and worst robber in the Colony.

Jalousia sent to Colonel Smith by Tyali, who had been up towards the Orange River to regain some of his stolen cattle, a message asking to be allowed to settle in Kaffirland. The Colonel stormed at Tyali for advocating the cause of a man who could rob his father and then turn traitor to the chief who had sheltered him. But, all the same, he, the Colonel, was prepared to enter into negotiations with Jalousia, for he felt that such a character roving wild in those parts would undoubtedly collect around him an independent and marauding band of expatriated Kaffirs, Corannas, and others, and perhaps be a continual and dangerous menace along the northern border. Nothing came of it, however, since Jalousia's desire to return vanished when he became aware of the existence of the military posts. As was expected, by the end of January, 1836, Jalousia, with four petty Ndhambi chiefs, did collect together a band of marauders. For a time they carried on a career of plunder among the Basutos near Thaba Bosigo, until, about September of 1836, they were attacked by Mosesh's people, when hundreds of them were slain, Jalousia among them.

In his investigations into Boer matters, Colonel Smith found that there had been neglect, in so far as that the Field Cornets had not been supplied with any Government notices or proclamations during the year. Some had been ignorant

of the steps which had been taken for their relief, while others had suffered from the contractor not having had sufficient supplies. Many were utterly destitute.

Shortly after Colonel Somerset's return, Mapassa with his retinue arrived in King William's Town to interview Colonel Smith. With all due ceremony he took the Oath of Allegiance, entirely voluntary, and was promised protection. It then transpired that he feared Jalousa—albeit his followers numbered several hundreds—and did not feel strong enough to repel him. The Governor approved of Colonel Smith's action. He considered Mapassa was sufficiently a British subject for the time; the planning of his location, the establishment of a military post and other matters could be left to the future.

A further inclusion in British sovereignty and jurisdiction at this time was that of a Bechuana chief called Kaptyn, who, with his people, was roving about near the Kraai River, in the present district of Wodehouse. On December 28th, 1835, at his own particular desire, he was received under British protection, promising to abstain from all allegiance with the Kaffirs in any proposal of war, plunder, or depredation, and to obey the Governor and those in authority under him. Mr. J. O'Reilly, the Justice of Peace at Cradock, went to Kaptyn and completed the negotiations.¹ The tribe consisted of 202 men, 390 women, 402 children, with 1,604 head of cattle, 6,300 sheep, and four horses. They were permitted to reside on a tract of country situated between the Kraai River and the Stormbergen, measuring about 25 miles long and 20 miles broad.

In all far-reaching revolutionary measures in which the habits, prejudices, and passions of man are concerned, one must not look for immediate success as a result of any political experiment, however wisely and carefully planned. Civilisation can develop only gradually. Whatever allurements to a new order of things there may be at first, the novelty is sure to wear off and to give place to a desire to return to the old conditions and traditions. It was, therefore, not to have been expected that the new British subjects in the Province of Queen Adelaide, more especially the erstwhile chiefs, would

¹ *Vide* Blue Book, *Return of Caffre War*, p. 10.

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view with satisfaction the prohibitions of many of their most cherished usages and beliefs, when the first glamour of showy uniforms, of martial music, and of their new status had passed away. Four or five months of the new state of affairs had elapsed when Colonel Smith continued to believe that he had the whole-hearted support of his new magistrates and their followers. The good man seems to have been led away by his enthusiasm and determination to see the fair side of their characters. Judging the dispositions of the chiefs from his voluminous correspondence with Sir Benjamin Durban, one cannot but conclude that they must have been beings possessed of more than ordinarily tender consciences—the mere mention of their delinquencies to them being sufficient to reduce them to dejection, and even to draw forth their tears. Maqomo, in particular, over whom Colonel Smith thought he had gained the ascendancy, as that chief was so profuse in his expressions of gratitude for the accessories of civilisation, was most sensitive to reprimand. He quaked with fear here and bent his head in misery there, as tokens of repentance for his sins. Tyali and Umhala, in like manner, seem to have been easily pregnable to wise counsel, and, with but little persuasion and argument, to have seen the blessedness of an honest, kind, and in short, a noble life. Umhala, on one occasion, had refused pointedly to perform his magisterial duties, and, in consequence, had had all his cattle seized by order of Colonel Smith. When they were restored to him on promise of better behaviour, a spy was sent to observe his attitude. According to Colonel Smith, the messenger reported Umhala to have acknowledged his guilt and to have said: "I see I have a father in Smith. I disobeyed, he might have kept all my cattle but he gave them back. These people are just—let us strive to do right—no one is injured by them—they are our brothers—they punish all according as they deserve."

In these good opinions of the Kaffirs, Colonel Smith stood practically alone. Those who had had long experience in dealing with them saw, speaking metaphorically, the tongue thrust into the cheek or the wink during all these virtuous professions. Captain Stretch, who had been in contact with Kaffir life for over a quarter of a century, stated, in March, that he did not think all was going well in Kaffirland.

Maqomo had complained that the chiefs were "dead," meaning they had lost all their power and influence and were now of no account. He (Stretch) thought that now that the corn had been sown and that the chiefs had had a respite from their troubles, some overt steps to reinstate themselves would be taken. The Governor himself foresaw restlessness on the part of Maqomo, and told Colonel Smith that all he had heard from other sources well accorded with that chief having kissed his hand as the concluding act of a long practised and successful deception to blind and mislead him.

A chief of less note who took no pains to hide his dislike of the new régime, or his defiance of the new law, was one Umboyna, a brother of Hintza. He had joined Maqomo's people and was living on the flats near Debe Nek. Nemesis overtook him, however, and following the example of the Boers at this time, he determined to move out of the reach of British jurisdiction. Having "eaten up" a man—one of his own amapakati—Colonel Smith sent to him ordering him to send the cattle he had unjustly taken as well as his own to King William's Town. As three days elapsed without any notice being taken, two messengers were sent to him, one to deliver a written summons and the other to receive his answer. The paper he kicked aside and gave as his answer that he would "eat up" his people whether Colonel Smith liked it or not. Captain De Lancy, therefore, with seventy cavalry from Headquarters, joined by a company of the 75th from Fort White, and some of the garrison of Fort Cox, under Captain Stretch, repaired to Umboyna's kraal. It was surrounded and 108 head of cattle were taken. The robbed man was repaid, while the remainder were divided among the magistrate chiefs. A Kaffir council was summoned the next day, when Colonel Smith's action met with their entire approval. Umboyna left for the Transkei. He settled for a time at Komgha when attempts were made to take him back, but without success.

This, however, is not the whole story. Colonel Smith, writing to the Governor on April 5th, 1836, says: "I find my seizing Umboyna's and Umhala's cattle has excited discussion. Although Maqomo applauded my procedure much, when he got amongst his heemraden he was much aroused by them; they have had great meetings, *in small parties*, to discuss

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¹ It is not clear what colour Maqomo usually was, unless black.

There you are, an individual lost by all ; if I say but a word, Tyali will be elected as your superior ; but I will not, like your own people, yet throw you away. A man in distress wants a friend ; you found one before in me ; you are now more in need of one than ever. I will therefore try you once more, and if you deceive me, I will make you the most degraded of my children.' He thanked me, and his professions to me were exceedingly proper, grateful, and penitent."

But while all these affairs were taking place in Kaffirland and Colonel Smith was giving such glowing accounts of the good behaviour of "his children," the Colony remained in a most unsatisfactory state. According to the return of depredation during the months of February to September, 1836, 514 cattle and 129 horses were stolen, of which 234 of the former and thirty-one of the latter were recovered. That is, along the whole border, an average of eighty animals per month were driven off. Although this extent of robbery was not large, considering the circumstances, yet it sufficed to maintain the feeling of insecurity and to give rise to alarms where none were warranted. Often, and probably due to the carelessness of the owners themselves, animals merely strayed into the adjacent bush or kloofs, and being believed to have been stolen, patrols followed on a supposed spoor, and perhaps took animals from innocent Kaffirs. A case reported at this time by the commanding officer at Fort Beaufort was one where it was said that Kaffirs had been *seen* driving some horses away from that place, and that traces of them had been followed towards the Chumie ; "but lo and behold ! they were found that evening at the place where they ought to be in Fort Beaufort". Alarms of this nature were common. Captain Campbell, the Civil Commissioner in Grahamstown, seems, on the one hand, to have been too credulous of them, while Colonel Smith, on the other, was certain such things could not happen without his knowledge.

Kaffir depredations and the loss of the means of subsistence owing to the war, however, were not the only causes of discontent and unhappiness in the Eastern Province at this time. The Dutch inhabitants were chafing at the so-called compensation for the liberation of their slaves and the imbecile manner in which the whole slave business was being conducted.

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In common with the British inhabitants they had just complaint in the delay of the payment of the sums due to them for the supplies, horses, and services in connection with the war. Commandant van Wyk, writing to Captain Campbell, February 2nd, 1836, said that when he gave directions for the purchase of supplies for his division, it was on the understanding that payment would be made as soon as peace was declared, but "it is now a year, and the burghers are praying me for payment ; the people are poor and badly in want of money".

Perhaps even more painful to bear than these things was the want of sympathy of the Home Government and people of England towards them in their misfortunes. Information of the proceedings of a Commission of Inquiry into the treatment of the Aboriginal natives in the British Colonies, which was sitting in London, leaked through to the Colony. From it, it was understood that all colonists, both British and Dutch, were being branded as the cruel oppressors of harmless natives, and that any disasters which had overtaken them were but the results of their treatment of these people. There were rumours also that the Kaffirs were to be freed from any kind of control and permitted to return and occupy the country right up to the banks of the Fish River.

Taking all these things into consideration, together with the fact that it was quite a part of a frontier Boer's life to migrate temporarily from the Colony in search of better grazing for his cattle, it is scarcely surprising that, at this time, there should have been a general desire to move away altogether with a view to escaping from these vexations. Ever since the first Dutchmen in the seventeenth century took to farming, and found the need or desire for larger pastures, there had been a continuous extension of the indefinite boundaries of the Colony by the gradual occupation of lands farther and farther from the Cape Peninsula. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the limits of the Colony were better defined, and the Legislature had succeeded in stopping the indiscriminate migration of the Boers ; yet there was still the tendency, and in many cases the necessity, to go beyond the recognised boundary. In times of drought, it was quite a common thing for the farmers to be accorded permission to graze cattle in more favoured parts outside the Colony, and to return when

rains had refreshed their own pastures. On the other hand, it was not uncommon for Boers to go without permission and to stay away altogether. In these cases, however, the motive for leaving the Colony was, probably, more that of obtaining lands which suited them better than that of desiring to escape from the control of the Government. Mr. Ziervogel, in reporting on his *commando* of May, 1835, already referred to, mentions that he found 162 Boer families settled down in the regions beyond the Stormberg Mountains—some forty miles beyond what was believed to be the boundary of the Colony. These people do not seem to have gone to those parts because they were dissatisfied with British rule, though perhaps they may have been so, but because they preferred the locality. Although out of its jurisdiction, according to Mr. Ziervogel, they paid taxes to the Colonial Government, traded with the Colony, were visited by the clergymen from Cradock, and, in short, acted as though they had been in the Colony itself. But disputes or quarrels among themselves, or with their servants, they had to settle as best they could without the intervention of a magistrate. In this respect, however, they were no worse off than many who were in the Colony. In the Tarka Field Cornetcy, for instance, which was twenty-two hours long, reckoning six miles to the hour, and fourteen hours wide, there was a population of 2,908 souls and only one Field Cornet, who lived in the extreme south.

But less well-disposed to British rule than this settlement of Boers was another party under a man who afterwards became a prominent leader in the Great Trek, namely, Louis Triechard, or Louis Triegardt, or Louis Strikhard, as he is called in the official despatches of the time. He "was a man of violent temper, and had given vent to his animosity to the Imperial Government in such blustering language, that he was regarded by the Colonial authorities as capable even of joining the Kaffirs against the English".¹ With about thirty families and slaves he crossed the boundary early in 1835 and settled, or perhaps more correctly, squatted down on lands near the junction of the Witte and Zwart Kei Rivers.² This was the place to which Hintza fled when pursued by Colonel Smith in

¹ Theal, vol. ii., p. 270.

² *Vide* vol. ii. of this work, p. 461. The place to-day is called Lubisi, the Kaffirised form of Louis.

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April, 1835. From native evidence collected after the war, there seems to have been some collusion between Triegardt and Hintza hostile to the Colony.¹

In other parts also, along and beyond the northern border, there were loose settlements of Boers, the whereabouts of whom were, in many cases, unknown until collision with the natives rendered the notice of the Government imperative. It was these inevitable collisions which made it so desirable to keep the Boers within the limits of the Colony. In some instances natives, resenting the intrusion of Boers into pastures which they (the natives) claimed, but to which, in truth, they were no better entitled, acted on the offensive. In May, 1836, a party of Boers who had taken up a temporary abode at a place beyond the Orange River, was attacked one night while they were asleep by a large band of Bushmen, when seven men, two women, and three children were killed. In other cases the Boers seem to have been the aggressors. The evidence in these cases was usually somewhat one-sided, being that of the complaining native, while the question as to whether there was provocation or justification for the act was seldom heard, as the defendants were too far away. A case in point was that of a charge of robbery and murder brought against two Boers, named Gert Olivier and Stephanus Erasmus, by some Bechuanas. According to the natives, they were living on lands which they had occupied for some time at a place called Donkers Hoek, in the Stormberg regions, and possessed cattle which they had acquired by working in the Colony. One, Lucas, had had his four years' service with a British settler at Bathurst thus rewarded, and, further, held a certificate of honest

¹ *Vide* Blue Book, *Return of Caffre War*, July 12th, 1837. *Deposition of Tyali* relative to the late events. "Louis Strikhard had great weight with Hintza. At first the latter was afraid which way Louis might turn, when Louis and he agreed to encourage the war in every way in their power, but to temporise with the English," p. 234.

Deposition of Maqomo. "That he (Hintza) thought Louis Strikhard would, being a Dutchman, be against the war; but that when he went up to the Ameva where Louis was, they agreed to appear neutral, but secretly, covertly, and clandestinely to encourage the war by every practicable means," p. 232.

Deposition of Umzuta. "Louis Strikhard said: 'We must not appear to encourage the war, but do so privately; we shall then get cattle'. Louis Strikhard said: 'We must send to Maqomo's people to send us all the cattle; we can then help ourselves,'" p. 233. This evidence was taken before Colonel Smith at King William's Town.

possession from his late employer. Olivier with some armed Boers visited the kraals of these people, and, in spite of being shown the certificate, drove away the cattle on the grounds that they must have been stolen. During some four or five months the despoiled natives frequently visited Olivier and Erasmus in the hope of recovering their property. At the end of that time they found that their cattle were dead. Shortly after this Erasmus, with a large party of his men, drove the Bechuanas entirely away from Donkers Hoek, ordering them to cross the Orange River. The wretched creatures, halting for the night contrary to orders, were fired upon, when one man was shot through the neck and killed. The Boers drove them across the Kraai River, by which time they had lost their remaining horses and cattle. Shortly after crossing the Kraai they were attacked by Kaffirs; a few of them therefore returned to Erasmus and sought his assistance, but it was refused. They then made their way to Grahamstown and brought the matter before the Civil Commissioner, Captain Campbell, when the above story was told. Sir B. Durban said that if Erasmus had done wrong he should suffer the penalty of the law. It is not clear, however, whether any steps were taken.

As has been stated, the migrations of the Boers from the Colony previous to the early part of 1836 had been more connected with the object of finding better grazing for their cattle than that of discontent with the Government, though it is not to be understood that this matter did not in some measure have its effect. But at the time now under consideration, the desire of being quit of British rule and the determination to get beyond its pale took definite form, and that great national self-expatriation known as the great Boer Trek began in real earnest.

What were the causes of the Great Trek? Why did some hundreds of persons—some of them the most respectable and honourable—sacrifice their farms and homes in what was ostensibly a settled country and with their women-folk and young children venture into unknown lands where they knew full well that all kinds of dangers and difficulties must be encountered? Something more than mere disagreement with political principles must have been at work. Had we only the statements of the Boers themselves, it might have been

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possible, however unjustly, to have charged them with inherent discontent and ingratitude; it might have appeared that any form of law and order was distasteful to them, and that their attitude was always that of "show me the Gov'ment and I'm agin it". But we have the evidence of impartial, purely British officials, who, had they possessed any bias at all, might have been expected to have adopted such views. Both Sir Benjamin Durban and Colonel Smith, in the numerous letters which passed between them, speak of the Boers as having real grievances. So also do the Commissioners of Relief, Messrs. Hudson and Jarvis. In October, 1835, when Colonel Somerset was sent on the expedition into the northern parts of the Colony for the purpose of investigating reports of collisions between the Boers and natives and the state of the country generally, he interviewed many of the leading men, Field Commandants and Field Cornets, on the subject of their grievances, and thus writes to the Governor on November 8th: "I found the following points a great matter of complaint among the farmers, which my visit among them, as well as the orders lately issued, will, I trust, tend considerably to alleviate.

"1. They complain that they have for the last five or six years been overrun with foreigners (savages) of all denominations, who have established themselves without let or hindrance within the limits of the Colony upon the unoccupied lands of the Government.

"2. That they have been subject to continual and indiscriminate plunder by these people, who have come upon their places and set them at defiance.

"3. That to their just complaints and remonstrances to the authorities on the above head, they have received no attention, and that there has been a total want of all orders or instructions for their guidance in this particular.

"4. That in consequence of this, and from no magistrate being within reasonable distance, they have from the untoward and daring conduct of these Mantatees been obliged to put up with their violence and plunder, or to take the law into their own hands, from which latter circumstances no less than four unfortunate Boers are now lying in prison under sentence or awaiting investigation.

"5. If a farmer detects a thief, he must leave his property

in the hands of these people to convey that thief from twenty to thirty or forty hours' ride on horseback ; the thief must be secured, the stolen property produced and conveyed to the magistrate, cattle, sheep, or goats ; this cannot be done without assistance. The witness must be produced, and the complainant must probably perform his journey twice or thrice before the culprit can be brought to justice. In the meantime the property of the farmer, as well as his wife and family, is left exposed to the insults and depredations of his servants and of passing strangers.

"6. The farmer would therefore rather lose the stolen property than subject himself to the risk of losing much more, besides the fatigue of the undertaking ; the thief is therefore allowed to escape, thus giving encouragement to continued thefts on the part of the Mantatee servants ; indeed it appears that numbers of these people have of late been travelling through the country with flocks of sheep and cattle, halting where they please and for what time they please ; if ordered off the farm by the farmer, they set him at defiance, with threats of repelling force by force ; and so shrewd have they become that upon the least attempt at coercion by a farmer they proceed to the magistrate, swear an assault, bring a host of witnesses, and he is immediately summoned, and must find bail or go to prison.

"7. Although their slaves whom they had purchased (many of them at a great price) have been emancipated contrary to their desire, they are called upon, previous to their slaves being taxed, to procure a certificate from the Register Office, for which they are obliged to pay. Certificates of their claims for compensation must be given in, for which they are charged five shillings. Thus before any compensation has been obtained for their property, they are twice called upon to advance a sum of money, and they entertain a feeling of doubt as to whether they will ever obtain any compensation for their slaves.

"8. In consequence of no orders or injunctions on the part of the Government prohibiting the inhabitants of the Colony from establishing themselves beyond the borders of the Colony, a restlessness or disposition for roving has crept in among the farmers that has increased to an alarming extent. The older inhabitants of the district consider the tacit sanction of the

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Government to the farmers removing themselves beyond the boundary of the Colony, and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the Colonial laws, as fraught with destruction to the Colony, it being apparent to them, as it must be to every one else, that those people who have thus removed themselves (being unshackled by any authority) will be induced to commit irregularities and acts of oppression towards their weaker neighbours, thus keeping up a constant war of seizure and reprisal, which must eventually fall with tenfold weight on the peaceable inhabitants within the Colony. Upon this head the farmers solicit a positive prohibition on the part of the Government to any person crossing the boundary of the Colony.

“9. It is further urged that the traders who have been permitted to pass the limits of the Colony are carrying on an illicit trade in gunpowder with the natives, which has been of serious injury to the farmers, inasmuch as that powder has been exchanged with those people for cattle which they made no scruple of plundering (whenever opportunity offered) from the farmers of the Colony, and which cattle the farmers were prevented by severe laws from following up and bestowing chastisement on the depredators.

“10. The farmers earnestly solicit decided and defined regulations for all classes, with proper authorities resident amongst them to enforce the due observance of such regulations.

“11. They complain that great injustice has been done them by magistrates not having been established amongst them (within a reasonable distance) to hear their complaints, redress their grievances, or in any way to make them aware of passing events; and that the civil authorities now placed over them never come among them to reconcile differences, or to see the difficulties under which they are labouring.

“12. It is, however, to be observed that in a district of 20,000 square miles it is quite impracticable for one public officer, however active and intelligent, to attend to all the public duties required of him, or to do anything like justice to the claims of the inhabitants. The sub-district of Somerset contains, at a low computation, 18,000 inhabitants, scattered over an immense extent of country with only one magistrate for their whole body.

“ 13. That although the distance to the seat of magistracy at Somerset is 250 and even 300 miles from many of their farms, they are summoned from their homes upon the most frivolous complaints from their servants and apprentices, without consideration of the circumstances or of the difficulties to which their absence exposes them. CHAP.
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“ 14. Another point I must allude to, about which very great complaint is made, is the very insecure tenure of their lands. Four-fifths of the land-holders are without their title-deeds; although those farms have many of them been measured by authority and paid for years ago by the occupiers, yet they have to this day not received their diagrams. Some instances of irregularity and apparent injustice and hardship have been brought under my notice, arising entirely from this neglect; to whatever cause it may be attributed, it demands early and indeed immediate attention and remedy.

“ 15. The want of gunpowder, apparently arising from a mistrust of the farmers, has also been pressed upon my notice; this latter impression my explanation has removed, and the difficulties of obtaining gunpowder I have promised to obviate as far as may be expedient.

(Signed) “ H. SOMERSET.”

If the Boers who gave the above as their grievances to Colonel Somerset were truly representative of their people, then the charge which has so often been preferred against them, viz. that they objected to law and order of any kind, is not fair or just. It will be seen, in fact, that lawlessness was their chief complaint. Paragraph 8 is of special interest. Here we see the Boers themselves objecting to emigration beyond the boundary. The neglect of the issue of the title-deeds was a grievance which was widespread. Many of the British settlers, especially those who had taken up land round about Bathurst, were in the same predicament. All fees had been paid, all formalities observed, and yet, year after year elapsed without title-deeds being finished.

The spokesman of the Eastern Province Boers was the famous Pieter Retief. Officially he was a Field Commandant of the Winterberg district, but unofficially he was the leader, general advocate, and intermediary between the whole Boer

CHAP. VI. community and the Government. Hence, from the Boer

Kaapstad onder ainsdage 3 Junij 1836.

Uw Hoogheeren

Ik raad U te allen tijde dat onze Republiek
keuze in de onbreuk van de hand van
In dat onze Boers Raad maken U. U. U. U.
Plaats verhoort, maar op de U. U. U. U.
Christiaan Daniël de Vries Refonmandant
als de gesticht Raad van het dat aapt.
in de U. U. U. U.

Caecil Potte wordt te weten hoe hij
wordt man gedragen bij het verhooren
van dat land en de U. U. U. U.

Ik raad U ook nog eens te weten dat hij
meer want wat te weten bij de U. U. U. U.
krijgt over de onbreuk van de U. U. U. U.
van met alle de U. U. U. U.
wanneer hij U. U. U. U. dan raad verhooren om allen
in de U. U. U. U. te verhooren
om alle handelingen het bij van wat het
het ook moet van onder het U. U. U. U.
niet stellen.

Uw Hoogheeren

J. A. van der
L. A. van der
J. A. van der

Uw Hoogheeren

J. A. van der

point of view, his letters to the authorities give the best accounts of the causes of the Great Trek. The following is his state-

ment of the condition of things in the early part of 1836, written to the Civil Commissioner in Grahamstown :—

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“ KOONAP, 11/4/36.

“ SIR,—Having been requested by the inhabitants residing in the neighbourhood of the Winterberg and the Koonap to lay before you for the consideration of His Excellency the Governor their distressed condition caused by the late Kaffir invasion, and their other grievances, I have therefore the honour to state, that more than a year has now elapsed since the inhabitants of this part of the Colony were reduced to absolute poverty by the burning of their dwellings and the plunder of their cattle, whilst up to the present moment there is no prospect, as far as they can perceive, that compensation will be made to them for their ruinous losses. Deprived of most of the necessaries of life amidst the heart-rending complaints of their impoverished families, they are threatened by their creditors with the sale of those few necessaries which some of them have still left for their support, whilst the debts due to them from the Colonial Government for grain and for other property sold or for services performed for the public, although incurred, some of them more than a year ago, have not yet been liquidated, and which has subjected them to great disappointment and inconvenience.¹ Their miseries are also aggravated at beholding their barbarous enemies in possession of their cattle, exulting in the success of their atrocious deeds and enjoying the fruit of their crimes unmolested; and although the inhabitants have much confidence in the measures adopted by the Governor to repress the rapacity of the Kaffirs, yet the present state of these savages, and of the coloured classes in general, under the present regulations affords but little security for them to resume with

¹ Extract of a letter from Mr. Rob. Hart of Somerset East to the Lieutenant-Governor, dated February 1st, 1837: “ SIR,—During the late Caffre war, heavy demands were made on the inhabitants for provisions, forage, etc. Two years have nearly elapsed without the least prospect of payment for these supplies, though many that furnished them are in distress and were obliged to pay for making out their accounts for these supplies. I have no doubt that I could purchase all these claims now for half their amount, if I could be so base; it is only for some individual to get access to these claims and to come through this part of the country and purchase them for a nominal amount. Is there any wonder at the people going beyond the boundary? ”

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confidence their agricultural labours. Their difficulties are also much increased by the non-payment of the slave compensation money, and which they have been led to believe would have been paid on the Government resuming a right to manumit those for whose services their property had been (?) under its immediate sanction and guarantee; the increasing insubordination and desertion among these manumitted slaves, now apprenticed labourers, and others of the coloured classes, on entering into service, and other grievances of great magnitude, to which they desire to call your particular attention. To this may be added the great distance of the seat of magistracy from their habitation, a circumstance which has powerful effect in producing this insubordination, it being impossible that the masters for every offence of an apprentice or other servant, can undertake a journey of two or three days to the nearest magistrate, a task not only attended with great loss of time, but under the present circumstances would greatly endanger the safety of their families. Another grievance which I am instructed to lay before you is, that a number of horses which had been stolen before the late Kaffir war, as well as afterwards, are in the possession of persons who refuse to deliver them up, on the plea that they were either obtained from the Kaffirs or Colonel Smith, and which plea has hitherto been a bar to their getting back such property. And it is requested to be informed whether the laws of the land do not admit as a justifiable act for the rightful owner to claim his property wherever he may find it, and to receive it upon clear identification." (Then follows the paragraph about the militia on page 222.) "In conclusion . . . unless their reasonable requests are complied with, and more especially some authority appointed to secure to them the limited means still left them for their support, that they will be compelled, however great their regret may be, to abandon their fertile farms, on which they most anxiously desire to remain in peace, and to seek protection and safety on some more favoured spot.

"I have the honour to be, your obedient servant,

"P. RETIEF."

The grievance with respect to the horses, mentioned in this document, was a very sore point at this time, and promised

to add considerably to the prevailing discontent and agitation. The case was this. Since the declaration of peace, several farmers, both Dutch and British, had purchased horses either from the Kaffirs themselves or from other farmers who had got them from the Kaffirs—in some instances the horses were bought at public auction. The animals had, before or during the war, been taken by the Kaffirs from other farmers, who may be called the original possessors. At this time many of the original possessors, recognising their animals, claimed them and brought actions at law against the subsequent possessors for their recovery. The Civil Commissioner in Grahamstown could not decide in these cases and so referred them to the Attorney-General. That high official, on January 22nd, 1836, in answer stated: "I am clearly of opinion that the owner has a legal right to recover by process of law any cattle stolen from him and purchased from Kaffirs during the War". Both Colonel Smith and the Governor disagreed with this decision. The former maintained that the Treaty of Peace was a general amnesty, and that all property "whether of military stores, the munitions of war, or private property, remains in the hands of the possessor as they stood upon the day peace was proclaimed. Such is the usage if not the Law of Nations." If the Attorney-General were right, then the Kaffirs would have the same claim against the colonists, and especially against the Fingoes for the thousands of cattle they had taken out of Hintza's country. Sir B. Durban said there never was anything more absurd or more mischievous than this opinion of the Attorney-General. This most consummate law officer applies the law of a horse stolen on Finchley Common to acts done "*flagrante bello*". He was asked, therefore, to reconsider his opinion.

The whole question seems to have turned on the word "stolen"; it was found in the end that property seized or captured during a state of war was *not stolen*. The following was the modified opinion: "The simple question originally brought by you (Duncan Campbell) was merely on the legality or otherwise of the sale of *stolen* cattle, and you are already aware of my opinion on that head. It seems to me, however, now that the whole extent of the question has come under my cognisance, that as no stipulation has been made in

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the treaties with the Kaffirs making provision for the restoration by both parties of property captured during a state of war, such property, according to international law, becomes the property of the captors, and, therefore, that any cattle so captured by the Kaffirs might be legally sold, and the original owner cannot maintain an action for the recovery thereof against the present proprietors. All cattle, therefore, which were driven off during the war must be considered as booty, and the person whose property it was, when thus driven off, has lost all legal right to recover the same from a third party.

“A. OLIPHANT, *Attorney-General*.

“*March 3rd, 1836.*”

A curious contributory cause of the exodus of the Boers from the Colony is alleged in the correspondence of Sir B. Durban at this time, and, at a slightly later date, also in that of Lieutenant-Governor Stockenstrom, who very strongly emphasised it. The ignorant Dutch people are said to have been deliberately misled and deluded by the false reports of designing and wicked men. The charges are always vague in the extreme. It is not in the least clear who these bad characters were and what object was in view—or indeed, whether there was any foundation for such statements. Among other things, the Boers were said to have been told that the Roman Catholic religion was to be compulsory throughout the Colony, that all were to be compelled to become soldiers, that all lands were to be given to the Hottentots, and other things equally untrue and absurd. That there may have been such rumours is more than likely, but that they were originated and propagated designedly and deliberately by men with ulterior motives is now difficult of proof. It might have been expected that there would have been land speculators interested in frightening the Boers from their lands; in the documents available for research to-day, however, there is nothing to warrant this.

It is not expedient at this place to go into the enormous amount of detail in connection with the wanderings, adventures, and sufferings of the Voortrekkers. It must suffice here just to look at this great movement from the point of view of the Colony, and to consider only the beginning of it as one of the incidents of the history of the Eastern Province during the

year 1836. Speaking generally, it may be said that the development of this project had, throughout this year, not got much beyond that of talk and preparation, more or less in earnest. There can be little doubt that a large proportion of those who eventually left the Colony were loath to do so, and tarried until they were convinced that there would be no change in the conditions of life they found so intolerable. Colonel Smith, in one of his letters to the Governor at this time, said that the Boers were waiting to hear the truth of the rumours respecting the abandonment of the Province of Queen Adelaide before they took any decided step. Until towards the end of the year, the magnitude of the exodus had not exceeded that of about three parties. As has already been pointed out, Louis Triegardt with a number of his people had, sometime before this, crossed the boundary and squatted down on lands on the "Ameva". He went there probably in the early part of 1834. He must have left that part for the north before the end of 1835, as by May, 1836, he had reached so distant a part as Potgieter's Rust in the far away Zoutpansberg in the Transvaal. His departure may have been hastened by Colonel Smith offering a reward of 500 cattle for his apprehension.¹ His party consisted of eight men, seven women, and thirty-four children. Another party of nine men, eight women, and thirty children, under Jan van Rensberg, joined him before he crossed the Orange River, when the whole cavalcade of ninety-seven individuals, with thirty waggons and large droves of cattle and sheep, moved off into regions hitherto unknown to them.

In February, 1836, the Field Cornet of the New Hantam (Graaff Reinet district) reported that a large concourse of people with seventy waggons had crossed the Orange River. He thought, however, that the greater number were intending to return, though four families of Liebenbergs and one Carl Celliers had expressed their determination to go somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Portuguese territories. Celliers afterwards played an important part in Voortrekker history. Though these were all who left at this early date, preparations for departure were in active progress throughout the whole of

¹ *Vide* Theal, *History of South Africa*, vol. ii., p. 270.

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the Eastern Province. Farms were being disposed of at great sacrifice, and in many cases they were just merely abandoned.¹ Mr. Commissary Palmer of Grahamstown tells us (March 8th, 1836), that for some time the Boers had been refusing to accept anything but coin in payment of the sums due to them, that they had been willing to take a sovereign in lieu of twenty-three shillings in paper money, or Treasury drafts, and thus "they have literally drained Grahamstown of all its metallic currency".

The Governor became alarmed at all this, and, though his sympathies were with the Boers, he endeavoured to stop it, but he was powerless. He referred the matter to the Attorney-General (August 13th), but received no further consolation than the statement that neither by any law then in force nor any which could be framed, could the Boers be prevented from leaving the Colony if they wished to do so. "Would it be prudent, or just," he continued, "even if it were possible to prevent persons discontented with their condition from trying to better themselves in whatever part of the world they please? The same sort of removal takes place every day in Great Britain to the United States." In spite of this, however, on September 4th, the Assistant Civil Commissioner of Somerset East was informed that he must prohibit and prevent all immigration under the penalties which the martial law awards to all who disobey orders and especially pass over to an enemy's country. This, of course, could only be valid while martial law was in force.

¹ An old Voortrekker lady, whom the author had the privilege of interviewing, stated that the farm adjoining the one on which she then lived (in the Alexandria district) was sold by its owner, who wished to join the trek, for a bulldog and a waggon. Some farms were disposed of for tea, coffee, and such-like provisions. Among other matters still within her recollection of these times, she said: "I was in the party with the Rudolfs under Commandant Carl Landman, who was my grand-uncle; my father's second wife was the eldest daughter of Pieter Retief. We went away in big ox-waggons which were provided with tents, white lined with green. As far as travelling was concerned, we were comfortable. We had good supplies of tea—in little boxes lined with lead—coffee, sugar, and other groceries, and also material for making clothes. For meat we killed the cattle and sheep which were driven along with us. Our journey to Natal was through the country where Aliwal North now stands. Some slaves went with us; they were attached to us from having been so long in our service and would not leave us. When I returned to the Colony, an orphan, a few years later, one of the slaves came back with me. The woman servant I have in this house now is the fourth generation of that slave."

During all the anxious months of 1835 and a part of 1836, the Governor received only two communications from England. One from Lord Aberdeen, dated April 11th, 1835, commending the promptness with which the outbreak had been dealt with, and asking that His Majesty's Government might be informed of the causes of the violent actions of the Kaffirs, and one from Lord Glenelg, dated April 30th, 1835, merely acknowledging the Governor's despatch of the previous January 30th. As month by month passed by, and ship after ship arrived in Table Bay, nothing of the nature of instructions or offers of assistance in men or money were received. "We are still without news of England," "ship's mails have arrived but nothing from Downing Street," "still no communication from the Secretary of State," and similar statements occur with almost tiresome frequency in the correspondence between Sir Benjamin Durban and Colonel Smith. "For while His Majesty's Government generally has never sent me instructions or communications of any kind, so His Majesty's Treasury on their part have never sent me either instructions or assistance to meet the immense increase of military expenditure, but both have left me to struggle with political as well as financial difficulties as best I may," says Sir B. Durban to Colonel Smith on March 4th, 1836.¹

It certainly did seem at the time as though the British Government had left the country to its unhappy fate, and that

¹ And to Lord Glenelg on June 9th, 1836, in answer to his famous despatch of the preceding December 26th. "By a despatch from Your Lordship of April 30th following, I know that these despatches (viz. those of January 21st and February 27th) had then reached Downing Street, but it contained a bare acknowledgment of the receipt of them, without any observation whatever upon their contents, whether of approval or disapproval. It conveyed no instructions; it announced no assistance to the public service, either of men or money, in the critical and unexpected circumstances of the period (neither was any rendered throughout the struggle); it passed unnoticed the dreadful calamities of His Majesty's afflicted subjects here; it offered no expression of sympathy, nor any hope of relief, which might have tended to cheer their minds, or to alleviate in some degree their distress; neither has any relief been since afforded. That communication, however (of April 30th, 1835), was the last and only one received throughout the year (note Sir B. D. seems to have forgotten the one he received from Lord Aberdeen), my subsequent despatches of February and March having been alike unnoticed, until, on December 26th, Your Lordship was pleased to reply to mine of the 19th of the preceding June, which had been delivered to Your Lordship on September 11th. It is just to myself, and to the Colony, that I here record this apparently utter abandonment of both, and I therefore record it." (Despatch, Durban to Glenelg, June 9th, 1836.)

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the extensive invasion by the Kaffirs had been too insignificant for notice or concern. Before charging those high authorities, however, with neglect and callous indifference to the misfortunes of the colonists, it will be well to consider how far Sir Benjamin's suspicions or convictions were justified.

In December, 1834, about the time when the war broke out, a change of Government in England took place. Lord Aberdeen displaced Mr. Spring Rice as Secretary of State for the Colonies. He held office for a few months only, in fact, until April, 1835, when Lord Glenelg succeeded him. That is, within a period of five months, there were no fewer than three different Secretaries of State for the Colonies. Sir Benjamin Durban's first despatch announcing the outbreak of war was addressed to Mr. Spring Rice, but was answered by Lord Aberdeen on April 11th, 1835, in the terms already mentioned. The next, that of January 30th, reached London on April 27th, shortly after Lord Glenelg took office, and was acknowledged on the 30th of that month. From that day until October 20th, Lord Glenelg did not address the Governor on the subject of the war, although in that interval he received despatches dated February 27th and March 19th.

Beyond stating that he was incurring considerable expense in the matter of horses, equipment, and relief of the destitute, the Governor did not in any other manner intimate that he was, or likely to be, in any financial difficulty; nor did he give Mr. Spring Rice reason to believe that the forces at his command were inadequate for the task before them. It would seem, therefore, that if blame attached to anyone for deficiencies in these subjects it was to Sir B. Durban himself. Further, it is difficult to see to what purport Lord Glenelg could have written during those six months, seeing that he was without definite information on the progress of events in the Colony, and that three months had to elapse before any announcement concerning them could reach England. He preferred, as he tells us, to wait until the struggle was ended, and then to take the whole into review, rather than to perplex and perhaps harass the Governor by commenting on or giving instructions from time to time on matters which, from the nature of the case, he could know but little. In this way he accounted for his silence. It was broken, however, and a very definite

stimulus was given to his action by the receipt of the Governor's despatch of June 19th (addressed to Lord Aberdeen), in which the extension of the Colonial boundary and the formation of the Province of Queen Adelaide were mentioned. Lord Glenelg had expected an answer to Lord Aberdeen's request for information respecting the cause of the war, but as this had not been supplied, and the noble Lord had had to collect what information he could in England, he was not prepared to hold out any prospect that that measure would meet with the approval of His Majesty's Government. Sir Benjamin in that despatch was warned against taking any steps such as granting land, building forts, constructing works, and "in short, from committing further the British Government in regard to a measure, from which it is not impossible that you may be called upon to recede". This chilling reply was received in Cape Town about the end of January, 1836. It was the precursor of still more direful instructions which were then on the way to South Africa.

Coming events were casting their shadows before them. At the beginning of 1836, rumours to the effect that all that had been accomplished in Kaffirland was to be undone were widely spread. The dissemination of these had commenced before the Governor had had any official communication from the Secretary of State. Hence there must have been some private and unofficial source of information of what was pending. "I am not surprised at the report," says Sir Benjamin Durban on February 19th, "because, if I mistake not, the *Fairbairn Journal* (the *Commercial Advertiser*) has asserted that it will be so. What may be the reality, I do not know, for as yet I have no word from England, but I hope not for the sake of all." Even Maqomo was able to surprise Colonel Smith by being the first to tell him that all the country up to the Keiskamma was to be given back to the Kaffirs. "Never!" thundered forth the Colonel, giving a fiery decision in the name of the King. Associated with the Philippine party as these rumours were, and realising the influence which that party had in England, the colonists saw good reasons for thinking them to be true; the British therefore were petitioning the Home Government for better protection, while the Dutch were meditating leaving the country altogether. Further

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signs of the times were, that firstly, Dr. Philip was about to return to England to give evidence on the cause of the war before the Select Committee of the House of Commons then sitting, and secondly, at this time a petty Kaffir chief, Jan Tzatzoe, one of Colonel Smith's magistrates, mysteriously disappeared from his home at King William's Town.

Tzatzoe was the chief of the Amatinde, a small tribe consisting of about a thousand individuals of both sexes and all ages. In his early years he had been under the influence of Dr. van der Kemp at Bethelsdorp and then became an assistant to the Rev. J. Read, in fact, a London Society's missionary. At the time now under consideration he was settled down with his family and aged parents on land at King William's Town, which had been allotted to him by Colonel Smith, to whom he was responsible for the good behaviour of his people. He is described as a docile, well-disposed, though unenergetic man, of no influence whatever among the high-born and more powerful chiefs. Circumstances now conspired to make Jan the best-known Kaffir in the British Empire. One day early in January he left his home, ostensibly to conduct a missionary over the mountains to the Kat River Settlement. Colonel Smith gave him permission to go, but with the injunction that he was to be back as soon as possible. He should have returned the next day at the latest, as he was on horseback. But days passed without Jan appearing. His wife and old father became very distressed and brought their trouble before Colonel Smith, who was scarcely less concerned. After some days both the Colonel and Jan's wife received letters from Jan himself, written from Bethelsdorp, saying that he was with Dr. Philip, and was about to accompany that divine to England. Colonel Smith took immediate steps to have him arrested and brought back—not with any view to preventing him from going to England, but that he should personally deliver up his authority as magistrate, and, more important, that Colonel Smith might have the opportunity of taking down in writing Jan's views, opinions, and evidence respecting the events of the Colony during the preceding quarter of a century; so that if need be these might be compared with what he might say when, as was expected, all sorts of statements would be put into his mouth to suit party purposes.

But, as the Colonel said, the Doctor had completely outflanked him and given him no chance for a counter move, for Jan was hurried off to Cape Town before he could be captured. While at Philipton, in the Kat River Settlement, the party, consisting presumably of Jan Tzatzoe, Dr. Philip, and a "Rev." Captain Fawcett, H.E.I.C., of the Bombay Army, who was doing a little preaching while on leave in the Colony and working with Dr. Philip, was joined by a Hottentot, Andries Stoffles. The Governor on hearing of the abduction of these people also decided to place no obstacle in the way of their proceeding to England; though, as eventually turned out to be the case, he felt that this mission would lead to their ruin. Dr. Philip and Tzatzoe called upon him just prior to sailing. "I expressed my displeasure," he says, "in very strong terms to them both, adding that both the man and the parties who had been employed to carry him off might have spared themselves the trouble of deception, since his own free will would not have been opposed, and that he would then have taken his departure in a way more creditable to himself and more to the satisfaction of his family." We shall meet them presently in England, though we may not at first recognise the insignificant Jan Tzatzoe in his regal blue and gold uniform.

This departure of Dr. Philip with the two natives for England, the silence of the Home Government, and the atmosphere of doubt and foreboding which the rumours had created, made it incumbent upon the Governor to be prepared against attack and false accusations of all kinds. That they would be made he felt certain. For the public mind in England at this time was so engrossed with the subject of slavery and cruelty to aborigines in distant parts of the Empire that any statement concerning the iniquities of white men and the innocence of black received unquestioned credence. Here was the chief source of Dr. Philip's greatness and importance. Colonel Smith therefore was asked by Sir Benjamin Durban to collect evidence from those around him, more especially the great chiefs. "I shall carefully abstain," he says to the Colonel on February 5th, "from taking any part in the controversies of the period. But I am bound to collect essentially all the materials which information can give me for the defence of the war in England which Dr. Philip and his faction are

CHAP. VI. commencing, and in which I am by no means to be spared." Colonel Smith did as he was asked, and in due course a number of depositions were forwarded to Cape Town. Both Maqomo and Tyali, as well as other important witnesses, were interviewed. The evidence itself seems trustworthy, though one's mind must be kept open to the fact that the peculiar disposition of Colonel Smith may have influenced the natives to say too much or too little. On the whole the statements made are in accord with what has been described in the foregoing.¹

¹ *Deposition of Maqomo*, at King William's Town, April 28th, 1836 (*vide* Blue Book on *Caffre War*, July 12th, 1837, p. 232). The substance of this statement was that Hintza advised him to fight, as the English had treated him badly (over Tyali's cattle); that Louis Triegardt was in league with Hintza; that the English did not take half of the cattle which were driven into his country, and that he (Maqomo) now sees that Hintza's wavering policy was to get all the cattle into his country. Knows of the death of Hintza only by hearsay, but states that no Kaffir will be taken prisoner while he has an assegai left. The following probably is of more value, as Maqomo made the statement quite spontaneously and before Colonel Smith commenced to collect evidence. It is in a private letter from Colonel Smith to the Governor, dated January 28th, 1836. "Maqomo came to me this day and begged to have some private conversation with me. I said certainly, and let him have his own way entirely." After talking about his inclination to put aside his royalty, become a private individual, and have a farm at the Mancazana, "He then in the most clear, concise, and conspicuous manner gave me his own history, the important extract of which is, he considered himself cruelly used in his first expulsion from the Koonap and Kat Rivers, after he had attacked the Tambookies and driven them out of a country they had no right to, and would not quit; that he took their cattle, Gaika his father told him to do it; that he told this to Captain Armstrong who said, 'You ought to do what your father tells you'. After he took the cattle Colonel Somerset sent for him and some witnesses. He at first gave a decision in his favour. Colonel Somerset then examined the witnesses privately; he then called for Maqomo again and said, 'Your witnesses tell lies, and you restore the Tambookies their cattle'. Maqomo said, 'If my witnesses say to you before me one thing and behind my back another, they are liars, and not to be depended on'. Colonel Somerset said, 'Yes, because you are as bad as they'. Maqomo said, 'I will give up the cattle as you say so, but the truth shall come out. We shall both die and our witnesses shall die. I will then have you and them before God, who sees and knows everything.' From that day he (Maqomo) took a rooted enmity to Somerset, for he could not trust him. Stockenstrom afterwards came to him and said he was sorry, but he hoped there would be no bloodshed. 'The truth is,' he said, 'Stockenstrom and Somerset are not friends; what one said the other contradicted, and their dissension fell upon us. I was very sore in heart when last turned out, and when Philip came up I was glad to get hold of any man who knew the Governor and would state my case for me. I thought I had been hardly used.' Philip talked of peace and said good words, that he would represent his case and that he must wait patiently. That although very sore, this was not the immediate cause of the war." He then spoke of the seizure of the "Royal cattle," which was regarded as a declaration of war. "Somerset

Towards the end of March, 1836, the uncertainty and suspense regarding the intentions of the Home Government were removed by the arrival of Lord Glenelg's famous despatch of December 26th, 1835. Of all the official documents which have ever reached South Africa, there has probably not been one which has been so effective in moulding the characteristic troublous history of the country as this one. The announcement of its contents was the signal for general commotion throughout the Eastern Province. The Dutch population, in real earnest, commenced to swarm out of the Colony in hundreds, so as to be beyond the reach of British rule; the Kaffirs saw that all their degraded and cruel customs, together with their lost facilities for stealing cattle, were to be restored to them; while the British learning, in common with their Dutch brethren, that they had given ample justification for the Kaffirs to despoil them, could only look to the future with the direst forebodings. The receipt of this despatch was the turning-point—for the worse—in the history of South Africa.

Regarded purely as a despatch, it was an able document.¹

was good to us one day, cross another; we had no dependence on him, or when he would deceive us."

Deposition of Tyali, at King William's Town, May 4th, 1836 (Blue Book, p. 234). Incriminates Hintza, describes that chief as urging them on to fight and to send all the cattle into his country, "all he cared for was to get the cattle, he was a cunning fellow"; speaks of "Louis Strikhard having great influence with him"; the Kaffirs expected help from the Hottentots, both in arms and ammunition; they were tired of sawing yellow wood trees and quarrying stone—they would no longer serve the English; gives the usual hearsay account of Hintza's death.

Deposition of Eno, May 23rd, 1836 (p. 237). Says Maqomo and Tyali sent to him a message that the Hottentots wanted to join the Kaffirs in making war on the Colony. He answered, if the Hottentots want to fight, let them do so by themselves; we ought not to make war on the Colony. "I knew that there had been much stealing in the Colony at this time. I was much against this war, so was Botman and Guanga. The patrols irritated our people. In place of coming to the chiefs and demanding restitution and indemnification, they would seize cattle anywhere, if the spoor came near, without any regulation as to number. The young people were all ready to fight and expected the Hottentots to join them; many of Hintza's people were with mine. Our custom is to declare war; we did not do so; we ought to have done so. Caffres are wild men in war."

¹ For the full text of this despatch, *vide* Blue Book, *Caffre War and Death of Hintza*. House of Commons, May 30th, 1836.

Deposition of Omza, a pakati of Hintza (p. 237). Gives an account of going into the Izolo camp with Hintza and the incidents up to the proclamation of the Kei as the boundary. "He (Hintza) told us on the Ndabakazi (the second

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Lord Glenelg had evidently studied all the available information and thought deeply before he penned it. He was undoubtedly actuated by generous and noble motives, but withal he laboured under grievous misapprehension. Had he studied still more deeply and waited until he was in possession of more authentic information from the Cape, he would have seen his mistakes earlier and saved a vast amount of unnecessary suffering. There can be no doubt that he shared in the prejudice against the colonists which was then so prevalent in England, and equally little doubt that he was misled by those whose zeal in the cause of humanity had got the better of their discretion. It is noteworthy that at the time he wrote the despatch he had no information regarding the events of the last three months of the war and after—the last despatch he had received from the Governor bore the date June 19th, 1835. The following is an epitome of this momentous document:—

He commenced by endorsing Lord Aberdeen's commendation of the Governor's vigour and decision in dealing with the outbreak of the war, but considered that success against such an enemy as the Kaffir could add but little to his military distinction. He deplored the want of official information concerning the causes of the war, which he thought Sir Benjamin ought to have sent him; for want of this he had been compelled to search through a large mass of documents in his office as well as others which had been brought under his notice "by the voluntary zeal of various individuals, who, for many different motives, interest themselves in the discussion". On these he had arrived at conclusions respecting the

camp we were at with the English) that he would make his escape, and he was always wanting to ride among the Fingoes for the purpose. . . . 'We will not be made prisoners; we never take one; it is life or death.' Hintza ought to have behaved well to the English. Some years ago they saved our country, and he ought not to have promised to go with Smith, and then run off—for Smith was very kind to him and all of us."

Deposition of Yoyo, nephew and captain of Eno (p. 238). In much the same strain and on the usual topics.

Deposition of Umzuta, pakati of Hintza (May 3rd, p. 233). Gives evidence concerning the perfidy of Hintza, the collusion with Triegardt, the good treatment they received at the hands of Colonel Smith. *Vide* also the depositions of Ganya, p. 74; of Tyali, p. 75; Botman, p. 76; Mr. Robson, pp. 77-78; Mr. J. Weir, p. 79; Klaas Platje, p. 88; Dr. Atherstone, p. 91—all of Blue Book, *Return of Caffre War*, July 12th, 1837.

origin of the war. Having proceeded to consider "whether the invasion of the Colony by the Kaffirs was provoked by such wrongs as afforded them a legitimate cause of war," and whether it is correctly designated as an "unprovoked outrage," he was constrained to admit "that in the conduct which was pursued towards the Kaffir nation by the colonists and the public authorities, through a series of years, *the Kaffirs had an ample justification for the war*". In support of this opinion, he recounted the negotiations and various measures for the protection of the frontier which had been adopted from the first interview of Lord Charles Somerset with Gaika in 1817—the formation of the neutral country and its violation by Sir R. Donkin—the fluctuating policy of the different Governors—the Kaffirs at one time being permitted to cross the boundary, and, at another, being driven back; "harassed by a long series of aggressions and the victims of successive changes, opinions, and conduct of the local authorities, they wanted nothing to complete their right to regain possession of the lands from which they had been expelled but the power to render their assertion of it effectual". Lord Glenelg then passed on to a very emphatic condemnation of the spoor law, and found in this a second apology for the Kaffirs devastating the districts of Albany and Somerset. There can be no doubt that that procedure for the purpose of regaining stolen cattle or its equivalent was bad, that the innocent were, at times, punished for the guilty, and that, on principle, it deserved all the hard things which the noble lord said about it. But, on the other hand, what else could a robbed farmer do? The alternative was, from the beginning, to abandon all hope and intention of ever again seeing his property. All experiments in negotiations and treaties with the Kaffirs, both before and after that time, had been failures, except when the bayonet and bullet had been at hand to enforce compliance. Lord Glenelg, however, saw the cause of the Kaffir depredations to have been the driving them from their "ancient and lawful possessions" into a comparatively narrow sphere, and that therefore "*they had a perfect right to hazard the experiment, however hopeless, of extorting by force that redress which they could not expect otherwise to obtain*". The Governor, in his Proclamation of May 10th, 1835, had referred to the

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Kaffirs as "irreclaimable savages," and, in a despatch, had given the substance of a conversation he had had with the rescued missionaries, in which the Kaffirs were described as wolves. The Secretary of State found it difficult to describe the pain with which he read these statements. He recorded his dissent from this unfavourable estimate of the Kaffir character, and endeavoured to show that their treatment of the missionaries and traders gave the lie to these aspersions.

Turning then to the conduct of the operations in Kaffirland, he considered the measures for repelling the invaders had been on a most, and presumably unnecessarily, extensive scale, employing "an army of no less than 5,000 men," and this against merely disorganised bodies of men skulking in their natural fastnesses.¹ The fact that there were only eighteen² casualties on the side of the invaders, while hundreds of Kaffirs were killed, indicated that it was a very unequal contest between helpless and undisciplined hordes and overwhelming numbers of regular troops. Further, Colonel Smith's actions in destroying Kaffir dwellings and corn showed that he was actuated by vengeance, unbecoming a soldier. The treatment and death of Hintza appeared to Lord Glenelg to admit of no satisfactory justification. It was with extreme distrust that "he contrasted the Governor's statements with those impressions derived not from a distinct knowledge of facts, but from apparent presumptions of the case". These presumptions were that Hintza would not be likely to countenance war against the Colony, seeing that he was surrounded by hostile clans and was fully aware of the benefits of an alliance with the British. "He was slain when he had no longer the means of resistance, but covered with wounds, and vainly attempting to conceal his person in the water into which he had plunged as a refuge from his pursuers. . . . It is stated to me, how-

¹ The number of troops in Kaffirland was roughly 3,000, of which only 400 were regular soldiers; 760 were Hottentot levies, 300 of the C.M.R., the remainder were mounted burghers—not greatly distinguished for their discipline. Of the 2,000 of the defensive force left in the Colony, 485 only were regulars. *Vide* Despatch, Sir B. D., June 9th, 1836.

² Lord Glenelg was wrong here, for *not* including those of Bailie's party who were killed on Tabindoda, and the forty-three men who were murdered at the first outbreak, there were sixty casualties up to that date, viz. twenty-three killed, thirty wounded, and seven missing. *Vide* pages 6, 14, and 36 of Blue Book, May 30th, 1836.

ever, on evidence which it is impossible to receive without serious attention, that Hintza repeatedly cried for mercy ; that the Hottentots present granted the boon, and abstained from killing him ; that this office was then undertaken by Mr. Southey, and that then the dead body of the fallen chief was basely and inhumanely mutilated." Into this an investigation was to be instituted. With reference to the practical outcome of all these opinions and presumptions and the policy to be adopted, Lord Glenelg, in consequence of want of official information respecting the cause of the war, did not feel prepared then to submit any definite instructions. He was prepared, however, to refuse to admit that the British sovereignty over the country between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers rested on any solid foundation of international law or justice. Further, "the claim of sovereignty over the new province bounded by the Keiskamma and the Kei must be renounced. It rests upon a conquest resulting from a war in which, as far as I am at present enabled to judge, the original justice is on the side of the conquered, not of the victorious party. . . . You will, therefore, prepare the public mind in the Cape Colony for the relinquishment of the newly acquired province, by announcing that the British occupation of it is temporary and will be resigned by the end of the year 1836." Thus the die was cast. A new officer, called the Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province, was by this time appointed, and was about to sail to South Africa for the purpose of trying another experiment in frontier government. It was a failure. It brought further misfortune to the Eastern Province and led to another Kaffir war. Finally, it was seen that Sir Benjamin Durban's policy was the right one, and Kaffirland again came under British rule, but the old name of the Province of Queen Adelaide was forgotten and that of British Kaffraria reigned in its stead.

CHAPTER VII.

SOUTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS IN ENGLAND.

CHAP. VII. IT will be well now to study, somewhat in more detail, the trend of public opinion in England at this time, and especially that which became so prominent while the war was in progress. It will be interesting to note how the prevailing ignorance of South African affairs, coupled with a violently effervescent prejudice, led, as a climax, not only to Lord Glenelg's famous despatch, but also to still further disaster and suffering in Cape Colony. As has been pointed out already, there was, perhaps with some reason, a growing conviction in England that the European systems of colonisation had been fraught with injustice to the aborigines. The horrors of slavery were fresh in the minds of all; and the public mind, without too fine a discrimination of the true facts of all the cases, was predisposed to consider that in all conflicts between white and black races, the former must have been guilty of oppression, while the latter were innocent of anything but revolt against cruelty and robbery. People living in peace and security under the protection of the wise and efficiently administered laws of England found it easy to dictate to and reprobate the South African colonists scattered along an extensive and thinly populated frontier with hostile tribes ever in their proximity and ready at all times to despoil them. "The treatment of the aborigines is one of the darkest and bloodiest stains on the page of history, and scarcely any is equal in atrocity to the conduct of the Dutch Boers, ably seconded, according to Pringle, by some of the most degraded of the English settlers," said the *Spectator* of March 17th, 1834. "Civilised Christians in South Africa have been nothing better than a horde of plundering and sanguinary banditti," was the opinion of the *Birmingham Reporter*. Even the far-away *Sydney Monitor* took up the strain and re-echoed

from Australia the impulses which had had their origin in the *Commercial Advertiser* of Cape Town. Commenting on the war and the proceedings which immediately followed it, the paper states that "the more we see of the proceedings of General Durban at the Cape, the more do we find them deeply affecting the British name and character. In endeavouring to give our readers a passably perfect view of this 'bloody drama,' as Mr. Fairbairn so emphatically calls it in his truly able newspaper, we shall be compelled to occupy a considerable portion of our space. . . . In our last we exhibited from the 'South Africa' the manner in which the chief of the staff, Colonel Smith, a British officer, had put to death the Kaffir King, Hintza. It was a heartless affair, and we are convinced it will not be passed over silently in Britain. . . . The drama is still in progress, the chief of the staff, Colonel Smith, is acting with the same spirit throughout. After having pursued, with fire and sword and rapine, the unhappy people thus expelled from their possessions, he compels their kings to come before him, and to the cruel injuries they have sustained he adds the bitter insult of referring them to 'treaties' of his own making—to the terms of peace of his own dictation." The enlightened writer then, having given his own version of Colonel Smith's ceremony for the investiture of the chiefs as magistrates, proceeds: "The ruthless invader, his hands wet with the blood of the gallant Hintza, has the profanation to invoke the name of God to his proceedings in plundering these people of 25,000 bullocks and 1,000 horses. The whole scene is characteristic, so much so, that we cannot trust ourselves to comment upon it with due regard to the character of our country. The people of England will, we fervently hope, do so in the stern voice of Retributive Justice." The effect of the dissemination of these cruel misrepresentations in England—was, as might be expected, the alienation of British sympathy from the thousands, who, sixteen years previously, had left the British shores for South Africa, and who, in spite of difficulty and danger, were at last commencing to enjoy the fruits of their toil, when all was suddenly annihilated by the thieving Kaffir. So strong was the prejudice against the settlers, that when the account of their sufferings reached England in the early part of 1835, and an attempt

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was made to start a fund for the relief of their distress, Mr. Borradaile, the Chairman of the Cape of Good Hope Trading Society, said "that the committee, with every inclination on their part, thought an appeal to the public under existing circumstances would prove a failure". Thus far were the endeavours of Philip, Fairbairn, and Pringle crowned with success.

As the chief events of the war did not take place until towards the middle of 1835, nothing definite, beyond the facts connected with the first outbreak, could be known in England during the first half of that year. But public opinion putting its own interpretation upon the probable causes, the Parliament of the country considered that an inquiry into the treatment of the Kaffirs was called for. A Special Committee of the House of Commons, known as the Aborigines Committee, was therefore appointed in July, "to consider what measures ought to be adopted with regard to the native inhabitants of countries where British Settlements are made, and to the neighbouring tribes in order to secure to them the due observance of Justice and the protection of their rights, to promote the spread of civilisation among them, and to lead them to the peaceful and voluntary reception of the Christian Religion". The Committee consisted of Mr. (afterwards Sir) Thomas Fowell Buxton, Sir R. S. Donkin (the former Acting Governor of the Cape), Sir George Grey, Colonel Thompson, Messrs. W. E. Gladstone, Hawes, Bagshaw, Holland, Lushington, Dease, Baines, Johnston, Hindley, Plumtree, and Wilson; honourable and religious men, who were actuated by a deep and unselfish interest in the welfare of native tribes, and who conscientiously endeavoured to elicit the truth from the witnesses who were brought before them.

Altogether this Committee met forty-three times and examined thirty-nine different witnesses. The period of inquiry was divided into two sessions, one lasting throughout the month of August, 1835, that is, before the war in the Colony was ended, and then, with a break of five months, the second continued from February 1st, 1836, until August 1st of that same year. Twenty-four witnesses gave evidence on South African matters, while the remainder dealt with the native affairs of New South Wales, New Zealand, Van Diemen's

Land, and Canada. With one or two exceptions these witnesses were people who happened to be in England at the time, and on businesses quite unconnected with the objects of the Committee. The exceptions were Captain Andries Stockenstrom, who was summoned from Stockholm, though he happened then to be in London, and Dr. Philip, J. Read, sen., J. Read, jun., Jan Tzatzoe, and Stoffles (Hottentot). These, however, do not appear to have been called by the Committee, but, on their own initiative, and probably at the expense of the London Missionary Society, to have gone to England to volunteer evidence, Dr. Philip knowing well that his views would meet with approval.

On the whole, the statements made before this Committee told against the colonists, although their case was well championed by Colonel Wade, a former Acting-Governor of the Colony, the Rev. W. Shaw, the Wesleyan minister, who went out with the settlers in 1820, and Major W. B. Dundas, a former Landdrost of Grahamstown. The whole atmosphere of prejudice, the accident of there being present a preponderance of those who were inimical to the Colony, and the great distance of the place of inquiry from the scenes of the alleged iniquities, conspired to gain but scant justice for the ruined Eastern frontier farmer. "With the greatest possible respect for this Committee," said Colonel Wade, "I deny that you are in a position to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, viz. to elicit the whole truth, and thereby do justice to all parties. Let a commission proceed to investigate upon the spot; let the accusers and accused be confronted, and the colonists will not, I dare affirm, be found to shrink from an inquiry which they have over and over again challenged and solicited. Let a commission of competent and unprejudiced men be granted, and I feel well assured that the inhabitants will stand acquitted, in the eyes of their fellow-subjects, of the foul charges which have been so unsparingly and unhesitatingly preferred, and so credulously—nay, I must say, so unjustly—received in this country, as substantiated, without a single little bit of evidence having been heard on the part of the accused."¹

Of all the witnesses who appeared before the Committee

¹ *Report of Aborigines Committee*, p. 394.

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none created such an impression as Captain Andries Stockenstrom. He was called forward eleven times and gave answers, some of great length and involving the reading of numerous documents, to no less than 826 questions. His many years of intimate official acquaintance with the affairs of the country undoubtedly enabled him to speak with great authority on a multitude of subjects. So impressed was Lord Glenelg by his evidence during the first session, that he saw in him a fitting agent for carrying out his contemplated Colonial policy. Before the commencement of the second session, therefore, during which he gave still further evidence, Stockenstrom found himself appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province. But this same evidence won for him distinction of another order. In one of his letters,¹ dated August 31st, 1835, he says, "that my evidence will make me a number of enemies is no more than I expect". He was certainly right. For, when many of his statements reached the Colony, the indignation which was aroused and the hatred which they created against himself became intense. Investigations to which they immediately gave rise led to surprising results, and to consequences the reverse of pleasant for the new Lieutenant-Governor himself. So great in fact was the feeling against him that he had held his high office barely two years when the Secretary of State (a new one) found it necessary to tell him that the interest of the country would be best served by his resignation. To understand more clearly the course of these events, it will be well to give, in merest outline, some account of his evidence.

As a preliminary and evidence of his qualification to speak on South African matters, Captain Stockenstrom gave an account of his official career in the Colony. He began as clerk to the Landdrost of Graaff Reinet in 1808, and ended as Commissioner-General of the Eastern Province in 1833, when, through his own representations of its uselessness, the office was abolished. He then proceeded to a history of the early troubles along the frontier, endeavouring to show that they were due largely to the unwise procedure of the Colonial Government; he maintained that there had been undue inter-

¹ *Vide Autobiography of Sir Andries Stockenstrom*, vol. ii., p. 25.

ference in a quarrel between the Kaffir chiefs (Gaika and Ndhambi), and that a large quantity of cattle had been taken from them ; which act led to an incursion into, and an attack upon, the Colony. Gaika was then made a chief responsible to the Government, and from him a reluctant consent to the sacrifice of his land was extorted ; thus the Neutral Territory was formed. Matters were made worse by the impolicy of permitting the Kaffirs to remain in that territory on tenure of good behaviour after they had crept back into it surreptitiously. An account was then given of his own actions in expelling Maqomo from it, and the subsequent formation of the Hottentot Settlement.¹ He then took up dangerous ground and made some of those statements which produced such violent resentment in the Colony. The sole cause, in his opinion, of the continual turmoil along the frontier was to be found in the farmers' neglect of their cattle, which, he maintained, were more often merely lost than stolen by Kaffirs. He went further, however. He insisted that fraudulent representations of robberies which had never been perpetrated were made with a view, first, to enlisting the co-operation of the military, and then to going into Kaffirland and seizing the cattle of the innocent Kaffirs. "I say decidedly that one-tenth part of the cattle that are lost would not be lost if our people were cautious" (972) ; "the punishment in ninety-nine cases out of one hundred falls upon the innocent" (979). "The Kaffirs cannot with justice be regarded as a nation of thieves, and until these reprisals and commandos be stopped, there can be no civilisation among them ; there are unprincipled men (European) on the frontier who cannot resist the temptation of enriching themselves at the expense of their weaker brethren ; they have only to raise the cry of 'stop thief,' when, with military assistance, the first Kaffir kraals are attacked and the cattle seized ; in short, a systematic robbery of the Kaffirs is carried on by the colonists." As an instance of this and a case of wanton and cruel murder, the famous Zeko case was brought up. "Peace upon the frontier," he continued, "would be a losing game." The following answers are of importance in view of future proceedings :—

¹ For details the *Report of the Aborigines Committee*, printed by the House of Commons, August 5th, 1836, must be consulted.

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"1090. In the course of your evidence, when you used the word settlers in an unqualified manner, did you mean the English settlers or the Dutch settlers?—*Ans.* The settlers generally mean Englishmen, they go under that name in common conversation.

"1091. And by the farmers you mean the Dutch?—*Ans.* I generally mean Dutch, but they are more commonly called Boers.

"1092. Did any Englishmen ever serve on commando?—*Ans.* *Very often.*

"1093. What class of Englishmen?—*Ans.* I believe the settlers, English settlers, living in the Albany district are liable to be called on as well as Dutch Boers.

"1094. Were they so in fact?—*Ans.* *Very often.*"

At the next interview (August 28th) the matters dealt with were those connected chiefly with the former degradation and subsequent improvement of the Hottentots. A number of questions were then put to Captain Stockenstrom about the treatment and death of Hintza, matters concerning which the Committee must have been well aware he could know nothing, as he was then away from the country; the persistent "supposings this" and "supposings that" look as if the Committee, at this time, were not acting with their usual fairness, but were anxious to accumulate statements inculpatory of those concerned in the war. At this stage of the investigation there was a break of five months, during which Captain Stockenstrom received the appointment of Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province, and during which also the evidence already given reached the Colony. The alleged murder of the chief Zeko was heard of for the first time. Affidavits were collected from all available witnesses, and then having been despatched to London, they reached the Committee during the second session.¹

On February 12th, 1836, the Aborigines Committee recommenced its sittings. Lieutenant-Governor Stockenstrom was the first witness called. He suggested a policy for the better protection of the South African natives on the basis of written treaties—no land to be taken from them except upon

¹ For details of this, *vide* vol. ii. of this work, p. 398.

such treaties. In the case of the Bushmen, however, it must be different. He considered that extensive tracts of country should be reserved for them, where they might hunt, and in which they should be protected from the interference of other native tribes and the colonists. Missionaries of a politico-religious character should be settled among them. Turning then to Griqua matters, he reprobated the conduct of Dr. Philip in usurping so much authority as to take possession of Bushmen lands and "cede" them to the Griquas. He disapproved of Dr. Philip's exaggerations in connection with the farmers and Government officials (himself included). Then followed at some length an account of his disagreement with the former Governor, Sir Lowry Cole, and the conflict between the civil and military authorities. He had considered himself "the fifth wheel to a waggon," and being unwilling "to swallow up the public money without doing something for it," he resigned the post of Commissioner-General. In view of the former part of his evidence, his answer No. 2371 is curious, namely, his acknowledgment that under the circumstances of the Colony in these times the commando system was forced upon the Colonial Government as a measure of necessity.

On March 25th the affidavits in the Zeko affair had arrived from the Colony, and were put in as evidence before the Committee by Colonel Wade; one was from Captain Campbell, the Civil Commissioner of Grahamstown. He stated that although he knew of the commando, he had not heard of the alleged murder in cold blood of the chief Zeko. Had he done so he would certainly have instituted an inquiry at the time. However, even then, late as it was, he felt it incumbent upon himself to commence a public examination and called for all the information available. As will be seen in the sequel, the collection of this information led to the famous libel action of *Stockenstrom v. Campbell*, which convulsed the Colony from end to end. Other affidavits were from some of the farmers who had taken part in the fight, viz. H. I. Lombard, P. de Lange, T. J. Botha, W. J. Bezuidenhout, G. C. Sheepers, and Boesac Tambour, the Hottentot achterryder of Erasmus, on whose word Stockenstrom had relied and made the charge. All these agreed in the account already given, viz. that the farmers were attacked by a large number

CHAP. VII. of Kaffirs while driving their stolen and recaptured cattle through a bushy pass, and that Zeko was killed with other Kaffirs during the general mêlée.

The last, the eleventh, appearance of Lieutenant-Governor Stockenstrom before the Committee was on April 18th, when he endeavoured "to expose the real character of the affidavits in question". It cannot be said that the "exposure" or refutation amounted to much. He maintained that when he sanctioned the commando, he gave orders that no Kaffir cattle were to be taken, but only such as the farmers could swear to as their own. The other side said that the orders were that all cattle, except the milch cows and calves, were to be driven from the kraals to Fort Willshire, when the Colonial cattle would be picked out and the remainder returned to the Kaffirs. With reference to the death of Zeko, he insinuated that Boesac had been tampered with, in order to induce him to make statements in the affidavit different from those he had made to him (Stockenstrom) previously. That previous examination, however, could not have been very satisfactory, for Stockenstrom himself added to the document, bearing date July 16th, 1831, "With difficulty the above answers were procured, so that his (Boesac's) statement must be received with much suspicion". And yet this is the only witness on whose word he made the charge of murder. There was another, Lodewyk Peffer, but no statement on oath was taken from him. All he had to say was that he saw the rush of cattle in consequence of some Kaffir shouting to them from a distance, that he did not hear Erasmus give any orders to fire, and that he saw Zeko, who was wearing grey pantaloons and a tiger-skin kaross, shot. But another native said that the man so dressed was not Zeko; in any case, whatever Zeko had on, he was shot. A week later another batch of affidavits was received by Colonel Wade, all tending to show that Stockenstrom's statement was untrue. They were from Lieutenant-Colonel Somerset, Erasmus, the accused, another from Boesac, and others from A. L. Pretorius, J. P. Kock, W. J. Botha, J. M. Bekker, and a Kaffir named Maart.

Three days after his last interview with the Committee, Lieutenant-Governor Stockenstrom embarked on the *Lord W. Bentinck*, East Indiaman, at Gravesend, for the Cape,

where he arrived on July 3rd. His quarantine for small-pox was the beginning of a sea of troubles which awaited him.

Dr. Philip, as might be expected, also gave evidence at great length, and put in many documents. Whatever authority he may have been on Griqua and Hottentot affairs, his knowledge and experience of Kaffir matters, besides hearsay evidence from prejudiced individuals, had been limited to two tours in Kaffirland, on one of which, so he tells us, he spent a whole fortnight in that country. He had never lived on the frontier. He ascribed the cause of the war to the continual state of alarm in which the Kaffirs dwelt in consequence of commandos and patrols, and the final outbreak to the Sparks and Sutton affairs. By a long series of wrongs and aggressions, they had been driven to desperation. It was unjust to regard the Kaffirs as crafty savages who had placed themselves outside the pale of humanity; their conduct towards us had been no more than a reaction of ours against them; we had burnt their houses and they had burnt ours, and if the first victims who fell into their hands were put to death, it was no more than was to be expected. He assured the Committee that he saw woeful sights during his journeys. Besides the heart-rending stories which were told him, he himself saw starvation and misery; in some cases the natives were sitting down in small groups and watching, at a distance, the burning of their houses (huts), and threatened with the bayonet if they attempted to cross the river. He mentioned the case of a Kaffir who had been unmercifully flogged in the Grahamstown jail, for no other reason than raising his hand to save his hut in which were his wife and child; so disgraced was the man by this treatment that he could never again hold up his head in society—he had better been shot.

Dr. Philip described his going into Kaffirland in 1834, in order to collect information for Sir Benjamin Durban, who was about to leave for the frontier. He, Doctor Philip, had an interview with the chiefs at Knapps Hope, on the Keiskamma. He told them the good Governor was coming who would redress all their wrongs and counselled them to be patient. Maqomo then composed a letter of "beautiful simplicity, of touching pathos, confiding magnanimity, and dignified remonstrance," which Dr. Philip read to the Committee,

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but the genuineness of which the Committee took the liberty of doubting. Colonel Cox, who had known Maqomo, was called in and asked what he thought of the letter. His reply was that he did not think Maqomo capable of writing such a letter. It was then explained that Maqomo had dictated it in Kaffir to a German, who took it down in Dutch, and that a Scotch mechanic then translated it from Dutch into English. But all the same the "superior mind" of Maqomo was still evident in the letter.

Having given his views on the injustice of the treatment to Gaika in 1819, to Maqomo in 1829, and to Maqomo and Tyali in 1833, Dr. Philip proceeded at great length with the affairs of the Griquas and Hottentots. He showed how education had flourished among the latter, especially at the Kat River Settlement, where there was quite a demand for instruction in *Greek*. The boys having learnt, the girls then clamoured for that classical language—when the boys became jealous, feeling certain that the girls would beat them!

With Dr. Philip there came before the Committee his interesting companions, J. Read, sen., J. Read, jun., Andries Stoffles, the Gonah Hottentot from the Kat River, and "King" Tzatzoe in a uniform of blue and gold.

Jan Tzatzoe, examined through the interpretation of Mr. Read, said he was a chief in Kaffirland over a tribe called the Tindees, consisting of about 2,000 individuals, including women and children. He had learnt to read and write at Bethelsdorp, under the late Dr. van der Kemp; he had also learnt the carpenter's trade, and had now become an assistant missionary. Being a Christian he did not join the Kaffirs in the late war, though he did, with 400 men, act for three weeks under Colonel Smith's orders in scouring the country. Beyond hearsay, he did not know much about the cause and outbreak of the war. Tyali had told him about Xoxo's wound. His (Tzatzoe's) people never stole cattle from the Colony and patrols never troubled them. He was present at the conference with Gaika in 1817, and considered that Gaika was too frightened to say anything but what he was wanted to say. He spoke in high praise of Dr. Philip and his actions, was quite sure the Doctor had never said anything to the Kaffirs which could excite them against the Colony, nor had Mr. Read. Dr.



BEFORE THE ABORIGINES COMMITTEE

Jan Tzatzoe

J. Read, sen.
Andries Stoffes

J. Read, jun.

Dr. Philip



Philip told them to send their children to school and be good. But Maqomo said: "How can I do that when I am shot every day, and have to sleep with one eye open and the other shut". Asked why and when he came to England, he said he did so entirely on his own initiative; he had not been advised or instructed to do so by anyone; he did not come to give information, but to complain. (Ques. 4807). "Did you get permission of the Colonial Governor to come to this country?" "Yes, I got permission from Colonel Smith to go to Cape Town and then permission from the Governor to come to England." He omitted to add that he forgot to say good-bye to his relatives before he left. His complaint was that he had been deliberately and knowingly robbed of his lands by Sir Benjamin Durban. A fort and town (King William's Town) had been built upon them. Colonel Smith had taken the missionary's house for his own residence and his (Tzatzoe's) house had been turned into stables. Asked why he made no complaint in the Colony, he answered that he thought that it would be no use, as the Governor himself had robbed him and knew that he had done so. He therefore went to England to see the Committee which he had heard of from the newspapers; Dr. Philip did not instigate him or tell him what to say. He simply heard that Dr. Philip was going to England, so he took a horse and said, "I will go where Dr. Philip is" (Ques. 4753), and then with Mr. Stoffles he went to Cape Town and both joined the party for England.

Andries Stoffles—a Hottentot settler at the Kat River, between fifty and sixty years of age—was born on the Bushman's River in the Zuurveld. Went to Bethelsdorp with van der Kemp when that institution was first founded. Before van der Kemp's time the Hottentots were wild men, though he himself was not quite as savage, as he had been among white men. The missionaries tamed the Hottentots and had done wonders for them—now they can plough, and make shoes and waggons, in fact, anything except a watch and coach. But no Europeans except missionaries have done them any good, others have beaten them to death—so much so that their numbers were decreasing; but the missionaries came and then they began to increase—the missionaries have been their salvation. They began to live only after the

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formation of the Kat River Settlement and the passing of the Fiftieth Ordinance. He eulogised Dr. Philip, who always counselled peace—he told the people not to resist if they were ill-treated. He was present at the interview with Maqomo, and corroborated the story of the Kaffir having been flogged in jail. “It was a great disgrace to have his back spoiled, as he could not be used in dancing parties.” Mr. Stoffles had not a high opinion of the English settlers; he did not think that they had done much good to the Hottentots; but the missionaries? “I love the missionaries,” he said, “the missionaries tell us to ascribe all to the people of England; and I love the people in this country also” (5086). It is not clear from the evidence how and why he went to England. He told the Committee that a “printer from the Cape came to our part; he (the printer) said, ‘I know you’. I said, ‘I do not know you,’” then having mentioned that Dr. Philip was going to England, Stoffles said he wished to go too.

Rev. J. Read, sen. He had been a missionary among the aborigines in South Africa thirty-six years, having gone out in the first instance with Dr. van der Kemp. He read a long, historical statement concerning the conditions of the Hottentots during his time, describing the rising of the Boers against the Government in 1799, and the hopeless condition of the Hottentots which led to the foundation of Bethelsdorp. He mentioned the “upwards of 100 cases of murder” with which he created such a stir in England in 1809, and which led to the proceedings of the Black Circuit; but he omitted to state the findings of the Court and the results of the trials. So that the Aborigines Committee, knowing nothing of the history of those times, must have been led to believe that those 100 cases of murder were true. This *suppressio veri* indicated the spirit in which he gave his evidence and also the caution with which any statement from him must be received. Had there been the means or opportunity of cross-examination before this Committee, it might have been shown that the Rev. J. Read, sen., was the most dangerous and wicked man upon the frontier. It is the actions of this man, ably seconded by the Rev. Doctor Philip, which have made the name of “London Missionary Society” stink in the nostrils of South Africans. It is a great misfortune for that honour-

able and worthy Society that it should have been associated with those two names; for it has done great and noble work in all parts of the heathen world. Its long list of self-sacrificing missionaries and martyrs, the world-wide extent of its operations, and the invaluable results achieved and progress made, render it worthy of all veneration and support. But all the same, it is difficult to dissociate "London Missionary Society" from malicious calumny, native unrest, race hatred, and, though more remotely, warfare between British and Dutch. The chief points of the remainder of this man's evidence were that he did not know that Kaffirs had to have passes to go into the Colony—this was in connection with the famous tea¹ meeting to which he had illegally invited Maqomo; and further, that there was no collusion between the Kat River Hottentots, his special congregation, and the Kaffirs before the outbreak of the war.

J. Read, jun., son of the above by a Hottentot woman, was a teacher under his father at the Kat River Settlement. In his evidence he added but little to what had already been said. He gave an account of the schools and teaching in the settlement, and also of his own experiences at the outbreak of the war. He did not believe that there was anything in the nature of a conspiracy between the Kaffirs and Hottentots. He spoke in the usual high terms of Dr. Philip, and described his endeavours to pacify the Kaffirs until the arrival of the Governor. He (Read) gave his version of the Kat River tea meeting which was interrupted by the soldiers in order to arrest Maqomo. He believed the London and Glasgow Missionaries were unpopular among the colonists, but not so the Wesleyans, and mentioned the fact that the Governor would not let him return to his work.

Most probably, however, it was not so much for the information of the Aborigines Committee, as for the edification of a much larger audience, that these five gentlemen travelled all the way from South Africa. For as soon as the Committee had finished with them, they commenced a kind of triumphal tour through England, addressing large meetings at Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, Birmingham, and, of course, Exeter Hall in London. The "native Christian trophies" were everywhere welcomed with the greatest enthusiasm and admiration, while

¹ *Vide* vol. ii., chap. ix.

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Dr. Philip, acting as a sort of clerical Barnum, was the hero of the hour. 'Twere useless to follow them in all their peregrinations; it will suffice to stop and listen first at Exeter Hall, on August 10th, and at the Missionary breakfast at Birmingham, on September 15th. Exeter Hall was crowded to its utmost limits, and all denominations seem to have been represented on the platform. Amid great applause, Jan Tzatzoe rose as the first speaker. He spoke in Dutch, and Read, jun., interpreted. In effect, he said that he was surprised to see so many people in the House of God. Before they (the Kaffirs) had the Word of God, they were like wild beasts, each man tried to destroy his brother, but now that they had the Word of God, all was peace, and the wolf could lie down with the lamb (applause).

Stoffles followed. Before the Bible came, he said, we were baboons on the tops of mountains, we painted our bodies with red paint, now we are civilised men. "I thank God in the name of every Hottentot in South Africa that I have seen the face of an Englishman." He then enlarged on the work of the missionaries and the generosity of the people in England. "I stand before you as the fruit of your exertions" (applause). He could not sit down, he said, without thanking them for sending Dr. Philip out to them. "The Word of God has brought my nation so far, that if a Hottentot young lady and an English young lady were walking with their faces from me, I would take them both for English ladies" (great applause and laughter).

Read, jun., then stood up before them as an individual who had been oppressed in the Colony and deprived of his liberty, because he would not sacrifice principle to expediency; he then spoke of the conflict between the missionaries and the powers that were.

Dr. Philip then rose. He pictured a traveller standing at that time on the banks of the Keiskamma or Sunday Rivers, or on the "snow mountains" of Graaff Reinet, and noticing how few natives there were in those parts compared with what that same traveller would have seen twenty-five years previously, showing thereby how their numbers had diminished by extermination. All this, however, was quite untrue, for both Hottentots and Kaffirs had *increased* during that time.

Romance and Reality, or Hottentots as they are said to be and are.

ROMANCE

REALITY



"And we have no other way
Of passing all we do or say;
Which, when 'tis natural and true
Will be believed by a very few."—HUDIBRAS

"Far from the mad'ing crowd's ignoble strife
Their sober wishes never learn'd to stray;
Along the cool sequester'd vale of life
They kept the noiseless tenor of their way."—GRAY'S "ELEGY"

In fact, the argument which was then used for not taking land from the Kaffirs was that they had so increased as to render it difficult to find sufficient pasturage for their cattle. Dr. Philip then talked about the war, and showed that nothing much had been gained by it, which was perfectly true. Referring to the Hottentots, he described the good work which had been done among them and pointed out that 30,000 were then under instruction, and instanced Stoffles as an example of what could be done with such raw material.

At Birmingham, Dr. Philip's speech was that mixture of truth and falsehood which was so characteristic of him ; or perhaps, instead of falsehood, it might be more correct to say, that association and dove-tailing together of statements which taken by themselves were perfectly true, but from the arrangement he gave them he conveyed entirely erroneous and unjust impressions. The advantage to himself was that there were always loopholes of escape when he was brought to book by those whom he had injured. Whether he did this designedly and deliberately it is, of course, impossible to say. This Birmingham speech was typical. His remarks concerning slavery were perfectly true, but they applied to parts of Africa over which the British Government had no control or jurisdiction, much less, therefore, had the Colonial Government, the British settlers, or the Boers. Yet, by mixing up statements concerning Albany with these, Dr. Philip could not but convey the idea that these iniquities were being perpetrated in Cape Colony. He was welcomed at the meeting with the utmost enthusiasm and eagerness to hear him ; perhaps the more so as the *London Times* had just previously struck a discordant *audi alteram partem* note, which was not very gratifying to the "philanthropists," and which did not pass unnoticed at the meeting. Dr. Philip gave an account of the commando system in much the same strain as Captain Stockenstrom had done before the Aborigines Committee, and proceeded to show the confidence Sir B. Durban had in him (Dr. P.) when he first arrived in the Colony. He described an alleged interview with the Governor after he had made certain suggestions. "The Governor said : ' I thank you for your documents. I concur with you in every point and every regulation you have recommended, and I mean to put them in practice in the Colony'. I said :

CHAP. VII. ‘ Sir Benjamin, do you mean to say that I am to be responsible for the working of the system?’ He signified by a nod and a smile his answer, and I understood it in the affirmative.” Dr. Philip then read to the meeting long extracts from Lord Glenelg’s despatch of December 26th, and described it as “one of the noblest documents, containing the most enlarged and Christian view, and the most encouraging prospect for the Church of Christ that had ever issued from any Government” (cheers). Civilisation in South Africa was retarded, he went on, by the illicit traffic in brandy, guns, and ammunition along the borders. This was perfectly true, but he omitted to state that every successive Governor of the Cape had done his utmost to stop it, and that it could only be carried on under great difficulty and risk. Still talking about the Colony he proceeded: “They had heard of China being hermetically sealed to the Gospel; but he would tell them of a country where they could employ no ships to land missionaries on its shores—of a country comprehending 1,000,000 of human beings, to whom was denied access, unless at one little point, and that under severe restrictions—of a country that was sealed against the Gospel, not by the spirit of its people or the edict of the kings, but—*by their countrymen* (loud applause). . . . The facts were these. When tribes or nations were robbed of their cattle as well as their people; when this was done by those hired ruffians, those remorseless murderers, the people that escape must die or rob their neighbours to sustain life (applause). Here, then, robbery after robbery excites to hostility every single tribe of Africa, until every social tie—every kindly feeling—every fragment of Society is dashed one against the other (loud applause). O God! (exclaimed Dr. Philip) how long wilt thou suffer this state of things to continue!”

After advertng at length to all the circumstances of the new settlement in Albany, he closed his address with an affecting appeal on behalf of injured Africans. “There were 350,000 slaves in that country (Albany?) who seemed to be completely overlooked by British philanthropists and Christians; and while those in the West Indies were being prepared for liberty, nothing was yet done for Afric’s bondsmen.”¹

¹ *Vide Birmingham Philanthropist.*

As an instance of the effect of Dr. Philip's crusade, the following may be mentioned. An Independent minister of Truro, while preaching on the providence of God, said, by way of illustration, that at the Cape of Good Hope, two missionaries were placed at the mouth of a cannon and threatened with instant destruction for refusing to take up arms against the Kaffirs. They expostulated with the officer, and said they had come to preach the Gospel of Peace, and not to fight; however, by some miraculous interposition of Divine Providence, the match was extinguished and their valuable lives were spared! A South African, who happened to be in Cornwall at the time, wrote a letter to the Editor of the *West Briton* newspaper contradicting this vile assertion. This called forth a reply from the minister, who insisted on its correctness as he had it on the *authority of Dr. Philip*.¹

So far we have heard only the evidence for the prosecution. It is necessary now, in fairness and justice to the colonists, to return to the Aborigines Committee and to hear what is to be said in their defence. Of those witnesses who, from their personal knowledge of the frontier affairs, gained either from actual residence upon the spot or from official duties which enabled them to know all the details, were competent to speak on these matters, Major W. B. Dundas, Colonel Wade, and the Rev. W. Shaw stand out most prominently.

Major William Boldon Dundas, of the Royal Artillery, had been Landdrost of Grahamstown from 1825 to 1828, and then, until 1830, military secretary to the Governor. He was in South Africa merely on duty, and—disconnected with that—having no special interest in the country, he could be, as he was, quite unbiased on the question of the day. His word,

¹ And this was the man on whom Mr. T. F. Buxton placed implicit reliance for information on South African matters. On September 30th, 1834, in writing to Dr. Philip he said: "I have received and heartily thank you for your long letter dated May 6th. Pray keep me well informed.

"I have also received the letters and newspapers about the attempted renewal of the Vagrant Act. I think it will come to nothing, but if so, your prompt interposition prevented it. . . . I have also received your note about the commando system. Upon that I feel most deeply interested; furnish me with the facts, and I will, if alive and in Parliament, aim an effectual blow at them. . . . You know I look to you as my chief informant. Let me have every species of information about the Kat River Settlement. I am now going to a Bible Society where I shall make a speech out of your letters. . . . they do me frequent and good service."

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therefore, is of considerable weight. Speaking on the Hottentots, he was of opinion that there were many worthy characters among them, especially at the missionary institutions, but, generally, they were an idle, drunken, improvident people, who needed to be kept under restraint. He gave an account of the measures of Lord Caledon and General Bourke for improving and civilising them, and spoke in praise of the missionary institutions in bringing together the wrecks of the Hottentot nation. Turning then to the Kaffir, Major Dundas said: "He is a perfect contrast to the Hottentot; he is manly and enterprising and warlike in his disposition, but still a savage, ready at all times for offence as well as defence, regardless of human life, either of his own or others, roving from place to place with his cattle and living a wild life; he is more likely to become the oppressor than the oppressed; his first principle seems to be to exert the power which nature has given to the strong over the weak, by robbing him of his property. He is, in fact, by nature and disposition a thief, and he among them is most honoured and esteemed who conducts his expeditions against his neighbours with the most success and returns with the most plunder." Major Dundas then went on to show that the Kaffir must be a very troublesome neighbour. "During the whole time I was on the frontier, three and a half years, no week passed without depredations to a serious amount taking place among the cattle of the settlers—to my certain knowledge we did not get back one-tenth of those that were taken by the Kaffirs. I never knew of any period of absolute peace and quiet on the frontier." Major Dundas did not believe that the settlers brought their trouble upon themselves by their interference with the Kaffirs. "Upon my faith, I declare I do not believe that the British settlers of Albany had any right to expect the conduct the Kaffirs have displayed towards them. I know that the British settlers were kind on all occasions to them, I never heard of a well-attested fact of their having made inroads or aggressions upon them or their property. A man who had expended his little all in the purchase of cattle may lose the whole in the course of a single night, and is reduced from comparative comfort to abject beggary." The chief cause of all the trouble in the Colony has been due to want of proper protection. The settlers had

been sent out by the Government, and it was only right and proper that their situation should have been rendered as defensible and secure as possible. Military posts, stationed at distances of thirty miles apart, could have no restraining effect upon thieving Kaffirs, even although soldiers were continually on patrol. The extensive jungle along the Fish River was a most difficult part in which to operate, and afforded such good cover for the Kaffirs with their stolen cattle. If it should ever be contemplated to resume that, as the boundary of the Colony, then he would recommend the Government to send out ships and bring every Englishman back to England.¹ Major Dundas was asked whether he knew that a letter had been written by Maqomo, stating, in the strongest terms, that the war had commenced in consequence of the encroachments of the British. He replied, that if such a letter had been written, it must have been by some of the London Missionaries, for he can assert positively that Maqomo can neither read nor write; the London Missionaries had put such ideas in their heads—he firmly believed that Dr. Philip had plainly and positively told them that they ought not to be satisfied with the arrangements of the Government (Colonial). Major Dundas had no definite proof of this, yet he was prepared to make this charge against Dr. Philip. Pressed as to whether there was any harm in listening to the grievances of the Kaffirs and promising to get them redress, he answered that, when the security of the frontier was involved, as it was in such procedure, he considered that Dr. Philip had forgotten himself, that he was serving Mammon instead of God. “I firmly believe,” said he, “that Dr. Philip was actuated by personal and interested motives, and that he wished to become important in the eyes of a certain set in England.” The Major then brought up the subject of Dr. Philip’s book, *The Researches*, in which he himself was grossly maligned. Speaking then of other missionary societies, he said: “I think the Wesleyan Missionaries have done wonders, more than possibly could be expected from people in their situation. Mr. Shaw has done more than it is possible to imagine any human being could have done; he has kept in due and proper restraint some 10,000 or 15,000

¹ *Vide* vol. ii., *Rise of South Africa*, p. 418, note.

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people by the most discreet conduct on his part." These last statements are of importance, as two years after this the Wesleyans discovered that Dr. Philip had, privately of course, poisoned the ear of Sir Benjamin Durban with untrue statements concerning them. This will be dealt with in its proper place.

Colonel Thomas Francis Wade came to the Colony in 1828, as military secretary to the Governor, Sir Lowry Cole, and after his departure Colonel Wade became Acting-Governor of the Colony until the arrival of Sir Benjamin Durban. In his evidence he gave a very long historical account of frontier affairs, from 1817 until his own time, going into considerable detail on the nature and extent of the alterations in the systems observed towards the Kaffirs and other natives which had taken place during those years. With reference to the discontent among the Kaffirs and its causes, he read a letter he had just received from a Lieutenant Robertson, who had been present during the interview between Dr. Philip and the Kaffir chiefs at Fort Willshire in 1830. According to this, Dr. Philip and Mr. Fairbairn, together with "another missionary, and two foreigners likewise missionaries," met the chief in a tent which was pitched at a short distance from the Fort. He (Robertson) was in the tent. The purport of the conversation, which was through an interpreter, was that he (Botman) had been "an ill-used man, that his case ought to be known in England; that he ought to go himself to the King and Parliament, and if they did not give him redress for himself and people, all that he had to do then would be to appeal to the British Public and they would see justice done him."

Colonel Wade, proceeding, expatiated on the merits of the Fiftieth Ordinance, the intention of which was to emancipate the Hottentots from their unhappy conditions. He showed that it originated with the benevolent General Bourke and not with Dr. Philip, who, though he claimed that credit, had had nothing to do with it.

He (Colonel Wade) spoke in high praise of the Kat River Settlement, but deplored its contamination by the idle and vagrant bad characters who squatted on the lands of the worthy and industrious. He disapproved of Mr. Read's pro-

cedure in the settlement. At this stage in his evidence the Zeko affidavits arrived, which have been dealt with. He then gave an account of the removal of Tyali and Maqomo from the Mancazana in 1833, which was reported to be one of the causes of the war, and for which he himself was entirely responsible; he showed the necessity for the move and the gentleness with which it was carried out—not a shot being fired. At great length, he went into matters connected with Maqomo, the commando system, and the writings of Pringle, “an authority mainly relied upon by those who deemed it impossible to promote the welfare of the aborigines without assailing the character of both the colonists and the Colonial Government”. During his third interview with the Committee, Colonel Wade presented further affidavits in the Zeko case, which had just previously arrived from the Colony. Colonel Wade’s 102 pages of evidence are of great interest, and coming from one who had no party interests whatever, the information he imparts is of great value.

Rev. William Shaw went out to South Africa with the British settlers in 1830, as a Wesleyan minister. He settled first at Salem with the Sephton party and then at Wesleyville, a mission station among the Amagqunukwebi tribe of Kaffirs, which he founded. There had been missionary endeavour in Kaffirland previous to this, for John Williams, of the London Missionary Society, had started a mission among the Gaikas at a spot near Fort Beaufort—this was in the year 1816—but after two years of most devoted and unselfish work he died and the mission came to an end. During the five or six years subsequent to the foundation of Wesleyville, six other Wesleyan Mission stations came into existence. With regard to the ill-feeling of the Kaffirs towards the Colony, Mr. Shaw was of opinion that the origin of it was the driving of the tribes out of the Zuurveld during the previous thirty or forty years, though he would say nothing of the justice, or otherwise, of that procedure. The tribe among which he worked had been turned out of the Neutral Territory in consequence of Gaika’s negotiations with Lord Charles Somerset in 1819, but through his (Shaw’s) intervention, they had been allowed to occupy a part of it under the three chiefs, Pato, Kama, and Cobus. He had collected these people in the early days and

CHAP. had persuaded them to abstain from incursions on the Colony.
 VII. They heeded his word and behaved themselves, with the result that they were not troubled by patrols, commandos, or reprisals. Further, he had found these people so amenable to good advice and discipline that he had succeeded in persuading the chiefs to put a stop to a custom which had been very demoralising to the girls and young women, and had thus earned for himself the nickname of "Kakabafazi" or "shield of the women". Mr. Shaw and his Wesleyan brethren had busied themselves in reducing the Kaffir language to writing, and had thus produced a Kaffir grammar and translations of portions of the Scriptures. As a crown to their labours, the chief Kama had become a sincere Christian and had given up polygamy. As other signs of progress, he mentioned that the people were discarding beads and buttons in favour of the European cottons and wools, and also simple agricultural implements. They were attentive to his preaching as shown by the awkward questions they put to him from time to time, e.g. Where did Adam and Eve come from? Was Adam a white man or black man? Did Adam and Eve eat Kaffir corn? If we all came from Adam, why is it we speak different languages? Did their horses bite? etc.

Mr. Shaw thought there was, speaking generally, a friendly feeling between the settlers and the Kaffirs. Asked for the cause of the late outbreak, he said it was due to a concurrence of various causes, love of plunder and a reckless disposition on the part of the Kaffirs, together with a miscalculation of their strength, but further, the expulsion of Maqomo and various disputes and discussions followed by sundry land changes had much to do with it. The missionaries were quite ignorant of what was pending; the reason was that the Kaffirs had made a firm resolution to fight, and any hesitation or consultation with missionaries would have led to discussion, hence they kept it secret. As suggestions for future and better policy to be pursued, he thought that instead of the present reprisal system, the chiefs should be made responsible for the thefts of their people, and that a Lieutenant-Governor should be appointed for the Eastern Province.¹

¹ The following are the merest outlines of the evidence given by the remaining South African witnesses. *Captain R. S. Aitchison* of the C.M.R. had been on

After the disasters of 1835, the year 1836 dawned upon the Colony with no very cheering prospects. Batches of the

the frontier since 1819; he was present at the interview between Lord Charles Somerset and Gaika in 1819; he did not consider Gaika was justified in ceding the Fish-Keiskamma territory without the consent of the other chiefs. He spoke of things generally from a soldier's point of view. He knew of cases where Boers had claimed cattle which had not been stolen, his patrols having found them in a jungle in the neighbourhood of the place; he described the usual procedure of a commando; he took part in the removal of Maqomo; his knowledge of the interference of the missionaries in frontier affairs was merely hearsay.

Lieut.-Colonel William Cox had been in the Colony from 1824 to 1836, first in the C.M.R., then in the 75th Regiment. There was considerable cattle stealing in the Colony before the war broke out, patrols had to go from Fort Beaufort two or three times in each week. He described his raid on Eno's kraal at the beginning of the war, his operations in the mountains during the war, and his negotiations for peace, on behalf of the Government, with Tyali and Maqomo. The Committee endeavoured to get him to admit that the Kaffirs must be merciful people since they killed only two traders and no missionaries, but Colonel Cox would not allow it. Gave evidence of encouragement given to Kaffirs to commence the war by some party in the Colony. He showed that the result of Hintza's message, to the effect that he was a prisoner, operated upon the chiefs to prolong the war; he gave particulars of the massacre of the Bailie party, and stated that arms brought from England were purchased by the Kaffirs; very little Colonial cattle were taken from the Kaffirs, they had been driven into Hintza's country. He gave his opinion that the system adopted by Sir B. Durban would produce harmony in the Colony and protection for the frontier; the former continual changes of policy had emboldened the Kaffirs, who were by disposition thieves. He described the arrangements to be made for the re-peopling of the new province, the re-location of natives by commissioners, and the establishment of military posts.

Captain G. de la Poel Beresford was A.D.C. to Sir B. Durban. As he arrived on the frontier in January, 1835, and left it in July, his own personal knowledge and experience were limited to the actions of the 1st Division. He spoke with authority, therefore, only on the movements of that division up to Butterworth, the surrender of Hintza, and the incidents of the return march.

Captain Spiller, officer of Artillery, had been stationed on the frontier, chiefly at Grahamstown, for fourteen months. He left the Colony just before the outbreak of war. He gave general opinions on the conditions of the frontier and the relations subsisting between the Kaffirs and colonists, but he did not possess much definite information on anything in particular.

Captain R. Blakeman, of the 54th Regiment, gave some extraordinary evidence. He was in the Colony from 1819, when he was in command of Fort Willshire, until 1822. His duty was to patrol the country along the Keiskamma. He alleged that a fellow Lieutenant on one occasion, by means of beads and buttons, lured Kaffirs across the river on to the forbidden side, and then, while they were picking up the treasures, he fired upon them and killed them. On another occasion a Lieutenant threw a wounded Kaffir woman on to a burning hut and thus caused her death. He himself did not witness these alleged atrocities. He said he reported the matters to the proper authorities, but no inquiry, either civil or military, was ever instituted. He sent an account of it to Mr. William Parker, of Cape Town. When he reached England his papers were taken from him as it was suspected that he was insane, and for a time he was incarcerated in

CHAP. VII. evidence given before the Aborigines Committee, during its first session, commenced to reach the Eastern Province early

Hanwell Lunatic Asylum. There is no corroborative evidence of either of these allegations. He was singularly ignorant of matters of which a man in his situation must have been aware, such as the Gaika conference and the establishment of Fredericksburg.

William Parker was one of the 1820 settlers who landed at Saldanah Bay and returned to England in 1822 (*vide* vol. ii., p. 311). He received the Blakeman papers and made much hysterical noise about them. His evidence was quite worthless.

Thomas Phillips was another of the 1820 Albany settlers. He had travelled and spent considerable time in Kaffirland and had thus gained much information concerning it. He gave a good historical account of the state of the frontier before and at the time of the arrival of the settlers, as well as of the settler movement itself. He ascribed the continued aggressions of the Kaffirs to the want of better military protections as well as to the vacillating policy pursued towards them, being at one time severe and at another too lenient. This he attributed to the constant change in the Secretaries of State, "for every Secretary of State has a plan of his own in the instructions which he sends out to the Governor to act upon. Within the last eighteen months we have had no less than four Secretaries of State, and so long as we remain in the situation of a Crown Colony, with no Representative Assembly of our own, and we must be governed from this country, it is impossible any system can be well administered." The settlers, he said, had, in the early days, memorialised Earl Bathurst on the subject of better protection, and a Commission of Inquiry had considered the matter, but nothing came of it. Mr. Phillips approved of Sir R. S. Donkin's measures and deplored their reversal by Lord Charles Somerset. In spite, however, of these drawbacks, trade had increased. By 1828 the imports had risen to £55,201 per annum, while the exports were £41,290; for 1832 the corresponding figures were £112,845 and £86,931 respectively. The licensed traders were on the whole a respectable class of people and behaved well towards the Kaffirs.

(*Note.*—Colonel Smith did not always hold this view. He found the traders throughout the country cheating the Kaffirs, giving a piece of fat or a few buttons for a good ox-hide. He seized a number of these ill-gotten hides and kept them till the traders promised to act more fairly. "I forgave them," he said, "but by Joseph, the scoundrels went on precisely as before, and attempted to defend their conduct by saying that it was the duty of everyman to buy as cheaply as he could.") Turning to the Kaffirs, he (Phillips) thought them a shrewd, clever people, but with whom it would be useless to make treaties unless there was adequate force to compel observance of them. He did not believe the Kaffirs had looked upon the settlers as intruders. "I can most sincerely and decidedly say that I know of no instance whatever of aggressions on the part of the colonists towards the Kaffirs." With regard to the missionaries, he had observed the good influence they had upon the Kaffirs, more especially the labours of Mr. Shaw and his Wesleyan brethren. He himself belonged to the Church of England. Asked if he had anything else to add, he replied: "I only trust the Committee will take into their consideration the great losses the colonists have sustained, and that they are entitled to compensation, and from the evidence which has been adduced, I humbly submit it is proved that they have not been to blame, nor have they had any control over what has caused the invasion; that they have been innocent sufferers from a cause which might have been avoided, if a proper military system had been afforded them, and which they had been applying for the last eleven years. If we had been left

in that year. As though the cup of sorrow were not yet full, it was realised that this evidence was to be the cause of still

to manage our own affairs, and had a share in arranging an intercourse with the Caffres, nothing of that sort would have taken place."

Henry Rutherford was a merchant in Grahamstown. He gave evidence chiefly on the manner in which the information in connection with the Zeko case had been collected; he showed that the proceedings had taken place in open court and in all fairness.

Walter Gisborne had been a traveller in Kaffirland, having spent the whole of 1829 in that country. He was present at the ejection of Maqomo from the Kat River. He considered that Maqomo was an uneasy neighbour, and a most successful plunderer. His evidence was chiefly descriptive of the country and natives, including the Zulus, and had not much bearing on the matters the Committee were investigating.

Rev. Hans Peter Hallbeck, a Moravian Missionary, entered chiefly into matters connected with his mission and the lives of the Hottentots and Tambookies. He disapproved of a vagrant law; that which was travelling in the case of a Boer was vagrancy in a Hottentot. He considered the Fiftieth Ordinance had resulted in a decrease in crime among the Hottentots.

Captain C. Bradford, of the East India Company, had been at the Cape eleven months and twice in Kaffirland, when he travelled with Mr. Read, jun. He spoke of the chiefs as "kings" and their sons as "princes," and said it was absurd to regard them as thieves; they had been badly treated, and the British settlers were as bad as the Boers. He mentioned that he saw two Kaffirs, with riems round their necks, being led along by a trooper on horseback; they were not criminals, but *plaintiffs* about to lodge a complaint against a farmer. He was surprised that the Kaffirs had not risen before, so goaded by cruelty had they been. Captain Bradford entered into details of ill-treatment which had been communicated to him, but which he had not witnessed. The Committee suggested that he had received this information *cum grano salis* (1856). He concluded by reading a long statement on the industry, progress, and virtues of the Hottentots.

Saxe Bannister, Esq., had travelled in many countries and had spent six weeks in Kaffirland. He thought the Kaffirs were capable of any degree of civilisation; their civil policy was very high. He made suggestions with regard to the general treatment of the aborigines.

Captain Allen Gardiner gave evidence at considerable length on Zulu and Natal matters.

Rev. S. Young was a Wesleyan Missionary, who had lived six years with the tribes of Ndhlambi and three with the Amagqunukwebi. Having conversed with Pato, Kama, and Congo on the subject of the outbreak, he learnt that there had been considerable preparation and plotting beforehand. The Gaikas had sent to them asking them to co-operate with them, but Congo said: "Leave that subject, ye children of Gaika, for you above all other Kaffirs have the least reason to complain and talk of fighting; we were deprived of the whole of our land while you were deprived of only a part of yours, yet we have nothing against the English; they are our best friends; they never come into our country to steal cattle, or kill people. We have nothing against the colonists and cannot join you in the war. The other Kaffirs," he told Mr. Young, "have frequently tried to make us dirty by bringing stolen cattle through our part of the country in the night." Mr. Young attributed the fact that the tribes of Pato, Kama, and Congo had not been molested by patrol parties, to their general good conduct; stolen cattle had not been traced to their country, hence there was no search for

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further anxiety and suffering. The statements of Captain Stockenstrom gave rise to the wildest excitement and indignation. In vindication of their character, and in general justice to the Colony, the prominent settlers in Grahamstown called a public meeting for the purpose of protesting against his allegations, and of drafting a petition to the Secretary of State for a fairer investigation into their reputed ill-conduct. The meeting, which was held on January 23rd, was probably the largest there had ever been in the Eastern Province up to that time. A number of resolutions were carried, not only unanimously, but with the loudest acclamation.

The result of the meeting was the following petition: "That memorialists view with deep interest the proceedings of the Committee of the Honourable Commons House of Parliament on the State of the Aborigines in the British Settlements; and being deeply convinced that their future welfare and character, and the prosperity of the frontiers of the Colony, are involved in the issues of its deliberations, they have seen, with great regret and apprehension, that the evidence already recorded is not only defective, but in many instances erroneous, that it betrays a want of information of the true state of affairs of this settlement; and that hence, if it be acted upon, it cannot fail to be highly prejudicial to their dearest interests . . . they are of opinion that the evidence of a few persons, who are casually in England, however fairly that evidence may be given, is not sufficient to enable the Committee to take that comprehensive and just view of the subject to which memorialists, in common with the inhabitants of this frontier, consider themselves to be entitled. That the memorialists view the evidence of Captain Stockenstrom as most objectionable and extremely prejudicial to the character of the inhabitants of the frontier, and are of an opinion that a public inquiry into the charges which have been preferred against them would be attended with the most satisfactory results; provided the inquiry was carried on in the Colony by impartial persons, duly appointed by the British Government, and they are borne out in this opinion by the circumstance of the

them in those parts. Asked whether the Sparks' and Sutton's expeditions were not calculated to exasperate the Kaffirs, he (Mr. Young) answered that they probably invited something of the sort by their being ripe for war and by their offensive conduct.

most serious charge made by Captain Stockenstrom (*viz.* the murder of the chief Zeko and six of his men in cold blood by a party of farmers under the command of the Field-Commandant Erasmus), having been completely disproved in a late public investigation, held in open court, before the Resident Magistrate of the district . . . they most humbly and respectfully pray that a Commission of Inquiry may be appointed and sent hither by His Majesty's Government to inquire into these injurious statements, which have been circulated against the inhabitants of the Eastern frontier of this Colony, and which are degrading to their character and subversive of their interests." This petition was signed by upwards of 700 persons.

An answer to this was contained in a despatch dated July 18th, 1836, and received in the following October. It was to the effect that, while Lord Glenelg deplored the promulgation of any statements which had given so much pain to "these loyal and meritorious subjects of His Majesty—the inhabitants of the Eastern Province," and anxious as he was that they should be informed that His Majesty's Government disclaimed all participation in sentiments which had dictated the reproaches cast upon them, yet he did not see the expediency of appointing the desired Commission of Inquiry; it would be too expensive and the report too voluminous. Such a mode of repelling charges against a whole people had never been pursued or projected before; he thought the evidence might be encountered by new evidence before the same Committee. But the noble Lord quite omitted to say how the new witnesses were to make their way from South Africa to London. This was the sum total of the satisfaction obtained.

Long before this answer could have reached the Colony, or Captain Stockenstrom could have had an opportunity of replying to the statements in the petition, great consternation was created among the Eastern Province inhabitants by the news that the very man against whom they were so wrathful, had actually been appointed their Lieutenant-Governor. The creation of such an office had long been their heart's desire, as it had been said, with justice, that the seat of Government in Cape Town was too far from the frontier for any efficient control of the natives, or for that prompt action which had

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so often been necessary in dealing with them. Some form of separate government for the Eastern Province was advocated by several witnesses before the Aborigines Committee, especially by the Rev. W. Shaw. The hope had been, however, that the appointment would be conferred upon some impartial man, who had been quite disconnected with the Colony, and who might, in consequence, be expected to possess a mind unwarped by Colonial prejudice or early Colonial impressions. But when they heard that the administration of their affairs and their future welfare was to be in the hands of one who, so they considered, had gone out of his way to defame them, they saw little hope of any compensation for their losses. How could the British Government be expected to vote money for the relief of those who were believed to have brought disaster upon themselves by their own wickedness? How could anyone who believed Stockenstrom's account of the Zeko murder entertain any sympathy for people who could be guilty of such conduct? Whatever sentiments of goodwill the inhabitants of the Western Province entertained towards Captain Stockenstrom, there can be no doubt that the hatred with which he was regarded in the East, by British, Dutch, and Kaffirs alike, was very sincere. "The appointment of the Lieutenant-Governor has given most universal dissatisfaction," said Colonel Smith in writing to the Governor; "he is unpopular with the English, but more so the Dutch. . . . It is extraordinary how violently hostile the Boers are towards Stockenstrom. . . . The Kaffirs detest him for many things, particularly for locating the Hottentots on the Kat River, so that the poor man, in addition to the natural duties of his laborious office, will commence his operations thwarted at every turn by everybody, except the anointed of the earth." No official announcement of the appointment reached the Colony until long after it had crept through by means of the newspapers. Although it was gazetted on February 2nd, Sir B. Durban said, on May 13th, "as yet I have no official intimation of it". As soon as the colonists heard of it, their resentment took the form of the first steps of an endeavour to induce the Secretary of State to suspend the appointment until was known the result of the desired investigation into the charges which had been made against them. As will be

remembered, no public meeting could be held at this time without the permission of the Governor. Although opinions on public matters might be ventilated in the press, discussion in open meeting could only take place after the Governor had decided that such procedure was not detrimental to the public peace and safety. The circulation of a petition for signatures, however, often gained the end in view when a meeting was prohibited. In this case, sixty-five householders of Albany, on April 27th, asked permission to call a public meeting "for the purpose of taking into consideration the expediency of transmitting a Petition to His Excellency the Governor, and to the Home Government, praying that Captain Stockenstrom . . . may be suspended from entering upon the duties of that important office (the Lieut.-Governorship) until a rigid inquiry, by Commissioners on the spot, be made into the accuracy of those charges made by him against the frontier inhabitants. The undersigned are induced to urge this request, with the more solicitude, as they are convinced that upon the disproof of those charges, which have been made by Captain Stockenstrom, and the full investigation of their case, will mainly depend their ultimately receiving compensation for the late ruinous inroads of the Kaffirs, the approval of the late beneficial measures of His Excellency, Sir Benjamin Durban, and finally of the frontier being placed on such a footing of security as shall enable them to provide for their families and improve the country of their adoption." In reply to this on May 13th, John Bell, the Colonial Secretary, stated, "that His Excellency is ready, as you must be well aware, to afford his sanction to public meetings of His Majesty's subjects where he can consistently do so, and where the object and proceedings of such meeting may probably lead to useful results, but he would not feel himself warranted in sanctioning a meeting for the express purpose of taking into consideration the propriety of praying the Government to suspend or prohibit an officer from the performance of duties for which he has been expressly appointed by His Majesty. His Excellency regrets, therefore, that he cannot authorise you (the Civil Commissioner of Albany) to sanction the proposed meeting." At Graaff Reinet, in like manner, permission was sought, in May, to hold a public meeting "for the purpose of determining upon such

CHAP. VII. lawful measures as may be still open to them for averting, if possible, the evil consequences to be apprehended from the appointment of Andries Stockenstrom to the office of Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Division of this Colony," and which, in like manner, was refused. At Beaufort West, on the other hand, a memorial was sent to the Governor stating that "Memorialists had seen attacks on the character of Andries Stockenstrom, Esq., written by partial pens in the *Grahams-town Journal*, and therefore undeserving of notice". They learnt with surprise that steps were being taken to prevent him returning as Lieutenant-Governor; they could not be guilty of such ingratitude as refraining to come forward and state that he had been an impartial magistrate in their district; and they desired, further, that their sentiments of gratitude should be conveyed to His Majesty the King for the appointment which had been conferred on Captain Stockenstrom. In connection with this memorial it should perhaps be stated that the gentleman who was then the magistrate at Beaufort was brother-in-law to Captain Stockenstrom—a point which was made much of by the opposition.

Much unhappiness and grave apprehension for the future reigned in the Eastern Province during the early part of 1836. The condemnatory evidence which had been given in London, the rumours of the reversal of the Governor's policy in Kaffirland, and the poor prospect of compensation, or even sympathy, for their losses and distress, which all this portended, were conducive to little else than despair. For the somewhat helpless British settler—who had had nothing to do with the treaty with Gaika in 1819, or with the bungling policy of former governors—a possible immunity from Kaffir outrage by abstaining from the accumulation of stock or anything else that was worth stealing was about all to be hoped for.

The despatch of December 26th was not without its effect upon those in England who were interested in the Cape commercially. According to the *London Times* of January 5th, 1836, reports of what was to happen had created considerable sensation in the City among merchants who were trading with the Cape. Several of them lost no time in waiting upon Lord Glenelg in order to represent to him the ruin of their interests, which must be the result of the adoption of such measures.

They determined to suspend all further shipments and countermand the sailing of three ships then ready for sea, and, further, to hurry off instructions to their correspondents to secure and remove all property from a country which was to be left, with wanton indifference, to the open depredation of the savage. They deplored the sacrifice of the Colony to an excessive devotion, to a mistaken philanthropy, and to the chicanery of ambitious hypocrites.

For the Boers, the outlook and the remedy for the existing evils were those indicated in Pieter Retief's letter of April 11th, (*vide* p. 265).

As has been pointed out, both the Governor and Colonel Smith were greatly concerned about the Boers leaving the country at this time, not only because

A bold peasantry, their country's pride
When once destroyed, can never be supplied,

but because they felt deeply for the distress and destitution to which the Kaffirs had reduced so many of them. That they were leaving the country was obvious from the complaints of the Tambookie chief, Mapassa, who was objecting to the invasion of his country by them. The invasion was probably nothing more than the slow progress of the caravans on their way to the north, the long outspans here and there having the appearance of an occupation of the country. The Boers did not appear to have interfered with the Tambookies, though they, the Boers, complain of having been robbed of cattle by them. In Kaffirland also the prevailing uncertainty manifested itself. The chiefs showed a disposition to throw off the shackles of civilisation under which they had all along been groaning; while the common people saw with dread a return to the cruelties of witchcraft and other abuses, against which they had for a time been protected. Umhala, who had never gone far out of his way to conceal his dislike of Smith's rule, now commenced to give trouble openly. Refusing to respect or obey a sentry he received a stab with a bayonet; his hurt, however, was not serious. This wounding of a great chief did not make the stir it would have done before the war. Maqomo rejoiced, as openly as he dared, at the prospect of ceasing to be a magistrate and again becoming a "live chief"; while Pato and Kama, on the other hand, looked with misgiving on the

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withdrawal of British rule, as they felt that their allegiance to the King of England had given offence to the chief Eno, whom they feared. Colonel Smith in writing to the Governor, on June 4th, said: "When the Kaffirs became acquainted with the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor, and that I was to be removed from the administration of their affairs, much excitement was apparent. They say, 'Ah, this is the manner the English have always treated us. They never adhere to any system, but are always changing the men with whom we are brought in contact. We hear that the Great Kraal (King William's Town) is again to be abandoned, and we are to be left again to rule ourselves. This must not be, our people say you shall not go . . . we must lay our case before your King . . . whom have we to speak to but you? We have rascals among us, we help you to catch them, we do all you bid us. Oh, our father stay, we shall be ruined and be in confusion when you go.'" The Glasgow missionaries, in like manner, expressed their concern at the possible removal of Colonel Smith.

Lord Glenelg's momentous and voluminous despatch of December, 26th, 1835, reached Sir B. Durban on March 21st, 1836. Although the Governor's reply is dated June 9th, 1836, this answer was not transmitted to England till about six months afterwards. Besides the collection of the depositions, statements, and other documents which could refute Lord Glenelg's allegations, there was the result of the inquiry into the death of Hintza, which was conducted by a special committee in August, to be included. On March 23rd, the Governor merely acknowledged the receipt of the despatch, remarking that he would then abstain from any further comment than to express his deep regret that his measures had met with disapproval and were to be rescinded. "I forsee," he said, "in the consequence of this determination the abandonment and ruin of the frontier provinces" . . . "nevertheless I shall endeavour to obey your Lordship's commands with as little mischief to the Colony and to all concerned as may be compatible with that obedience." With this answer he sent a report of the Board of Relief for the destitute in order that his Lordship, impressed as he was that Sir B. Durban's description of the miseries of the frontier were "generalities," might see that those "generalities" were not exaggerations.

To have had his veracity called in question, his military arrangements ignominiously censured, and his measures untruly taxed as cruel and inhuman, were trials which bore heavily on the benevolent Sir Benjamin Durban. "I require some forbearance to reply to the Minister's despatch," he said to Sir H. Taylor; "to bear with the imputations upon good and faithful officers which it contains and with the injustice to the unfortunate colonists and its disbelief in their suffering, overwhelming as they had been unmerited." He was convinced that it had been written under "the influence of a party," because Lord Glenelg had avowed that he had formed his opinions from the gratuitous communications of people zealous to afford him information. "He preferred," continued Sir Benjamin, "following the account sent by the anti-Colonial party furnished to Dr. Philip, I believe, by Dr. Ambrose Campbell of Grahamstown."

The preparation of the Governor's reply involved a large amount of work, for besides the great length of the despatch itself, there were, not including the papers in connection with the Hintza inquiry, no fewer than 256 enclosures, consisting of reports, returns, depositions, copies of letters, and other matters. Considered as evidence on Eastern Province affairs, this formidable budget was comparable with the whole of the evidence collected before the Aborigines Committee, and, as an unbiassed statement, far more valuable. But it did not seem to carry much weight with Lord Glenelg, and the only practical result of it was the dismissal of Sir B. Durban from his Governorship of the Colony. This perhaps is scarcely surprising, considering on the one hand the ascendancy of the "philanthropic" party and on the other the sentiments of the Governor and the language in which they were expressed. Lord Glenelg regretted that the deliberation of six months had not led the Governor to soften and moderate expressions dictated by the first vehemence of excited feeling, and that he had departed from the tone and temper which ought to characterise the intercourse of public functionaries in the service of their common Sovereign.¹

The following is a rough outline of the Governor's reply: After expressing his gratitude to His Majesty for his commendation of the services rendered by the troops in repelling

¹ Letter, Durban to Smith, April 8th, 1836.

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the invaders from the Colony, and passing over parts of his Lordship's despatch which he told the Minister were mere declamation, he then premised "that Your Lordship appears to have overlooked or disregarded some essential statements in my despatches, and to have withheld your belief from others, while you have put implicit faith in anonymous information, drawn, as Your Lordship avows, from the gratuitous communications of people zealous to afford it but whose names you do not think proper to disclose". The opinions formed by his Lordship in this anonymous information were the same as those expressed in "a Colonial newspaper, the organ of Dr. Philip, whose relative is the Editor—a publication, to the influence of which, I apprehend, this Colony is indebted to no inconsiderable degree for many of the evils which have befallen it". Without following his Lordship through the long train of assumptions which have led him "to lavish all sympathy upon the enemy in the late war, and to consign His Majesty's unfortunate subjects to reprobation, destruction, and destitution," Sir Benjamin refers him to the enclosed documents for information as to what has actually happened. "Whatever the completion of the experiment of invasion might have been, incomplete as Your Lordship seems to consider it, it must, I think, be admitted, from all these documents, to have been as extensive, as desolating, and as bloody as any of the advocates of the Kaffir cause could well have desired; and it is to be hoped that its awful results may be admitted by these advocates, as some trifling expiation of the imputed sins of the unfortunate colonists." Sir Benjamin then gives an epitome of the remote and proximate causes of the war, though he feels that no weight will be allowed to the truth of any of his direct assertions when they are opposed to the private information which the zealots have afforded him, and he acknowledges that, unlike Lord Glenelg, he is unable to deduce from them any justification on the part of the Kaffirs for their atrocious enterprise. All the more so, as he was in communication with the chiefs through the proper official channels, as well as by the collateral unofficial assistance of Dr. Philip, though the latter denies it, for the purpose of entering into engagements with them which would have been at once advantageous and agreeable if they had been desirous

of relations of amity and reciprocal good offices with the Colony. If, therefore, there was ever a time when the Kaffirs had less excuse for attacking the unoffending farmers, it was at the latter end of 1834, yet "Your Lordship is pleased to advocate and commend it as a justifiable measure, only to be regretted because of their want of power to make it more perfectly complete; it is difficult for me to believe that such can be Your Lordship's sentiments with regard to the savage and treacherous enemy on the one part, and His Majesty's faithful, industrious, and unoffending subjects on the other; and I can only give credit to it, because it is before me in Your Lordship's despatch, and confirmed by your signature". The Governor stated that he had used the words advisedly, they conveyed his matured opinion, and, giving his reasons, he was disposed neither to modify nor retract them. Repudiating the charge of acting against the Kaffirs with angry feelings or revenge, he considered such a procedure unworthy of a British soldier, "but I am free to acknowledge," he continues, "that I was impressed with a deep feeling of commiseration for my fellow-subjects of the Colonial border whose murdered bodies, burnt houses, ruined farms, and destitute families had been recently within my sight, and with a proportionate feeling of indignation towards the murderers and spoilers. I am not ashamed of this feeling; nay, I am inclined to believe that even Your Lordship, all of whose sympathies seem engaged on the side of the savage oppressors, and none left for the suffering colonists, if you yourself had been a witness of these horrors, and the resulting calamities, instead of having formed your opinion many thousand miles off, upon tales supplied by 'the voluntary zeal of informants,' speaking, I am afraid, under a bias, and who besides had themselves been far enough from the scene of these atrocities, I am inclined, I say, to believe, that even Your Lordship would have been in some measure touched with pity and just anger, and disposed to participate in the feelings which had then affected me."

The Governor then defended the Wesleyan Missionaries who, as a body, had been censured by Lord Glenelg. He (Sir Benjamin) considered that the Wesleyan Mission had done more for the cause of religion and humanity than all the

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other missions put together. He showed that seven of them had for years been living in (not merely touring in) Kaffirland and had had great influence with the people, though probably in all that time they had not made twenty converts to Christianity. He spoke of the good offices they had rendered in bringing about peace. In answer to Lord Glenelg's animadversions upon the extensive scale on which the military operations in Kaffirland had been carried out, the unchecked success of the campaign, and the small loss of life on the side of the British, which he seems to have regarded with regret, Sir Benjamin pointed out that he was bound to take every precaution against disaster. The actual number of regular soldiers employed had been small, the greater bulk of the force having been civilians, British, Dutch, and Hottentots, a somewhat untrained and undisciplined body. The Kaffirs required no commissariat nor means of transport, the country through which they pass providing all they want; there was therefore no reason why, in the event of opposing them with a less force, 40,000 of them could not have penetrated and laid waste the country as far west as Cape Town. Further answer on the actual military operations was entrusted to Colonel Smith, who had been represented as a monster of cruelty. In a letter of considerable length he showed that if there had been any deviation from the usages of civilised warfare, it had been on the side of leniency and undeserved kindness. The Governor refrained from dealing with the charges in connection with the death of Hintza as they were to become the subject of a separate and special investigation. Turning then to, perhaps, the most important subject in the despatch, namely, the abandonment of the Province of Queen Adelaide, the Governor expressed his intention of availing himself of the Minister's sanction to suspend, for a time, the execution of that command, hoping that in the meantime Lord Glenelg, on becoming possessed of further information, would eventually reverse that decision. He pointed out the evil results the measure could not fail to produce on all. "It will be speedily followed," he said, "by an extensive abandonment of Albany and Somerset on the part of the farmers (Boers). They had considered themselves left without protection for several years previous to the Kaffir war at the end of 1834, in the middle

of which year they had been rendered still less secure by the abrogation of Ordinance No. 99, and they were much excited by the Slave Emancipation Act; but they still lingered in the hope of their grievances being remedied, when the war banished all these heart-burnings for the moment." Seeing in the proclamation which established the new province some promise of more efficient protection, and, perhaps also, some prospect of compensation for their losses due to the war and for the liberation of their slaves, the idea of wholesale immigration from the Colony was for a time relinquished. But when they heard for certain that the measure, which had been foreshadowed by the *Commercial Advertiser*, was actually sanctioned and ordered to be carried into effect by the British Government, they resumed their intentions of immigration.

In concluding his despatch, Sir Benjamin said: "I owe it, in justice to myself and to other officers . . . to record my solemn protest against the unfairness of the general tenor of these Your Lordship's despatches, in which *ex parte* statements, avowedly derived from anonymous information, accompanied by sweeping denunciations of censure, obviously written for publication" and which "have had a direct tendency to cast odium upon me, and upon His Majesty's other officers who have acted under me. Especially I protest against the indignity with which Your Lordship has, in more than one instance, been pleased to visit me, His Majesty's Governor of this Colony, in placing your declared reliance upon the anonymous information then before Your Lordship, in contradiction to my direct official statements, then also before you; unhesitatingly adopting the former and doubting the correctness of the latter. . . . I feel assured that His Majesty's Secretary of State cannot have been justified in such a course of proceedings." The long defence of Colonel Smith which accompanied this recounted all his military proceedings from the time of his arrival in Grahamstown until the date of the letter (April 17th, 1836). He showed that none of his actions had been more severe than circumstances warranted, and that he had used every forethought and every reasonable conciliation and kindness to gain the end in view, namely, a lasting peace and the introduction of civilisation among the Kaffirs. In view of the subsequent proceedings, the following extract from

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this lengthy document is of importance. In referring to the behaviour of Hintza, when he was pretending to assist in recovering the stolen Colonial cattle, Colonel Smith said: "On that evening he (Hintza) contrived to send off a mounted man to drive the cattle in the direction he proposed to conduct me, which he did in a particular pass, where he meditated making his escape. I refer Your Excellency to my despatch on the subject, which I believe is already transmitted to his Lordship, the truth of which I will support unsullied, against the vile slanders and wicked accusations of an individual who has furnished a report framed by his inventive genius, although it is a curious incidence that the horse which I rode on the important occasion he lent me on leaving Grahamstown, and (in a note now lying before me) from whom are these remarkable words: 'The horse is now more valuable to me as having been the instrument in assisting in the prevention of the escape of Hintza, and when I again ride him it will always bring to my recollection the name of Colonel Smith'. In another communication, he writes to consult me in the most friendly terms as to his future prospects in life, yet this double-faced scoundrel, Dr. Campbell, gets hold of two Hottentots who were never near the scene of action and trumps up a plausible falsehood which has been believed in preference to the official report of a Colonel in His Majesty's Army."

On June 19th, 1835, there appeared a letter in the *Commercial Advertiser* from Dr. A. G. Campbell of Grahamstown, giving an account of the death of Hintza and the mutilation of his body. Some Hottentots are described as having had mercy on the wounded and helpless chief, which was denied him by the colonists, particularly by a Mr. George Southey, who murdered him unnecessarily.¹ Whether Dr. Campbell himself sent this account privately to Lord Glenelg, or whether the noble lord learnt it in the communication made to him by the London Missionary Society is not clear; in any case, the story reached him and he determined, in consequence, to institute an inquiry into the affair by means of a Military

¹ The *Edinburgh Review* for January, 1836, in an article on "the late Kaffir war," said in talking of the death of Hintza: "Here the wounded man, up to the waist in water, leaned against a rock for support, and begged for mercy; the Hottentots heard his prayer and spared him; but a British officer, climbing the rock above him, shot the unfortunate chief."

Court. In accordance with this determination, a Court consisting of Lieutenant-Colonel Hare, as president, Majors Tripp and MacPherson, and Captains Answick and Fawkes, gentlemen all impartial and disconnected with the Colony, met at Fort Willshire on August 29th, 1836, for the purpose of "investigating the circumstances which immediately preceded and followed the death of the late chief Hintza". In his instructions to the Court, Lord Glenelg stated that a gentleman bearing the name of Campbell, practising medicine at Grahamstown, would be able to give or indicate some evidence on the subject.

This Court of Inquiry was hailed with very great satisfaction by all in the East, because it was of the nature of that which was wanted on a larger scale, namely, an investigation *on the spot* by impartial commissioners into all the charges which had been brought against the colonists. The witnesses having been conveyed to Fort Willshire from Grahamstown in waggons at Government expense, the proceedings commenced on the morning of Monday, August 29th. There were two classes of witnesses, one consisting of those who had taken part in the expedition across the Kei, and the other consisting of those who gave only hearsay evidence. Of the former, Lieutenant Balfour, A.D.C. to Colonel Smith, was the most important, for, besides George Southey, he was the only individual who was down at the river when Hintza met his death. After describing the flight of the chief and his disappearance into the bush, Lieutenant Balfour continued: "I said to Mr. Southey, it is no use our standing here, we must go into the bush. Mr. Southey held my gun while I scrambled down the steep bank (about 15 or 20 feet) when he reached me my gun and his also, while he got down. The bush was very thick, I could not see more than ten yards before me; I went to the left while Mr. Southey went to the right. I had scrambled on in this way, on my hands and knees, some little distance, when I heard a shot fired. I called out, 'Hullo, is he dead?' Mr. Southey said, 'A Kaffir is'. I crept back, breaking my way with my gun, and got to Mr. Southey, and we found it was Hintza. He was in a half-sitting and half-lying position in the nitch of a rock by the water's edge; one assegai was still in his right hand and a bundle in his left. The shot which

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Mr. Hoole, a trader and interpreter who was with the force, saw the body of Hintza. Seeing the chief rush into the bush he (*Hoole*) ran to the spot about twenty yards lower down and then endeavoured to follow him. He called out two or three times: "Hintza, come out of the bush," "You will not be killed," "It is not war with you," "The Colonel says he will not hurt you". But receiving no answer, he made his way down through the thick bush, and while doing so he heard the shot and the conversation between Balfour and Southey. He reached the body and examined it. "I found that he had received a shot in the head and it had taken off one of his ears."

Ensign Bisset, after giving the usual account of Hintza's flight, Colonel Smith's pursuit, the scuffle on horseback, the firing at Hintza and his disappearance, proceeded to say that when he arrived at the bush, Daniells and one of the Hottentot Cape Corps, Julie Windvogel, came up shortly afterwards. Hearing the shot fired, he jumped down into the bush and reached the spot where Hintza's body lay. He described the position of the body and the wounds in much the same terms as did the other witnesses.

Dr. Ford, the surgeon of the 72nd Regiment, had carefully examined Hintza's body, and certified that the ears could not have been taken away by the bullet as the wound was too high in the head.

Dr. Ambrose George Campbell, the accuser, had no first-hand evidence to offer; all he could state was what had been told him by a Hottentot, Klaas, one of the Cape Corps. *Dr. Campbell* evidently had a very bad time during the examination. In his defence it should be stated that whatever his source of information or the steps he took to give it publicity, there is no doubt that Hintza's ears, or at least one of them,

was cut off by somebody.¹ In support of his accusation, Dr. Campbell called—

Mr. John Phillips. This witness said that at the time of Hintza's death he was 100 miles distant from the scene of the tragedy, and could not understand why Dr. Campbell had referred to him.

Rev. J. Laing, the Missionary at Burns Hill, knew nothing personally. He had talked with Klaas, the interpreter, who had told him that Hintza's ears had been cut off and that attempts to extract his teeth with a bayonet had been made. Klaas had also told the story to another Missionary, Mr. McDiamid. Mr. Laing called as witness—

Private Willson of the 72nd Regiment. He deposed that although he was with the force, he did not see Hintza killed, nor did he see the body afterwards.

Mr. Driver, of the Corps of Guides, seems to have been an unwilling witness. For some unknown reason he refused to give any answer when he was asked whether he knew anything about Mr. Southey cutting off Hintza's ears.

Klaas, the Hottentot soldier, does not seem to have been examined.

¹ The author had an interview some years ago with a very old Mr. Bowker who had a clear recollection of those times, and whose bias, if he had any, was on the side of the colonists. He stated that, as a trophy of that campaign, he had had shown to him in the High Street of Grahamstown, two human ears wrapped in a piece of brown paper, which were said to have been those of Hintza.

Dr. A. G. Campbell, the fourth son of Major-General Campbell, and a settler of 1820, commenced medical practice in Grahamstown in the early years. He seems to have been a somewhat quarrelsome and vindictive person. He possessed considerable ability, no less with his pen than with his lancet and pills. A supposed injustice on the part of Government, whereby a Dr. John Atherstone received the appointment of district surgeon of Albany instead of himself, commenced the trouble. This was accentuated by his being mulcted in damages in a libel case which Dr. Atherstone afterwards brought against him. He then fell foul of Mr. Godlonton, the editor of the *Grahamstown Journal*, and thus became violently anti-Journal, anti-Wesleyan, anti-Government, anti-Colonist, in fact anti-everything and everybody. He allied himself with the Philippine party, and under the name of *Justus* wrote anti-frontier letters to the *Commercial Advertiser* and a very untruthful book called *Wrongs of the Caffre Nation*. In 1840 he commenced an *anti-omnes* monthly magazine called the *Echo*, edited and published by himself. It was an able and witty production but somewhat scurrilous. In answering the summons to attend the Court of Inquiry, he asked that he might be protected, as he had already suffered personal indignities and professional loss owing to the Governor's disposition towards him. His Excellency, in reply, said he was unaware of any indignity having been offered to Dr. Campbell.

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Mr. George Southey gave a long and detailed account of the whole of the expedition, from the time when it left the Kei up to the death of Hintza. Then dealing with the accusation against him, he said: "Whosoever asserts that I cut and mutilated Hintza's body in any way, asserts a falsehood, and I declare upon my honour, and I swear before God, that I never cut or mutilated Hintza's body in any way whatever. . . . This public investigation has, I trust, placed beyond all manner of suspicion that I could perpetrate such an act of cruelty, as abhorrent to my feelings as to those of any man on earth." Having collected all the available evidence, the Court, in the end, reported upon the findings. With reference to the incidents which more especially formed the object of the inquiry, it was stated that "there is no evidence of the chief having cried for mercy, and the only thing that has appeared throughout the examination and from which any inference might be drawn of this having occurred, is the evidence of Mr. Driver, that witness having declined to answer the question when directly put to him". "That with regard to the mutilation of the body of Hintza, it has been shown that the ears were cut off, and the Court in recording this act, in itself so barbarous and so contrary to the usages of civilised warfare, cannot but feel pain and indignation that it should have been perpetrated by any persons calling themselves Englishmen and acting with British soldiers, and the Court regrets that in the midst of so much conflicting and contradictory evidence, they are unable to fix this foul act on any person in particular." The result of this investigation and the documents connected with it having been sent to Lord Glenelg, the following reply was received in a despatch, dated May 1st, 1837: "With regard to the chief Hintza, I am happy to state that the information now transmitted now clears up the doubts and difficulties which, in my despatch of December 26th, 1835, I described as connected with that subject. It is, I think, now established, that if not the fomentor of the invasion, that chief was at least engaged in a secret confederacy with its authors, and was availing himself of such advantages as it offered him. On himself, therefore, rests the responsibility for the calamity in which he and his people were involved by the contest. . . . I have read with attention the proceedings of the Court of

Inquiry held on the subject of the indignities alleged to have been committed on the dead body of Hintza ; and I cannot but express my sense of the diligence, temper, and impartiality with which that inquiry has throughout been conducted. The mutilation of the body is indeed too clearly proved, but the fact has not been brought home to any person." His Lordship, after a careful perusal of the evidence, could not refrain from stating his opinion "that neither Mr. George Southey nor Mr. William Southey were at all implicated in that unmanly transaction. This act of justice I have much satisfaction in rendering to those gentlemen, and you will be so good as to communicate to them this portion of my despatch."

On Sunday, July 3rd, 1836, the East Indiaman, *Lord W. Bentinck*, having on board the new Lieutenant-Governor, sailed into Table Bay. As small-pox had broken out during the voyage, and the captain was anxious to leave immediately for India, the passengers, including the Lieutenant-Governor and his family, were landed and quarantined in the old Chavonnes Battery, where they remained until the 23rd. During this time, however, by means of fumigated documents, Captain Stockenstrom was able to communicate with the Governor, and thus expedite the preliminaries of the new order of things. As Lord Glenelg had intimated that more definite instructions in connection with the new province would be entrusted to the Lieutenant-Governor, the receipt of these papers was looked forward to with considerable concern. They contained nothing more explicit, however, than was to be found in the despatches already received. So that, as matters then stood, whether the Governor retained or abandoned the Province of Queen Adelaide, he would have to act entirely on his own responsibility. He had hoped that by that time Lord Glenelg would have been in possession of further information respecting the satisfactory state of affairs in Kaffirland, and that he would thus have been induced to decide to retain British control over the country. But nothing to guide the Governor in either course was received. "Although I have scant ground to stand upon," he wrote to Colonel Smith on August 5th, "I am decided to continue to hold the province upon my own responsibility until I am

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forced to do otherwise by further and more positive orders, and after a long conference with the Lieutenant-Governor, he is entirely of my opinion and prepared to act accordingly." Colonel Smith was instructed therefore to continue the course he was pursuing, "so that all may see the system was working well until its overthrow".

On July 25th, the Lieutenant-Governor, having been liberated from quarantine, took the oaths of office. Sir Benjamin caused every honour to be paid to him, and every ceremony, such as the firing of guns from the castle, to be performed in celebration of his arrival. All this he thought the more necessary, so he told Lord Glenelg, "as Your Lordship is doubtless aware, he has, from circumstances past, come out under the disadvantage of being personally unacceptable to a large proportion of the inhabitants of the districts which he is to govern". From the conversations which took place between the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor in Cape Town, the reason for Lord Glenelg's delay in sending further instructions to Sir Benjamin Durban became clear. In another interview with Captain Stockenstrom on April 19th, Lord Glenelg intimated that, though the supersession of Sir Benjamin's policy was to be the ultimate result of his intentions, yet, before issuing final instructions, he wished to receive replies to the many matters contained in his despatch of December 26th, 1835. But as the Governor did not send those replies until December of 1836, though dated June 9th, 1836, they could not reach London until March of 1837. The long-looked-for further instructions therefore could not have been received until well on in that year. But according to the command in the December despatch, Sir Benjamin was compelled to commence before the end of 1836 those retrograde steps which he felt convinced were to be so harmful to the Colony. The practical reversal of his system began therefore shortly after the arrival of the Lieutenant-Governor. Sir Benjamin Durban has been charged with upsetting his own system and substituting Lord Glenelg's, presumably because he considered it preferable.¹

¹ Who overthrew or reversed the Durban policy? Captain Stockenstrom would have us believe that *Sir Benjamin Durban himself* did so. "In one of his first letters *the Governor* already proposed to me that I should forthwith

The following memorandum to Colonel Smith, dated August 5th, 1836, will indicate how far this charge is founded on fact: "Whereas successive despatches from Lord Glenelg, His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, of December 26th, 1835, February 5th and 17th, and March 28th, 1836, have announced and reiterated the determination of His Majesty's Government to renounce the sovereignty and dominion of the country between the Keiskamma and the Kei, with the allegiance to His Majesty of the Kaffir tribes therein, disapproving of the arrangements which I have made for the settlement of that country and of that people, and concluding in the last of these despatches that His Majesty's Government 'considered these arrangements as entirely provisional, and that on the arrival of the Lieutenant-Governor, they *must* be in a great measure, if not altogether, superseded. . . .' And whereas when the last of these despatches was written on March 28th, my correspondence up to January inclusive was before his Lordship, wherein I had reported, in succession, all the progressive steps of the system I had adopted for the security at once of the border colonists and the benefit of the native tribes, with its prosperous results, and the fair and reasonable prospect of its ultimate complete success. And whereas subsequently, when the Lieutenant-Governor (recently arrived) had his last interview with the Secretary of State on April 19th last, and when his Lordship was also in possession of my correspondence up to February inclusive, no change in his already expressed determination, as above mentioned, was intimated to the Lieutenant-Governor. I am now compelled, most reluctantly, to come to the conclusion that there is no longer the slightest ground for hoping that the Secretary of State's determination may be hereafter changed, nor consequently any ground resulting from such a hope for my longer continuing to suspend the execution of, at

abolish his system and introduce the Lord Glenelg policy," he says in his autobiography (vol. ii., p. 42). This statement is most decisively contradicted by Sir Benjamin Durban in all his correspondence on the subject. It is true he did so in so far as he was compelled to obey the commands of His Majesty's Secretary of State. But his strongly worded protests against the abandonment, his forebodings of the evil and ruin which must result, and his determination to wait until the very last moment before moving in that direction, all indicate the falsity and the absurdity of such a charge.

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least, the preliminary measures directed in the despatch of December 26th, namely, 'to prepare the public mind in the Cape Colony for the relinquishment of the newly acquired province, by announcing that the British occupation of it is temporary and provisional only, and will be resigned by the end of the year of 1836, that date being fixed as affording sufficient interval for making those arrangements which will be necessary to enable the Colony to recede with safety from the limits assigned to it by my Proclamation of May 10th, 1835, renewed in June following'. It is full time to act upon this express, positive, and repeated order, so far, at least, as may suffice to prepare the way and establish the facilities for the ultimate fulfilment, within the period fixed, of the Secretary of State's will, without absolutely abandoning, in the meantime, and while there exists a possibility, however slender, of that will undergoing a change, the system which, after nine months of practical experience, has continued to afford so fair a prospect of ensuring, at once, the future security of the Eastern Border Districts of the Colony, and the civilisation and happiness of the Kaffir tribes beyond it. The adoption of these preliminary measures, thus rendered necessary by the commands of the Secretary of State, is enforced besides by the joint considerations of economy, of not keeping those concerned, as well colonists as Kaffirs, any longer in suspense, and of withdrawing a portion of the more distantly detached posts of occupation, and condensing them upon or within the old border, seeing too that on the one hand the improved order of the natives no longer demands, as at first, the presence of all these posts, and that by the intended abandonment of the country the villages of which they would have become the germ, are not now to be established. I propose therefore to avail myself of the professional skill and judgment of Colonel Smith, before he quits the charge which he has so long and so ably held, but which he has now resigned, to carry into effect the following arrangements, which he will therefore proceed to execute accordingly, namely:—

"I. Colonel Smith will cause the posts of occupation and communication at Warden's Post, Wellington, Waterloo, Murray, Beresford, and White to be respectively withdrawn,

in such order of evacuation and successive retirement as he shall judge most expedient, retaining for the present only King William's Town with its works, and Fort Cox, both which he will occupy in such force as he may judge necessary.

"2. In making these arrangements the 75th Regiment is to remain in the Province of Adelaide, and, so far as may be practicable, the 72nd to be sent back into that of Albany and Somerset, wherein it is intended that the latter should, so soon as it can be effected, relieve all the posts, and occupy all the quarters now held by the 27th. Having which arrangement in view, Colonel Smith will be so good to let Lieut.-Colonel Somerset be apprised of the arrival of the 72nd at Willshire, in order that he may cause the posts now occupied by the 27th on the left bank of the Fish River to be relieved by the 72nd before the latter should have crossed that river to the right bank.

"3. The Artillery from the posts evacuated to be placed for the present in Depôt at Fort Willshire.

"4. In evacuating the posts as above directed, everything that constitutes their defences is to be effectually, but quickly, razed and destroyed, under the superintendence of an Officer of Engineers. But everything else belonging to them, and which may in any degree be useful to the Kaffirs, to be left entire and uninjured for their use, and the ground of each for that purpose to be given over to the Kaffir magistrate of the arrondissement in which it is situated.

"5. It is needless to say that the natives are to be treated with every kindness and consideration in the course of these arrangements, and Colonel Smith will cause them to be assured that the Governor has earnestly besought the King, his master, still to allow the present state of things to be confirmed, and to retain them under His Majesty's dominion and protection, that the Governor still indulges some hopes that this may be, and that, in thus awaiting His Majesty's final determination, the Governor desires to give them this convincing proof of the confidence he entertains in their good and orderly conduct, which is evinced by withdrawing the garrisons of these posts.

"6. If Colonel Smith should consider it indispensable to

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(Signed) " B. DURBAN,
" *Major-General, Commander-in-Chief.*

" HEADQUARTERS,
" CAPE TOWN, *July 28th, 1836.*"

In the uncertainty as to the ultimate decision of His Majesty's Government with reference to the Province of Queen Adelaide, the Governor had, although peace had long been declared, retained Martial Law in that province. In fact, it is difficult to see how Colonel Smith could have carried on his "eat up" system without it, for besides his own personality, unconditional and immediate obedience to his word was effected by the almost instant appearance of soldiery at the offending kraal. A question in connection with this arose, however, upon which the Governor found it necessary to consult the Chief Justice and the Judges of the Supreme Court. He received their opinion to the effect that the maintenance of Martial Law during a time of peace was illegal. With great reluctance, therefore, he was compelled to issue a Proclamation, dated August 18th, revoking it. With this powerful support removed, it was obvious that the Lieutenant-Governor would be at a great disadvantage in continuing Colonel Smith's régime, however anxious he may have been to do so. Colonel Smith himself, on seeing the Proclamation, is said to have said: "The sooner we march out of the province the better, for how am I to 'eat up' a Kaffir according to Blackstone?" He had been perfectly aware that Martial Law could not be continued indefinitely; in order, therefore, to make provision against the day when it would have to cease, he drafted a simple code of laws which he considered would protect the colonists and restrain the Kaffirs. His proposals are of interest because they are not unlike those actually put in force at the end of the year by the Lieutenant-Governor, but which in the end proved a failure. In short they were: Assuming the Keiskamma and the Chumie to be the boundary of the Colony, to establish a line of military posts from the Winterberg to the sea, from which troops should patrol within the boundary line to the drifts. The troops to consist of Kaffir police, twenty at each post, under the superintendence

of an European officer, stationed at Fort Thomson (Alice). Upon the report of cattle being stolen and the spoor discovered, the police, decorated with large brass plates, on which were their numbers, should be despatched in pursuit of it, and never to quit it till the party be discovered. The chiefs to be paid so much per annum for assisting in the discovery of the thieves. Certain fines were then prescribed in punishment of thefts. "Upon a farmer discovering that he had been robbed, he was to follow up the spoor, proceed to the nearest agent of police, make affidavit of what he had lost, if during the day, that he was satisfied with the diligence of his herds, if at night, that his cattle were *in the kraal*. Half the depredations are occasioned by the farmers themselves, from allowing their cattle to wander about without *even counting them for days*. The next thing to be considered is, suppose the farmer is robbed to a serious extent, yet his cattle or any traces of them are not discovered; has he any claim on the Government? I say, NO! for if he attends to his herds it is totally impossible that they can fly; the spoor must be discovered and so must the cattle."

No Patrol ever to Cross the Boundary Line. In the event of contumacious conduct on the part of a chief or his tribe, let 200 soldiers be assembled and two pieces of cannon, march boldly up to the chief's kraal, fire a cannon, and demand redress. Colonel Smith thought that would have the desired effect. All British subjects crossing the boundary to be amenable to British Law. The Lieutenant-Governor should once a year meet all the chiefs assembled for the purpose, and with the missionaries and all functionaries listen to any grievances they might have—as well as indicate all sorts of virtuous ideals. With regard to criminal procedure: the chief was to assemble a jury of twelve of his people and himself as magistrate to try the offender in the presence of the superintendent of police. If the man be found guilty, the superintendent of police to pronounce sentence, and this, after having received the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor, put in execution. Colonel Smith was sure all this would succeed well, provided the military had as little to do with it as possible. These proposals were made on July 12th, 1836, the famous Stockenstrom Treaties, yet to be dealt with, came into force in the following December.

CHAPTER VIII.

STOCKENSTROM'S POLICY.

CHAP. VIII. NOTWITHSTANDING that Lieut.-Governor Stockenstrom had come out to the Cape to carry into effect the policy of Lord Glenelg, which was so obnoxious to Sir Benjamin Durban, but with which he himself was in perfect accord, his relations with the Governor until the time he left Cape Town for his duties in the east, were, outwardly at least, quite amicable. During the six weeks His Honour remained in Cape Town he was treated by all with the respect due to an official in his exalted position; by some he was very cordially welcomed on account of his procedure in England. Eighty-five "friends of justice and humanity" presented him with an eulogistic address, in which they expressed their approval of the "clear and explicit statement of your sentiments on the subject of our frontier policy before the Committee of the House of Commons".

His Honour's happiness, however, could not have been unalloyed, for there were current at the time some vague rumours of an unpleasant nature, which concerned him personally, and of which he could not have been entirely ignorant. In company with two officers, Colonels Havelock and Napier, he left Cape Town on August 17th. His route to the east lay through the districts of Swellendam, George, and Uitenhage.

On his arrival at Swellendam he received something of a shock on learning that, on the day after he had left Cape Town, the Governor had, by Proclamation, revoked Martial Law in the new province. It is scarcely a matter of surprise that he should have taken as a slight the fact that this question of revocation had been before the Supreme Court while he was in Cape Town, and that no intimation of what was pending had been conveyed to him; all the more so as there was no

one whom this procedure so seriously affected as himself. For he was now faced with the situation of having to carry on Colonel Smith's administration of Kaffirland without the very force which had contributed so largely to that officer's success. The Governor, however, had no alternative to acting as directed by the Chief Justice, and was not responsible for the judgment being given after the Lieutenant-Governor had started on his travels. From Swellendam he proceeded to the town of George, where, on his arrival on August 25th, a still greater shock awaited him. The evidence and letters which had reached London from the Colony while he was before the Select Committee, must, in a measure, have prepared him for the reception he was likely to be accorded in the Eastern Province. The vagueness of the rumours which he had heard in Cape Town were considerably dissipated when he received the following letter from Captain Campbell, the Civil Commissioner of Albany:—

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“GRAHAMSTOWN, August 17th, 1836.

“SIR,

“Having seen in the *Grahamstown Journal* a statement referring to some depositions which had been made respecting yourself by some frontier farmers, I conceive it incumbent on me, without waiting for Your Honour's arrival in Grahamstown, as I had originally intended, to forward for your information a copy of a deposition made before me by Hendrik Klopper of Baviaan's River, on the subject in question. I have likewise to observe that this deponent having referred to a farmer named Dolph Botha, residing in the Tarka, the affidavit of that person was subsequently taken at my instance by the Resident Justice of the Peace, to whom I have written for a copy; when obtained, I shall forward to you.

“D. CAMPBELL,

“C.C. for Albany and Somerset.”

The deposition of Klopper referred to in this letter is as follows: “I was on the commando that was called out in the year 1819;¹ I then resided at Brintjes Hoogte; when the burghers had assembled there, Captain Stockenstrom, at that

¹ This is a mistake; the incidents referred to took place in 1813.

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time Landdrost of Graaff Reinet, joined us, and took command of the party. We proceeded towards the frontier of the Colony; we passed the Kaga Berg and went towards the Kat River. When we came to the Blinkwater River, close to the former, we found a Caffer herding some cattle, who fled on perceiving us. Captain Stockenstrom, who was in front, spurred his horse and pursued him, the burghers following him. The Caffer hid himself in the bed of the river, *under some driftings of rubbish and bushes accumulated by the stream.* When we reached the spot he was soon discovered, as one of his legs was uncovered by the driftings. Captain Stockenstrom dismounted, and taking his gun from a servant who carried it, went close up to the Caffer and shot him; and addressed Dolph Botha, who was near him, and said, 'Now, Botha, we can revenge ourselves to-day; you for your brother, and I for my father'. Captain Stockenstrom was so close to the Caffer when he shot him, that the wadding of the gun set fire to the driftings, and when we got to a short distance off I saw it burning. The Caffer had no weapons. It would have been easy to take him prisoner, as there were fifty to sixty burghers present; he could not have made his escape. Theunis Botha, brother of Dolph Botha, whom Captain Stockenstrom addressed after shooting the man in the river, was murdered by Caffers with Captain Stockenstrom's father in 1812. I assisted to bury both their bodies. We did not take the cattle the Caffer was herding."

While the Lieutenant-Governor is continuing his journey towards Grahamstown, it will be well to digress here and learn the circumstances under which Klopper's, as well as other and similar depositions, had been collected.

It will be remembered that Captain Stockenstrom had, before the Committee of the House of Commons, accused the Field-Cornet Erasmus of murdering the chief Zeko and six of his followers in cold blood. Until this part of his evidence was received in the Colony, no one knew that there was any such accusation against Erasmus, or any other version of the Zeko fight than that the burghers had been attacked by Kaffirs in the bush and had had to fight in self-defence. It is true that, in 1831, Stockenstrom told Erasmus of what the chief Tyali had accused him, and equally true that he (Stockenstrom)

reported the rumour to the Governor, Sir Lowry Cole, and that no investigation took place.¹ .

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As soon as the charge against Erasmus became known to Captain Campbell, the Civil Commissioner in Grahamstown; he determined to spare no pains in collecting all available information concerning it. He did this, not only in justice to Erasmus, who was looked upon as a victim of Exeter Hall philanthropy, but also out of regard to the Government service, for, he argued, if the charge proved to be true, Erasmus had clearly demonstrated his unfitness for the situation he held. In addition to this, however, there can be no doubt that Captain Campbell, being an 1820 settler, and one of the general body of colonists who were being held up to public reprobation in England, entered upon the investigation with more zest than would have been the case in other criminal charges.

The affidavits thus collected were immediately sent to London, where, as we have seen, they were brought before the Select Committee by Colonel Wade. While this investigation was in progress, and public excitement was at its height, Erasmus happened to meet in the crowded street, an acquaintance, one Klopper of the Baviaan's River district, who was in town with his waggon. During the conversation between them on the prevailing topic, Klopper told Erasmus that he had been on commando with Stockenstrom, and had seen him commit as bad an act as that of which he accused Erasmus. A Mr. Jarvis, a Notary Public, overhearing this, turned to Klopper and told him he would have to go before the magistrate and put that in writing. Klopper made no demur, and the next morning he went before Captain Campbell and made the affidavit afore quoted. This was on February 2nd, the date on which Captain Stockenstrom's appointment was gazetted in London. Klopper in his statement before the magistrate mentioned the names of other farmers who could give corroborative evidence, particularly P. R. Botha of the Tarka district, and Charl Pretorius of Graaf Reinet. Captain Campbell therefore wrote to Mr. O'Reilly, the Justice of the Peace at Cradock, instructing him to take the affidavit of

¹ *Vide* vol. ii. of this work, p. 398.

CHAP. Botha. "I confess," he said, "I did not give credit to the
VIII. statement that was made to me, and stated my disbelief in it, upon which a man named Klopper was brought in to me, who said he was an eyewitness of the transaction alluded to, whereupon I deemed it but justice to all parties, to the accused as well as the accuser, to put this man Klopper on his oath."

In his letter, Captain Campbell enclosed a copy of Klopper's deposition. On February 27th, Mr. O'Reilly took Botha's statement. On the whole, it corroborated that of Klopper, except that he put the date of the affair in 1813, and that Stockenstrom said to C. Pretorius, "Wait, let me shoot him". Botha stated that he was quite close and saw everything. He put the ages of the Kaffir boys at nine years. For further information on this matter, Captain Campbell wrote separately to Mr. Ryneveld, the Civil Commissioner of Graaff Reinet, and also to Mr. Donald Moodie, a Justice of the Peace, who was then residing in that town and engaged in collecting documentary information on the treatment of the natives by Europeans. Mr. Moodie had formerly been protector of slaves, but when that office came to an end, in consequence of the abolition of slavery, Sir. B. Durban authorised him, retaining his former salary, to collect all the available evidence from the earliest times, respecting the treatment of the aborigines by the European colonists. The object of this was to have material with which to rebut the writings of Philip *et hoc genus omne*. How satisfactorily Mr. Moodie performed his onerous task, his big volume of *Moodie's Record*¹ bears testimony.

¹ *Moodie's Record*.—This valuable historical work may be regarded as an authentic record published with the sanction and assistance of the Colonial Government. It is not the expression or opinion of any party, but, it might almost be said, a dry list of the Government documents lying in the offices of the different Civil Commissioners and Clerks of the Peace. A very large number of the papers was to be found at Graaff Reinet, hence Mr. Moodie's residence and work there. In order to make the list as complete as possible, Mr. Moodie, on January 27th, 1837, wrote to the various officials who might be in charge of such papers, stating that he had been instructed by the Governor (Sir B. Durban) to collect and arrange "Documentary evidence regarding the treatment of the tribes beyond the boundaries of the Colony, by the Government, local functionaries, and colonists, as well as the treatment of the latter by these tribes and the provocation given and received on either side". The work continued until the end of 1837, when Sir B. Durban had to hand over the Government to Sir George Napier. The stoppage of this work was a matter of general public concern. In Cape Town, in January 1838, therefore, a committee consisting of Colonel Bird, Mr. C. J. Brand, Mr. Adv. Cloete, and a Mr. Norton was formed for the purpose

There was, therefore, nothing extraordinary in Captain Campbell sending to Mr. Moodie a copy of Klopper's deposition, dealing as it did with the treatment of the natives by a European.

Mr. Ryneveld associated with himself, in this matter, Mr. Moodie and another Justice of the Peace, Mr. W. Lloyd. On April 7th, with open doors and every publicity they took the statement of Pieter Aucamp, the Field Cornet of Rhenosterberg. In substance, he stated that he accompanied the commando in question, but was with that portion of it which went along the tops of the hills, while the alleged shooting of the harmless Kaffir was connected with the party in the country below them. Of the actual affair he knew nothing but what he had heard in general rumour and what had been told him

of continuing this work, and publishing an analysis of it, "with a view to refuting the calumnious statements which, whether from misinformation or by design, have so long misled the European Government of the Parent Country and the civilised world at large, as to the character of the people in this Colony". The committee sought and obtained the permission of Sir George Napier to make use of the necessary official documents. It was then found that the work to be done was so extensive that the assistance of Mr. Moodie had to be enlisted. The Colonial Government was herefore asked to grant a sum of £400 to pay Mr. Moodie and three clerical assistants, the committee guaranteeing to refund this in the event of Lord Glenelg refusing to sanction it. The Governor agreed to this on condition that Mr. Moodie was bound by oath to promise to refrain from omitting anything which related to the subject, but to give fully and truly the contents of the documents without regard to the character of the facts disclosed, whether for or against the colonists or Colonial Government, and that all translations should be certified by a sworn translator. Needless to say that Mr. Moodie agreed to this. The period of research extended roughly from 1649 to 1834. But the financial support, liberal as it had been, was inadequate for the task; the consequence was that the *Record* was very incomplete. It is now a very rare book and seldom met with.

Captain Stockenstrom's attitude towards this work was characteristic. He saw in all this, albeit it was commenced before his appointment, a conspiracy against himself. When he received the Governor's letter asking him to instruct the officials of Albany, Uitenhage, and Somerset to assist Mr. Moodie, he wrote, July 12, 1837, consenting, "painfully and unflinchingly to comply," but he protested against Mr. Moodie having made his (Stockenstrom's) administration of the district of Graaff Reinet an object of special research, "to collect unconnected and garbled matter out of my official proceedings and by his own distorted constructions, assisting in the propagation of the vilest slanders against me". He himself did not pretend to search after the deeds of van Riebeeck with a view to getting at those of Stockenstrom. He implied an abuse of trust on the part of both Sir Benjamin and Mr. Moodie in using the salary of protector of slaves for the purpose of research of this kind. 'Twere useless to answer any of this other than to say that the *Record* shows that there was no more specialisation on Stockenstrom than there was on van der Stell, Tulbagh, or anyone else.

CHAP. VIII. by one C. H. Davel, who said he was present when the Kaffir was killed, but, at the time of inquiry, was dead.

On April 14th, Messrs. Moodie and Lloyd examined Field-Commandant Charl Pretorius. He deposed as to Captain Stockenstrom killing in cold blood a Kaffir who had crept under some brushwood in one of the sources of the Kat River. According to him, Paul van de Merwe had shot one Kaffir, when, he continued, "I took a stick and opening the driftwood I saw another Kaffir alive. I said to Landdrost Stockenstrom, 'Now you may shoot him,' on which Captain Stockenstrom, with his own gun, shot him behind the neck, the ball passing through the breast and afterwards through the knee; the Kaffir was about two yards from Captain Stockenstrom when he fired." Pretorius gave the ages of the Kaffirs as about twenty-four or twenty-five years, and stated that they *had* assegais in their hands.

The deposition of Klopper was sent to a Mr. J. C. Chase,¹ then a Notary Public in Cape Town. The fate of that of Botha was somewhat mysterious. It seems to have been sent to Captain Campbell, who "did not preserve it," or take a copy of it, and for a long time it could not be discovered. Eventually it was discovered in Captain Campbell's own office in Grahamstown. Captain Campbell, however, could have had no reason for suppressing this one more than any other. The two from Graaff Reinet were sent to Cape Town, taken little

¹ Mr. John Centlives Chase was one of the 1820 settlers, who very soon proved a failure as a farmer or agriculturist. He was, however, not long in finding his place in the public life of the country, for which his education, ability, and uprightiness so well qualified him. He practised as a Notary Public. Long before the time now under consideration, he commenced to collect evidence and information on all matters connected with the Eastern Province; much of which was eventually embodied in his book, *The Cape of Good Hope and the Eastern Province*, published in 1843, and in the first history of the country which was written (*History of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope*, by Wilmot and Chase, 1869). It was because of this self-imposed task, and withal his being a personal friend of Colonel Wade, that Captain Campbell sent to him Klopper's deposition. Mr. Chase was one of the very last men who would associate themselves with anything dishonourable, much less with a conspiracy against the life and honour of anyone. In 1847 he became Secretary to Government and then Civil Commissioner of the newly established district of Albert, in which he founded the present town of Aliwal North. Afterwards he was promoted to the Civil Commissionership of Uitenhage. In 1864 he was returned to Parliament as member for Port Elizabeth. In 1869 he was elected to the Legislative Council, with the well-deserved title of "Honourable". He died in 1876, aged seventy.

notice of, and pigeon-holed in the Colonial Office. As all this was made the foundation of a charge of conspiracy against the life and honour of the Lieutenant-Governor, and since there was undoubtedly some irregularity, if not illegality, connected with it, it is necessary to observe that depositions such as these, being of the nature of preliminary examinations, ought to have been sent to the Clerk of the Peace, whose duty it then was to transmit them to the Attorney-General for him to take whatever action he thought proper. But none of these went to the Clerk of the Peace. Klopper's was sent to a private individual, Mr. Chase, and by him was despatched to Colonel Wade in London in order that it might be brought before the Aborigines Committee. Further, the alleged offence, if offence there were, was committed beyond the boundary of the Colony and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Commissioner of Albany, who, in consequence, acted *ultra vires* in taking the depositions at all.

On the other hand, these depositions were not considered as preliminary examinations as there was no idea or intention of bringing Captain Stockenstrom to trial, but rather as information which should throw discredit upon the statements derogatory to the colonists which had been made in England.

Landing in Cape Town on July 3rd, Lieutenant-Governor Stockenstrom could not have been long in ignorance of what was in progress against him. For on the 6th there appeared, in the *Commercial Advertiser*, a leading article from the pen of Mr. Fairbairn, headed, "The New Lieutenant-Governor". Referring to the collection of the affidavits, it continued: "The motives of those who have attempted the life and honour of this gentleman in his absence are as little liable to misconstruction from the unprincipled Place Hunter at Graaff Reinet (referring to Mr. Moodie), to the wretched and most ungrateful tide waiter at the Cape, creatures of selfishness and malignity, of whom the serpent in the fable is but a type. Dissatisfied hopes and revenge, hopes based on the most ludicrous presumptions, revenge which springs up naturally in base natures, were the moving powers with them in this case.

". . . No man's life, no man's honour, is secure in a community where individuals, drawing the emoluments of an office

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long after that office has expired, are enabled, from that circumstance, to lead the unwary and ill-informed into a belief that they are employed by Government to collect evidence against life and honour! They must and shall be brought under the Eye of the Public, if our Laws are so defective as to overlook crimes so detestable. When that has been accomplished, our readers will become acquainted with a scene of villainy unparalleled since the days of Titus Oates.”

On account of this article, Messrs. Chase and Moodie, in 1837, brought libel actions against Mr. Fairbairn. In the former, the Supreme Court gave Mr. Chase judgment for forty shillings and costs, and in the latter, Mr. Moodie obtained £50 and costs.

Leaving George, His Honour continued his journey and arrived in Grahamstown at about 5.30 on the afternoon of Saturday, September 3rd. His route into the town lay through a pass, or poort, between high hills, afterwards known as Howieson's Poort, and then up a long incline until a flat stretch of country was reached; travelling over this for about two miles, a gradual descent commences, from near the top of which a part of the town comes into view. Passing a few houses scattered here and there, the road gradually became the street in which was the hotel where he was to stay.¹ On the outskirts of the town he was met by a few people, consisting chiefly of the civil and military authorities. A notice had been issued asking the general public to go out and welcome him, but the response seems to have been meagre. As the small cavalcade entered the town proper, his arrival was announced to all by a salute of seventeen guns fired from the Selwyn battery situated on a hill at some distance from the road on the right. In the street immediately in front of the hotel there was a large crowd of people, which received him in silence, and, when he had disappeared into the house, quietly dispersed without the least demonstration.

Shortly after his arrival he received a letter from Mr. W. R. Thompson, a prominent citizen, asking permission to present to him an address, signed by 412 inhabitants of the District of Albany, a copy of which accompanied the letter.

¹ This was the old Phœnix Hotel in New Street, but then known as Ayton's Hotel.



SIR ANDRIES STOCKENSTROM, BART.

By Permission of Messrs. Jula & Co.

In the address, the signatories, after speaking of the numerous advantages likely to accrue to the Eastern Province by the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor, and while expressing their gratitude to His Majesty for his most gracious acquiescence in appointing such an officer, deemed it their duty to state explicitly their deep apprehension that His Majesty's Government, labouring under erroneous impressions respecting the real character of the colonists and their treatment of the native tribes, might disappoint them in their just hopes of future support and adequate protection. They had then before them, they said, the indubitable fact that the scenes of suffering which they had so recently witnessed, the severe privations they had been called upon to endure, and the sweeping ruin that had overtaken a large proportion of this once smiling and prosperous settlement, had been caused mainly by misrepresentation widely circulated in the parent country by uninformed and partial witnesses. They did not affect to conceal from His Honour their conviction that the evidence lately given by himself before the Committee of the House of Commons, had made an impression on the public mind exceedingly derogatory to their character for humanity and justice, injurious to their future prospects as a young and rising community, and fatal to their claims to that compensation for their losses by the late barbarous inroad, to which in equity they were entitled from a paternal Government. With these views and feelings, they addressed His Honour at the earliest moment after his arrival, and, as an act of unquestionable justice they asked him to answer the following questions: "1. Whether, in your opinion, the conduct of the British settlers in Albany has ever been, in any one instance, such as to justify the native tribes adjacent in making incursions upon them, and in laying waste the country in which they have been placed by the British Government? 2. Whether Your Honour has any knowledge of their having, as a community, acted inconsistent with the British name and character? 3. Whether it is your opinion that the frontier farmers in general derive any advantage by hostile collision with the natives? or whether, on the contrary, it is not within the knowledge of Your Honour, that the inhabitants, along the whole of the inland frontier of this Colony, have been

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continually suffering from the daring and unprovoked inroads of the native tribes upon them? 4. Whether, in short, the evidence given by Your Honour before a Committee of the House of Commons was intended to make on the public mind such impressions as are calculated to lead to a conclusion that the inhabitants of this Colony, or of this frontier, deserve, as a people, by their ill-treatment of the native tribes, or any other course of misconduct, to be reproached by their country with having brought disgrace upon the British name, or acted inconsistent with the requirements of humanity and justice?"

Assuming the charges implied in these questions to be true, and that His Honour knew them to be so, and considering that he had made them under circumstances which precluded the accused from defending themselves, it would have been but an act of the merest justice to state the foundation of fact on which he based the accusations. Instead of any such straightforward and honourable course, however, he refused to receive the address, and appeared to be afraid to say to their faces what he had said behind their backs. Replying to Mr. Thompson's letter the same day, he told him that before competent and impartial authority he would justify his official act and defend his opinions. "Your 'indefeasible rights,'" he said, "as a British subject pave the way for your grievances and representation to the legal tribunals of the country, the Government, the Legislature, and to the foot of the throne itself," and "your remonstrances against my measures, however strong, provided they preserve due respect to the King and His Government, shall be readily and faithfully transmitted to my superiors."

In consequence of this refusal the Lieutenant-Governor received, on September 5th, the following note signed by thirty-three names:—

"SIR,—We, the undersigned, request permission to call a public meeting, to be holden in the Commercial Hall to-morrow (Tuesday), at 12 o'clock, for the purpose of considering what steps should be taken in consequence of your having been pleased to refuse to receive the address of the inhabitants, which they had requested permission to present to you on your arrival amongst them as Lieutenant-Governor."

The desired permission was granted. At the appointed



THE OLD COMMERCIAL HALL, GRAHAMSTOWN



THE SEAL OF LIEUT.-GOV. STOCKENSTROM

(Note the prominence of the Kaffir and the insignificance of the farmer in the background)

hour another of the excited public meetings, which so characterised life in Grahamstown at that time, was held, and the populace sat in solemn conclave, and, almost within his hearing, passed resolutions tantamount to accusing the Lieutenant-Governor of falsehood. The meeting was held in the old Commercial Hall,¹ which at that date was just finished, and this was the first time it was used for any public purpose. The speeches, as well as the behaviour of the meeting, were as moderate as decorous, for all undoubtedly felt that a much larger audience than that within the walls of the Commercial Hall would hear of the proceedings. Mr. Norton, in proposing the first resolution, had hoped that His Honour would have given them some explanation of his words, showing that his remarks had applied to individuals and not to the whole community; the public mind would in that case have been satisfied, and all would have rallied round him and supported him in his Government. He himself (Mr. Norton) had never heard of a specific case of a settler plundering a Kaffir.

Mr. Godlonton and other speakers traced the unhappy history of the times, and denied that settlers had ever set up false alarms of Kaffir depredations and then made these their excuses for pillaging Kaffir kraals; the settlers had only once been on commando in Kaffirland, that was in 1827 when they went to *defend* the Kaffirs against the inroads of the Fetcani; Captain Stockenstrom might have been expected to come out as their friend, but he had joined himself to their enemies, and with an ambitious, political, and designing missionary had traduced them and done them much harm.

The resolutions which were passed unanimously were:—

1. That this meeting having had communicated to it the refusal of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor to receive the address which it was intended to present to him . . . is of opinion that the rejection of it is at variance with the spirit of the British constitution and degrading to a community of free and loyal British subjects.

2. That this meeting most unequivocally denies the fact stated by Captain Stockenstrom in his evidence that the British settlers have *very often* served on commando, or that

¹ This building afterwards became the Eastern Districts Court. In 1914 it was pulled down and the present Law Courts built upon the site.

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they have in any way participated in those atrocities which he has described as being of frequent occurrence on such expeditions . . . with reference to which they now challenge, in the face of the world, the production of a single case in proof of any such allegation.

3. This one had reference to the petition for inquiry upon the spot, which had been sent to England, but to which no answer had been returned. They still pressed their anxious desire for that investigation, and now declared that they would not allow the British name and character to be aspersed without immediately challenging proof and subjecting the accusation to the test of public examination.

4. That the resolutions of this meeting, together with the rejected address, be sent to the *London Times*, *Morning Chronicle*, *Atlas*, and *Watchman*.

Thus auspiciously began the reign of Captain Stockenstrom as Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province.

A few days after the public meeting, Captain Stockenstrom—having been away from the Colony three years, during which the Kaffir war took place—set off on a tour round the eastern and northern districts, in order to make himself better acquainted with the actual state of affairs and the changes which had taken place during his absence. He went first to King William's Town for the purpose of being introduced as Lieutenant-Governor to the Kaffir tribes and to relieve Colonel Smith of his authority and charge.

On September 13th, a concourse of between three and four thousand natives with the great chiefs met on the open land near Colonel Smith's headquarters. At the appointed hour, with something of the usual pomp and ceremony so dear to Colonel Smith, the proceedings commenced. After three cheers for the King and a prayer by the Rev. J. Brownlee, Colonel Smith addressed the meeting. He spoke to them as a father leaving his children. He compared the happy state in which they were then living with that in which he found them when he "took them out of the bush"; he exhorted them to maintain their good conduct, and above all things to continue to discourage witchcraft; having reminded them of the benefits which had accrued to them in consequence of being under British rule, he showed them that by perseverance in

these good paths, they would emerge from uncivilisation and become like Englishmen themselves—who in centuries past were rude and uncultured people; he then, with regret, bade them farewell, but he had the satisfaction of knowing that they were going to be cared for by the Lieutenant-Governor, Captain Stockenstrom. The latter was then introduced to them—scarcely a necessary procedure, as of old he knew them all and they knew him. He addressed them in a short speech which had the merit of firmness, and perhaps was none the less effective in being more magisterial than paternal. He told them they had seen recently a little of the power of England, well would it be for them if they did not compel him to show them much of it; he assured them, all the same, however, that he had no other earthly wish concerning them than that of their welfare. He then invited any of them who wished to say or ask anything to speak. Maqomo was the only one who took advantage of this. He arose and after “thanking for the news” asked for more land, especially for that which had been given to Pato. Further, he said, he wished to be permitted to punish for witchcraft as formerly; thus indicating the small extent to which he had been influenced by Colonel Smith’s exhortations and restraint during many months. Witchcraft was far too profitable to the chiefs to be relinquished until every step towards its restoration had been tried. The Lieutenant-Governor, in reply, could only say that Maqomo had signed the treaty of September, 1835, and that he must abide by it, and further, that he had come only for the purpose of being introduced to them and not to discuss the treaty or anything else. The Rev. Kayser having offered up a prayer, the meeting ended.

The Kaffir women made a great demonstration of affection towards Mrs. Smith, presenting her with their bangles and other ornaments, and in other ways expressing their appreciation of her kindness to them and their sorrow at her departure. There can be no doubt that Colonel Smith and his good wife gave up themselves whole-heartedly to the Kaffirs, and that great changes in that part of Kaffirland might have been brought about in a peaceful manner, and the subsequent shedding of blood and the expenditure of much treasure avoided, had they been supported and encouraged as they should have been.

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While at King William's Town the Lieutenant-Governor was visited by a number of the Hottentot levies, who acted as a deputation for the Hottentots who had been called out on active service during the late war, and who, up to that time, had not been discharged. They complained that the burghers had long since been allowed to return to their homes while they, having joined under the same conditions as the burghers, were detained on military service. Knowing full well the sympathy Captain Stockenstrom had for them in all their concerns, and remembering the formation of the Kat River Settlement, they saw the opportunity of obtaining remedy for what was undoubtedly a grievance, but one which they seem to have feared to emphasise to the Governor or to Colonel Smith. Small bodies of these men were found to be necessary adjuncts to any European force acting against the Kaffirs. As infantry they could scour bush and make their way to enemy haunts in a manner peculiar to themselves; and being for the most part docile and obedient men under military control, they were far too valuable to be allowed to depart until every fair means to retain them had been adopted. About the fairness of the means there was some difference of opinion. Colonel Somerset maintained that they were bound, by the 142nd Article of War, to remain in the field as long as their services were required. Sir B. Durban and Colonel Smith, judging from the steps they took to *persuade* them to volunteer to remain, seem to have been a little uncertain on this point, while Captain Stockenstrom had no doubt that they were on the same footing as the burghers and had been detained illegally.

The question of the discharge of the Hottentot levies had long been in the minds of the Governor and Colonel Smith. Experiments of releasing some and offering bonuses to them in order to get them to volunteer for further service had been made, but without success; the answer always was that they were tired of being soldiers and wanted to return to their families. Colonel England, at King William's Town, tested the feeling of his men by asking how many would be willing to rejoin if discharged, when only nine or ten out of three companies offered, and these only for three months. They all admitted that they had been well treated, especially by

Colonel Smith, who had called them "his Kinderen". They were satisfied with their pay, rations, and uniform; in fact many of them were far better off in military service than they would have been if left to themselves, when many became "schelms in the bush" and added to the robberies of the farmers' cattle. But all the same the desire to be released from military service was paramount. This they obtained as a result of their representation to the Lieutenant-Governor. Of course this did not apply to the Cape Corps, which was composed of properly enlisted men.

On September 14th, the Lieutenant-Governor wrote to Sir B. Durban giving him an account of these proceedings as well as the conclusions he had formed from the information he had so far gathered. There was no doubt in his mind, he said, as to "the impossibility of carrying on the system which Your Excellency introduced into the new territory without the discretionary power of Martial Law. On this subject, Colonel Smith and every one of the agents entirely agree." . . . "But in thus showing that the newly acquired territory cannot be safely maintained as a British dependency without Martial Law, I by no means mean to argue that it can be advantageously or even safely maintained as such with that control. Order has hitherto been maintained by the indefatigable exertions of Colonel Smith, supported by competent means and zealous auxiliaries; but, though we may take for granted that a great proportion of the Kaffir people are pleased to be emancipated from the despotic power of the chiefs, yet we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that the chiefs are dissatisfied with the actual state of things; that they have many adherents, such as subordinate chiefs, councillors, family connections, and all the ramifications which bind these together here with no less force than in civilised states." The Lieutenant-Governor was certainly in a most difficult situation. Order and good government could not be maintained without Martial Law, and yet, under the circumstances, this was illegal. The root of the matter was that the peace of those times was merely nominal; actually, the Kaffirs were always in a state of war, always prepared and determined to carry on their depredations and to use violence when and where they found it necessary; thus, without perpetual Martial Law in Kaffirland there was not much

CHAP. prospect of peaceable relations subsisting for long between
VIII. the Kaffirs and colonists.

From King William's Town the Lieutenant-Governor went to Fort Beaufort, where, on the 17th, he met Colonel Somerset, and commenced the actual relinquishment of the Province of Queen Adelaide by instructing him to withdraw the troops from and to dismantle Forts Warden, Wellington, Beresford, and Murray. This act shows that there could have been little doubt in his mind as to the intentions of Lord Glenelg, for no further communications from Downing Street had reached the Colony. Such a procedure would not have been justified had there been the least intention of retaining the new province. Although Colonel Somerset expressed his willingness to obey his orders, yet he felt it incumbent upon him to point out to His Honour the increased excitement among the Kaffirs and their more numerous depredations in the Colony which had taken place since the intended abandonment had become known to them, and before any movement of the troops had been effected. It was on this account also that the Governor had thought it expedient to suppress, for a time, the instructions for the evacuation of the forts, which he had given to Colonel Smith, when he became convinced that Lord Glenelg's sentiments were likely to remain unchanged. In accordance with His Honour's orders, the commissariat, ordnance, and other public stores, as well as the guns of the Royal Artillery, were escorted, some to King William's Town and some to Fort Willshire; the remaining disencumbered troops, consisting of regulars and the C.M.R., then finally marched to one or other of these places, leaving the empty huts and buildings undamaged for the use of any natives who wanted them. All this was accomplished by September 30th.

From Fort Beaufort the Lieutenant-Governor continued his journey to the north, travelling through the wild and mountainous country of the Blinkwater to Balfour in the Kat River Settlement; thence via Mapassa's kraals at Shiloh to the Tarka—probably the site of the embryo village of Tarkastad, and then on to Cradock which he reached on the 25th. He remained there until October 5th, then striking south he met the Koonap farmers at Tomlinson's on the 7th, and returned to Grahamstown where he arrived on October 9th.

At Balfour he interviewed numbers of the Kat River settlers (Hottentots). Assuring them of the philanthropic views of the British Government towards them, he expressed his hopes that they would be liberally compensated for the losses they had sustained during the late war. While he was at Balfour, he was visited by the Field-Commandant Pieter Retief, who had taken the earliest opportunity of bringing before him the distress of the Winterberg farmers. After enumerating the grievances which Colonel Somerset had already brought to the notice of the Governor, he emphasised the continual fear and danger in which the people lived in consequence of the swarms of Kaffirs who roamed about aimlessly with and without passes. In the cases of those who had passes, it was often found that they were for dates and periods long past. In many instances natives were found to have been "squatting" on farms for months or to have built huts in the wooded kloofs on the strength of passes permitting them to go into the Colony for a few days only. Having no other means of subsistence, even had there not been more convincing evidence of theft, it was clear that they must have lived upon the small amount of stock which yet remained to the despoiled farmer. The magistracies, Retief continued, being, too often, so far distant, and the fear the people had of taking the law into their own hands as well as the shortage of ammunition there always was, the farmers were practically at the mercy of the robbers. This state of things had created a desire to abandon the country altogether. But, so Retief told the Lieutenant-Governor, the people were wavering in their intention, hoping that a more happy state of things might yet come about. A kind and sympathetic word to Retief and those whom he represented might, at this juncture, have done incalculable good. But, no! this sour-tempered Lieutenant-Governor could only tell them that they would receive strict justice, and that if they wished to migrate to some other country, he could not prevent them, and that they had better do so. Retief, therefore, gained but little satisfaction from the interview. When the Lieutenant-Governor reached Shiloh, three days later, he thus gave Retief his sentiments in writing :—

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"SHILOH, *September 23rd*, 1836.

"FIELD COMMANDANT,—Considering it necessary to travel from hence to Cradock, I shall probably be unable to visit your ward at present, but as I have fully communicated my sentiments to you verbally, you will be easily enabled to make them known to your burghers. They, I believe, all know me. Many years have they been acquainted with my government. From the principles to which I have always clung, I shall not deviate one hair's breadth; everyone, therefore, knows what he has to expect, my utmost exertions to promote the prosperity and the protection of the good, peaceable, and honest, of whom so many surround us, and the rigid punishment of the laws (*en de gestrenge straffen der wetten*) to those who, by deeds of blood and injustice, may again place the country in danger. In one word, equal rights to all classes without distinction. In this I know you and all good men (particularly those who bear the name of Christians) will assist me, that we may once more grow and bloom together in peace, and we hope to show that all endeavours to move us from our duty will be fruitless. With respect to those who intend leaving the Colony, I can only say that I cannot prevent them from so doing, and if they could be happier in another country, I would myself advise them to remove; but I place so much interest in the fate of my countrymen, that I consider it my duty at least to advise them fully to weigh what they undertake, and what the consequences may be to them and their posterity, and not allow themselves to be led away by the cunning and deception of persons who have nothing but their own interest in view. I wish you all happiness, and inform you that if any one should wish to speak to me, there will be an opportunity for doing so at the Baviaan's River.

"Your obedient servant,

"A. STOCKENSTROM."

"*September 24th*.

"I have this moment received intelligence that Moselikatzé has murdered about thirty of the migratory persons, among whom are women and babes. The remainder are returning to the Colony. When will my unfortunate countrymen learn whose advice they ought to take? and what have those to

answer for who have misled these unfortunate victims? Do as an honest man and watch against such deception.

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“A. S.”

The widening breach between the Boers and the Lieutenant-Governor, and the effect his attitude towards them was having upon their abandonment of the country, is indicated in the following letters :—

From Retief to the Lieutenant-Governor :—

“WINTERBERG, *October 18th, 1836.*

“SIR,—That Your Honour has not visited my ward, as we expected, caused dissatisfaction to my burghers.¹ I have, therefore, not delayed to copy both your letters and to send them to my Field Cornets, and have spared no trouble to pacify the inhabitants of my ward by making known to them that we are now on the eve of enjoying a better and more serene life. But notwithstanding all this, I must inform Your Honour with deep regret that this day ten families, chiefly my principal burghers, leave my ward to proceed over the boundary with the utmost grief at being compelled to quit so promising a country, because they cannot conceive that we shall ever have such laws here as to guarantee us a quiet and secure living. Not the slightest fear exists among them with regard to the recent massacre over the boundaries. They intend to remain a few months at some convenient spot across the boundary to ascertain whether better laws will be enacted. Their wish is to return if they can but enjoy a quiet and peaceable life here. To give Your Honour some idea of the cause of inhabitants here leading such an insufferable life is that our country is at present filled with robbers roving about publicly. I have to inform Your Honour that from the 10th inst. to this date I caused thirty coloured persons to be apprehended, mostly Kaffirs going out to plunder, and some caught plundering, and sent them to Captain Armstrong at Fort Beaufort; among these were two Kaffirs with passes, whom I apprehended with the greatest suspicion of their being out for the purpose of plundering. I must add to this that if no protection² is granted me to stop the ruin of the country, the abandonment

¹ Heeft ongenoegen bij mijn manschappen gewekt.

² Proteksie.

CHAP. of this will be the consequence in my ward. In expectation
VIII. that by your good orders we may live in peace,

“ I remain, etc.,

“ P. RETIEF.”

To which the Lieutenant-Governor replied :—

“ GRAHAMSTOWN, *October 26th, 1836.*

“ FIELD COMMANDANT,—Your letter of the 18th instant I have only this moment received. Instead of the word ‘ dissatisfaction ’ you mean ‘ regret ’ ;¹ because your burghers are all aware that I myself best know when to visit any part of my Province. That persons are quitting the Colony grieves me on their account, because I heartily sympathise with their lot ; but as regards the ‘ promising country,’ the Government will take care that it is inhabited speedily enough, as I am daily overwhelmed with memorials. I again tell you that if you and your fellow-burghers will be wise under all your misfortunes, I yet see happy days for you in future ; but be assured that nothing is to be had from me by threats. I would walk round the world to serve this country, but will not allow myself to be moved one inch out of my road. I speak plainly, because I wish to be understood, without the possibility of doubt. If you have apprehended any person with a pass without sufficient grounds, you will have to thank yourself for the consequences. Until the law is altered you must abide by it. If my business will allow it, I purpose going to the Gonappes (Koonap) Church on Saturday, and if I have time, farther.

“ Your obedient servant,

“ A. STOCKENSTROM.”

According to the statement of Retief, the Winterberg farmers, at the time of the Lieutenant-Governor’s arrival in Grahamstown, had also prepared an address of welcome, to which were attached sixty-five signatures. But it was not sent to him then, as Retief, being under the impression that Captain Stockenstrom would visit his ward, intended to wait until it could be presented personally. Not until October 18th was it received. It was as follows :—

“ SIR,—We, the undersigned, inhabitants of the Winterberg and Koonap, take the liberty to congratulate Your

¹Voor’t word “ ongenoegen ” hebt gij gemeend “ leedivezen ”.

Honour on your appointment as Lieutenant-Governor for the Eastern Province, and we hope that the choice of the English Government will prove to us that *that* choice will be productive of favourable results.

“We are, however, driven to the necessity, before we take upon ourselves to express our individual joy at this appointment, respectfully to request Your Honour to pause for a moment with regard to our sentiments, as we must acknowledge with sorrow and deep regret that our wounded feelings are not to be pacified by outward appearances or fair promises, that nothing less than *deeds* and *demonstration* will bring us back from the opinions we at present hold. We offer these remarks that it may not be thought that a hidden discontent exists among us; but we mention it in passing to remind Your Honour of the evidence given by yourself, as well as others, before the House of Commons Committee, respecting the deeds committed by us, as in our present circumstances we see ourselves placed in a situation—in consequence of the evidence above alluded to—cut off, as it were, from all hope of brighter prospects for the future. And how, then, Sir, could we, holding such opinions, offer up songs of gladness, in consequence of the elevation of Your Honour, if such does not ensure to us some amendment? We will not trouble Your Honour further with a detailed account of all the miseries which we have to contend with, and for the sake of brevity will satisfy ourselves by requesting Your Honour to be good enough to clear up to us—who cannot fathom the reasons why we have been held up to the British Government as *monsters of cruelty and barbarity*—the circumstances which could have held out an inducement for portraying us in the above light, as Your Honour must be but too well convinced to the contrary. We close this, our humble address, with the certain assurance, that should Your Honour come to the determination of satisfying our minds, in order to reconcile us and our unfortunate expatriated countrymen to the land of our birth, by clear proofs and actions, so that we may experience an improvement in our distressed and deplorable circumstances; then, yes then! will our hearts cry aloud with unfeigned gratitude: *Blessed be the day of the appointment of our respectable Lieutenant-Governor, and God be praised that it*

CHAP. VIII. *should have entered the thoughts of His Majesty, the King of England, to send us such happiness.* But alas! our long oppressed and dejected feelings have not yet experienced those hallowed moments to which such heartfelt outpourings can be applied. We therefore close this address, with the solemn assurance that when we shall experience light and relief, we will then show our unmingled gratitude, in rendering the task of ruler as easy as possible to Your Honour with the full conviction that—

1 ‘ Where loyalty and love are bound
There will the task be easy found,
But if distrusted and suspected,
How can we ever be connected? ’ ”

Retief and his friends must, at this time, have been well aware of the tenor and fate of the Grahamstown address, and could therefore have been scarcely surprised or disappointed at receiving the following reply:—

“ GRAHAMSTOWN, *October 20th, 1836.*

“ SIR,—In answer to your letter without date, received this day, I have to state that the address accompanying it cannot be accepted, and is therefore returned enclosed herewith.

“ The only thing that even causes me to take so much notice of it is the conviction that you do not understand the contents thereof, for a man of your experience and respectability would not advisedly place his signature to a document, the contents of which are directly at variance with truth, and also contrary to the sentiments expressed by yourself verbally, when on the 20th ult. at the Kat River you brought to my recollection atrocities which had been perpetrated on the frontier, and which I had already forgotten. You are misled. I therefore do not speak in wrath, but with pity, and shall faithfully tell you the truth.

“ You have allowed yourself to be deluded into the notion that it would be valiant, or Commandant-valiant, to follow the example of those who have had time to be ashamed of their folly, before you could prevail on sixty-five credulous persons

1 “ Waar trouw en leifde gaan gebonden
Daar wordt het werk ook ligt bevonden,
Maar wantrouen en agtedogt,
Zijn immer aan elkaar geknogt.”

to make themselves equally ridiculous ; and as you have even required no less than six weeks for this purpose, you must now already be convinced that our countrymen are beginning to open their eyes, and are no longer so easily led into an abyss as blind men. Let this, therefore, be a lesson to you, and consult henceforth your own common sense, instead of allowing yourself to be dragged along by those who, knowing your weakness, will use you as a tool to their interest, and who will ridicule you when you are fallen. With respect to those who have signed with you, they have to struggle with so many misfortunes, that it would be cruel to add one word to their reproof. I know too well how those ignorant persons are deceived. Heaven forbid that I should avenge upon one of them the cunning of their seducers. Many of those who have signed think they have paid me a very pretty compliment, and there are few among them who would not follow me through fire and water when occasion required, just because they know that threats and songs of praise or adulation are alike indifferent to me ; and that nothing that can be said, written, or done, will prevent me from lightening their burden and advancing their happiness as far as lies in my power ; at the same time causing you and them to obey the laws under which Providence has placed us.

“ One word more as a friendly warning : Colonel Somerset has placed in my hands copies of your letters to Captain Armstrong in which several unbecoming expressions are used. I believe that the situation you occupy is of little value to you ; but it would be unpleasant to me to dismiss you, a man whom I have respected, and whom I consider competent, when he makes use of his sound reason, to lend me a helping hand to bring our country and its inhabitants back to prosperity, and thus to secure to himself the blessing of posterity. But if, on the contrary, you attempt to add one iota to the confusion which you yourself say has so long existed on the frontier, and threaten to trample the existing regulations under foot, this unpleasant step will be necessary as an inevitable consequence.

“ Your obedient, humble servant,

“ A. STOCKENSTROM.”

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This letter may be looked upon as the last ounce which weighed down the balance in determining, not only the wavering Winterberg farmers, but most of the Eastern Province Boers to leave the country. In Retief's answer to the above, he told the Lieutenant-Governor that five or six words would have removed the obstacles between them, and that then with an unclouded conscience he could have "lent His Honour a faithful and helping hand". These five or six words, however, were not spoken. It was the parting of the ways. The leaders of the Boers commenced to draw up a manifesto of their grievances and their reasons for abandoning their homes.

Retief answered the above letter on October 31st:—

"I now calmly sit myself down to reply according to my feelings," he said, "in the full hope and wish that this may be the last correspondence I shall have with Your Honour. I am happy to find Your Honour has expressed yourself so plainly, and may, therefore, humbly request you to permit me to do so likewise." He then goes on to say that no one has a greater love of the land of his birth or a greater regard for its peace and law than he has, but who, he asks, will not evince impatience under the calamities all have suffered? daily the bitter wailing and the sighs of the unhappy inhabitants rise to the Almighty. He assured His Honour that faithlessness and dissemblance were no part of his character, and that he did not sign an address which he did not understand and which was contrary to the truth—nor had he prevailed upon anyone else to do so. "'Valiantly' or 'Commandant-valiantly' to follow foolish examples, I dare to state is not my character."¹ In defence of his action in having arrested some Kaffirs with passes, he stated that in one case, a Kaffir with a pass for eight days had been wandering about for five months; another with a pass for one month, with eight other Kaffirs, was building huts in the Kroomie bush for a permanent residence, while a third with a pass was caught stealing four sheep and goats from one Malan. "Permit me, Sir, in conclusion, again to remind Your Honour of my declaration to you at the Kat River, how happy we find ourselves to have

¹ "Manhaftig," "Kommandanthaftig" of "dwaze voorbeelden" te volgen, durf ik verklaren als mijn karakter niet kennen.

Your Honour as our Lieutenant-Governor; and that the only obstacle between us may be removed entirely by but five or six words. I trust that God will grant that we may speedily, on both sides, accomplish the desired object, by seeing that obstacle removed.

“ I have, etc.,

“ P. RETIEF.

“ P.S.—On the receipt of Your Honour's letter, I instantly recalled my issued orders for the protection of my ward, not to commit myself further to Your Honour's threats.”

A sad affair which befell some of the Boers who first abandoned the Colony was the murder of emigrant farmers by the hordes of the Zulu chief Moselikatze, mentioned in the letter of the Lieutenant-Governor of September 23rd, and that of Retief of October 18th. It took place in the lawless regions beyond the north-eastern boundary of the Colony, where the more powerful band of robbers could unrestrainedly murder and pillage any who could not withstand them. It was an inauspicious augury for the general emigration; it was not heeded, however.

The history of the affair as it developed at that time is as follows: Field Cornet S. P. Erasmus, who lived in the almost uninhabited country along the Kraai River in the present district of Aliwal North, formed, for the purpose of hunting elephants, a party consisting of himself and three sons, one P. Bekker and his son, and two other Boers named Claasen and C. Kruger. With five waggons and the necessary oxen and spare horses, and also with a considerable number of native servants, they set out some time in August, 1836. They trekked right across the Orange Free State in a northerly direction and crossed the Vaal River. Game, however, was scarce, and, it seeming to be useless to go farther, the return journey was commenced. One morning they decided to divide into three small parties and to take different directions in search of better luck. One party consisted of Erasmus with one son, his other two sons with Kruger formed another, while Claasen and Bekker formed the third party, each presumably with a share of the available native servants. The outspanned waggons were left in charge

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of five natives. Towards evening, when Erasmus was returning, he was suddenly horror-stricken at seeing, in the distance, some hundreds of armed natives, evidently the dreaded warriors of Moselikatze, surrounding the waggons. As it was obviously hopeless to attempt to do anything against such numbers, he rode off in a different direction, to where he knew there was, about five hours' distant, an encampment of expatriated farmers. Arrived there with the news, eleven men came forth, and thus reinforced, they moved off in the direction of the waggon. After about an hour's ride, they beheld in the distance ahead of them a very large body of natives, estimated at several hundreds, evidently coming to attack the emigrant camp. The Boer party instantly turned back to warn their friends as well as to collect together, for combined defence, others who were encamped at short distances from them. Scarcely had all assembled and the waggons formed into a circular laager when the Matabele, as they were called, were upon them. Furious fighting immediately ensued, the Boers (thirty-five men) firing from between the wheels and openings between the waggons, while the natives hurled showers of assegais. This lasted from ten in the morning until four in the afternoon, at which time the enemy retired, leaving, so it is said, one-third of their number lying dead around the waggons. On the side of the Boers, one man, A. Bronkhorst, was killed.

In this laager the people remained on the defensive for some days. About six days after this, when it seemed to be safe, Erasmus rode forth to the place where he had left his waggons, hoping to learn something of his two sons and companions. All he found, however, was the spoor of the waggons going to the north and the five dead bodies of the natives who had been left in charge of them. Of the others of his party nothing was ever heard. Presumably they were overtaken and murdered before they could reach assistance. Erasmus then made his way to the Colony, and on September 9th he sent a letter to Colonel Somerset reporting the affair. Thus the Lieutenant-Governor came to hear of it. In the region where the above fight took place there was another Boer encampment, but at too great a distance from that of Erasmus for warning or assistance. It consisted of a family party under the leadership of an old man called Barend Liebenberg. They were

attacked by another huge body of the Matabele, and being taken unaware and unprepared, the loss of Boer life in this case was considerable. Excepting two young girls, who were taken away as a present for the chief, it is not clear that any-one of the party survived. The murdered were : old Liebenberg and his three sons, his daughter and her husband, a schoolmaster named Macdonald, four children, and twelve coloured servants. Three children were taken away, the two girls mentioned and a boy who was never again heard of.

After these demonstrations on the part of Moselikatze's people, the emigrant Boers who were near the Vaal River were by no means certain that these attacks would not be renewed. They therefore determined to combine, and while there was time and opportunity to form as secure a laager as possible. They crossed the Vaal into the present Free State and chose a place called Vechtkop, between the Rhenoster and Wilge Rivers. There fifty waggons were joined end to end so as to form a large circle and all the openings were filled with bush and thicket. All this soon proved to be most necessary, for the Matabele returned and made another furious onslaught. It will perhaps be as well to allow Carel Celliers, who took a prominent part in the proceedings, to tell the story. "I was on a commission to Zoutpansberg, when it happened that a frightful murder and plunder had taken place; and when I returned to our own laager after an absence of three months, I found it in a most melancholy state. Many had been murdered, most of our cattle had been taken by the enemy, and with deep sorrow I witnessed the agonies of the wounded. My heart was almost broken. We returned then to Rhenoster River. One party went back to Valsh River, and we removed on to Vechtkop, above Rhenoster River. On arriving there we received tidings from two Kaffirs that the commando of Moselikatze was coming against us, and that it was already at the Vaal River. We sent the news to those at the Valsh River, so that they could come to our assistance, but on hearing it they fled with all possible haste to Maroko.¹ We sent two spies to ascertain the truth, and one of them discovered the

¹ This was a Basuto chief, living at Thaba N'Chu, who was kindly disposed towards the Boers, and had living with him the Rev. Mr. Archbell, a Wesleyan Missionary.

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I had two guns, one loaded with slugs, and the other with ball. When they were about thirty feet from us, I shot with the slugs and then took the other gun. It was dreadful the force which the enemy used to wrench out the thorn bushes, but these were interlaced through the chains, and they succeeded only in dragging the waggons half a foot out of their places. The waggon by which I was had seventy assegai holes in the tent cover when the fight was over. On our side there were two killed and fourteen wounded, of which I was one. Around the camp, 430 of the enemy lay dead, and inside were found 1,137 assegais. We also had two horses killed and one wounded, but the Kaffirs took all our cattle away. . . . We were obliged to remain fifteen days in the laager. I had a wife and seven children with me, and we were without mealies or corn and unable to hunt."

They seem to have made their way eventually to the Rev. Mr. Archbell's mission station at Thaba N'Chu, where they were cared for.

In his further journey through the Tarka and Cradock districts, the Lieutenant-Governor saw for himself the unsatisfactory state of the country; the want of protection of life and property against hordes of natives and the paucity of magistrates. He heard the complaints of want of compensation for losses and the discontent which arose in connection with the Kaffirs retaining the Colonial cattle, the non-payment for supplies, and other grievances. It is extraordinary that, knowing all this, he should have shown so little sympathy for the sufferers as he did. By his apologists this state of things was used as an argument against the "Durban system," and as ground for replacing it by the "Stockenstrom system". In answer to this, it should be borne in mind that the "Durban system" referred only to the establishment of the Province of Queen Adelaide and its government by the method already explained, and had nothing to do with the internal affairs of the Colony. In justice to Sir Benjamin Durban it must be said that he never had a fair opportunity of setting in order the affairs of any other part of the East than Kaffirland. Arriving in the Colony early in 1834, the task which confronted him and occupied most of his time during that year was the abolition of slavery. But besides this, as we have seen, he

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was making arrangements to visit the Kaffir chiefs and to introduce better relations between them and the colonists, when, with tragic suddenness, the '35 war broke out. During the whole of 1835, he was either in the field with the troops or concerned with matters connected directly with the restoration of peace and the re-location of the Kaffir tribes. Then when it might have been expected that the unhappy state of the Colony would have received his attention, he found himself thwarted at every turn by the machinations of the London Missionary and "philanthropic" party; thus nothing could be done, and affairs remained as the Lieutenant-Governor found them.

While at Cradock, further alarming intelligence reached him, but this time it was from the south—from a part of his own district. Besides a report from the Civil Commissioner in Grahamstown, dated September 29th, "that since the period of Your Honour's departure from Grahamstown, several depredations have been committed by the Kaffirs," and "that the public mind is greatly disturbed," he received one of a more serious nature from Colonel Somerset. It appears that some horses had been stolen from Fort Brown, and a number of cattle, which had been sent down to the Keiskamma River to drink, were forcibly seized and driven off to the kraals of the Chief Seyolo. A patrol was sent from Fort Peddie and the spoor was traced unmistakably to that chief's place. On seeing the horsemen, however, the Kaffirs drove the cattle away, and raising their war-cry, defied them. The men could do nothing but return to the fort. Lieutenant Lowen then, with a larger party, went to the same place and found crowds of armed natives on the hills on both sides of the river. They were very insolent, and in answer to Lowen's demands said they were prepared to fight and to go to the Fish River bush, as they knew the force at the post (Fort Peddie) was weak. This party also returned to the fort without doing anything—except that they discovered that the Fingoes in those parts were resuming their shields and assegais and preparing for some eventuality. As soon as all this was reported to Colonel Somerset, he sent one company of the 72nd Highlanders to reinforce Fort Peddie, and withdrew another from Fort Beresford and sent it to Fort Willshire. On receipt of the news

of all this, the Lieutenant-Governor instructed the Civil Commissioner in Grahamstown to issue supplies of ammunition to all Field Cornets, and, without creating a panic, to advise isolated farmers and others in exposed situations to assemble for combined defence and protection. All this, taken in conjunction with the restlessness in Kaffirland after the departure of Colonel Smith, looked very like the prelude to another war. However, nothing further happened¹

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¹ The following extract from a letter written to the Lieutenant-Governor by the Rev. W. B. Boyce, dated October 10th, 1836, throws some light on this: "Since the departure of Colonel Smith, the Kaffirs in my neighbourhood have appeared much unsettled and excited by rumours of changes in the system hitherto pursued, and also by foolish reports of permission having been granted by Your Honour to Maqomo and Tyali to 'eat up' Pato and Umkye. It is currently reported and believed that Colonel Smith has been sent away for killing Hintza, that it is illegal to shoot a Kaffir under any circumstances, or to prevent them going into any part of the Colony, armed and in parties of any number. The evacuation of several posts at this juncture has had the effect of emboldening those who are endeavouring to prepare the people for war. . . . They have nothing to lose, they may gain, and at all events would, at the beginning of the war, enjoy a short period of feasting and unlimited licence. . . . I am satisfied that the principal chiefs are opposed to any war at present, but should any exciting cause transpire to give weight to the opinions and wishes of the popular leaders, the chiefs must give way now as on former occasions."

The following letter from W. Gilfillan, of Cradock, to Captain Stockenstrom on November 25th, 1836, gives some idea of the state of the country in the northern parts: "In pursuance of your instructions of the 14th inst., I lost no time in proceeding to Cradock and hence to the different Field Cornetries under my charge. I found a considerable degree of excitement existing even in these parts of the district where their appears at present no idea of emigration, in the Field Cornetries of Brak River, and Great, or Orange River, where the principal grievance (exclusive of the old and painful subject of the slaves) of which the inhabitants complain, is the impossibility of restraining the bands of Mantatees which are constantly wandering through the country and committing small thefts on the flocks and herds of the farmers, which they do with such dexterity that it is almost impossible to detect them; they are perfectly aware that an order exists for apprehending these wandering vagabonds, but state that they are afraid to do so, as the Mantatees are generally armed, and that in case of collision and any lives being lost they would, in all probability, be dragged from their families and arraigned for murder. Another great annoyance is the continual skirmishes which take place between the Caffres and Mantatees, one party frequently retreating into the Colony where the fight is generally renewed. Sometimes the Caffres venture to attack the Mantatees residing on the places of the farmers in the Colony, stating as their reason for doing so that the Mantatees are in possession of cattle they have stolen from the Caffres on these occasions. The farmer, seeing so many armed savages about his premises, fearing that they themselves may be the object of attack, fly with their families. . . . There is a rumour that many of the farmers, who have been reduced by the invasion of the Caffres to a state of destitution and consequent recklessness of the consequences likely to result to themselves, as well as to the Colony, from so rash a step, openly declare

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Among the expedients for the protection of the Colony which the Lieutenant-Governor adopted at this crisis was the establishment of three new military posts in the vicinity of the Great Fish River. One was in a very wild part of the country where that river is joined by the Kat River. It was on the farm of one Doris Botha, hence the place was afterwards known as Botha's Post. The place is surrounded by high hills, which at that time were covered with dense bush and forest. It still is to-day, but roads have been cut in all directions through it. It must have been a most dangerous place at that time, for in whatever direction troops moved out of it, they could have been attacked by unseen enemies.

Another post was placed in more open country at a spot about seven miles from the Fish River, on the Colonial side, called Frazer's Camp; and the third at the Committee's Drift of the Fish River, the advantage of this last being that it was on a main road and within easy access of headquarters, and contiguous to a good supply of water. Further, the establishment of this post, so thought the Lieutenant-Governor, rendered unnecessary the existing Fort Montgomery Williams, which was also on the main road about fifteen miles from Committee's in the direction¹ of King William's Town. He therefore ordered its immediate abandonment. All this was part of a scheme for the protection of the frontier which long experience had shown to be impracticable, namely, that of making the Fish River the boundary of the Colony, and attempting to keep the almost interminable bush clear of Kaffirs by military posts and patrols. Colonel Somerset had been engaged for over twenty years in defending the Colony against the Kaffirs and had become convinced of the uselessness of such a measure. Sir B. Durban, as we have seen, was deeply impressed with the impolicy of allowing the natives to have access to the Fish River bush; rather, he believed in keeping the country between the Keiskamma and Fish Rivers a kind of No-man's-

their intention (if the Government does not grant them compensation for past losses and protection for the future) to fall upon the Caffre, and help themselves."

¹ The water supply here was undoubtedly a difficult matter. A waggon was employed for four and a half hours every day in bringing up casks of water from the Keiskamma, about three miles distant. This was a considerable item of expense in the maintenance of this place.

land, and prohibiting any Kaffir in it without a pass—in short, he was convinced that prevention was better than cure.

Stockenstrom, on the other hand, maintained that whatever precautions were taken, the Kaffirs, under cover of night or other means, would for certain get access to those parts; it was therefore wiser to recognise this and make provision against it. A number of forts and troops far away in Kaffirland, he argued, would be useless in case of attack from the Fish River; the former, therefore, should be abandoned and the latter stationed where they could be of more service.

The accounts of these drastic measures and the havoc the Lieutenant-Governor was making with the "Durban system," caused great concern to the Governor. His Honour, in his voluminous despatches, endeavoured to show His Excellency that he was mistaken in thinking that the "system" to which he was so attached was a success; and that only the worst could be looked for as a consequence of its continuance. Based on the information he had collected during his month's tour, he gave the Governor his views regarding the causes of dissatisfaction in both the Colony and Kaffirland, and the measures he intended to adopt to remedy them. Sir Benjamin Durban, on October 13th, said: "I observe with some surprise the opinion at which you appear to have arrived from information recently given you . . . that incessant depredations have continued within the old border ever since peace"; and that "up to the present hour there has never been a week's successive tranquillity since the peace was made. That the Fingoes and Kaffirs, since they have become British subjects, plunder worse than ever they did before the war, etc., and so on to the end of your letter of the 7th. This is in direct contradiction to a series of reports extending at the least, through the whole of the present year—up to the month of August last—from various officers in trust, civil, and military, all of whom have concurred in the beneficial results of the new system, successful beyond all reasonable expectation. In August, and since, it is very probable, and doubtless very true, that some thefts have taken place. But this state of restlessness is easily accounted for: (1) by the publicity every day gaining fresh credit, of the intended renunciation of His Majesty's Government of the new territory, and of the allegiance of its people;

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VII. Inquiry at Fort Willshire; (3) by the critical change in the
administration of the Border Provinces." He could not con-
cur with His Honour that the excitement among the Kaffirs was
due to their existing relations with the Colony, and he could
not view the premature evacuations of the forts as calculated
to allay it. "I see with some cause for regret that Your
Honour should have entered into the question of the discharge
of the native troops directly with them, instead of bringing the
matter regularly before the Commander-in-Chief." With re-
gard to making the Fish River the boundary of the Colony,
he (the Governor) could only express astonishment and dis-
may. Even the Secretary of State had never contemplated
such a measure; he had, in fact, expressed his opinion against
it in the famous despatch of December 26th, 1835, where he
stated, "the British sovereignty over the country between the
Fish River and the Keiskamma is *not* to be surrendered".
After dissenting from the unfavourable opinions concerning
the characters of Pato and his tribe, as well as the Fingoes,
which had been expressed by Captain Stockenstrom, and
generally disagreeing with him, the Governor proceeded to
point out that the Lieutenant-Governor was then responsible
for the further government of the Eastern Province, and, in
particular, for "the framing, consolidating, and carrying into
execution such a system as may ensure the maintenance of
peace, good order, and strict justice, in all the intercourse and
relations between the inhabitants of European and African
origin and descent". And as the Lieutenant-Governor had
made a personal inspection and examination of the affairs of
the border, and had come to the conclusion that it was ex-
pedient, in accordance with the wishes of Lord Glenelg, to
abandon the sovereignty of the country beyond the Keis-
kamma, there was nothing left for the Governor but to issue the
necessary instructions; which he did, accordingly. They
were: (1) to proceed without delay in the preparation for the
abandonment in conformity with Lord Glenelg's despatch; (2)
for the framing of treaties with the Kaffir chiefs; (3) for the
protection of missionaries, traders, the Fingoes, Pato, Kama,
and their people, "our faithful friends and allies," Sutu and
her son, Sandilli, and, "as far as it may be possible, peace and

good understanding between the respective native tribes whose allegiance to His Majesty and obedience to our laws are now about to cease. With their abstention from wars and inroads among each other, and the abolition of all proceedings under the pretence of witchcraft."¹ From this time, the expressions of differences of opinion between Major-General Sir B. Durban and Captain Stockenstrom regarding frontier policy became more and more emphatic. It was painful to the Lieutenant-Governor to be obliged to enter into details which proved that the system, which had been acted upon since the war, had not worked successfully; while the Governor was no less pained to observe, and to be obliged to state, that the measures which His Honour was adopting were calculated to create a panic, and to originate a project on the part of the Kaffirs to attack the Colony. "It is to me," said Stockenstrom on October 28th, "most discouraging to find that they (i.e. his measures) have deserved so little of your countenance, and that they have elicited a degree of acrimony, which I did not fear that the anxiety with which I have tried to conduct the affairs of this division, and the candour with which I communicated my views, could deserve." Sir Benjamin, on November 8th, disclaimed anything like acrimony, but he felt compelled to express his opinions unreservedly and plainly upon several important points of the policy then in progress.

¹Further, on these matters the Governor wrote to Stockenstrom on October 21st. He said: "The withdrawing of any of the posts established between the Fish River and Keiskamma (viz. Forts Montgomery Williams and Willshire), which you appear to meditate, will be found, or I am much mistaken, to be a fatal error. These posts were all placed after a careful consideration of the ground and of the subject, and having in view also the possibility, now unfortunately about to happen, of the renunciation of the country beyond the Keiskamma—an event which only seems to render them still more necessary. Upon this point I must regret that my views of the best military positions for the defence and protection of our border should differ from those of Your Honour. The measure of scattering numerous small detachments along the western bank of the Fish River, will, I think, be found in practice a very inefficient one—while it will harass the troops to death, exhaust the means of transport and material, and require more force to give it any chance of being useful than you will ever have at your disposal, even when Adelaide shall be entirely evacuated." Disclaiming any intention to interfere in the Lieutenant-Governor's territory, yet he finds it "his duty to send to Colonel Somerset precise instructions *not* to evacuate" Forts Peddie, Montgomery Williams, Willshire, Thompson, Beaufort, or Armstrong, "but, on the other hand, to urge upon the Commanding Royal Engineer to perfect their defences to the utmost".

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The position was a peculiar one. The Lieutenant-Governor was supreme in authority in the Eastern Province, and being responsible for all law and order had necessarily, in accordance with his own views as to the best methods of maintaining these, to call for various military measures. The Governor, on the other hand, being military Commander-in-Chief over the whole of the Colony, had the right, in accordance with *his* views, to make the best arrangements for the protection of the country. These views differed widely. Hence we find Colonel Somerset, who was in immediate command of all forces in the East, receiving from the Lieutenant-Governor orders which were countermanded by the Governor, as in the case of Fort Montgomery Williams. This conflict of authority could not be but galling to anyone in the Lieutenant-Governor's position; and much more so to one of Captain Stockenstrom's disposition to take offence. For the information of Lord Glenelg, he reviewed the whole situation in a letter of great length addressed to the Governor.

It might be remarked here, that the only channel of official communication with the Home Government was through the Governor. Hence, although all the Lieutenant-Governor's letters on Eastern Province matters were written to Sir Benjamin Durban, they were really intended for the eye of the Secretary of State, to whom the Lieutenant-Governor expected they would be sent. In fact, having intimated this expectation to the Governor, he was told, "All Your Honour's correspondence with me will be duly transmitted to the Secretary of State, according to His Lordship's instructions thereon". It is not clear what instructions His Lordship ever issued on this head, or whether the Governor ever received any—most probably he did not. Be that as it may, Sir B. Durban did *not* forward to Downing Street any of the Lieutenant-Governor's letters until June of 1837, when he sent a batch of 125, followed on July 29th by another batch of 120; so that in October of 1837, Lord Glenelg had the satisfaction of perusing no less than 245 of these depressing documents.¹ How far Sir B. Durban was justified in withholding these letters so long may be a matter of question. In the letter referred to

¹ *Vide* Despatch of Lord Glenelg to Sir George Napier, November 13th, 1837.

above, the Lieutenant-Governor said: "As the manner in which you have received and viewed my proceedings affords matter for serious consideration to His Majesty's Secretary of State, and originates doubts as to the utility of my continued administration of the affairs of this division, I owe it to myself and to my employers to lay before the latter a review of the position in which I have been placed. If any of my statements shall, from the notoriety of the facts they adduce, appear supererogatory to Your Excellency, I beg of you to bear in mind that they are more especially intended for the consideration of the Colonial Minister, whom I only address through you. It is with unfeigned regret that I must commence by admitting that I had hardly landed on my native shores before I found that the policy which the said Minister was said to be pursuing, with reference to our frontier relations, was most unpopular, and nothing more so than my appointment to administer those relations and the affairs of the Eastern half of the Colony generally. It was with no small degree of humiliation that I found that the same public prints which were incessantly overwhelming the local Government with such fulsome adulation as I am confident disgusted its objects, but which betrayed the ignorant masses into the belief that those prints were in the interest of that Government, were at the same time employed in vilifying the supreme authority and all those who were suspected of coinciding with its views; in rendering them obnoxious to the community by the most malicious misinterpretation of their measures, and in spreading discontent and disaffection into the remotest nooks of the country, whilst I, to whose lot the duty had fallen of carrying these measures into effect, was assured upon authority that all the basest of calumnies and the most palpable perjuries, backed by the assistance of public records in official keeping, had been resorted to, to brand me with infamy, if possible, and to excite the multitude against me in the execution of its plans, and deterring me from undertaking the charge." In spite of all this discouragement, however, and though his ideas on the relations between the colonists and the natives differed from those of His Excellency, he was prepared, he continued, to give "the system" a trial. But on his journey to the East, he was not a little surprised to find that the community did

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not see general safety in the present state of affairs. At Uitenhage, he found the inhabitants of Oliphant's Hoek preparing to emigrate to the North, while "at Grahamstown I at once saw that nobody was contented, except those who were deriving, or had derived, pecuniary advantage from the actual state of things. Some of these, indeed, who had absorbed the greatest portion of the half million which had been expended since the commencement of the war, as well as their various connections, thought proper to show their approbation of that which had enriched them by an impotent attempt at an insult upon His Majesty's representative, who, they dreaded, was likely to put a period to their rich harvest, but the farmers, upon whom the burden had fallen from all sides, complained that their misfortunes had never ceased for one week at a time since the war, that their new fellow-subjects, Fingoes as well as Kaffirs, had plundered them of the little they had saved out of that catastrophe. . . . You were altogether mistaken when you believed that no thefts took place since the peace was made."¹ His Honour then gives an account of his visit to Adelaide, "which was tranquil, owing to the activity and ability of an experienced officer at the head of an overwhelming force. . . . But I solemnly declare that I saw nothing that promised the ultimate success of the plan we were pursuing." The Kaffirs were quiet merely because they expected a change, and because they had not recovered from the shock which they had received in the late war. But as for undermining the authority and influence of the chiefs, the suppression of witchcraft, and other evils of Kaffir life, he, the Lieutenant-Governor, did not believe that the measures then in operation would have any effect. "The premature adoption of British rule among the Kaffir tribes will certainly be the cause of much bloodshed, turmoil, and never-ending disputes." He then proceeds to tell Sir Benjamin, in reality Lord Glenelg, his intentions with reference to the abandonment of the advanced military posts and his establishment of others nearer to the Fish River. "These arrangements I believe I was

¹ It is not clear that Sir B. Durban believed anything of the kind. In fact, both he and Colonel Smith acknowledged that a *bellum in pace* would have to exist for a time—until they had had time to settle matters in the Colony as they had in Kaffirland.

fully authorised by my instructions to make on my own responsibility, and it is with the utmost pain that I must state my apprehension that Your Excellency's ordering the re-occupation of Fort Montgomery Williams, can, besides the expense of transport and the fatigue of the troops, have no other effects than to show the public that I have not Your Excellency's support, and to encourage the evil-disposed to redouble their efforts to mislead the ignorant, and, if possible, to thwart the measures which I must pursue in compliance with His Majesty's commands." In pursuance of these commands, and as the renunciation of the allegiance and territory of the Kaffirs had been determined upon, he proceeded to explain, at some length, the steps he intended to take to give effect to those commands, namely, the basis of the written treaties with the Kaffirs he was then formulating. Thus a new experiment on frontier policy was inaugurated.

If there had been any doubt in the Lieutenant-Governor's mind, which perhaps there was not, as to the approval which Lord Glenelg would accord to such sentiments as were expressed in this letter to the Governor, it must soon have been dispelled by the tone of the noble Lord's despatches to Sir B. Durban at this time. On August 29th previously, an "Ordinance to indemnify the Governor of the Colony, and all persons acting under his authority, against certain acts done during the existence of Martial Law in certain parts of the Colony," was passed by the Legislative Council. Not only was there complete unanimity in the matter, but the Hon. Henry Cloete caused to be put on record an opinion which was subscribed to by the whole Council, namely, that it was due to His Excellency the Governor to record their unqualified approval of all those measures which were adopted and carried into effect in repelling the late Kaffir invasion, and that the treaties of September 17th, 1835, were those best calculated to ensure the tranquillity of the Eastern frontier. On receipt of this opinion and ordinance, Lord Glenelg replied on November 25th, 1836: "I entirely concur in the opinion that it is proper that an Act of Indemnity should be passed for the protection of all persons, who, in obedience to your orders, had carried Martial Law into execution, but I am not satisfied of the propriety of enacting such an ordinance in favour of yourself.

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As Governor of the Colony, you are responsible for acts done by you in that capacity to the King, to Parliament, and in certain cases, to the Court of King's Bench at Westminster, but not to the Colonial tribunals."

Further, also, at this time, Lord Glenelg expressed his disapproval of the Governor having taken the land and roadway in the Transkei from Kreli in lieu of the cattle which the Gcalekas still owed the Colony. Possession of this tract of land had to be renounced, and no further trouble was to be taken to recover the cattle. Thus the Gcalekas were greatly the gainers by their complicity in the invasion of the Colony. From this time onwards, the abandonment of Kaffirland and the return to the old state of affairs progressed in good earnest. On November 15th, the Civil Commissioner in Grahamstown was told officially that the evacuation of the new province would take place in the course of the next month, and that any colonists who might be trading or residing provisionally beyond the Fish River must be warned to retire within the Colony. Colonel Somerset was instructed to make the necessary arrangements for withdrawing the troops from King William's Town, Fort Cox, and Fort White, so that the ruins of those places might be in the hands of the Kaffirs as soon as possible after the ensuing December 2nd. And to complete these preparations, the Lieutenant-Governor himself was drafting the treaties to which the Kaffirs were to be asked to assent.

As it was expected that the natives, in their first elation at being released from the restraint of pursuing their barbarous customs, and being allowed to return to the Ceded Territory, might become a danger to themselves as well as others, reinforcements were sent to Forts Peddie and Willshire, as well as to the new posts at Doris Botha's and Frazer's Camps. Fort Thomson was to be retained for a time, as the disposal of the Gaga Fingoes was a question of some difficulty. They were British subjects and under especial British protection, yet they were located on lands which had belonged to the Gaikas. These lands the Gaikas were exceedingly anxious to repossess, and they would certainly not scruple at murdering the Fingoes to do so, when Kaffirland was again unrestrainedly in their hands.

On December 1st, the Lieutenant-Governor arrived in King William's Town in order to perform the crowning act towards which all the aspirations of Lord Glenelg and the negrophilist parties, both in England and the Colony, had tended, namely, that of treating with the Kaffirs as a civilised community, and taking from them promises to observe an honourable conduct which was quite foreign to their nature.

A large concourse of Kaffirs, chiefs and representatives of the different tribes, met His Honour. A necessary preliminary of freeing these people from all control was that of persuading them to sink those differences which had arisen between them in connection with the late war. Those who had fought against the Colony were more or less hostile towards those who had not. Among the latter were the "loyal" Gaikas of Sutu, Matwa, and Tinta, the peoples of Tzatzoe, and the Gunukwebis of Pato, Kama, and Congo. In order to arrange these matters, Captain Stockentrom told them to go and discuss among themselves, and, when they were agreed, to meet him again and hear what further he had to say. They did so. Their meeting lasted three days, during which they "opened their hearts" to one another so unreservedly, that they came very near to breaking one another's heads. It appeared that the "royal captain," Eno (or Nqeno) had, for safety at the beginning of the war, sent his cattle to the "dog" Pato of the Amagqunukwebi to be taken care of. These cattle had, long before this time, disappeared, had probably been eaten, and so Pato could not restore them. This was considered an affront to the dignity of the royal house; retribution was in consequence demanded. Eno, however, who was now an old man and tired of war and strife, and who, moreover, had given his daughter in marriage to Pato, was willing to write off the debt; thus one cause of discord vanished.¹ Another, however,

¹At the end of 1838, however, when the effects of the war had in a large measure passed away, a different version of this came to light. In spite of the apparent reconciliation which was effected at this 1836 meeting, this cattle question continued to trouble the Gaikas, and in 1838 was very nearly a *casus belli* between the two tribes. Colonel Hare, the acting Lieutenant-Governor, went to Peddie in the hope of settling the matter, when Tyali made the following statement: "When we made war upon the Colony, Pato professed to remain neuter, although his people, as is well known, were as active in the war against the English as any other of the tribes. Every head of cattle taken along the sea, and in the district of Bathurst, and every murder that was committed in that part

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was that the "great captains," Maqomo, Tyali, and others had gone to war, while the Gunukwebis had been so wanting in respect to their superiors, as, being only "common people" and "dogs," to hold aloof while these great personages desired their services. Kama, the chief spokesman of his tribe, replied with great dignity and good common sense.

He said: "For all that has been said, and for which others have thanked, I do not thank at all; for what am I to thank? You have said we are not captains but dogs; but we are captains, and our chieftainship we received from the old captains, and not from you. What we say we abide by; we told you we would not join in the war, and advised you to remain at peace, and we kept our word; do you mean that by doing as our father Congo did, by joining you in war, and losing his life and country in battle, is the way to be captains? Do not think to frighten us by anything you may say; this war is gone by, but should another arise from your misbehaviour, do not think that anything you have said on this occasion will scare us in such a way as to cause our joining you unjustly. Whatever we do is done on our own authority; and for what reason, or by what authority, do you consider yourselves at liberty to call us 'common people' or 'dogs'?" In the end, however, these discussions were settled as amicably as the Lieutenant-Governor desired. On December 5th, therefore, the final great meeting took place.

Before a treaty could be made with the Kaffirs as with a foreign power, it was necessary, in the first place, that they should be released from their allegiance as British subjects, and the treaties which Sir B. Durban had made with them annulled. Hence the Lieutenant-Governor read to them a Proclamation, bearing date December 5th, 1836, in which all this

of the Colony, was committed by Pato's Kaffirs. The Colonial cattle in great numbers were received by Pato, who, fearful that they should be found in his possession and his true character thus be discovered by the English, went to Eno's kraal and proposed to him an exchange of cattle, Eno to take those plundered (by Pato) from the Colony, and Pato to hold those of Kaffir breed, the private property of Eno; each chief promising to restore respectively to each other the cattle so exchanged at the termination of the war. Eno honestly returned every head of cattle that was placed by Pato in his safe keeping, but on demanding his own he was told by Pato, that having engaged in the war on the side of the English, Eno's cattle became his property, and at this moment Pato is in possession not only of Eno's but of the Colonial cattle also."

was accomplished. The final clauses were: "And whereas His said Majesty has been pleased to direct that His Majesty's Sovereignty over the said Territory annexed to the said Colony by the above-cited Proclamation, and the Allegiance of the said Chiefs and Tribes be renounced,

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"I hereby, on the part of His said Majesty, renounce the same accordingly, as I do recall the above-recited Proclamations, and annul the said Treaties, and the same are hereby Repealed and Annulled."¹

This Proclamation having thus, in a few minutes, turned some thousands of British subjects into foreigners, international negotiations with them could be commenced. The following are the chief points of the treaty which was read and translated to them, sentence by sentence, by Mr. Theophilus Shepstone, and afterwards signed by the "contracting chiefs":—

Art. 1.—That there shall be Peace and Amity for ever between the Colonists and Kaffirs. Thus by a magic stroke of the pen, a state of affairs which had never yet been known was to come suddenly into existence, and a semi-barbarous people, who by nature and disposition were thieves, were to be transformed into an honest and upright community.

Art. 2 dealt with the boundaries between the Colony and Kaffirland which were to be observed by both parties. Roughly the old Keiskamma-Chumie boundary decided upon by Lord Charles Somerset was agreed upon.

Art. 3.—The Kaffirs to acknowledge His Majesty's Sovereignty over the territory to the west of that line.

Arts. 4 and *5* were of a dangerous nature, and calculated to cause, as they did, very grave concern to the colonists, more especially to those living nearest to the frontier. Although the Ceded Territory was not to be given up to the Kaffirs in full possession, yet they were by these articles to be allowed to occupy it as a kind of loan, or to hold it, even up to the Fish River bush, on the tenure of *quamdiu se bene gesserit*, never to be reclaimed by His said Majesty except in the case of hostility committed by said chiefs or tribes. And this at a time when, far from deserving any such privilege, their predatory inroads were as bad as the vigilance of the troops

¹ Namely, those of May 10th, June 14th, and October 14th, 1835.

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permitted. It was this which, more than anything else at that date, made it difficult for the Kaffirs, and for most Europeans as well, to comprehend the general policy and attitude of the British Government towards them. They had been turned out of this territory in 1819, and forts had been built to keep them out. Stockenstrom himself, in 1829, expelled from it Maqomo and his people who had crept back into it. The Kaffirs had seen every precaution taken to keep it inviolate, and yet now, for no good reason and without their asking, it was given back to them.

Art. 6.—In the said territory, “the Kaffirs to enjoy full and entire right to adopt or adhere to Kaffir law: the Right of His Majesty’s dominion shall in no way exercise itself therein”; that is, witchcraft with its attendant murders and atrocities was to have full and unrestricted play.

Art. 7.—His Majesty reserved the right of stationing troops or building forts in said territory, but troops were not to be allowed to patrol or scour bush.

Art. 8.—Details of the boundary of the country to be occupied by the British.

Art. 9.—Except with permission and under certain restrictions, no Kaffir, armed or unarmed, to cross the boundary to the west, and no colonists, armed or unarmed, to cross to the east.

Art. 10.—Previous to the Kaffirs occupying the territory, the chiefs were to meet the Lieutenant-Governor and fix upon certain spots near the boundary line on the Kaffirland side where chiefs or responsible men called Amapakati were to be stationed. Their duties were to maintain a good understanding with the commanding officers at the corresponding posts on the Colonial side and to do everything in their power to prevent inroads or aggressions on the part of the natives or colonists.

Art. 11.—The establishment of agents in convenient situations near the residences of the principal chiefs; these agents to act solely in a diplomatic capacity, the chiefs undertaking to respect and protect them.

Art. 12.—All representations, complaints, or applications from either the colonists or Kaffirs against one or the other to be made through these diplomatic agents.

Art. 13.—The chiefs bind themselves to afford free access to such agents. Further, Kaffirs may be engaged by the Colonial Government as policemen (in Kaffirland), which police shall have every facility in carrying out their duties.

Art. 14.—Any British subject wishing to cross the boundary in order to communicate with one of the agents was to obtain a pass from the officer commanding the nearest post. The officer had then to send a messenger with him to the pakati, who was then, in turn, to cause such person to be safely conducted to the station of the nearest resident agent; but no person so entering Kaffirland was to be allowed to carry fire-arms or any weapon of defence or offence, except with the consent of the chief.

Art. 15.—The above not to apply to soldiers belonging to a military post or those escorting waggons of military supplies.

Art. 16.—All British subjects entering the territory under any other circumstances to do so at their own risk, and, while there, to be subject to Kaffir law.

Art. 17.—The chiefs agree to protect the property, families, and persons of those British subjects who obtain their permission to reside in Kaffirland.

Art. 18.—The chiefs agree to allow access to all British vessels to any harbour or port on the coast, and in case of shipwreck to give full protection and safe conduct to survivors to the nearest military post.

Art. 19.—Every British subject charged with crime or misdemeanour has the right to demand that notice of his trial be given to the agent, who shall be at liberty to attend the trial and to speak or plead on behalf of the accused.

Art. 20.—In the case of a British subject committing a crime and escaping into the Colony, the agent to exert himself to bring the guilty party before the Colonial Courts.

Art. 21.—Kaffirs going into the Colony must do so unarmed and with a pass from the agent. The chief to be responsible for the good conduct of the man while in the Colony.

Art. 22.—All Kaffirs found in the Colony without passes to be sent over the border and punished by the chief. For the second offence, to be sent over the border and punished according to the laws yet to be enacted.

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Whatever good there may have been in this treaty, it was quite neutralised, as after-experience showed, by the provisions of the following three articles. Of course, it was not the intention of the framers to *legalise* Kaffir stealing; though the effect of the restrictions and conditions in these articles being such as to place every obstacle in the way of the farmer in recovering his property and to offer every facility to the Kaffir to get clear with it, amounted to that. Could the Kaffirs but steal the cattle and succeed in driving them by devious paths over the boundary—as they always could—then they became irreclaimable, and any time spent by the robbed farmer in attempting to recover them was wasted. In fact, the whole treaty seems to have been made in the interest of the Kaffir. These important articles are given *in extenso*.

“*Art. 23.*—Any Caffre found in the act of committing any crime or depredation within the said Boundary, shall be dealt with according to the laws of this Colony, and it is to be clearly understood, that in case of resistance or attempt at flight on the part of such criminals and depredators, it is perfectly legal to fire upon them, or otherwise to disable or kill them, if they cannot in any other way be secured, or prevented from completing such crime. But if such criminal, being pursued upon spoor, be not overtaken before they shall have crossed the line occupied by the said Amapakati, the course agreed upon in the following Article shall be adopted; *and on no occasion whatever shall any Patrol, or armed party of any description, be allowed to cross said line for said purpose.*”

“*Art. 24.*—If any person being in pursuit of depredators, or property stolen by them, shall not overtake or recover the same before he shall reach the said line (provided he can make oath that he traced the said depredators or property across a particular spot on the said line, that the property when stolen was properly guarded, and in the case of cattle, horses, or the like, that they were so guarded by an armed herdsman—that, if the robbery was committed during the night, such property had been, when stolen, properly secured in kraals, stables, or the like, and that the pursuit in that case was commenced, at latest, early next morning), such person shall be at liberty to proceed direct to the pakati living nearest the spot, where he can swear such traces to have crossed the

said line, which pakati shall be bound at once to receive the statement, examine the traces, and, if the statement appears well-founded, use his utmost endeavour to recover the stolen property; and it will be at the option of the party pursuing to continue the search at once, under the guidance of the said pakati, provided he do not go armed, or accompanied by armed British subjects, or assist in any violence of any kind. If the party pursuing shall thus, with the assistance of the said pakati, or with that of the police, recover the property, he shall be at liberty to proceed with the same, either to one of the said agents, or to one of the military posts, in order to make a statement of his proceedings, and the quality and nature of the property recovered, which statement he shall be liable at all times to be called upon to make oath to, after making which he shall be at liberty to carry off the said property, leaving the pakati or police to pursue the criminal and recover compensation for their exertions, by means of the Caffre chiefs.

Art. 25.—If, however, a party pursuing stolen property deem it more safe or convenient to proceed to the nearest military post, he shall be at liberty to do so. The officer commanding such post shall provide such party with a policeman, who shall accompany such pursuing party to the spot where the said traces cross the line and examine the same with the assistance of the said pakati, whose presence must be obtained. The pursuer, if he do not think it safe to follow the spoor further, or, having so followed the same, prove unsuccessful, shall proceed to the resident agent for the chief into whose territory the property was traced, and, before the said agent, lodge his complaint on oath, and, in case of lost property, swear particularly to the circumstances stated in the said foregoing Article, and also the exact value of the property stolen. Unless this affidavit be made, the agent shall take no further notice of the case; but as soon as such affidavit shall be made, the said agent shall, if he has no reason to discredit the same (he being at all times at liberty to demand further proof), lay the case before the chiefs of the territory. And the chiefs do hereby engage to call a Council, and to enter into the strictest investigation, to cause the stolen property to be recovered and the perpetrators punished. If at

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the end of one month the property shall not have been discovered, and if proved that the property was traced into their territory, the said chief shall at once indemnify the person robbed to the full value of the property lost, and *no more*, and compensate the Pakati and police.

“*Art. 26.*—With the exception of indemnification obtained through the chiefs, no person pursuing stolen property shall be allowed to take any but his own property, or the identical property he is in pursuit of, even if tendered to him, on pain of having to restore it and losing all further claim to the property actually lost.”

It will be well now, in the light of local conditions and Kaffir character, to examine some of the difficulties placed in the way of the robbed farmer, with which these three articles bristle. In the first place, in order to receive any official assistance—for none other was available—he was called upon to make on oath a number of statements concerning details of which, from the nature of the case, he could know nothing. He had to swear that at the time of the theft the animals were properly and securely guarded—a statement which in nearly every case it was impossible to make. In daytime, stock had, in consequence of the poverty of the pasture, to roam and scatter over a wide area; and perhaps get temporarily hidden in woody kloofs or behind the rise of hills. A herdsman, usually a Hottentot, armed with a gun, would be in charge of them. At some moment when he was off his guard, perhaps asleep, not infrequently drunk under a bush, or in some other manner lacking in enthusiasm in his master's interest, a party of Kaffirs on the watch and prowl would take advantage of this want of vigilance, sweep off whole or part of the herd, and make off with all speed to the boundary. The fact of the herdsman having a gun added to his danger, for this and the ammunition were greater temptations to murder him than the possession of the cattle. At night time, the flimsy kraals, constructed of either stones loosely piled one upon the other, or of bush, were of exceedingly doubtful security against clever and determined cattle thieves. It was only with a most elastic conscience, therefore, that a man could ever swear that his cattle were “properly

and securely guarded". Then the cattle having been stolen and the theft discovered, perhaps not until several hours afterwards, the farmer would have to start in pursuit, following the spoor. Should he see the thieves and cattle in the distance and not catch up to them before they got to the boundary, he would have the mortification of beholding his property driven leisurely into Kaffirland without being allowed to cross the river and retake them—the only step which offered any reasonable chance of recovering them. If, on the other hand, the thieves had crossed into their own country and had not been seen, the farmer, in that case, was obliged to make oath that he had traced the spoor to the *particular spot* where the boundary had been crossed. The Kaffirs, however, were far too well experienced in their business to drive cattle to any other places at the river's edge than either those where the ground was so hard as to be incapable of being marked by hoofs and feet, or where rain or other cattle could obliterate the spoor. A still more elastic conscience was needed to swear to these spots. Where, by some odd chance, the spot could be identified, the farmer had then to go to the nearest pakati—perhaps ten miles distant—and take him to the place. In the meantime the cattle would have been driven into greater inaccessibility and safety in Kaffirland. As if this irritation was not enough, insult was added to injury by the farmer's statements having "*to appear well-founded to the pakati*" (Art. 24)—a Kaffir, more likely than not to be in league with the thieves. By the pakati refusing to be satisfied, the matter was at an end, and the cattle were irreclaimable. But if the pakati condescended to take the case on to the agent residing with the chief, then again more oaths were required and further proofs might be demanded. "Unless he (the farmer) can make oath to all this (i.e. the security, the spot, and some other matters), the agent will take no notice of the case" (Art. 25). Finally, in the rare instance of all this having been complied with and a month having elapsed since the theft, the robbed farmer might receive the *exact value* of what he had lost, and *no more*; no compensation for his anxiety, trouble, loss of time, and perhaps loss due to the cessation of farming operations in consequence of

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want of oxen and horses. Had the avowed object in making this treaty been that of defeating the ends of justice, and, had they not been already so, that of tempting the Kaffirs to become a nation of thieves, scarcely any better procedure than the above could have been adopted. Governor Sir George Napier, who succeeded Sir B. Durban, said shortly afterwards in reference to this treaty: "Some of its provisions seem to shock our sense of natural justice and to be unsupported by any consideration of sound policy". Throughout the whole there is an air of vindictiveness against the farmer, both British and Dutch, and a disposition to regard him as the thief and the Kaffir as the despoiled. Perhaps the bogies of "uncles still at the Horse Guards" and the "accusations of murder of innocent natives" had their influence in the formation of the Articles! How they worked in actual practice the sequel will show.

The remaining Articles in substance were:—

Art. 27.—The chiefs agree to protect missionaries and encourage the Christian Religion.

Art. 28.—The chiefs agree to abstain from molesting the Fingoes who may be located in the Ceded Territory; and

Art. 29.—They further agree to abstain from interfering with the Fingoes who have to remain near the Gaga until their crops are reaped.

It is extremely doubtful whether the reading and translation, sentence by sentence, of this long and wordy treaty made the impression upon the contracting chiefs which was desired. One more acquainted with the customs and manner of thought of the native than Captain Stockenstrom was, would probably have used less of the phraseology of the Law Court and more of the figurative language they so well understood. "Tyali said it was as long as one of Mr. Chalmers' sermons, and he would never recollect the half of it. . . . They all signed it on Monday, and many of them made very shrewd remarks about it. Umhala, for one, said they did not know how to make treaties with the English, as no sooner was a treaty made than the Governor went away, and another came and made a new one, and upset all the other had done before him. The Lieutenant-Governor told him no one could do that with this, as it was neither his nor anyone's word in this

country, but the King of England's, and that no one but he (the King) could alter it."¹

The treaty was signed separately, that is, on different copies, by the Gaikas, the Ndhlabhis, and the Gunukwebis; on December 10th, at Fort Peddie, with the wording slightly altered to suit the case, by the Fingoes, and later still by Mapassa on behalf of the Tambookies (Tembus).

The Kaffirs then being a foreign and independent power, there remained nothing to complete their independence but to remove all signs of British occupation from their territory. This was going on apace. The guns, howitzers, all articles of ordnance, stores, cut timber, and other military effects were being removed from Forts Hill, Hardinge, White, and Cox, and were being taken to Fort Willshire, which was to be the military headquarters until the Kaffirs had established themselves in the Ceded Territory. The troops of King William's Town and Fort Cox assembled at Fort White and, being joined by those of that Fort, the whole marched into Albany. A small party, however, consisting of a subaltern with twenty-five of the 75th Regiment, thirty of the Provisional Corps (Hottentots), and four mounted men, remained for a time at the mouth of the Buffalo, where the brig *Knysna* was still unloading some stores. These men in a short time went into the Colony, and thus the last trace of British control in Kaffirland disappeared. The few hereditary chiefs with their immediate dependents were at full liberty to exercise again their tyranny over the mass of the people; every cruel and degrading custom was, on the one hand, to be restored, while on the other, every obstacle was to be opposed to the promotion of Christianity and civilisation; and free access to the Fish River bush was to be a continual menace to the safety of the Colony. These seeds of further disaster and suffering bore their fruit in due season. And all this the result of an indiscriminate and mistaken zeal on the part of benevolent people in Great Britain who, at heart, were really desirous of accomplishing the exact reverse of all this.

¹ Private letter of Mr. J. M. Bowker, who was present at the interview, to his brother.

Vide speeches, letters, and selections from important papers of the late John Milford Bowker, pp. 10 and 11.

CHAP. VIII. *Note.*—In connection with this and the preceding chapter, the following works should be consulted :—

The Lieutenant-Governor's *Letter Books* and *Despatches* in the Cape Archives in the Houses of Parliament in Cape Town ; especially vol. 1586 of the former and vols. 1354 to 1357 of the latter.

Report of the Select Committee on Aborigines, August 5th, 1836.

The private letters and correspondence between Sir Benjamin Durban and Colonel H. G. Smith. The originals are in the Cape Archives. They have never yet been published, though Dr. Theal prepared them for the press.

Autobiography of Sir Andries Stockenström, 2 vols.

The Grahamstown Journal and *The Commercial Advertiser* for the years 1834-37.

Notes on South African Affairs, by the Rev. W. B. Boyce, 1839.

J. M. Bowker's *Letters and Speeches*, Godlonton and Richards, Grahamstown, 1864.



RUINS OF FORT COX



RUINS OF FORT COX

CHAPTER IX.

STORM AND STRUGGLE IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE.

AS has been stated, the inquiry upon the spot into the conduct of the colonists and the general state of affairs in the Colony, which had been asked for by Petition in the early part of 1836, was refused by Lord Glenelg. His answer was received in the Eastern Province at the beginning of October. The sufferers were by no means disposed to take this refusal as a final settlement of these matters. As there appeared no likelihood or possibility of receiving at the hands of the prejudiced and party-ridden Secretary of State that justice to which, as British subjects, they considered themselves entitled, they determined to bring their case before the Imperial Parliament by transmitting Petitions to both the Lords and Commons. Perhaps the more so as they recognised that the realisation of their hopes for compensation for losses and of guarantee of protection for the future were blocked practically by the bigotry and incompetence of one man, Lord Glenelg, who, they must have known, was becoming discredited, not only in the Colonies, but in England itself.¹ It was felt that

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¹The *London Times* of September 10th of this year commented, in somewhat strong terms, upon Lord Glenelg's incapacity and "Oriental sleepiness". After touching upon his unconcern at the treatment which British fishing vessels were receiving from French and American intruders in Newfoundland waters, the article goes on to speak thus of the expatriation of the Boers: "One thing which we take to be pretty clear is, that men are not likely to have subjected themselves to such privations and perils except under circumstances of no ordinary pressure. Considering that they are disposing of their property at an immense loss, as well as abandoning their settled occupations and homes to locate themselves amidst the hazards and hardships of a wilderness where they can have little to depend upon but their gun, the inference seems to be a legitimate one, that they have long and hopelessly complained of the injuries they have endured under Lord Glenelg's management. Nor are the persons who have been driven to this alternative a set of mere buccaneering adventurers, possessing neither capital nor character, nor the common attributes of good and respectable subjects. Their loyalty, we understand, is irreproachable—they are honest, industrious, intelligent farmers of peaceable habits, The oppression and

CHAP. IX. the people of Great Britain generally were ignorant of the real state of affairs in Cape Colony, and that it was only necessary to have their case fairly stated and made known in order to rouse public opinion and enlist the common sympathy and commiseration on their side.

To this end another large public meeting was held in the Commercial Hall in Grahamstown on November 21st, 1836. Its avowed purpose was "for taking into consideration the expediency of preparing and transmitting Petitions to both Houses of Parliament on the subject of compensation for losses sustained by the late Kaffir irruption and the affairs of the frontier in general". This meeting, like all others of this nature, was decorous and temperate, and, as usual, the resolutions were passed without a dissentient voice. In substance they were (1) that, in consequence of the disregard which had hitherto been shown to the petition addressed to the Secretary of State, praying for protection for life and property against the incursions of the Kaffirs, it was then incumbent upon them to lay their case before the Imperial Parliament. (2) That the meeting had seen with sorrow and indignation such statements in the despatch of December 26th, 1835, as that the Kaffirs had had a perfect right and ample justification in laying waste the country as they had done. (3) That the late unjustifiable and barbarous inroad was entirely unprovoked by any acts of the colonists, whose inclination and interests have always led them to cultivate relations of peace

ruinous treatment which these ill-fated exiles are supposed to have received at the hands of Lord Glenelg are set forth with sufficient explicitness to show that His Lordship has conducted himself with flagrant indiscretion, prejudice, and rashness. . . . His Lordship has lent an idle and credulous ear to *ex parte* statements. He has made himself the tool of certain inflamed zealots in the Colony without full and impartial inquiry. He has given his countenance to judicial burlesques, disgraced in some instances by insane evidence. He has opened the path of plunder to the Kaffir hordes, and reduced Colonial property on the frontier to such a state of insecurity as scarcely to be worth a month's purchase. The native aggressors are protected by him, while restitution and redress are denied to the pillaged settlers. Verily, we have here such a scene of disorder as in most instances would disturb the drowsiest Oriental that ever slumbered! What the case demands from the head of the Colonial Office is a full and impartial inquiry among neutral and disinterested persons. The sort of individuals appointed to Lieutenant-Governorships should also be looked into. But the likelihood is, that if the noble Asiatic (N.B. Lord Glenelg was born in Bengal in 1778) should lift up his eyelids at all, he will turn upon his couch and resume his siesta and give himself no further trouble upon the subject."

and friendship with the native tribes. (4) That, however impotent and unsuccessful the endeavours of the Kaffirs may have appeared to Lord Glenelg, this once flourishing district is now one wide scene of misery and desolation, and that unless compensation be made for the losses, irremediable ruin must be the result. (5) That as it appears to this meeting inexpedient and indeed fruitless again to address Lord Glenelg on the subject of our grievances, it is therefore expedient that the Petition to the British Parliament should embody the whole of our case, and that we pray for an Inquiry upon the spot into the causes of the late war, compensation for losses sustained, and protection for the future. (6) That a Committee of five gentlemen be appointed to draw up the Petition.

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In accordance with these resolutions, Messrs. R. Godlonton, W. R. Thompson, E. Norton, W. Smith, and G. Jarvis drafted a petition of great length. It comprised an epitome of frontier history from 1795, and showed that the Kaffirs had always made a peaceable life in their vicinity an impossibility. In consequence of flattering representations of the conditions of life at the Cape, and a firm reliance on the good faith and protection of the British Government, petitioners had been induced to quit the land of their birth and settle on the Eastern frontier. Their just expectations had not been realised. The action of the British Government betrayed either great disregard for the lives and welfare of His Majesty's subjects, or a total ignorance of the history and actual conditions of the country. Then followed a detailed account of the activities and vicissitudes of the settlement, implying that the people had been induced to expatriate themselves for no other purpose than to serve as a defence to the Colony against barbarian hordes. They repudiated the charges of cruelty and injustice towards the natives which had been brought against them, and protested against the Kaffirs being allowed again to occupy the Ceded Territory and Fish River bush. Finally, they prayed that the Honourable House would take their case into consideration, and adopt such measures as would ensure the three desired objects.

The petition to the House of Lords was sent to the Duke of Wellington, while that to the House of Commons was

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entrusted to the care of Mr. W. E. Gladstone. The latter gentleman, in a kind and courteous reply, dated July 10th, 1837, said that, as the dissolution of Parliament was near, he thought it wiser to do nothing more than to give notice of presenting the petition during the next session, when he would have had time to become possessed of the fuller information necessary for forming a more conclusive judgment. The Duke of Wellington also adopted this course.¹ Cape Town, no less resentfully than Grahamstown, protested in public meeting against Lord Glenelg's action, and sent petitions to the Imperial Parliament. The Committee for this purpose consisted of such prominent men as the Hon. H. Cloete, the Hon. J. B. Ebden, Hon. H. Ross, Hon. C. S. Pillams, and Messrs. J. C. Chase, and F. Stoll.

The hope, however, of gaining the desired ends by these petitions does not seem to have been very sanguine. For before Mr. Gladstone could have had any opportunity of bringing the matter before the House of Commons, another step to obtain Inquiry, Compensation, and Protection was adopted. On June 20th, 1837, King William IV. died, and Her Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria ascended the British Throne. The British colonists of the Eastern Province did not allow the occasion to pass without a public meeting, and the drafting of a respectful address of congratulation to Her Majesty. But it was more of the form of a petition for redress of grievances than an undiluted congratulation. The framers acknowledged that, "Although in framing addresses of congratulation it may not be customary to introduce topics leading to political

¹ Exactly a year after this, viz. on July 10th, 1838, Mr. Gladstone did call the attention of the House to the Albany petition. He went into the whole matter with a detail and sympathy for the sufferers which left nothing to be desired by them. But Sir George Grey strenuously opposed the petition for inquiry. He adopted the prevailing view that the Eastern Province inhabitants were freebooters. "There had," he said, "undoubtedly been a series of continual aggressions by the British settlers on the Kaffirs and neighbouring tribes under the pretence of obtaining additional security." The aggressions of the colonists could not be justified or sanctioned by Parliament or the Government, and he trusted that these excesses, which were a disgrace to the British name, would in future be prevented. He now trusted he had made out a case to convince the House that this was not an occasion upon which the British Parliament could be induced to sanction, under any pretext, the application of persons who had placed themselves in trouble and peril by means of their aggressions. On the matter being put to the vote, the Ayes were 32 and Noes 41, a majority of 9 against the justice of hearing the maligned settlers in their defence.

discussions, nevertheless, the state of this Province is so alarming as not only to warrant a departure from this usage, but to make it a positive duty to our Sovereign, to our country, and to ourselves, not to permit this opportunity to pass without faithfully placing upon record our sentiments upon matters of such grave and momentous import". All this, however, availed the country but little. Two more Kaffir wars, twenty years of further disorder and disaster, and the great self-immolation of the Kaffir tribes by starving themselves to death in the hope of driving the white man into the sea, were yet necessary before any Eastern Province progress worthy the name became possible. By that time, the necessity or expediency of inquiries upon the spot was out of date, and many of those who had sought compensation had founded new Governments in distant parts.

The history of the frontier under the Stockenstrom regime is chiefly one continuous record of depredations, alarms—many of them undoubtedly false—general commotion throughout the country and its abandonment by the emigrant Boers. The almost more than sporting chances which the treaty gave the Kaffirs to win the Colonial cattle proved a losing game for the already impoverished farmers. Where the game, so to speak, was played according to the Stockenstrom rules, and the prescribed procedure was followed, the cattle almost invariably became irreclaimable and the Kaffir scored. But when the farmer, in the interest of his home and family, refused to abide by these rules and took matters into his own hands, he had some prospect of regaining his property. By rushing past and ignoring Amapakati and diplomatic agents, by taking his cattle whenever or wherever he saw them, and perhaps—as in the case of Dods Pringle of Glen Lynden who tied the thief to the wheel of the waggon and applied the sjambok—using an *argumentum ad pellem*—a tedious and worrying expedition might be avoided.

The barriers and well "riemed" gates to the kraals were no protection to the animals within; for the marauding and determined Kaffir, under the cover of night, found but little difficulty in removing these obstacles. Even when the noise made by the disturbed animals was heard at the homestead, and brought the farmer's gun to his shoulder, the thieves by

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mixing themselves among the cattle could find protection and in all probability get off with some of the booty. The eyes of the Kaffirs seem to have had capabilities different from other human beings, for on the darkest nights cattle thieves could find their way through most intricate and dangerous parts and behave almost as if they had the noonday sun to assist them. At this time, however, circumstances were so much in their favour that there was not the same need for the cover of darkness. They cared as little for the twenty-nine Articles of Stockenstrom as they did for the thirty-nine of the Church. In broad daylight and almost with the owner looking on, oxen and horses were taken away. In some cases the theft happened while the animals were tied up to a waggon which was standing near the farm house; in others, a portion of the herd, which was left standing at one spot while others were being put into a kraal, or were being attended to in some other way, was robbed. Oxen which had just been released from the plough, others while they were on the bank of a river drinking, much more than those which, during an outspan, were grazing at a distance, were watched by the wily Kaffir and seized at the first moment of unguardedness on the part of those in charge of them.

In all these raids there was no definite and extensive combination among the Kaffirs, except in so far that all were out to steal cattle. The marauding parties consisted generally of a few individuals who were working in their own personal interests. Hence it frequently happened that the same farm was visited more than once in the same day by different parties. In the generality of cases only a few, perhaps one or two, animals were driven off, but there were some when the number amounted to hundreds, as in the case of Mr. Robert Hart of Glen Avon, near Somerset East. In August of 1837, "upwards of two hundred" cattle were missed from the farm. No one seems to have seen them driven off or noticed any spoor, and for a time their disappearance was a mystery. It should be stated that the farm was, and still is, situated in a somewhat mountainous and bushy country, and that cattle grazing on the hills could well be stolen and the theft remain unknown for some time. About the same time, Andreas Botha, one of the Hottentot settlers at the Kat River Settle-

ment, also lost cattle. He followed the spoor and after some days traced it as far as a spot near the Kei River—far away in Kaffirland—where the chief Tyali had a temporary location. While there, Botha recognised some of the animals belonging to Mr. Hart. On receipt of this intelligence, Mr Hart sent his son with five men to that place. Among a drove of eight hundred animals they saw, on their arrival, about thirty of their own cattle. The Kaffirs, on learning the object of this visit, became insolent and so threatening that the men thought it more prudent to return empty-handed. The matter was reported to the chief Tyali, who was then a guest of the Lieutenant-Governor in Grahamstown. He undertook to do his best to cause the animals to be restored. He “did his best” with the result that after some months Mr. Hart received back *twenty-three* oxen out of his “upwards of two hundred”.¹

The attempts to regain stolen cattle in accordance with the terms of the treaty were beset with many difficulties and much irritation. Application for assistance at a military post was too often fruitless, not from any disinclination on the part of the officer to afford it, but because it had to be refused in consequence of the robbed man having failed to comply with the regulations; perhaps there was no proof of the animals

¹ Mr. Hart followed up this case to the bitter end with a perseverance worthy of being rewarded by the return of his cattle—though he never was. Finding Tyali would not deliver up the animals which were *known* to be in his possession, Mr. Hart sent a petition to the Lieutenant-Governor asking him to investigate the theft and to compel the thieves to restore his property. In reply Mr. Hart was referred to Articles 23, 24, and 25 of the famous treaty and to such assistance as was afforded by Article 12—which was nothing. He then went a step higher and appealed to the Governor, stating that if there is a treaty in existence which authorises a Kaffir thief to retain his (Hart's) property when clearly proved to be in his possession, then it is time he should make the most of what he has left and quit the Colony before it is too late. In answer to this, Mr. Hart was informed that he would have an opportunity of communicating with the Governor personally when he would be able to state by what means he proposed to regain his cattle other than by the treaty or Kaffir law. This failing, Mr. Hart took the only legitimate and constitutional step which remained, namely, that of approaching the Throne itself. On June 23rd, 1838, he sent a petition to the Queen. After describing the general state of the country with regard to stock theft, he said that at no period during the occupation of this Colony, in time of peace, have the inhabitants suffered so much by thefts as during the last two years. He asked that the Kaffirs might be compelled to restore his cattle or to grant him remuneration—his loss being not less than £600. Answered March 7th, 1839, “That it is not in the power of Her Majesty to grant you any redress for the injury which forms the subject of your memoir”. Thus satisfactorily did the Stockenstrom Treaty work!

CHAP. IX. having been guarded ; or the native had not been armed ; too long a time had elapsed since the theft had taken place, or there had been some other condition unfulfilled. At times assistance could not be given because all the available men were already out endeavouring to recapture some other farmer's cattle. Two courses were open to the farmer in such cases as these ; either he might go quietly home and submit to his loss, or, what was more probable, he might collect a few friends together, take the law into his own hands, and follow his cattle wherever they might be. The journey often lasted days, as to elude pursuit, the Kaffirs often drove the animals to very distant parts by tortuous paths and through difficult country. Not infrequently want of food and knocked up horses compelled the return journey to be commenced before the object had been gained. In their visitations to the various farms, the Kaffirs were no respecters of persons. They did not even stretch a point in favour of their great protector and champion the Lieutenant-Governor himself. His own farm at the Kaga, now a part of the district of Bedford, was robbed on more than one occasion during this year. On August 10th, J. J. Theron, His Honour's bailiff, made deposition before the Resident Magistrate at Somerset East that on the previous May 20th, eleven oxen and two saddle horses belonging to himself had been stolen ; on July 27th, three more of his oxen and twelve cows belonging to a native in His Honour's employ were taken, while on July 31st, nineteen cows and an ox, *the property of Captain Stockenstrom himself were driven off*. Lastly, on August 7th, a further attack was made upon the farm property. During that day seven Kaffirs were seen lurking about in the adjacent bush ; the servants therefore waited in hiding until half-past nine that night when a determined assault was made upon the place. A fight ensued during which four of the Mantatee herdsmen were wounded. The assailants, after a considerable struggle, were beaten off, though they were not prevented from taking with them a further four horses.

Nor do the Kaffirs at this time seem to have had much respect for, or fear of, places where they must have known that due provision against their visitations was made. Mr. Howse, who occupied the farm Leeuwfontein, near Fort Beaufort, tells

us that besides there being a military post adjacent to his farm, he always kept twenty stand of arms with a suitable supply of ammunition, that there were always three or four armed men on the lands where the oxen and sheep were grazing, yet in spite of all this vigilance he could not prevent the plunder of his stock. During eighteen months he had been a loser to the extent of Rds. 3,000.¹

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¹The following out of the almost interminable list of robberies which characterises these times may be taken as typical. Some of them were sworn to on oath before a Resident Magistrate, while others were merely reported and published in the weekly lists in the *Grahamstown Journal*, the losers finding it useless to do anything else.

January 8th, 1837, eleven oxen were driven off from the farm of one Botha living near the Winterberg. They were traced as far as Balfour in the Kat River Settlement where the spoor became so mixed up with that of other cattle that it could be no further followed. Balfour being so near the boundary, they were soon driven into Kaffirland and became irreclaimable.

January 31st, Adriaan Nel, also of the Winterberg district, lost eight head of cattle, and his neighbour, J. Mundell, three horses. Nel followed the spoor of the cattle as far as the Blinkwater but was then afraid to go nearer to Kaffirland. He applied for assistance at a military post but was told it could not be afforded him as the Fingo herd, who was in charge of the cattle at the time of the theft, had no gun. Nel then collected together a few neighbours and, in spite of the treaty, continued the pursuit, with the result that seven of the oxen and the three horses were recovered. The next night Nel's kraal was again broken into, when the whole of his cattle were taken. It does not appear whether any of them were regained.

Viljoen, also of the same district, lost nine oxen. He did not miss them until evening when it was too late to follow the spoor. Refused assistance by the officer at the military post, as too long a time had elapsed between the theft and the commencement of the action. Viljoen with some neighbours followed the spoor for some days when they found the dead body of one of his oxen lying at the bottom of a precipice, over which it must either have jumped or been driven. The pursuit was abandoned and the farmers returned.

In February, a Boer named Klopper was in charge of his own and the cattle of another Boer named Botma. About four in the afternoon—and therefore long before sunset—Klopper drove the animals to near the homestead and seems to have left them in order to fetch a servant to take further care of them. He was absent only a short time, yet on his return nineteen of them were missing. The question was had they merely strayed or had they been stolen?

On May 8th, in open day, a party of six Kaffirs visited Rietfontein, the farm of Mr. Potter, situated about twelve miles from Grahamstown. They cut the riems with which the kraal gates were tied and drove out forty head of cattle and six horses. Assistance was sought from the nearest military post and, in this instance, obtained. A patrol of seven men, together with five mounted burghers, went off in pursuit and succeeded in recovering all the cattle and three of the horses. Mr. Potter's place was again visited in the following October. According to the deposition of Gert Plaatjes, Mr. Potter's cattle herd—before the Resident Magistrate at Grahamstown—about four o'clock on a certain afternoon he was with the cattle when he saw a sudden commotion amongst them. On going near to find out the cause, he saw four armed Kaffirs attempting to drive

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“I really wish I could name one farm to you that did not in some measure escape from Kaffir depredation,” said Abraham

some of them off. They frightened Gert by brandishing their assegais at him and got clear with fourteen head. Although Gert had a gun, he was afraid to use it, so he said, as he was alone with four Kaffirs. It is not clear whether the animals were recovered.

In July, Mr. Human of the Kroomie lost four oxen. He followed them as far as the law allowed and then gave the matter over to the Kaffir police. They took up the spoor as far as Block Drift (Alice) and were then afraid to go any farther, so they said. Mr. Human therefore applied to Captain Armstrong at Fort Beaufort, but no action was taken. He then applied to Captain Stretch, the diplomatic agent, still nothing was done. In the end Mr. Human lost his oxen.

On September 14th, the cattle of a Mr. Lucas, who was farming near Grahamstown, were being driven down to the Brak River, when they all started running at a great rate, one cow bellowing loudly. The Hottentot herd followed the cow into the bush and found that she had been stabbed in the shoulder with an assegai. He did not see any Kaffir though five had been seen lurking about the place the day before.

From the town of Fort Beaufort itself, during the month of June only, the following losses were sustained. There is no direct proof, however, that the animals were stolen by Kaffirs, but none of them were ever recovered, so that, had they merely strayed, they must have gone very far. Mr. Mulligan lost fourteen oxen; Mr. Bower, fourteen oxen and two horses; Mr. Rorke, seventeen oxen and ten horses; Mr. Cornish, six oxen; Mr. Holliday, eight oxen and two horses; also animals, numbers not stated, from Carpenter, Foden, and Austen.

On December 5th, 1837, Stephanus de Lange made affidavit before the Civil Commissioner of Grahamstown to the effect that while he was engaged in putting his cattle and sheep into one kraal he left his horses standing outside another, which was only about 200 yards from his house. When he could turn his attention to them he found six were missing. As it was too dark then to follow the spoor, he started off as soon as it was light enough the next morning. He traced them over the Koonap as far as a spot on the Kat River, near Botha's Post. From that place the Kaffir police followed it into Kaffirland. It is not recorded with what result.

On February 9th, 1837, Mr. J. D. Norden lost twenty-two head of cattle. They had been out grazing during the day and towards evening were driven back to the farm. The herd left them for a short time while they were drinking at the dam. On his return he found some gone—thirty-three head were missing. He immediately followed the spoor, reached the cattle, and found them being driven by a single Kaffir. It is not clear why he made no attempt to regain any. Instead, he returned to the farm where he arrived at five o'clock the next morning.

Mr. Norden with a friend immediately set out on horseback and soon overtook eleven trek oxen which had been abandoned. Some distance farther they came to a place where there had evidently been a halt and other Kaffirs must have been, for the remains of a dead ox and some cooked meat were found. The two men then went on to Botha's Post and reported the matter to the Kaffir police. They (the police) continued the search but returned and said that the cattle must have been divided into smaller lots as the spoor indicated that they had been driven into Kaffirland in different directions. And that was the last Mr. Norden heard of his twenty-two animals.

On August 18th, 1837, one Michael Pretorius was going with his waggon

Greyling of the Winterberg, in reporting upon the state of that part of the country. And yet, in spite of all these accounts of robberies, the Lieutenant-Governor, as will be seen more fully in the sequel, professed to disbelieve them and to maintain, either that cattle had merely strayed and got lost through the neglect of those responsible for the care of them, or that the reports, even when made on oath before a magistrate, were fabrications or the conspiracies of wicked and designing men originated for the purpose of urging on another Kaffir war, and thus causing the further expenditure of British money in the Colony.

The security of Colonial person and property being thus dependent upon the adherence to a treaty by a people proverbial for their faithlessness and disregard of all principles of honesty, and a deaf ear being turned persistently to the claims for compensation and protection, a fine fertile country was being hurried on to ruin. British as well as Dutch were making every endeavour to get rid of their farms and to move away from the frontier districts. The latter, at this time and in consequence of this state of affairs, were preparing upon a large scale to follow the comparatively few who had already gone northward.

from Fort Armstrong to Fort Beaufort with a load of forage for the commissariat. While he was outspanned at the Blinkwater, Kaffirs came, took all the oxen, and murdered the Fingo leader. On the 21st, three other Fingoes were murdered while preventing Kaffirs from taking cattle.

The Fingoes, as perhaps might be expected, suffered badly at the hands of the Kaffirs at this time. They were robbed even worse than the Europeans, and several were murdered while endeavouring to save their own or their master's animals. The protection of these wretched people became a serious consideration for the authorities; for the contempt and disregard with which the Kaffirs treated the whole of the Stockenstrom Treaty left little hope that any notice would be taken of those sections providing for fair and just dealings with these people.

It were useless to multiply cases such as the above. According to the imperfect returns which were kept during 1837, the losses of animals (not including those which were driven away and recovered) amounted to 384 horses, 3,403 cattle, besides sheep and goats (numbers not stated), of approximate value of £8,000—no small amount when it is considered that it was taken from a people already impoverished by a recent war. In addition to all this there were twenty-two murders. One of them, however, namely, that of the farmer Jan Engelbrecht, was committed by one of the Beaufort Levy (Hottentots), Klaas Stuurman. It appears Klaas with five others went out from Fort Beaufort in the direction of Klu-Klu and saw Engelbrecht with his sheep on a distant hill. Klaas fired at him, killed him, and then helped himself to some of the sheep. He was eventually hanged for it.

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Pieter Retief, the spokesman of the Eastern frontier Boers, proclaimed this intention by the following "Manifesto of the Emigrant Farmers," which he sent to the *Grahamstown Journal*, and which was published in that paper on February 2nd, 1837: "Numerous reports having been circulated throughout the Colony, evidently with the intention of exciting in the minds of our countrymen a feeling of prejudice against those who have resolved to emigrate from a Colony where they have experienced for so many years past a series of the most vexatious and severe losses; and as we desire to stand high in the estimation of our brethren, and are anxious that they and the world at large should believe us incapable of severing that sacred tie which binds a Christian to his native soil, without the most sufficient reasons, we are induced to record the following summary of our motives for taking so important a step; and also our intentions respecting our proceedings towards the native tribes which we may meet with beyond the boundary.

"(1) We despair of saving the Colony from those evils which threaten it by the turbulent and dishonest conduct of vagrants, who are allowed to infest the country in every part; nor do we see any prospect of peace or happiness for our children in a country thus distracted by internal commotions.

"(2) We complain of the severe losses which we have been forced to sustain by the emancipation of our slaves, and the vexatious laws which have been enacted respecting them.

"(3) We complain of the continual system of plunder which we have ever endured from the Kaffirs and other coloured classes, and particularly by the last invasion of the Colony which has desolated the frontier districts, and ruined most of the inhabitants.

"(4) We complain of the unjustifiable odium which has been cast upon us by interested and dishonest persons, under the cloak of religion, whose testimony is believed in England to the exclusion of all evidence in our favour; and we can foresee as the result of this prejudice, nothing but the total ruin of the country.

"(5) We are resolved, wherever we go, that we will uphold the just principles of liberty; but whilst we will take care that no one shall be held in a state of slavery, it is our determination to maintain such regulations as may suppress

crime and preserve proper relations between master and servant. CHAP. IX.

“(6) We solemnly declare that we quit this Colony with a desire to lead a more quiet life than we have heretofore done. We will not molest any people, nor deprive them of the smallest property ; but, if attacked, we shall consider ourselves fully justified in defending our persons and effects, to the utmost of our ability, against every enemy.

“(7) We make known, that when we shall have framed a code of laws for our future guidance, copies shall be forwarded to the Colony for general information ; but we take this opportunity of stating, that it is our firm resolve to make provision for the summary punishment of any traitors who may be found amongst us.

“(8) We propose, in the course of our journey, and on arriving at the country in which we shall permanently reside, to make known to the native tribes our intentions, and our desire to live in peace and friendly intercourse with them.

“(9) We quit this Colony under the full assurance that the English Government has nothing more to require of us, and will allow us to govern ourselves without its interference in future.

“(10) We are now quitting the fruitful land of our birth, in which we have suffered enormous losses and continual vexation, and are entering a wild and dangerous territory ; but we go with a firm reliance on an all-seeing, just, and merciful Being, whom it will be our endeavour to fear and humbly to obey.

“By the authority of the farmers who have quitted the Colony.

“ P. RETIEF.”

The publication of this manifesto very soon came to the notice of the Lieutenant-Governor. He immediately instructed the Civil Commissioner of Grahamstown to strike Retief's name from the list of Field Commandants, and to take from him his princely salary of £22 10s. per annum. The necessity for these steps is not very obvious, seeing that Retief himself had practically brought all this about by announcing his intention of leaving the Colony altogether. Yet it formed the subject of an acrimonious correspondence between the

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Lieutenant-Governor and the Governor, and necessitated appeals to the Attorney-General and Lord Glenelg. This last probably was Stockenstrom's object in originating it. In reporting his action to Sir Benjamin on February 6th he said: "As the frontier is enjoying a state of the utmost tranquillity, excepting the excitement kept alive by those who wish to restore the public expenditure to a war footing, or gain money and importance by imposing upon the ignorant, I have no doubt of my proceedings in this instance being fully approved by the Secretary of State and yourself". "Men actually stare at one another at the state of peace which we enjoy, yet they are made to hate, fear, and fly from the Government which protects them, and hurry into destruction by a regular system of delusion."¹ "The sort and extent of confusion at which I suppose them to aim is that which would be best calculated to gratify their avarice and revenge, and nothing would seem to answer the purpose better than to paralyse the execution of the laws, to see the ignorant land-holders flying terrified from British protection, and to have a new frontier war in full blaze. The ways in which profit may be made under such a state of things are various. Some few, stimulated by mere vanity, aim only at a little notoriety or popularity, fearless of consequences, as they will manage to keep themselves out of danger when an explosion takes place. . . . A few more may be anxious to see the re-establishment of the reprisal system when a few patrols and a few oaths may make a beggar a farmer. Some others may have no objection to purchase the lands of the deluded fugitives for half their value—not a few may desire to see another million or two expended on war contracts, and others may long for the possession of the lands as far as the Keiskamma or the Kei."²

Sir Benjamin Durban disapproved of this dismissal of Retief. He considered the Lieutenant-Governor had exceeded his powers in thus acting, and took the first opportunity of telling him so. In a despatch to Lord Glenelg he called "the especial attention of the Secretary of State to the question of the Lieutenant-Governor's power of dismissing public officers in the Eastern district from their offices without the interven-

¹ Letter, Stockenstrom to Durban, March 9th, 1837, vol. 1355, No. 123.

² *Ibid.*, February 15th, 1837, vol. 1355, No. 100.

tion of the Governor-in-Chief". He had already referred the question to the Attorney-General, and that officer had given his opinion against the Lieutenant-Governor. CHAP.
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In reply to the Governor's letter, Captain Stockenstrom said (March 20th, 1837): "I believe this man (Retief) had always been a respectable farmer, and therefore rejoice that Your Excellency had it in your power to do him so much honour; his elevation, however, seems to have originated ambitious views which decoyed him into error; the prospect of becoming a sort of leader or Governor among the emigrants induced him to foment dissatisfaction against the British Government, and Colonel Somerset, who had represented him so favourably to Your Excellency, was compelled, in handing to me two violent letters addressed by the said Retief to Captain Armstrong in which he threatened to set the laws at defiance, to complain that he (Retief) was making himself extremely troublesome.¹

¹The outline of the correspondence referred to is as follows: On October 9th, 1836, Retief wrote to Captain Armstrong, the J.P. at Fort Beaufort, asking that the ammunition which Colonel Somerset had promised might be sent by waggon. His burghers, he said, were continually out on patrol and had to watch their kraals during the night. Thirty draught oxen and breeding cattle having been taken from one Roberts in the Mancazana, his Field Cornets had asked him for instructions how to act in view of the intolerable plunder. Retief had told them to shoot any Kaffir found near a cattle kraal at night time, and, further, that he would not allow any Kaffir to come into his ward, whether he had a pass or not. He gave notice that any found in his ward were to be brought before him. He asked for a supply of handcuffs. Captain Armstrong, in reply, October 15th, commended Retief for his vigilance, but begged he would not interfere with Kaffirs who possessed passes; he supported the request for handcuffs, and in short, was prepared to support Retief in all respects except in the matter of impeding the movement of Kaffirs with passes.

Retief, October 16th, in answer to this said that if he was not to apprehend Kaffirs, who, with passes for eight days have been loafing about for six months—if they have passes for a different ward and roam about in his, if they are to be allowed to build huts in the kloofs and hills in his ward, then "I must tell you plainly that we would do better at once to give up the little we have got to subsist upon, and not to trouble ourselves further to remain masters of our own property". By giving such passes their (the farmers') peace and happiness was not once thought of. "From fear that *we* may injure the Kaffirs, we are prohibited from going to them, but there is no fear lest *we* should be injured by their influx among us." They must console themselves for a short period with the reflection that the Lieutenant-Governor will remedy their miserable state of life; if he does not, then they will have to abandon the Colony. They felt they were distrusted by Government, because so little powder was sent to them.

Captain Armstrong, sending 152 lb. of powder with lead and flints, and instruction that in alleged thefts, the prisoners and evidence were to be sent on to him, concluded the correspondence.

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I should then have dismissed him. I have taken my stand upon his signing and publishing the 'manifesto,' and so far am I from considering such an act insufficient for dismissing him from office, that I am under the impression that I should have deserved dismissal myself if I had allowed him to act as Field Commandant after the circumstance had been brought to my notice. . . . I have little doubt that the Secretary of State (whatever his Lordship may decide about my power to dismiss Mr. Retief) will have no doubt of the responsibility of those who have deceived and encouraged this poor man and so many of his fellow-subjects for the scenes of blood for which they have paved the way."

Pieter Retief, having thrown down the gauntlet, as it were, and the Boers realising that there was not much sympathy or amelioration of their harassed lives to be expected from the Lieutenant-Governor, the final preparations for the abandonment of the Colony began in real earnest. With their lumbering ox-waggons packed with the bare necessities for their long journey, and with their very large droves of cattle, sheep, and horses they moved slowly northward. To the greater number of them—more especially the younger ones—the prospective life of adventure in unknown lands was anything but unpleasant. The full tented waggons and the shelter which could be found underneath or at the sides by attached sail-cloths formed a home which was a little less comfortable than that to which many had been accustomed. Mutton and beef accompanied them, and their guns provided all the game they required. Their cows gave milk, and by an ingenious arrangement whereby a kind of churn was made to revolve by the movement of the waggon wheel, butter could be produced. Bread was baked in temporary ovens which were constructed by making holes or small caverns in the side of a hill. Into these a quantity of wood or some other fuel was burnt until the cavern was hot enough. The uncooked bread was then introduced, and, having closed the entrance, it was allowed to remain until properly baked.¹ Tea, coffee, and sugar they seem to have taken in plenty. In short, by many the movement, at first at all events, was regarded as something of the

¹ On the authority of Mrs. Voortrekker Fick of Alexandria.

nature of a huge picnic. Their numbers gave them confidence in their strength and a sense of their ability to cope with any such danger as was to be feared from Moselikatze or other native chief. Onward they went, little thinking of the disasters in store for them or the numbers of their relatives and friends who, within a year from that time, were to become victims to native treachery and bloodthirstiness.

The country to which they were wending their way was not entirely unknown to some of the leaders. For early in 1834 a party, consisting of Stephanus Maritz, P. Uys, G. Rudolph, Hans de Lange, J. Moolman, and six others, followed in the track of a Dr. Andrew Smith, who had made a tour of scientific exploration in these parts. They visited Natal and returned with a most favourable account of that country. At that time, a project of a general emigration was entertained by several, and in order to carry it into effect, three parties set out in different directions in quest of pastures new. One, as above mentioned, went to Natal; another, under one Scholtz, went as far as the Zoutpansberg in the present Transvaal, while the third, under Johannes Pretorius, journeyed to Damaraland. All seem to have returned to the Colony after the '35 war. S. Maritz then travelled about the country and brought the subject of a general migration before the notice of the scattered Boers.¹

A party of emigrants, under the patriarchal Jacobus Uys, consisting of about 100 individuals, left Uitenhage in April, 1837, and passed through the northern outskirts of Grahams-town. They encamped for a time on the flats above the town, near where the Cradock road now passes. The friendly regard of the British inhabitants towards the Dutch and the lack of anything of the nature of racial feeling was very evident on this occasion. As soon as it was known that Uys' party was approaching, a public subscription was started, and with the money collected a massive Bible in handsome Russia leather was obtained. On the outside in gold letters was inscribed, "Geschenk van de Inwoonders van Grahams' Stad, en nabijheid, aan den Heer Jacobus Uys, en zijne weggetrokkene landgenoten". And on the inside of the cover was printed:

¹ *Vide* a lecture given by the Voortrekker, G. M. Rudolph, at Maritzburg in 1905, and printed in pamphlet form at Greytown, Natal.

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“Dit Heilig Boek is gepresenteerd aan den Heer Jacobus Uys, en zijn vertrokkene landgenoten, door de inwoonders van Grahams' Stad en omtrek tot een Vaarwel Gedenkteecken van hun hoogachting, en hartelijke leedwezen op hun vertrek. De angstvalligheid welke zij heden betoond hebben om te trachten een Prediker te verkrijgen, en hunne stiptelijke nakoming der heilige Instellingen, zijn duidelijke bewijzen dat in hunne wandelingen om een ander land te zoeken, zij zich zullen laten geleiden door de Bevelen in dit Heilig Boek begrepen, en standvastiglijk aankleven aan deszelfs heilige wetten, de strenge Besluiten van den schepper van het heelal—Den God van alle Natiën en Volkeren.”¹

A deputation, accompanied by most of the inhabitants of Grahamstown, went out to the encampment, and, in their names, Mr. W. R. Thompson made the presentation, saying that ever since the arrival of the British settlers, seventeen years before, there had always been the greatest cordiality between themselves and their Dutch neighbours. Mr. Uys, in reply, said that as long as they all remained on this side of the grave, he hoped, that although parted by distance, they should remain united in heart. Thus in these days were British and Dutch united.

With regard to the number of people who left the Colony at this time, there is no exact or satisfactory account. The number has been estimated roughly by those who should know² at about 5,000. This is undoubtedly far too high; half that number is nearer the mark, though probably still in excess of the true figure. When Sir Benjamin Durban found that the movement was assuming a magnitude greater than ever he expected, he instructed the magistrates of the different districts to collect authentic information and transmit returns

¹ “This Sacred Volume is presented to Mr. Jacobus Uys and his expatriated countrymen by the inhabitants of Grahamstown and its vicinity, as a farewell token of their esteem and heartfelt regret at their departure. The anxiety which they have evinced and endeavour to obtain a Minister of Religion, and their strict observance of its ordinances are evident proofs that in their wanderings in search of another land they will be guided by the precepts contained in this Holy Book and steadfastly adhere to its solemn dictates—the stern decrees of the Creator of the Universe—the God of all Nations and Tribes.” This volume is now in the Museum in Pretoria.

² E.g. the Rev. W. B. Boyce in his *Notes on African Affairs*, printed in 1839.

of those who had left as well as those intending to leave. Up to July, 1837, the following numbers were obtained :—

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	Number Left.				Number about to Leave.			
	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
Eastern . . .	230	192	630	1052	44	30	110	184
Western . . .	8	5	2	15	35	18	23	76
	238	197	632	1067	79	48	133	260

Assuming all did leave, the total to July of 1837 amounted to 1,327. This number presumably includes the parties under Triegardt, Rensburg, Uys, Retief, Potgieter, and Gert Maritz. Added to these there were probably some who were already beyond the boundary pasturing their cattle, and who having left the Colony in the first place with the intention of returning, finally threw in their lot with those they saw moving away altogether. With all these, the total number of individuals who joined in the Great Trek may have amounted to about 2,000.

In the disposal of their farms, some Boers merely abandoned them and left them to anyone who thought it worth their while to occupy them. Others sold theirs, and, considering they were leaving them in any case, they obtained quite good prices for them.¹

Their live stock they took with them. Taking into account the extent to which many of them had been robbed, it is surprising to see what large numbers of animals some had.

¹ The following are instances. In the Tarka district the farm "Winterberg Poort" was sold by J. C. Muller to Mr. Wood of Grahamstown for Rds. 2,500 (£187). "Tafelsberg Vlei," Rds. 700 (£52 5s.). Bezuidenhout's Kraal with Schaap Kraal, plus a load of wood worth Rds. 200—the whole for Rds. 1,200 (£90). "Keis Kop," bought by P. Grobbelaar twelve months previously for Rds. 3,000, Grobbelaar was glad to get Rds. 500 (£37 5s.) for. "Ratels Hoek" was sold to W. van Heerden by Jan Steenkamp for Rds. 4,000 (£300). The two farms "Wegelboom" and "Groen Nek" for Rds. 200 (£15). While "Keis Poort," "Klein Haasfontein," and "Rooi Draai" were abandoned. "Schaap Kraal," bought by P. Botma for Rds. 10,000 (£750), was sold to Mr. Ziervogel, the magistrate at Somerset East, for Rds. 4,000 (£300).

CHAP. IX. From the Tarka district alone, for instance, Jan Labuscagne was able to take away 3,500 sheep and 100 cattle; P. and J. Steenkamp had 3,000 sheep and 200 cattle; the families of Gaspard, du Plessis, and Geyer possessed 9,000 sheep and 500 cattle. With the twenty-nine families or small parties consisting of one or two individuals, the total stock they took is given as 6,150 cattle and 96,600 sheep.

With the long cavalcades of waggons and the many thousands of animals, the Boers trekked, in the first place, to Thaba N'Chu, about thirty miles east of the present city of Bloemfontein. There they halted for a time and made further preparations for their proceedings, both with respect to the country in which they were to settle and the form of government they were to adopt. There for the present they must be left.

Although, so far as can be ascertained, no British joined in the Dutch trek, there was a general desire to be rid of frontier farms and to move more to the west. A Major Bagot sold his farms "Nurney" and "Green Hills," near Grahams-town, and moved to the Gamtoos River. S. Cawood "resolved upon quitting the district of Albany in consequence of the unsettled state of the frontier," and left his farm adjoining the military post of Kaffir Drift. Mr. J. Bailie put up his farm to public auction when the highest bid was £125 for a place said to be worth £1,200. R. Southey moved from the Kap River in August. J. T. Phillips and W. Currie moved to the Krome River, 150 miles more to the west, and so on in many more cases.

While all these depredations were taking place and the colonists' cattle were becoming irreclaimable by treaty; while hundreds of the Dutch inhabitants were leaving the country for want of better protection, and constant alarm was the normal condition of life in the Eastern Province, the *Commercial Advertiser* in Cape Town was pouring forth, week by week, a continuation of articles and reports on the "unprecedented tranquillity on the frontier". "We hear of no agitation, disturbance, robbery, or theft; the Lieutenant-Governor's reign has been one of unvarying tranquillity on the part of the people on both sides of the border." "Profound tranquillity is the telegraph from the whole frontier this week." "We hear nothing

of hostile inroads or Kaffir depredations." "The news from the frontier is of the most pacific character." "Our accounts for several weeks past may be summed up in the words of our correspondent. Such tranquillity has not been known for many years." These are specimens of the statements by which Mr. John Fairbairn described the state of affairs at that time, and by means of which he seemed determined to bolster up the Stockenstrom policy. In his defence, however, it must be said that the generality of the reports from the diplomatic agents residing among the Kaffirs, and other officers on the frontier whose situations entitled them to speak with authority, was such as to give good grounds for these statements. In February, 1837, Colonel Somerset, for instance, reported that peace and quiet prevailed everywhere, not a Kaffir was traced, yet he was assured at every turn in Grahamstown that the Kaffirs were about to invade the place in great numbers. "The very tranquil state of the frontier," he said on February 8th, "must have been apparent to every one, and yet the farmers in the district of Albany are preparing to remove beyond the borders and seek residences in more remote parts." The Civil Commissioner also about the same time wrote: "I am quite at a loss to discover the cause of the excitement which at present prevails so generally among the inhabitants, the country is quite tranquil; more uneasiness is manifested at this time than at any period since the war". Mr. C. L. Stretch, the diplomatic agent residing with the Gaikas, and Mr. J. M. Bowker, living with the Fingoes, in like manner, frequently reported all quiet, and no aggressions on Colonial property. These reports by men *living in Kaffirland*, though undoubtedly true, really meant little, as—if the farmers' statements were true, and there is little reason to doubt them—the robberies took place not in Kaffirland but in the Colony, and, as the accounts of the expeditions into distant and difficultly accessible parts showed, the Kaffirs knew their business better than to drive stolen cattle to places where it was likely to be recognised and reclaimed. Hence it was quite possible that the seamy side of frontier life was invisible from Kaffirland. Yet in this state of reputed tranquillity and happy calm, there was everywhere a sense of impending doom and a readiness to prepare for the worst. The sight of a single Kaffir

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IX. create a panic and to call for the assistance of the military. The recollection of the unexpectedness and suddenness of the outbreak in December of 1834 was fresh in the minds of all, and any suspicious action on the part of the Kaffir was felt to be the presage of further disaster.

The Lieutenant-Governor had his own views of the reasons for all this disquiet. According to the voluminous despatches which he sent to the Governor for transmission to Lord Glenelg, he believed it to be due to the machinations and conspiracies of a disappointed and unprincipled faction, which was ready to sacrifice the tranquillity and happiness of the Colony and of the surrounding natives, to their thirst for revenge and lucre, to a systematic combination of individuals, who, by the grossest deception and misrepresentation were misleading the ignorant mass of the population with regard to the measures and views of the British Government, and equally deceiving the Government and the Legislature as to the feelings and complaints of the Colonists.¹ Their industry in fomenting dissensions and irritating and reviling those with whom the King sought reconciliation and peace, is only equalled by the ingenuity with which they invented the most disgraceful false alarms, and the dastard insolence with which they defamed His Majesty's Minister and all others who dared to approve of and support his measures.² Something in this strain is to be found in almost every despatch he wrote. This supposed rascality seems to have haunted and obsessed him at this time, as the bogies of "Uncles at the Horse Guards" had done at an earlier date.

Besides the extreme vagueness of these frequently reiterated charges, two strange features obtrude themselves in a study of these letters. One is, that with all the power and authority which the Lieutenant-Governor possessed, and the information he professed to have, he seems to have taken no steps to bring the guilty parties to book, or even to indicate with any definiteness who they were. That the Dutch came under his

¹ Letter, Stockenstrom to Durban, March 9th, 1837, vol. 1355 of the Lieutenant-Governor's Letters, No. 123.

² *Ibid.*, May 9th, 1837, vol. 1356 of the Lieutenant-Governor's Letters, No. 182.

lash is evident, for in referring to them he tells Lord Glenelg that "the so-called civilised Christians" see a liberal nation pay £20,000,000 sterling for their slaves, yet, such is their fury at the emancipation of those slaves that after pocketing the money, they talk of being revenged by going out of the way—that the enemy may without difficulty knock out the brains of those who paid those millions.¹ "I might, indeed, have soothed Retief and his associates with the promise that the slaves should be free (? *sic*), that the Fiftieth Ordinance should be repealed, that Caffraria should be divided amongst the colonists, the missionaries hanged, and the blacks extirpated.² I should most likely then have been overwhelmed with flattering addresses."

The British settlers were equally his abhorrence, and, in his opinion, were a set of miscreants who were frightening away the Dutch in order that they might obtain their farms, and were anxious to replunge the country into war, with all the horrors of rapine and massacre, provided they can satisfy their love of lucre and rapacity.³ Perhaps he was referring to those of them who wished to send a petition to England, asking that he might not be appointed Lieutenant-Governor, when in the same vague manner he wrote to Sir B. Durban (for Lord Glenelg) on May 25th, 1837, "that in order to prevent the resumption of office, the basest of calumnies and the most palpable perjuries, backed by the assistance of public records in official keeping, were resorted to. That these base proceedings were countenanced by men in authority, to whose machinations even the public revenue was made accessory; that for years every act of mine has been exposed to the uncontrolled research of those who have given the most indubitable proofs of their rancorous hostility, that upon all the said calumnies, perjuries, and machinations a species of cowardly insult was attempted to be founded; that the unhappy Retief, and other functionaries, hoped to gain certain objects by echoing that insult, and instead of being dismissed as they deserved, were only reminded of their utter insignificance and

¹ Letters, Stockenstrom to Durban, Lieutenant-Governor's Letters, vol. 1357, No. 283.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 1356, No. 199.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 1358, No. 321.

CHAP. IX. folly and were forgiven; and that after wading through all that ocean of iniquity, my accusers have failed, stand aghast—with spite and disappointment; see that they may ruin a country in trying to ruin individuals, without bettering themselves, and will, when properly unmasked, find themselves the objects of the scorn and contempt of every honest man.”

In the second place, all these splenetic outbursts and this vituperation were semi-private, and meant for the eyes of Lord Glenelg and the party he represented in England. The accused, therefore, had no idea of what was being said about them and no opportunity of defence. It is difficult to account for the origin of the hatred and vindictiveness with which Captain Stockenstrom came to regard the inhabitants of the Eastern Province, both British and Dutch. Before he left the country in 1833, though he had fallen foul with many, if not all, of those in authority either over him or with him, he does not seem to have harboured any grudge against the governed. The Dutch burghers in these early days were willing to follow him anywhere. As Landdrost of Graaff Reinet he gained a popularity which did not become lessened while he was Commissioner-General. But, though it is scarcely conceivable that one of his generally upright character could have condescended to say that which he knew to be untrue, or deliberately to have conveyed false impressions before the House of Commons, for the purpose of gaining power or pre-eminence, yet he certainly seems to have done so; and further, it would appear that the abusive language and continuance of the ill report which characterised this voluminous semi-private correspondence, was necessary to maintain the impression thus created. His apparent distortion of the death of Zeko, during a general attack by the Kaffirs upon the Boers, into a charge of cold-blooded murder against Erasmus, and his unfounded accusation against the British settlers of going on reprisal commandos, led to investigation into his own conduct while upon guerilla warfare, and thus to a similar charge of murder against himself. Captain Stockenstrom was easily offended and never forgave a slight. He always had some grievance over which to brood, and was prone rather to whine about it than either to take the necessary steps to remove it, or to decide to endure that which

he could not cure. In this murder charge, for instance, for over eighteen months he allowed it to pass by default, instead of compelling the professed eyewitnesses, Klopper, Botha, Aucamp, Swanepoel, and others, to substantiate their statements. And when at last he did take action, it was not against his maligners, but against the magistrate who felt it his duty to collect the evidence. It was well-nigh impossible to have made a worse choice for the office of Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province at that time than that of Captain Andries Stockenstrom. Only after his dismissal by a new Secretary of State, and the recognition by a new Governor that the Stockenstrom policy "shocked one's natural sense of justice," was there any chance of matters mending. It is somewhat curious that after the dismissal of Sir Benjamin Durban, and when Sir George Napier had become Governor, Stockenstrom's correspondence with Lord Glenelg loses much of its asperity and vindictiveness; yet, with the exception of the expatriated Boers, the same "miscreants" were in the country, and as far as can be seen, they had undergone no reformation. Perhaps the fact that Sir George Napier came to the country with the avowed intention of supporting and carrying on the Stockenstrom policy, was something of a palliative; while Sir B. Durban, however conciliatory and anxious to benefit the country with the knowledge and experience he had gained, was a continual source of irritation to him. "It is true indeed," he writes to the Governor on May 15th, "that I was sent here to carry into effect measures which were disagreeable to Your Excellency. Equally true, that never were the public affairs of my country in a more complete state of disorganisation than those of the frontier upon my assuming the reins of Government, and it has been my misfortune to meet with Your Excellency's determined opposition and resistance to almost every effort which I deemed it my duty to make to restore peace. I have, therefore, no alternative but to appeal to a quarter where I may hope to have my measures and motives considered with less aversion and distrust."

It will be well now to examine some of the cases of false alarms, or "disgraceful fabrications," as Stockenstrom called them, which figure so prominently at this time. The study

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of these, whether true or not, almost more than anything else, gives a clear idea of the circumstances of life of the Eastern Province inhabitants under the Stockenstrom policy. As will be seen, many of these alarms were groundless; but the whole atmosphere of suspense in which all lived, and the conditions of ever-watchfulness and armed preparedness, which were imposed by the treaty, all conspired to make people see danger where little or none existed. Experience taught them, that if their farms were not robbed one day, they might be on the next.

Mr. Field Cornet Forbes (son of Alex. Forbes, who was murdered at his house by Kaffirs in December, 1834) lived on his lonely farm at Waai Plaats in a bushy part of Lower Albany, near the Kap River.¹ In February, 1837, he wrote to the Civil Commissioner in Grahamstown an alarming letter, stating that the Kap River bush was infested with Kaffirs, armed with guns and roaming where they pleased. He described how some of them went to a distant farm-house and asked for milk, and when this had been given to them they demanded meat and became insolent. As his place (i.e. Forbes) was on the main road from Kaffirland to Grahamstown, Bathurst, and Salem, and, therefore, one of the first places likely to be attacked in the case of this behaviour betokening mischief, he wrote the letter asking for protection and concluded with, "For God's sake answer this as soon as it comes to hand, that the women and children may be got to town". In reply to this, two military officers went down to Waai Plaats and the vicinity to investigate. According to their report, four Kaffirs had been seen in the Kap River bush some time during the preceding month; one was found at Kaffir Drift, but he had a pass and permission to be on Mr. Cawood's farm in that part. No fresh spoor could be found in any of the passes leading to the river drifts, and hence it was assumed that there were no Kaffirs squatting anywhere in the extensive bush. A party of fifteen Kat River Hottentots, however, was discovered, who, on being interrogated, said their object was to hunt buffalo. On the whole, Forbes' statement was considered to be a gross exaggeration, and for this he was dismissed from his

¹ Not to be confused with the Kat River in the north. The Kap River is a small stream running into the Fish River in the Bathurst district,

office of Field Cornet. In reporting the case to Lord Glenelg (through the Governor), Captain Stockenstrom said: "I must take the opportunity to point out to the Secretary of State what might have been the result of this functionary's conduct, if, instead of causing the matter to be investigated (suspecting from the first the whole to be an unmixed fabrication), I had acted upon the letter and caused the women and children to be brought into town as proposed. A panic in the Colony would naturally have followed, thereby causing a corresponding one among the Kaffirs; both parties would arm in self-defence, one or two real or pretended depredations and reprisals would operate like a lighted match upon gunpowder, both colonists and Kaffirs would be ruined, a few fortunes made, and the whole attributed to the measures of the King's Government".

"Among the many attempts to keep up alarm and excitement on this frontier, there was for some time a report industriously propagated of vast numbers of Caffres and other foreigners, many of them armed with muskets, swarming in the Zuurberg and Oliphant's Hoek, where they were congregating in kraals on any land they thought proper, insulting and threatening the inhabitants, setting all law and authority at defiance, and causing such an alarm and feeling of insecurity that most of the colonists in that quarter had made up their minds to emigrate." Thus Captain Stockenstrom wrote to the Governor (for Lord Glenelg) on April 26th, and continued: "The originators of all the false reports, finding their rapacity disappointed, have certainly adopted the surest way of bringing about that state of things to which they trust for a realisation of their earlier hopes".¹ It is curious that among the enclosures which accompanied this despatch, there were some papers which entirely corroborated the statements of the "fabricators," and which, to anyone else but Lord Glenelg, would have been a sure indication of the worthlessness of much, if not all, of which Stockenstrom wrote in this strain.

Captain Rishton, who was sent with a party of cavalry to the Zuurberg to investigate the "false alarm," reported on March 22nd: "There are a great many Kaffirs, armed with muskets, located without permission in the Zuurberg and

¹ Stockenstrom to Durban, April 26th, 1837, vol. 1356, No. 173, with enclosures.

CHAP. IX. Oliphant's Hoek, as many as twenty on the one farm of J. J. Kok". There were also many others in these parts, but they had passes, and against these the complaints were not levelled.

There *was*, therefore, some foundation for the report. It must have been this state of things which drove Uys and his followers from that part, as it was just at that time when they left. That Stockenstrom himself did not entirely disbelieve the "false reports," is evident from the fact that he instructed Colonel Somerset to send a party of cavalry to co-operate with the Field Cornet Buchner in the Oliphant's Hoek and Bathurst districts. He also caused circular letters to be sent (by H. Hudson, his secretary) to the Civil Commissioners of Grahams-town and Somerset East, reminding them of their procedure in dealing with "wandering foreigners" in accordance with the Forty-ninth Ordinance of 1828.

Besides the Kaffirs, Stockenstrom's own Hottentot Corps was implicated in the commotion of the times. In their regard also, the authorities were disposed to shut their eyes to what was taking place under their noses, and to open their mouths only to deprecate as idle talk that which subsequent events proved should have been taken as timely warning. In May, a discharged Hottentot soldier, Jan Wildeman, told a Boer, Gert Scheepers, that the Hottentots and Kaffirs were going to combine and "fight the Government".¹ They had decided, so he said, to intercept the post rider so that the news should not reach Cape Town, to burn the canteen and seize the powder magazine in Grahamstown, and to perform other preliminaries to a general attack upon the place. Scheepers took fright at this and reported the matter to the Civil Commissioner, adding that he had determined to leave the Colony rather than expose his wife and family to the mercies of the blacks. Shortly after another discharged Hottentot soldier, Plaatje Tongaat, made a statement on oath before the Civil Commissioner at Uitenhage. It was to the effect that he had just been released from the prison in Grahamstown, where he had been detained on a charge of theft. While there, in company with other Hottentots, conversations had taken place which showed that some conspiracy among these people was on foot. On his return to the barracks at Cypherfontein¹ he

¹ Now Palmerston, about five miles from Grahamstown.

heard a good deal of similar talk. Andries Stoffles had returned from England and died from some pulmonary complaint shortly after landing in Cape Town. This seems to have upset these people, and they decided that in the event of the report of Stoffles' death being true, there must be a disturbance (oproer). The people of the Kat River and Theopolis Missionary institutions were expected to join, and then all would combine with the Kaffirs in an attack upon the Colony. Perhaps the party of Hottentots found on Forbes' farm at Waai Plaats had something to do with this. Plaatje then went into details of the intended preliminaries. As an unintentioned tribute to temperance, they acknowledged that the first thing to be done was to burn the canteen in Grahamstown—as the men would be sure to get drunk and then the soldiers would get the better of them.

In bringing this before the Secretary of State in due course, the Lieutenant-Governor said: "His Lordship will not be at a loss to assign an adequate cause why a country can be thus excited in the midst of peace and tranquillity, and see how an ignorant mass can be brought to look with terror and dissatisfaction upon the supreme Government, at the very moment when all the measures adapted for the prosperity of its subjects are exceeding beyond expectation. . . . It might be hoped that, if the designing speculators in confusion would leave the ignorant farmers in quiet possession of their lands, instead of frightening them with conspiracies between Caffres and Hottentots, and the oppressive tyranny of the Home Government, the Eastern Division might soon become the quietest part of the British Dominions." In answer to these statements it will suffice in this place to say, that a few months after this time rebellion *did* break out in the Hottentot Corps, that they murdered Ensign Crowe, one of their officers, and that they were in league with the Kaffir chief, Umkye, whose plans for the extermination of Grahamstown were thwarted by this premature murder.

In the foregoing cases there was some foundation for the alarms, however much the Lieutenant-Governor may have desired to minimise them in his letters to Lord Glenelg. But there were other cases such as the following. On May 11th, the military party at Bathurst received a report that cattle had

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been taken from the kraal of a Mr. Fuller in that district, and that a native herd had been killed. On investigation it was found that no cattle had been taken, but that one native herd had shot another accidentally, but not fatally.

Some horses of one Lombard disappeared. They were reported stolen by Kaffirs, but were eventually found in the pound in Grahamstown. De Lange's horses in like manner were found to have strayed, and not to have been stolen; the same with widow Barrett's cattle, the same with horses belonging to the military at Fort Beaufort. The fault of much of this, however, was to be found in the treaty, for according to this the theft had to be reported as soon as it was discovered; thus time spent in making sure it was theft, and not a case of straying, jeopardised the owner's chance of recovering his animals in the event of its being the former.

The inhabitants of the isolated village of Salem lived in much fear, and formed themselves into the "Salem Safety Association" for mutual protection. Places of refuge were appointed and subscriptions were collected for the purchase of increased quantities of guns and ammunition. Such was the care and anxiety involved in cattle farming in those days.

Besides others, a great and inherent difficulty in carrying into practice the Stockenstrom policy was the Fingo question. The Fingoes were loathed by all tribes of Kaffirs, chiefly because they had brought away so many thousands of Hintza cattle, and partly because they were, at least nominally, under the very special protection and encouragement of the British Government. The Kaffirs allowed no opportunity of molesting them to pass without taking advantage of it. The last sections of the treaty, which were framed to protect them from the savagery of the Kaffirs, availed them but little. Their cattle were stolen in twos and threes, and their women, when found unprotected, were unmercifully beaten. When Mr. Bowker complained of this to the Kaffirs, he was told that the Fingoes were dogs and had no right to cattle. A most wanton and glaring infringement of that part of the treaty which was framed for their protection, took place on August 2nd, 1837, when a deliberate attempt to destroy the settlement under the immediate protection of Fort Peddie was made. According to the account of Mr. Bowker, the resident agent at that

fort, the Kaffir chief, Eno, was with him on that day, receiving such hospitality as he could afford, when a messenger rushed in breathlessly with the news that a large Kaffir army, consisting of the people of Eno, Nonibe, Umkye, and Seyolo, were standing in battle array at Mount Somerset, a few miles distant. Instantly, with six mounted men and Mr. Cyrus, his interpreter, Mr. Bowker rode to the spot. He found between four and five hundred Kaffirs, under the leadership of the petty Ndhlabi chief, Seyolo, prepared to fall upon a similar army of Fingoes, who were standing ready to receive them. Regardless of their own safety, Messrs. Bowker and Cyrus rode up to Seyolo, and demanded the meaning of this demonstration and infringement of the treaty. Seyolo replied that the Fingoes had taken some of their cattle. It was pointed out to him that his remedy was to report the matter, when, in the event of his statement being true, the Government would see him righted. Mr. Bowker then called the Fingo chief, Umhlambiso, forward. He came and was standing between Messrs. Bowker and Cyrus when he was stabbed in the back. Immediately the war-cry was given and a general fight ensued. Umhlambiso was placed on Mr. Cyrus' horse and taken to the fort. Nothing further could be done and the fight proceeded. Corporal Porter, one of the six soldiers, was killed, and so also were ten Fingoes, while eleven were badly wounded. The whole settlement having been plundered and nearly four hundred cattle driven off, the assailants withdrew to their own country. Shortly after receiving the news of this affair the Lieutenant-Governor went to Fort Peddie to interview the chiefs whose people had taken part in this murderous onslaught. He met them on the 6th. It then transpired that a Fingo, who had had two of his cattle stolen by some Kaffirs, saw these two animals some days afterwards among a number of Kaffir cattle. He took them, telling the Kaffir herd that he was not stealing them, but merely recovering his own property. All were most apologetic to the Lieutenant-Governor, and, disclaiming any participation in the affairs, made Seyolo the scape-goat. Umkye, in whom the Lieutenant-Governor seemed to have every confidence, said that this was no affair of the great chiefs—they knew nothing about it—that Seyolo was a headstrong young man, and had done this thing without consulting

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his elders, as he should have done. All this was followed by many protestations of loyalty and determination to abide by the treaty. In the end it was decided that as Seyolo was a Ndhambi, the great chief Umhala should be held responsible for making due compensation to the Fingoes. After some days Seyolo sent thirty-nine, and Umhala thirty-five, of the poorest Kaffirland cattle to Peddie, as full payment for the 370 taken away, as well as for the destruction of the gardens and other property. With this the Lieutenant-Governor expressed himself as perfectly satisfied, and considered it an earnest of their sincerity to behave fairly and honestly. In truth it was a demonstration of his inability to enforce the provisions of his treaty. Sir B. Durban's view of the matter is expressed in his letter, of October 3rd, to the Lieutenant-Governor. He said: "I am led to understand that Your Honour considers these proceedings . . . as having offered an adequate satisfaction for the wrongs done to the Colony by the tribes of Seyolo and Eno . . . and as having, accordingly, afforded sufficient atonement to vindicate the insulted dignity of Her Majesty, whose troops have been attacked, one of Her subjects murdered, and Her royal safeguard, in the person of Her accredited resident agent, defied and set at naught—to indemnify the native tribe, living under our avowed protection, for their brethren wantonly slain, and their flocks and herds plundered by these Kaffirs, and to secure the colonists themselves from similar outrages. If this be Your Honour's opinion, as I gather that it is, I regret that I cannot concur in it, nor regard the system, to the working of which you attribute these results, with a satisfaction at all equal to that which it appears to have afforded Your Honour."

Quite apart from such affairs as this, the Fingoes were a difficult people to deal with. Even under a wiser government than that of Captain Stockenstrom, they would have given much trouble. Whether it was that the freedom under which they had lived in Natal still influenced them, or whether they were constitutionally obstinate or unable to realise or appreciate the measures for their protection and well-being which were instituted, it is certain that, by their own actions, they invited much of the suffering which overtook them. They wandered and settled down for a time in any part of the country they

chose, ignoring the rights of other natives and very soon coming in conflict with them. As cattle herds or servants to the farmers in the Colony they were found to be unsatisfactory, remaining for but a short time and then wandering, without passes, into other districts, and grazing their cattle on the limited pastures of others. Regardless of the fact that the Kaffirs looked down upon them as "dogs," and entertained a jealousy and spite in consequence of their being under special British protection, they seem, at times, to have gone out of their way to give them offence. Hence, as Captain Stockenstrom said, there was little likelihood of peace while they were so near the Kaffirs, and he wished there were 200 miles of country between the two races.

In July, 1837, the time arrived when the Fingoes, who were living on the Gaga and Chumie lands, were to move out and make way for Gaika Kaffirs. Some six weeks had been necessary to convince them that they had to go. The intention of the authorities was to settle them down with the other Fingoes at Peddie, and thus reinforce Umhlambiso and the other Fingo chiefs at that place. But to Peddie they determinedly refused to go. With their cattle, goats, and household valuables they moved off slowly in the direction of the Katberg. They divided into two parties. One, consisting of about 300 individuals, made its way as far as Mapassa's place, near the present town of Queenstown. Here for a time they settled and acknowledged Mapassa as their chief. But the inevitable quarrels with the Tambookies soon arose, and Mapassa was obliged to send messengers to the Colony asking to have them removed. The other and larger party went to the Kat River Settlement, where the Lieutenant-Governor would not permit them to remain, as that place was too near to Kaffirland. In August, therefore, Colonel England, with sixty soldiers of the 75th Regiment, left Fort Beaufort to escort these people to Peddie. Some 1,200 of these half-naked people, with great droves of animals, cattle, and goats, were with difficulty got into a straggling procession and conducted along the main road from Balfour to Fort Beaufort. They were, during the whole journey, in dread of Kaffirs; perhaps with some reason, for there were indications of intended attacks upon the cattle by these people. When these outcasts

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arrived on the flat lands at the Lower Blinkwater, their further course lay through the "Blinkwater Poort," a road about a mile long between high hills covered with bush. It then became known that Kaffirs were waiting for them in that place, and that their passage through would be disputed. Colonel England, therefore, sent for the great chief, Maqomo, telling him to come and insist upon the Kaffirs refraining from molesting the Fingoes. Maqomo behaved well. With Colonel England and an escort of seventeen cavalry, he rode through the Poort, ordered away the Kaffirs, and thus cleared the passage.

During the time the wretched Fingoes had been waiting for Maqomo, perhaps a day or so, they kept up a war-dance in order to maintain their courage at the pitch necessary to make an attack on the Kaffirs. When the path was free from danger, however, their courage must have waned, for they could not be persuaded to go through, and, in spite of the coercion of the soldiers, they made their way to Fort Beaufort by a circuitous route.

The difficulty of getting them as far as Fort Beaufort was small compared with that of moving them from that place. They had a most extraordinary dread of Fort Peddie. It is not clear that the Seyolo affair had anything to do with it. The only reason for their dislike of that place, which could be elicited from them, was that they believed the waters of the Chusie (Igqushwa) were bewitched, and that—referring to the dysentery which had broken out among them when they first went there—they would all die if they touched them. Their horror of Peddie must have been very real, for they refused to go any farther, but sat down in groups and howled; "the women giving vent to their grief in the most saddening tears and lamentations, sufficient to move the most hard-hearted soldier present".¹ The experiment of driving away their cattle from them was tried, but showing no concern, they simply remained motionless, crying and moaning; they said they preferred to die where they were rather than at Peddie. In the end their objection seems to have been met by taking them on to the Tzitzikamma, a region between Humansdorp

¹Letter from Captain Armstrong, J.P., at Fort Beaufort, to H. Hudson, August 21st.



FORT THOMSON (NEAR ALICE)

and George, nearly 200 miles from the Kaffirland frontier. This proved a most unsatisfactory location. Attempts were made to get these Fingoes to move still more to the west, even as far as the Cape Peninsula, and to find them work, but they would not; they wished, instead, to go to the country beyond the Orange River. In the hopes that a permanent settlement might be formed at the Tzitzikamma, a large tract of land or "Institution" called Clarkson, was allotted to them. But it was a failure. So also was the attempt to get them all to settle down at Peddie. They were a restless, wandering people and gave almost as much trouble as avowed enemies.

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As the first year of Captain Stockenstrom's rule as Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province was drawing to a close, the time was arriving when it was fit and proper that he should give to Lord Glenelg some account of his stewardship during that time. To that end he deemed it expedient to have conferences with the principal Kaffir chiefs and their councillors, in order to discuss the events of the period, to learn the opinions of the Kaffirs with respect to the new order of things, to hear any disputes, and to renew the engagements with them.

On October 15th, accompanied by Sir John Wylde, the Chief Justice, Captain Stockenstrom met a large concourse of the Gaika clans, on the flat ground on which Fort Thomson stands. In his address to them, he upbraided them for the depredations committed by their people, and told them that if they drove him to it, he was prepared to make war upon them. The chiefs in reply professed their innocence and ignorance of the ill-doings of their followers, but acknowledged that there were thieves among the black as there were among the white people. Presents of saddles and bridles having been given to the important chiefs, and some cattle killed to provide a feed of beef for the adherents, all ended happily. Although all the Kaffirs were armed, the visitors said they felt as safe as if they had been in London. The Chief Justice declared that he was delighted at having been surrounded by so many armed barbarians, and to have been permitted to leave with a whole skin. That alone spoke volumes for the Stockenstrom policy!

On November 15th, a similar meeting was held with the

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Ndhlambi and Dushani clans, at Line Drift, on the Keiskamma River. The Lieutenant-Governor was accompanied by Colonel Peddie and a few other officers. About 1,500 natives, armed with assegais and muskets, collected under the leaderships of Umhala, Umkye, Eno, Seyolo, and some lesser lights. The whole arrayed in karosses, red clay, or their native nothingness, squatted upon the ground. In addressing them the Lieutenant-Governor told them that a year ago they had military posts in their country, but these had been removed as the King thought he could treat with the Kaffirs as reasonable and honest people. "The treaty," he continued, "had been in existence a year, and who could say so much of it had been broken?" (measuring off the tip of his finger). It had been shown that a serious affair (referring to Seyolo's attack upon the Fingoes) could be settled without recourse to arms, and, in short, that the treaty had inaugurated a reign of peace and happiness. There had been nothing to complain of, he stated, but a few petty thefts. The chiefs were then asked to say anything they wished. Umhala expressed his thanks, and said he was glad to enjoy his country and his laws. Seyolo also thanked the Lieutenant-Governor, and added that they were great thieves and had been so from their youth up, but His Honour must not get tired of going to them and telling them of their sins. With the usual distribution of bridles and saddles and beef the meeting ended.¹

The Lieutenant-Governor professed to regard these meetings as most satisfactory, and to give indications of a right and proper spirit on the part of the natives with respect to the peace of the frontier. Further assurance of the happy state of affairs at the end of this year were to be found in the reports of the Resident Agents in Kaffirland, which, as has been

¹ The Lieutenant-Governor lost no opportunity of conciliating the Kaffir chiefs. He welcomed them to his house in Grahamstown and had them to sit at his table with him. They seem on these occasions, however, to have put off the kaross or blanket and donned the clothes he provided for them. In the accounts of the period, we find that J. Hart was paid £4 14s. 6d. for waggon hire to convey Gaika chiefs to Grahamstown. Webber & Co. were paid £5 5s. for clothing for the chief Stock. £10 was given for a horse for Botman. C. Fuller was paid £67 19s. 9d. for presents for Ndhlambi and Fingo chiefs. Umhala was delighted with his visit to Grahamstown; he said he had not been there since he helped to attack it in 1819, but even then he did not visit it—as circumstances over which *he* had no control prevented it.

pointed out, had been for the most part satisfactory, having been in terms of "no reports of thefts this month," "all quiet on the frontier"; and his own statement in his despatch to Lord Glenelg, of December 18th, 1837, that the total claim of the Colony on Kaffirland was limited to six horses and thirty-five cattle, for all of which compensation was to be made, completed a picture of good order and quietness such as the Colony had never known!

Captain Stockenstrom was so emphatic on the innocence of the Kaffirs and the falsity of the charges of theft brought against them, while the colonists were equally emphatic in their contradiction of these statements, that it is a difficult matter to learn whom to believe. Fortunately for the historian the puzzle was solved by the action of the new Governor, Sir George Napier, in 1838. That able man determined to discover the truth of these conflicting charges by a process so obvious that it is a matter of surprise that it did not occur either to Sir B. Durban or Captain Stockenstrom. It was to insist upon the Civil Commissioners keeping careful records of all aggressions of one party on the other, and to send these to Government as monthly returns. They were enlightening. The table on next page shows the thefts of horses and cattle, not including sheep, from March 1st, 1838, to August 31st, 1839. It shows clearly who were the aggressors and the annual loss sustained by the farmers.

Yet while losses at this same rate must have been going on during 1837, Captain Stockenstrom could write to Lord Glenelg on December 18th: "This then, Sir, is the state of the case" (referring to the six horses and thirty-five cattle) "which I would just request the Secretary of State to cause to be compared with the disgraceful fabrications which are incessantly propagated as to the ruinous depredations daily perpetrated by Caffres upon the Colonists. However, the objects of these false alarms and that agitation are now so well understood that they have ceased to dupe the most ignorant. The agitators themselves begin to despair of reproducing disturbance and dividing among themselves the Caffre country up to the Kei; even the hopes which were founded upon the collision between the Caffres and the Fingoes during last August have died away . . . the predictions about

CHAP. RETURN OF CATTLE AND HORSES STOLEN BY THE KAFFIRS FROM THE FRONTIER
IX. COLONISTS DURING THE "PEACE". COMPILED FROM THE OFFICIAL RETURNS
Published by Government.

	Reclaimable under Treaty of Dec., 1836.					Not Reclaimable under the Treaty.				
	Stolen.			Recovered.		Stolen.			Recovered.	
	Separate Acts of Robbery.	Cattle.	Horses.	Cattle.	Horses.	Separate Acts of Robbery.	Cattle.	Horses.	Cattle.	Horses.
March 1—May 31, 1838	24	423	19	236	11	109	549	167	89	16
June 1—Aug. 31 . . .	27	141	23	63	9	45	211	75	—	—
Sept. 1—Nov. 30 . . .	22	76	21	66	24	47	134	88	17	4
Dec. 1, 1837—Feb. 28, 1839	22	79	40	47	22	39	131	67	—	22
March 1—May 31 . . .	25	150	35	160	75	44	229	109	24	10
June 1—Aug. 31 . . .	23	157	37	91	10	64	279	75	68	4
	143	1026	175	663	151	348	1533	581	198	56
	Total separate acts of robbery						Stolen	Cattle. 2559	Horses. 756	
							Recovered	861	207	
							Balance	1698	549	

the immediate war, then deemed unavoidable, have covered the prophets with ridicule and disgrace, and all the clamour which disappointment renders outrageous has for its object only to keep up a little excitement at a distance or to delude a few people in England, if possible." He had done his best to perform his duty but "from first to last my efforts to carry into effect the orders with which I had been honoured by His late Majesty were opposed and thwarted at every step; nothing that the most refined ingenuity could suggest was left untried to prevent my rescuing this part of the Colony from the most disgraceful state of confusion that ever dishonoured a civilised Government; and the Supreme Government was held up as a fit object of hatred and contempt to the ignorant mass, who was thus led to consider resistance to the laws acts of patriotism".

Thus the year 1837 ended with mutual hatred and distrust

between the Lieutenant-Governor and those he governed. It had commenced as soon as his appointment was known and increased in intensity as the year progressed. He seems to have had no friends¹ and to have wanted none, but to have regarded all, including military officers, with sovereign contempt. As his voluminous correspondence shows, even the cautious and benevolent Sir Benjamin Durban did not escape his frowns and displeasure.

Among those who had sad experience of the working of his treaty were two military officers, Captain Nicholson and Lieut. Moultrie, who were on leave from India. Lieut. Moultrie had been at the Cape previously for the purpose of big game hunting, and had returned with his friend for further sport of that nature. They appear to have bought a waggon, span of oxen, and other necessaries for a trip inland, and having started from Grahamstown and outspanned for the first night, they found, on wishing to continue the journey on the next morning, that the oxen were gone. The spoor indicated that they had been driven in the direction of the Fish River and thus towards Kaffirland. Steps were taken to recover them, but in the end the officers discovered that the provisions of the treaty had not been observed, and thus the oxen had become irreclaimable and the rightful property of the Kaffirs who had stolen them. It is not clear whether other oxen were obtained and the journey continued, but it is clear that these two officers from this time forth became thorns in the side of the Lieutenant-Governor. Captain Nicholson wielded a facile pen and wrote a series of open letters to him in the *Grahamstown Journal* under the name of "Aquila". They were clever productions which, in a semi-humorous but biting manner, expressed the sentiments of the people with regard to the Lieutenant-Governor and his administration of the province. At a later date (1838) the two brought out a series of cartoons illustrating the "Life of our L——t G——r," painted by the artist F. J. J'Ons and published in London. In these the eagle (Aquila) represents Captain Nicholson and the rhinoceros Lieutenant Moultrie.

These officers, however, were by no means the only individuals who satirised Capt. Stockenstrom. There was a con-

¹ Dr. Ambrose George Campbell and Rev. Mr. Heavyside perhaps excepted.

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The object of his despatch of December 18th seems to have been to show to Lord Glenelg how satisfactorily the treaty was working, and what a conscienceless community the Europeans were. No mention is made of any real progress which had been effected in the Eastern Province. True it is there had not been much; but one measure, at least, due to the Lieutenant-Governor is worthy of special note, and one for which he deserves every credit. At the time of his appointment there were, in the whole of the Eastern Province, only three full magistracies, namely, Uitenhage with a Justice of Peace at Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown with subordinate officials at the small villages of Somerset East and Cradock, for the then huge district of Albany, and the magistracy at Graaff Reinet.

Quite apart from the complaints of the Boers, it was clear that so vast an area of country could not be efficiently controlled in this manner. Most probably, in consequence of his investigation during the tour he made through the country shortly after his arrival, he proposed to the Governor, in October, 1836, that three new districts should be created, each with its own full magistracy and police establishment. They were to be Port Elizabeth, Cradock, and Colesberg. Port Elizabeth was at that time rising in commercial importance and had become almost as large as Uitenhage, and being the port for the East, some official invested with greater authority than a mere Justice of Peace was absolutely necessary. Under the 33rd Ordinance, Sir B. Durban could appoint a magistrate straight away. This was done, and a Mr. J. G. de Villiers became the first Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate. In the cases of Cradock and Colesberg an Ordinance passed the Legislative Council on February 2nd, 1837, when in the

His Honor entertaining Macomo and Tyali. - Frontier Policy.



W.P. Matthews
 From the front of the
 "The American"
 1878

Macomo and Tyali
 are the only two
 who are not
 afraid of the
 white man's
 gun.

Let me drink you
 good health
 and prosperity.

Tyali

"Beasts of each kind their fellows spare,
 Bear lives in amity with bear."—JUVENAL

former Mr. W. Gilfillan and in the latter Mr. Fleetwood Rawstone became the respective heads of those districts, and the boundaries of the districts were defined. Further, in July, a large portion of the northern part of Albany was cut off and became the district of Somerset, also with its own magistracy. Thus the Eastern Province then comprised the districts of Albany, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Somerset, Colesberg, and Graaff Reinet.

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During this year also the township of Fort Beaufort was laid out. Though established as a military post in 1822, it had not, in 1837, got much beyond the actual fort—all of which has now disappeared—the commissariat buildings, officers' quarters and a few tradesmen's houses. In June, 1837, Captain Armstrong, the resident J.P., instructed Mr. Land Surveyor Rex to plan out a town. This was done, and the plan being approved by the Surveyor-General, Charles Michel, a number of plots were granted to people who had already built.¹ In 1843 eighty-four plots of land were sold; some substantial buildings were commenced, including a church and school, and thus Fort Beaufort as a more purely civil residential place became established. More than this, the importance and dignity, and perhaps promise of great things in the future, was marked, at this time, by the possession of a Government House or residence (temporary) for the Lieutenant-Governor. It was the building which had belonged to the mess of the Cape Corps. Having served in course of time as a temporary lock-up, an Episcopal Church, a tailor's shop, and a regimental schoolroom, a sum of £101 16s. transformed it finally into a Government Residency. It is not clear, however, that it was often used as such.

Besides the increase in law and order which was brought about at this time by the establishment of additional magistracies, there was the further development of the towns, such as they were, by the creation of elective Municipal Councils, or Municipal Boards. Up to this time there were no local

¹ They were: W. Graham, Lt. Donovan, W. Sands, C. Holliday, B. Rorke, J. Austen, E. Harris, T. Foden, G. McKay, R. Featherstone, C. Stone, C. Jansen, J. Whybrew, and — Clarke. Also the following, who were about to build: Capt. Aitchison, Dr. Parrot, — Bovey, — Rolman, W. R. Thompson. These, therefore, were the first inhabitants of Fort Beaufort town.

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authorities whose special duty it was to see to the improvements of the town or to regulate the general life of the place. The making and repairing of streets, the abatement of nuisances, and other matters relating to well-ordered town life were nobody's business. The "opgaaf," or tax on property, went into the Treasury, and from that source all monies for local necessities had to be obtained. The taxpayer had little or no voice in the expenditure of the revenue to which he had contributed.

In February, 1836, the Governor submitted a draft Ordinance for the establishment of Municipal Boards to the inhabitants of Port Elizabeth in order to ascertain how far such a measure would be applicable to that place; and on August 15th of that year, an Ordinance passed the Legislative Council authorising the "Creation of Municipal Boards in the towns and villages of the Colony, on which the local regulations of each shall be founded". A special Ordinance was then necessary to apply this to any particular town.

Beaufort West was the first place to take advantage of this (Jan., 1837). In April the Ordinance authorising the Municipal Board for Grahamstown was passed, and about the same time George, Somerset East, and Cradock took upon themselves the management of their own affairs. Uitenhage followed in 1841.

In accordance with this, seven commissioners were appointed and formed what may be called the first Town Council¹ of Grahamstown. The first meeting was held in a room in a small inn called "Beales' Hotel," but afterwards in one of the rooms of the Commercial Hall. On February 7th, 1838, a meeting of the inhabitants was held for the purpose of assessing a rate for the current year under this Ordinance, when, the rateable property being valued at £12,000, a six-penny rate was imposed.

Grahamstown did not get municipal regulations before they were required. The streets were little more than the tracks worn by the ox-waggon traffic, and the drifts over the waterless streams which crossed them at places were deep and

¹They were: W. R. Thompson, G. Gilbert, P. W. Lucas, B. Norden, G. Jarvis, T. Hewson, and W. Shepherd. J. Latham was appointed Town Clerk at £80 per annum.

dangerous. At night there was no lighting whatever, if one
excepts the tallow candle which was kept in the window of a
house at a certain corner¹ where the descent to the "river"
was more than usually dangerous. The butchers slaughtered
their cattle on the veld, either at the back or at the side
of their premises, and left, or placed, the offal where it became
a great nuisance, and seems to have given rise to many un-
availing complaints. Wild dogs and jackals were thereby
attracted, the howling of which in the streets on a pitch-dark
night was no uncommon occurrence. The "penny soup
canteens," where a glass of vile brandy was within the reach of
any Hottentot who possessed a penny, disgraced some of the
streets, and the occasional constable, though frequently sober,
was not a reassuring guarantee of public order and decency.

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There were some special features of Grahamstown life at
this time which happily are no more, but which were within the
memory of the oldest inhabitants who have died during this
young century. Perhaps the public flogging of soldiers on the
Drostdy ground and the ceremony of drumming out of the
army stood out as prominently in the recollection of the
grandparents of the present generation as did the periodical
killing of stray dogs, the illicit traffic in guns and gunpowder,
the doctors' quarrels, and other human and inhuman affairs
which varied the metropolitan life of the Eastern Province at
that date.

The public military flogging was carried out as follows :
A large wooden equilateral triangle of about seven or eight
feet altitude and having a number of horizontal and upright
bars joining the opposite sides, forming a kind of large grating,
was stood upright on one edge. When a punishment was
about to take place, this triangle was fixed on the ground a
little in front of the present Drostdy House. Near by stood
an officer, the doctor, and a man holding the "cat-o'-nine-tails,"
near whom stood a pail of salt water. A large number of
soldiers standing in two ranks about eight feet apart and facing
each other formed a passage leading up to the triangle. Be-
hind the soldiers stood the general public. The batch of men
to be flogged—it may have been half a dozen—were marched

¹ Shepherd's "lighthouse" at the corner of Hill Street and Dundas Street,
near the present Albany Hall.

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from the prison, escorted by soldiers with fixed bayonets up the passage and halted near the triangle. Each one was then stripped to the waist and had his hands and feet tied to the triangle so as to expose his back. The "cat" having been dipped in the salt water and given three deft flourishes in the air, was brought down upon the naked back. The normal number of lashes was thirty-nine (i.e. forty, save one), but in many cases the number far exceeded this. The flogging ended, the bleeding back was washed with the salt water, and the prisoner was then released and conducted back to prison. In cases where the wretched individual showed signs of collapse under the punishment, the doctor stopped the flogging. They were European soldiers who were treated in this manner.

The spectacle of drumming out of the army was less brutal and somewhat amusing. Soldiers were formed up on three sides of a hollow square—with the opening opposite to the entrance to the Drostdy ground. The drum and fife band would be waiting in the square. The individual who was to be degraded wore his uniform, but the attachments of all the buttons, facings, or other ornaments were cut partly through. He was marched up to the square where certain soldiers were told off to go up to him and pull off all his buttons and ornaments. The drums and fifes then struck up the "Rogues' March," and followed him while he marched back to the entrance to Drostdy ground. There he received some parting kicks from men stationed there for that purpose.

But of all the public displays which seem to have charmed many of the inhabitants in those days, the most revolting was that of the hanging of criminals in the open street. Before 1838 this took place on the outskirts of the town, near where the railway station now is, but after that date the hideous ceremony was performed *outside* the jail in Somerset Street, the staging and gallows being erected as occasion required. These public warnings to evil-doers, for such they were intended to be, were discontinued after 1863.

The uncertainty and anxiety with respect to the attitude of the British Government which had existed in the Colony ever since the termination of the war, and the hoping against hope for better times and amelioration of the harassed life in spite of the disposition of Captain Stockenstrom, reached a

climax at the end of this year, 1837, when it became known that the benevolent and idolised Sir Benjamin Durban was to be dismissed from his high office of Governor of the Colony. Towards the end of November, the Governor received a long despatch from Downing Street, dated May 1st, 1837, in reply to his outspoken and uncompromising defence of himself and the colonists, with its many enclosures of the previous June 9th. In reading through this long document, one becomes more and more prepared for the apology with which it seems fitting it should end—but this expectation is met by surprise and disappointment. Lord Glenelg acknowledged that some of the topics on which there had been differences of opinion between himself and Sir Benjamin Durban had been reduced to insignificance by the explanations given in the Governor's despatch of June 9th. He withdrew his charges of Sir Benjamin having been actuated by revenge in his warfare against the Kaffirs, and also of using forces which were in excess of the necessities of the case. He admitted that Hintza deserved the fate which overtook him, but he deplored the mutilation of his body, though he exculpated the Southeys (George and William) of all complicity in it; and he gratefully acknowledged the services which had been rendered to His Majesty's Government by Colonel Smith. In answer to the Governor's accusation of his having listened to and having placed reliance on anonymous information in preference to official despatches, Lord Glenelg gave his denial, though he admitted that he had certainly received and perused with attention documents submitted to him by various individuals, "amongst which were some communications from Dr. Philip to private friends, or to the London Missionary Society," but he deliberately laid them aside, he said, as documents on which it was not fit that the measures of His Majesty's Government should to any extent be formed. He disclaimed having questioned the veracity of the Governor, but had formed his opinions on the evidence laid before him, on which he had a right to form an independent judgment. "Finally," he continues, "there are in your despatch of the 9th of June last, several passages which I will not transcribe nor make the subject of any particular comment. They involve imputations on me which carry with them, as I think, their own refutation; I will only say of them

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that they were not provoked by any failure on my part in the respect and courtesy towards you which duty, as well as inclination, required me to maintain. I regret, and not for my sake alone, that these passages were ever penned, and still more, that having been penned, the deliberation of six months did not lead you to soften and moderate expressions dictated by the first vehemence of excited feelings. I regret further that not only in these passages, but throughout your despatch of the 9th of June, you have departed from the tone and temper which ought to characterise the intercourse of public functionaries engaged in the service of their common sovereign. This, I repeat, is to me a matter of real concern, because, honouring as I do your name and distinguished services, it was my hope that, notwithstanding our differences of opinion on some points, I might continue to enjoy your assistance and co-operation in the government of the Colony over which you preside. . . . But my hopes and expectations, whatever they may have been, are finally closed by that communication. You have indeed left me no alternative, and I have felt myself constrained to represent to His Majesty the impossibility of your continuing with me in the relations which we have hitherto held towards each other. To this representation His Majesty has been pleased to give his attention, and it is now my painful duty to inform you that His Majesty thinks proper to dispense with your services as Governor of the Cape. You will, therefore, consider yourself as holding the government of the Colony until you shall be relieved by a successor.

“I have, etc.,

“GLENELG.”

CHAPTER X.

THE END OF THE STOCKENSTROM REGIME.

THE officer who was chosen to succeed Sir Benjamin Durban as Governor of the Colony and Commander-in-Chief was Major-General George Thomas Napier, C.B. He was a soldier who had seen much active service, having served under the famous Sir John Moore in Sicily, Sweden, and Portugal ; he had taken part in the Peninsula campaigns of 1809-11, and was at the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812, when he lost his right arm. He retired from the army in 1821, but did not take up any civilian duties until he was appointed to the Cape at this time. With his ideas of rigid discipline and implicit obedience, and with a brusqueness of manner which, at times, amounted almost to rudeness, it was doubtful how far such a character was likely to create the order and happiness the country so needed ; more especially when it is taken into account that his mind was biassed against the colonists, and that it was his avowed intention to maintain the Glenelg policy and support Captain Stockenstrom.

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He arrived in Cape Town on January 21st, 1838, accompanied by his wife, two sons and two daughters. He himself had barely recovered from an injury he sustained on the voyage. One of his sons fell overboard, and in the attempt—presumably successful—to save him, he “ received a severe contusion ”.

Barely a month had elapsed between the arrival of the new Governor and the surprise and shock the country sustained by the receipt of the news of Sir Benjamin’s recall. The prospect of his speedy retirement was regarded as a public misfortune, and meetings were convened for the purpose of giving expression to this opinion and of framing addresses to him. Nor was it in the Colony only that indignation at this procedure of Lord Glenelg found vent. *The United Service*

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Gazette of October 7th, 1837, expected that, as not one of Lord Glenelg's allegations had been founded on fact, an apology to Sir Benjamin Durban would have followed, "but now the insult and persecution of which he has been the object, have been succeeded by his recall". *The London Times*, of October 4th, was of opinion that Sir Benjamin Durban's rule had been one of continued efficiency, humanity, and kindness, and that "we know of no one who could with more truth adopt the expression 'My life is my reply'. No reasonable cause can be assigned for this wanton exercise of power on the part of Lord Glenelg, and in the absence of such we must attribute it to a paltry feeling of annoyance and irritation produced by the castigation which we and others felt it our duty to administer to the somnolent lord on the first publication of his intemperate and ungracious communication. We have authority for stating that the subject of this dismissal will be brought before Parliament in all its bearings, as the inevitable consequence of one of the most unpopular among the silly measures of the Minister who has too long been permitted to direct the Colonial portion of the Empire."

Among the more tangible expressions of esteem and gratitude which the late Governor received, was a service of silver plate costing nearly a thousand pounds. This was subscribed for by the whole Colony. After his dismissal he did not leave the Colony, but seems to have settled down in it as his home. He eventually left in 1846, when he became Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in North America, and died in Montreal in 1849.

After remaining a few weeks in Cape Town, General Napier left, on March 22nd, for the Eastern Province where his presence was more necessary.¹ There was considerable misgiving as to what his attitude towards the colonists would be, for, appointed as he had been by the Secretary of State who had dismissed Sir B. Durban, and, it having become known that he (Napier) had made public statements in England which showed that his sympathies were with those who, inadvert-

¹ Extract from a letter of Donald Moodie in Cape Town to his brother Ben in Grahamstown: "Before you get this it will have pretty generally transpired here that the main object of the Governor's visit is to hold a Court of Inquiry by order of the Secretary of State into the truth of the affidavits".

ently, were doing so much harm in the country, the immediate prospect of more happy circumstances was not very bright. Addresses of welcome and congratulation, to which he replied, met him along his route. But it was not until he laid open his mind in answer to the address which was presented to him at Port Elizabeth that it became clear what his policy was to be. He said: "Gentlemen, you say in that address that you consider it a duty you owe to yourselves and your families, to submit to me in respectful but *decided* language the grievances under which you are labouring, and which are fast tending to depopulate this once flourishing province; and then you enter into a general and vague charge against the policy of the measures pursued by the Government, and particularly against the treaties with the Kaffir tribes. Now, gentlemen, I *decidedly* tell you, that I accepted the government of this Colony in the conviction that the former system, as regarded our Kaffir neighbours, was erroneous; and I am come out here agreeing in, and determined to support the system of policy pursued by the Lieutenant-Governor of these districts, in accordance with the instructions which His Honour and myself have received from Her Majesty's Secretary of State. To that opinion, and in that determination, I still adhere." With regard to the alleged insufficiency of the number of troops for the defence of the frontier, he held himself to be a competent judge "without the assistance or opinions of the gentlemen who signed the address".

And in answer to the Albany address: "Her Majesty's Ministers have fully approved of all His Honour has done, and Her Majesty has ratified these treaties. I have been appointed to the government of this Colony . . . to give every support to the Lieutenant-Governor in his views and measures, and, above all, to see that strict adherence to his treaties is maintained by the Kaffirs as well as by the colonists. I have, therefore, determined to support His Honour's measures with all my power, and to the best of my judgment and ability." This, then, was the new Governor's attitude of mind when entering upon his office. He was, however, actuated by a sense of justice, and though somewhat dogmatic in his public utterances, he was not entirely impregnable to evidence which ran counter to his preconceived ideas. Hence, before he left

CHAP. the Colony he saw good reason to speak very differently of
X. the Stockenstrom treaties, and to alter the opinions he had held in England with regard to the colonists and Kaffirs.

Although he had been warned, on February 21st, by Captain Stockenstrom that "there will be desperate attempts made at agitation in consequence of Your Excellency's arrival and some other circumstances of late occurrence with a view to deceive you," the Governor, within a day or so after his arrival in Grahamstown must have had his first doubts awakened as to the truth of Stockenstrom's allegations of "fabrications" on the part of the colonists. Circumstances at this time showed that the alarms and rumours of conspiracy between the Hottentots and Kaffirs were anything but false, and called upon him, almost as his first duty, to superintend, with some pomp and ceremony, the public execution of two soldiers of the Hottentot Corps. The necessary investigation into the conduct of these two men and others showed that, again, great danger had been threatening the frontier, and that the Lieutenant-Governor's faithful, devoted, and present-laden Kaffir chiefs were implicated. About this time, too, native servants were suddenly leaving their employers for no assignable reasons, and Kaffirs, in twos and threes, were known to arrive at farms at night time and leave before morning—signs which betokened that some mischief was brewing in Kaffirland.

It appeared that there had been considerable treasonable talk and negotiation between one Meyers, a corporal in the Hottentot Corps, and the Kaffir chief, Umkye. According to the evidence taken at the court martial on the ringleaders and the dying confessions of those who were executed in connection with this, Umkye and Meyers had discussed the possibility of the Kaffirs and Hottentots combining and murdering all the Europeans upon the frontier, capturing all the Eastern Province towns, and carrying on their ravages as far as the town of George. Elaborate details for the attack on Grahamstown from different points simultaneously were arranged, wanting only some information with regard to the position of the powder magazine and the number and positions of the cannon. To supply this Umkye visited the town, and while he was the guest of the Lieutenant-Governor, he seems to have assured himself on these matters. The success of the scheme was to

depend upon the unanimity of the Hottentot soldiers, who were to make the first move, and then having gained the upper hand, the Kaffirs were to join them. Maqomo and Tyali were said to be willing to co-operate as soon as they saw that the Hottentots "would not cheat them," as they had done at the beginning of the '35 war. CHAP.
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Meyers and Umkye had been busily engaged for some time, probably months, in visiting the soldiers at the different posts and urging upon them to take their part in the proposed rebellion. Hence the rumours, already referred to, which alarmed the Boer Scheepers and which Captain Stockenstrom spoke of as the wicked machinations of "designing speculators in confusion". In February, 1838, Colonel Somerset and some other officers had suspicions that there was something wrong among the Cape Corps men at Fort Peddie. On Sunday, the 19th, therefore, a small party of the 72nd Regiment under Ensign Frazer was sent from Grahamstown to that fort in order to escort back some of the younger men and recruits. On Monday twenty of these commenced the return march and halted for the night at Frazer's camp, a small military post about twenty-five miles from Grahamstown. About ten o'clock that night, when the officers were sitting round the table in the mess room, a musket was fired through one of the windows and an Ensign Crowe was killed.

This was followed by a general volley at the windows, but no one further was hurt. The officers and men of the 72nd then rushed out to save the ammunition and seize the mutineers, but all had disappeared. This removal of the twenty men from Fort Peddie on that Monday was a most fortunate circumstance, for on that night, with their assistance, the outbreak was to have commenced. It had been arranged that an outbuilding was to be set on fire, and during the confusion which would ensue in the endeavours to extinguish the flames, the large body of Kaffirs, which was already in hiding at only about 300 yards from the fort, was to rush on and, joining the Hottentots, murder all the Europeans. Messrs. Bowker and Ross were to receive the special distinction of being cut into riems. But the departure of the twenty frustrated the plans for that night. The next day Meyers was arrested, and within

CHAP. X. a short time all the mutineers were in custody.¹ They were brought to trial, and two of them, Meyers and Windvogel, were condemned to death. The execution took place on April 21st. The ceremony and display attending it were worthy of Colonel Smith. The object was to make a public example of the fate which must be the result of treason and rebellion, and to deter others from the same evil courses. General Napier organised and personally superintended the whole affair. All soldiers, European as well as Hottentot, who could be spared having been assembled on the open Drostdy grounds, the two prisoners were brought forth, bound hand and foot and made to sit facing each other on two seats placed on an open waggon. A long procession then moved down the High Street of Grahamstown. First went the waggon, on each side of which Hottentot soldiers with fixed bayonets marched. Then followed the Governor accompanied by the members of his staff, and the rank and file of the Hottentot Corps and European soldiers. The solemn procession then moved towards the northern outskirts of the town² and halted near two open graves, each with a coffin beside it. The two prisoners having been taken from the waggon and blindfolded, knelt each beside his own coffin. At a distance stood thirty soldiers with loaded rifles. At the command a shuddering volley broke the stillness and the two men fell lifeless. The Hottentot soldiers were then made to march past in single file and view the still quivering bodies, and then having been addressed at some length by the Governor, the ceremony ended.

Against Umkye, who was most probably the chief instigator of the whole affair, no steps were taken. It seems to have been convenient to regard him as one who could not break a treaty—or, as Captain Stockenstrom put it, “one who could not drink wine at his table and at the same time act treacherously against his Queen”.

Among the surprises which overtook the new Governor as

¹ They were imprisoned in the Prevost at Grahamstown, which was then nearly finished. The work was hurried on to completion for the accommodation of these mutineers. So says Mr. Watson, an 1820 settler, who was engaged in the building operations.

² Near to where the pound now is.



SMILING KAFFIRS



THE OLD PREVOST, GRAHAMSTOWN

he became more and more acquainted with the state of affairs of the Eastern Province, the depopulation of the country by the Boers trekking northward was the first to engage his attention, almost to the extent of alarm. He realised that it was on a far larger scale and that it was a more serious matter than he had any idea of in England; he found it impossible to regard it with the indifference and unconcern which had characterised Captain Stockenstrom's attitude. He was disposed to put forth every endeavour to stop it. To this end he issued a notice in the *Gazette* of April 27th urging upon all Civil Commissioners, ministers of religion, and others to do their utmost to dissuade intending emigrants from moving; while he himself, in his subsequent travels in the country, sympathised with the farmers, telling them that he was determined at all hazard to compel the Kaffirs to observe the treaty, and where this was found to be objectionable and unworkable to recommend immediate amendment to the Home Government. And so soon as May 18th we find him writing to Lord Glenelg asking for compensation for the losses which the farmers had sustained, and pointing out the injustice of making them suffer because the system of government was faulty. Thus in the short space of a month his feelings towards the inhabitants had undergone a great change, and were a striking contrast to those he expressed in his answers to the Port Elizabeth and Albany addresses. This action of the Governor may have been spurred on by the fact that people were still moving out of the Colony, especially from the district of Graaff Reinet. Andreas Pretorius had returned from Natal in the previous January, and had brought glowing accounts of the country, and as he had performed the journey with a horse waggon in no more than seventeen days, all who heard of this were anxious to go there. In April, therefore, although the news of the murder of Retief and his party had come through, fourteen families with twenty-one waggons, about six hundred cattle, five thousand sheep, and seventy horses started for Natal.

During his lengthened stay of about six months in the Eastern Province, General Napier made himself well acquainted with the state of the country by travelling from place to place and having personal conferences with the farmers and Kaffir chiefs. He seems to have been impressed with the immensity

CHAP. of the Fish River bush and the difficulty, if not impossibility,
 X. of preventing it being the rendezvous of thieves ; he considered Stockenstrom's line of defence the worst possible, and far from agreeing with the Lieutenant-Governor as to the small number of troops necessary to maintain it, he, on July 12th, wrote to Lord Glenelg and asked that three regiments might be sent out with the least possible delay for the better protection of the frontier. On May 1st, accompanied by Captain Stockenstrom, he met the Ndhambi chiefs with about five hundred of their armed warriors at Fort Peddie. In spite of their violent onslaughts on, and robberies of, the Fingoes, in spite of Umkye's complicity in the plot to lay waste the frontier again, and their continual depredations, Captain Stockenstrom reiterated, in presence of the Governor, his belief that the Ndhambis had not broken the treaty.

A few weeks later General Napier, or Sir George Napier as he had now become, visited Maqomo and Tyali. He does not seem to have waited for any assurance that they had not broken the treaty, but addressed them in no uncertain terms on the assumption that they had. He told them he had come from England to see that the treaty was observed, and that his orders were to spare neither men nor money in the protection of the people ; although an old soldier he did not like war, yet if he were compelled to draw the sword, he would not sheath it again until the Gaikas were driven beyond the Bashee. Further, he told them that in the case of stolen cattle not being restored, he would send armed patrols to take them, as had been the case before the signing of the treaty.

On June 17th, the Governor was again at Fort Peddie, but this time it was to hear the appeal of the Gunukwebi chiefs, Pato and Kama, and their people for protection against the Gaikas. The old feud between these two tribes was as bitter as ever, and the peace between them which had been patched up in December, 1836, was not of such a nature as to debar the Gaikas from molesting these people if they chose to do so, more especially since the freedom they enjoyed under the Stockenstrom Treaty enabled them to do as they pleased in such matters. At that time an attack was feared, hence the appeal to the Governor. He promised them protection, and in the event of their being attacked, he gave them permis-

sion to cross the Fish River and to go into the Colony. Nothing happened, however, except that Mr. Bowker, the resident agent, who by means of his agents and spies had learnt what was intended, was severely reprimanded as an alarmist. CHAP.
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As has been mentioned, in order to accumulate some trustworthy information with respect to the causes of the prevailing turmoil and discontent, and to arrive at the truth of the conflicting statements regarding the culpability of the colonists and Kaffirs, Sir George Napier instituted the monthly returns of complaints of each party against the other and authorised their publication in the *Government Gazette*. These could not have commenced more opportunely, for during 1838 the Kaffirs had learnt the extent of the impunity which the treaty gave them to rob the farmers. And the passes to enter the Colony, which were so easily obtained from the diplomatic agents, enabled them to watch their opportunities and lay their plans. A perusal of these returns shows that not a single day passed without some robbery being committed, and often three or four are listed on the same day. The Lieutenant-Governor's own farm was robbed three times during this year. A Mr. Bear, of the Winterberg, lost 280 sheep at one time, while another farmer lost all the valuable pure bred sheep which he had imported from Australia. There was not one single instance of an aggression on Kaffir property by a colonist. This, in a small measure, was the investigation on the spot which was so much desired and which had been so uncompromisingly refused by Lord Glenelg. Sir George Napier was most certainly going in the wrong direction if it was still his intention to adhere to the policy which he had come to the Colony to maintain. How long he would have supported Stockenstrom or how long it would have been before that worthy relegated him to the class of "conspirators" and "fabricators" it is unnecessary to inquire, for a train of circumstances was developing which took Stockenstrom from office, and for a time removed him from the Colony altogether.

Besides the robberies, murders of Fingo and Hottentot herdsmen were no less frequent than they had been during the previous year. At times they were found dead with

CHAP. X. riems tightly drawn round their necks, showing that they had been taken unawares and strangled before the animals they were guarding were driven off. It was almost impossible for a waggon laden with merchandise to travel any long distance without being robbed, and all this in spite of the fact that on the estimates for this year, £1,500 appears for the support of the Kaffir police and £200 for presents to chiefs. Although in the lists of cases brought before the Judges on Circuit there were numerous records of punishments of Hottentots for theft and other crimes, there seems to be no record of a Kaffir being punished for anything. On the contrary, their misdeeds were significantly ignored. A farmer, Arends, for instance, caught a Kaffir in broad day stealing his cattle. He arrested him and brought him before the Justice of the Peace at Fort Beaufort, but, without any inquiry or evidence, he was simply liberated. The post-boy with letters for Grahamstown was stopped by Kaffirs near where Carlisle bridge now is. His horse was taken from him and he himself barely escaped murder. The matter was brought before the Civil Commissioner in Grahamstown but he refused to take the boy's deposition. No steps were taken to find and punish the murderer of the European soldier by Eno's people at Peddie; the same with two soldiers (Hottentots) murdered and mutilated near Committee's on the Fish River. It is true that in the case of another soldier shot at De Bruin's Drift, a reward of £15 was offered for the capture of the murderer, but nothing came of it.

But perhaps the most extraordinary case of deference of the authorities to the Kaffirs was that of old Mr. Carpenter of Fort Beaufort. Mr. Carpenter was an old man of sixty-four who had served in the '35 war and had received wounds from which he was still suffering. The Government allotted him a small piece of land on the outskirts of Fort Beaufort, on which he had built a house. By Stockenstrom's demarcation of the new boundary, this land became a part of Kaffirland—a part of Maqomo's territory, in fact. On complaining of this, Carpenter was told to cultivate friendly relations with Maqomo, and the better to accomplish this to pay the chief a trader's licence as a rent for the land. This Carpenter did, as the receipts for the money show. One night in May of

1838, he was awakened by the sound of a gun fired outside his house. On going out to see what had happened, he found his Fingo herd lying dead but no one else about. After firing a few shots over the cattle kraal to frighten off thieves, and, presumably, looking to the body of the dead Fingo, he returned to bed. The next day, Maqomo with a number of his followers went to Carpenter's house to inquire into the matter. Maqomo accused Carpenter of having committed the murder. Carpenter protested, stating that he was in bed when he heard the gun fired. "But who then did it?" asked Maqomo. "I do not know," replied Carpenter. "Then you must be the man," was Maqomo's logical reply. After a good deal of parley on these lines, Maqomo ordered his men to seize all Carpenter's property, a command which was obeyed with all alacrity. The house was ransacked and the waggon loaded up with household goods and tools, and, with Maqomo sitting on top, it was driven off. The old man himself was dragged along the ground for some distance and trampled upon. His old wife, mad with terror, fled to the Kat River, threw herself in and was drowned. But this was not the end of Carpenter's trouble. Some few weeks afterwards, Carpenter saw his waggon and oxen standing in a street in Fort Beaufort. He retook them and drove them to the house where he was living. A few hours later a military sentry was placed over it, and Carpenter found himself arrested for *stealing Maqomo's property*. In the Court Room at Fort Beaufort he was brought before the Justice of Peace, Mr. Cole, the diplomatic agent, Mr. C. L. Stretch, and Lieutenant-Colonel Grieve, the commandant of the Fort. The plaintiff, Maqomo, having stated his case, and witnesses on his behalf having been heard, Carpenter, under a military escort, was marched, or rather hobbled along, to the jail in Grahamstown—a distance of forty-six miles—taking four days on the journey. He was brought before the resident magistrate and liberated on bail. On December 14th, he reappeared before the Grahamstown magistrate, having had again to walk from Fort Beaufort. It then appeared that the Attorney-General, to whom the preliminary examination had been referred, declined to prosecute. On the 24th, he was again brought up before the magistrate for the final hearing of the case. After the Clerk of the Peace,

CHAP. X. as prosecutor, had made a great display of his legal knowledge and decided, to his own satisfaction at least, what constituted riots, routs, and illegal assemblies, and having shown the danger which might accrue to the Colony by such acts as those of Carpenter against a personage of Maqomo's rank and importance, the magistrate decided that though there had been no breach of the peace *in fact*, there had been *in law*; Carpenter was therefore condemned to pay a fine of ONE SHILLING—after which he was at liberty to walk back to Fort Beaufort.

While all these things were in progress, Nemesis was overtaking—if not the author of them—the chief agent in the Colony by whom they were brought about. The Attorney-General, A. Oliphant, Esq., and Mr. Advocate Musgrave of Cape Town, advised Captain Stockenstrom to bring an action for libel against Captain Campbell, the Civil Commissioner of Grahamstown, for collecting the affidavits already referred to, the first of which, as has been pointed out, had been received by Captain Stockenstrom as far back as August, 1836. It seemed at the time very strange that with all the power and authority which he possessed as Lieutenant-Governor to summon his accusers and compel them either to substantiate or retract their charges, that he should have waited until 1838—a period of eighteen months—before moving at all in the matter. He had not been as idle, however, as appeared.

For, early in 1837, he informed Lord Glenelg, as an example of the conspiracies which he alleged were so rife in the Colony, of the charge which was being brought against him, and asked that the noble Lord would give instructions for the formation of a Commission of Inquiry into the subject. It was not until December 19th, 1837, that Lord Glenelg answered this and consented, and not until April of 1838 that this reply was received in Cape Town. In the meantime it was decided to bring a libel action against somebody, and Captain Campbell was selected for this honour.

On February 28th and March 1st, 1838, there came before the Supreme Court, before Sir John Wylde as Chief Justice and Messrs. Menzies and Kekewich, the action of *Stockenstrom v. Campbell*, “for maliciously and unlawfully causing and procuring the said Andries Stockenstrom to be falsely charged

with having deliberately fired at and killed a Kaffir child . . . and for maliciously and unlawfully publishing a libel of and concerning the said Andries Stockenstrom . . . intending to injure the said plaintiff in his aforesaid good name, fame, and credit, and to bring him into public scandal, infamy, and disgrace," in that, "without any reasonable or probable cause whatsoever" he procured the affidavits of Botha and Klopper. The said plaintiff therefore prays that the defendant may be adjudged to pay him £1,000 of lawful sterling money, with the costs of the said suit. The Attorney-General and Mr. Denysen appeared for the plaintiff and Mr. Advocate Cloete for the defendant.

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The defendant denied all and every allegation set forth in the plaintiff's declaration. The accusation of murder, he maintained, was not his, but was contained in an affidavit voluntarily made by Klopper; it was his duty as magistrate of the district, he contended, to receive this and also to test this man's veracity, as well as to elicit the truth of the many current rumours, by instructing the Justices of the Peace at Cradock and Graaff Reinet to take statements on oath from those who professed themselves to have been eyewitnesses of the incidents. The Chief Justice was of opinion that the magistrate of a district was not bound to wait for instructions from Government before entering upon an investigation into anything which concerned the district under his charge, and the Court decided that Captain Campbell had been justified in his action. This was the point to be decided, and not whether Captain Stockenstrom was or was not guilty of murder. With reference to the incidents of the 1813 commando, much evidence was taken, but it was somewhat contradictory, as might be expected considering that the events happened a quarter of a century previously. There was no doubt, however, that a Kaffir had been shot while hiding in some driftwood on the bank of the Kat River, but it was not proven that Captain Stockenstrom had been guilty of the act laid to his charge.

Without calling upon Mr. Advocate Cloete to sum up for the defence, the Court gave judgment for Captain Campbell with costs.

The joy with which this verdict was hailed, in the Eastern Province at least, was tumultuous. The case was regarded as

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not one of Stockenstrom *v.* Campbell, but of Stockenstrom *v.* the Colonists. Such illuminations and demonstrations as were possible prevailed in the large towns, and bonfires blazed forth from the top of the Boschberg at Somerset East, as expressions of triumph and hatred against the Lieutenant-Governor.

These hostile ebullitions, together with the general feeling against Captain Stockenstrom, must have impressed Sir George Napier with the little benefit the Colony was deriving from the Lieutenant-Governorship being held by him. For on August 31st, 1839, Lord Normanby, who had succeeded Lord Glenelg as Secretary of State, wrote to Captain Stockenstrom: "The feeling of distrust and alienation towards you, which I learn from the Governor have unhappily taken such deep root in the minds of a large proportion of the colonists, as to deprive your services of the value which would otherwise belong to them, and as even to convert exertions in themselves the most meritorious into sources of discontent and disaffection to the Government".

The libel trial having left the charge against Captain Stockenstrom *in statu quo*, it was well for all concerned that Lord Glenelg's authority for the formation of a Court to investigate this matter arrived when it did; all the more so as many of the witnesses were still available. The case was tried in Grahamstown. The Governor, as President, was instructed to associate with himself Major Charters, his military secretary, and Captain the Hon. A. Dundas of H.M.S. *Melville*, three gentlemen who were almost strangers to the country, as well as to the parties concerned. They commenced their proceedings on May 21st, and sat for fourteen days. The whole matter was very carefully and thoroughly sifted, and each Commissioner drew up a report of his finding and opinion independently of the others. These were transmitted to England for the information of the Secretary of State. The final judgment, therefore, could not be known in the Colony—not even to Stockenstrom himself—until some months afterwards. It was then found that there was a general agreement between all three. The decision of the Governor in short was: (1) That Captain Stockenstrom was on commando in Kaffirland in 1813. (3) That the general

orders were to destroy, lay waste and shoot all male Kaffirs. (4) That during the general rush which was made to scour the bush on the banks of the river, Captain Stockenstrom's party saw two Kaffirs concealing themselves under some drift-wood in the bed of the river, and upon a cry of "the Kaffir's throw," Captain Stockenstrom and others fired and killed two Kaffirs . . . "those two Kaffirs were armed with assegais and were not helpless boys, but grown-up young men". (7) "I am clearly and decidedly of opinion that Captain Stockenstrom acted according to orders, and the established custom of commando warfare against the Kaffirs, and I therefore fully and honourably acquit him of shooting an unarmed young Kaffir boy in a cold-blooded and cruel manner." (8) In justice to Captain Campbell and Mr. Ryneveld he acquitted them of any conspiracy against Captain Stockenstrom, though he thought the former had acted injudiciously in delaying to send Klopper's and Botha's affidavits to the Governor.—
(Signed) GEORGE NAPIER.

Shortly after the close of the inquiry, Captain Stockenstrom obtained leave of absence for the purpose of proceeding to England to hear there the verdict as well as to hand in his resignation to Lord Glenelg. He left Grahamstown on August 11th, and sailed from Cape Town on September 12th, 1838.

His administration of the Eastern Province had lasted twenty-three months. He commenced it by telling the delegates who presented him with the Albany address, which he refused, that they would soon find out whether he was disposed to condemn the inhabitants and their interests. It may have been that by this he intended to express his intention of making their welfare his special concern; but a retrospect at the end of his rule showed that they could not have been much worse off, had it been part of his plan to ruin them. He left the farmer practically at the mercy of the merciless Kaffir, the Fish River bush again presented all the dangers which the policy of his predecessors had in a large measure obviated, his tactless and supercilious treatment of the Boers had hurried off hundreds of the best of them to Natal, and he had entered into a treaty with robbers, compliance with the terms of which he had been unable to enforce, and in the numerous infractions of which he had sought refuge in a belief, real or

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pretended, that the natives were innocent. The only real satisfaction he gave the colonists was his resignation; all deploring his appointment as one of the greatest misfortunes which had befallen the country.

But, on the other hand, he was an indefatigable worker and punctilious in the discharge of all his duties—virtues which were not conspicuous in all Government officials at that time. He wrought a beneficial change in the conduct of the public business of Grahamstown—at least where, from the magistrates downwards, there had been want of proper attention to the interests and convenience of the public. He caused a gun to be fired at nine o'clock every morning from the Selwyn Battery situated on a high hill above the town, at which time every official had to be in his office. He took up the question of want of education and moved in the matter of the establishment of more and better schools. And, as has been stated, he increased the number of magistracies. In all these things he deserved well of the Eastern Province.

On his arrival in London, he called at Downing Street and was kindly received by Lord Glenelg, who could then inform him of the favourable decision of the Court of Inquiry. Lord Glenelg was anxious that he should not resign his Lieutenant-Governorship, and as an inducement to him to continue in that office, he gave him an increase of £500 per annum to his £1000 per annum salary. This Captain Stockenstrom accepted and decided to return, after spending some time on the Continent. On February 8th, 1839, Lord Glenelg went out of office and the Marquis of Normanby took his place. But, according to Stockenstrom, there was intrigue in Downing Street, as there seems to have been in every place where that good man set his foot. Lord Normanby had, at first, been willing to confirm Stockenstrom's reappointment, but information on the state of affairs in the Eastern Province reached him, and this induced him to alter his mind and write to Stockenstrom on August 31st, 1839: "I have felt it my duty to submit to the Queen that it is not expedient that you should resume the Government of the Eastern Division of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope". This decision proceeded, said Lord Normanby, from no distrust of Stockenstrom's

qualifications, or from any opinion or surmise unfavourable to him personally or officially, but from feelings of the colonists against him. He (Lord Normanby) was disposed to entertain favourably any proposal, having for its object either the undiminished confidence of Her Majesty's Government, or for providing him with such indemnity as might compensate him for any pecuniary loss involved in his termination of government at the Cape. He was offered the Governorship of a West Indian Island, with a knighthood, both of which he declined; but the further offers of a baronetcy, with a pension of £700 per annum, were accepted. Thus in May, 1840, he arrived back at the Cape as Sir Andries Stockenstrom, but without any official status.

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
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